COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: August 2023

Both Al-Shabaab and ISS have targeted federal and state officials, however, this sub-profile focuses on individuals targeted by Al-Shabaab.

This sub-profile should be read in conjunction with the 3.2.1. Overview.

COI summary

Al-Shabaab has increased its operational tempo since August 2020, and the beginning of 2021 had seen a new peak in the number of attacks targeting government officials [Targeting, 6.1., p. 88].

Al-Shabaab has targeted individuals such as high-ranking FGS and FMS government and administration officials, also in the context of the parliamentary and presidential elections [Security 2023, 2.4.2., p. 131], police officers, government intelligence officials, tax collectors and any individual suspected to be a government or an administration employee. It has also targeted government officials with different or non-specified profiles, both in targeted assassinations and in attacks on venues frequented by government and security officials. Lawmakers have also faced attacks, assassinations and executions. [Targeting, 6.1., pp. 88-91]

Attacks against such officials have taken place in Puntland, where Al-Shabaab has steadily become stronger, and in South-Central Somalia [Targeting, 6.1., p. 88].

From July 2021 to November 2022, Al-Shabaab’s attacks included: several IED attacks targeting officials of the South-West administration, a mortar attack against the Presidential Palace in Baidoa, the killing of the Minister of Justice and Judiciary Affairs of the South West State and his son [Security 2023, 2.2.2., pp. 94, 96], the killing of Marka’s District Commissioner in Lower Shabelle [Security 2023, 2.2.3., p. 105], the attack and siege of a hotel frequented by members of parliament and senior government officials, injuring a minister, the attack in Benadir of a seaside restaurant frequented by government officials [Security 2023, 2.3.3., p. 117], election-related killings and attacks on government officials in Hiraan [Security 2023, 2.4.1., p. 122], the killing of two lawmakers in a twin attack in Hiraan [Security 2023, 2.4.1., p. 126], the attack on a local restaurant in Hiraan ‘packed with local officials and politicians’ [Security 2023, 2.4.1., p. 127], the killing of several members of Middle Shabelle regional parliament over the past years, and the attack on a restaurant in Middle Shabelle [Security 2023, 2.4.2., p. 129, 133].

Conclusions and guidance 

   Do the acts qualify as persecution under Article 9 QD?   

Acts reported to be committed against individuals under this profile are of such severe nature that they amount to persecution (e.g. assassination).

   What is the level of risk of persecution (well-founded fear)?   

In South-Central Somalia and Puntland, well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated in the case of higher level federal and state officials. With regard to lower level officials, the individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: nature of duties, visibility of profile, area of origin and operational capacity of Al-Shabaab, etc.

In Somaliland, where the group has limited operational capacity, the risk of persecution for state and federal state officials is generally low. However, risk-impacting circumstances (e.g. visibility of profile, nature of duties, area of origin and operational capacity of Al-Shabaab) should be given due consideration

   Are the reasons for persecution falling within Article 10 QD (nexus)?   

Available information indicates that persecution of this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of religion and/or (imputed) political opinion.