COMMON ANALYSIS
Last updated: June 2022

This profile includes, in particular, individuals who are or were associated with the US forces and foreign oil companies, such as interpreters, engineers and drivers.

COI summary

[Targeting 2019, 1.9; Targeting 2022, 9.1]

Personnel who worked for the United States between 2003 and 2011 often did so at great risk to themselves and their families. Targeting of this profile, in particular by Shia militias, was prevalent in the period before the US troops were pulled out of Iraq in December 2011, and especially in the most violent period between 2005 and 2008.

The assassination of Iranian’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander, Qasem Soleimani, and his ally, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Deputy Chief of the PMF, in January 2020, marked a significant increase in targeting of Iraqis collaborators of the US Coalition and other western forces. Multiple attacks by Iran-backed PMF and façade groups using hand-thrown grenades, missiles, gunfire or IEDs against Iraqi-operated logistics convoys contracted by the US-led Coalition began and have continued up until the end of October 2021. The attacks occurred mostly in southern and central Iraq governorates, particularly Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Basrah, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Qadisiyah and Salah ad-Din. According to the ISW, these attacks have ‘escalated’ in late 2020 and into 2021.

These attacks have mainly damaged the trucks and transported material and supplies, but in some instances have also wounded or killed the Iraqi contractors who are primarily responsible for driving these trucks or escorting the convoys. Reportedly, the aim of those attacks was to weaken and end coalition’s presence and intimidate Iraqi Businesses cooperating with the US-led coalition. A weekly average of seven convoy attacks in the first quarter of 2021 and a weekly average of 6 convoy attacks for the second quarter of 2021 have been reported.

In 2020 and 2021 threats and targeting of Iraqi personnel working with western forces was reported. Between June 2020 and May 2021, news articles were published which included interviews with Iraqis who had worked for the British or U.S. military or the U.S-led Coalition as interpreters or contractors and who feared being targeted by non-government armed groups. Some received threatening messages or felt observed. It was specifically reported that Iraqi interpreters working for the U.S. military or the U.S.-led Coalition feared targeted attacks from ISIL and Iran-backed militias who view them as kafir [unbeliever]. It has been reported that Iraqi translators and others working with the international community continued to experience strong societal hostility, particularly in Shia areas.

Risk analysis

The acts to which individuals under this profile could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution (e.g. assault, killing).

Not all individuals under this profile would face the level of risk required to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: nature and period of occupation (e.g. interpreters), visibility of the occupation, previous threats, etc.

Nexus to a reason for persecution

According to available information, persecution of this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion and/or religion (e.g. in the case of interpreters).