European Asylum Support Office

EASO Country of Origin Information Report

Somalia Security situation

December 2017

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Somalia
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The report is to a large extent based on a joint fact-finding mission report by the Austrian Bundesamt für Fremdwesen und Asyl/ Staatendokumentation and the Swiss Staatssekretariat für Migration, as well as a joint fact-finding mission report by the Danish Immigration Service and the Danish Refugee Council (see Introduction).

The following national asylum and migration departments reviewed this report:

Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, Centre for Documentation and Research (Cedoca);

Italy, Ministry of the Interior, National Commission for the Right of Asylum International and EU Affairs, COI unit;

The Netherlands, Immigration and Naturalisation Service, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis (OCILA);

Norway, LandInfo, Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre.

Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, UK, gave EASO permission to reproduce the map originally published in Mosley, J. (2015), Somalia's Federal Future: Layered Agendas, Risks and Opportunities (url).

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

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Disclaimer

This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2012) ([1]). The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced. To the extent possible and unless otherwise stated, all information presented, except for undisputed or obvious facts, has been cross-checked.

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

'Refugee', 'risk' and similar terminology are used as a generic terminology and not as legally defined in the EU Asylum Acquis and the Geneva Convention.

Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report.

The target users are asylum caseworkers, COI researchers, policymakers, and decision-making authorities.

The drafting of this report was finalised on 26 September 2017. Any event taking place after 31 August 2017 is not included in this report. The exceptions to this cut-off date were made during the peer-reviewing process completed on 20 December 2017, and are clearly identified in Annex 1: Bibliography. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the Methodology section of the introduction.

([1]) The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI), 2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: http://www.easo.europa.eu.

Glossary and Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
Amniyad	Al-Shabaab's intelligence wing
AS	Al-Shabaab
ASNE	Al-Shabaab North-East
ASWJ	Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a
CCTV	Closed-circuit television
CID	Criminal Investigations Department
Danab	Special forces of the SNA
Darawish	Puntland Defense Force (PDF)
Darwish	Paramilitary unit SPF
Deyr	October-December rains
Emir	The highest leader of Al-Shabaab
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defense Force
Diya	Payment of compensation (see also *mag*)
FOB	Forward Operational Base
FFM	Fact-Finding Mission
Gashaan	Special unit in NISA
GIA	Galmudug Interim Administration
Gu	April-June rains
Guurti	House of Elders
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IS	Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, or *Daesh*)
ISWA	Interim South West Administration
Jaysh al Usra	Military wing of Al-Shabaab
JDF	Jubbaland Defense Force
KDF	Kenya Defence Force
Liyu Police	Regional Police Force of the Ethiopian Somali Regional State
LSPG	Lower Shabelle People's Guard (a former militia)
Mag	Payment of compensation (see also *diya*)
MSM	Mogadishu Stabilization Mission
MP	Member of Parliament
Murtadd	Apostates

NISA	(Somali) National Intelligence and Security Agency
PDF	Puntland Defense Force (*Darawish*)
PMPF	Puntland Maritime Police Force
sab	minority group, occupational caste
SEMG	UN Security Council Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
SLA	Somaliland Army
SLP	Somaliland Police
SNA	Somali National Army
SPF	Somali Police Force
SRCC	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission
SWS	South West State (of Somalia)
SWSPF	South West State Police Force
SWSSPF	South West State Special Police Force
UAG	Unidentified Armed Groups
Ugaas	Clan elders
UPDF	Ugandan People's Defense Force
VBIED	Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
Wali	Governor
Xeer	Customary (clan) law
Zakat	Religious tax

Introduction

This report is a joint production by a Country of Origin Information (COI) specialist from Denmark and the EASO COI sector, as referred to in the Acknowledgements section of this report. This report is an update of the February 2016 EASO COI Report Somalia Security Situation ([2]) and covers the period from 1 January 2016 to 31 August 2017.

Methodology

- Defining the terms of reference

The report aims to provide information on the security situation in Somalia, which is relevant for international protection status determination (PSD; refugee status and subsidiary protection). The terms of reference are based on security indicators as explained below. The terms of reference can be found in Annex 2: Terms of Reference.

For the assessment of the need for refugee protection and subsidiary protection, especially taking into account Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive (QD), the following are key elements:

- a 'real risk of serious harm';
- an 'internal or international armed conflict';
- 'indiscriminate violence';
- the term 'civilian'; and
- a 'serious and individual threat to life or person'.

Based on various sources consulted by EASO ([3]), these key elements can be broken down into topics and/or indicators. Examples include: parties to the conflict; intensity level of the violence; nature of the violence; regional spreading of the violence; targets of the violence; risk of collateral damage; use of arms and tactics; possibility to reach areas – security of transport (roads and airports); and indirect effects of the violence/conflict.

Based upon a study of all the mentioned sources, a list of elements and indicators was drafted, which served as a basis for the terms of reference. In order to make a well-informed assessment of the fear of persecution or risk of serious harm, information is needed on these security-related elements and indicators on a regional and provincial level in the country of origin.

- Collecting information

The information in this report is based to a large extent on a report on a joint fact-finding mission (FFM) conducted in spring 2017 (published August 2017), carried out by the COI units of the Austrian Bundesamt für Fremdwesen und Asyl/ Staatendokumentation and the Swiss

([2]) EASO, COI Report Somalia Security Situation, February 2016 (url).
([3]) The elements, topics and indicators were identified by various sources that have a different position in the legal hierarchy and provide different levels of detail: The Qualification Directive (Recitals and articles); Case law from the Court of Justice of the EU in Luxembourg; National State Practice (National legislation; National case law; National policy and first instance decision practice); Case law from the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg; Opinions of experts, academics and specialised organisations; See the following EASO publications: EASO, Article 15(c) Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU) A judicial analysis, 11 December 2014 (url); EASO, The Implementation of Article 15(c) QD in EU Member States, July 2015 (url).

Staatssekretariat für Migration (hereafter called BFA/SEM) ([4]), and, in addition, information from a FFM conducted in December 2016 (published March 2017) by the Danish Immigration Service and the Danish Refugee Council (hereafter called DIS/DRC) ([5]).

The information was complemented and put in context with desk research of public specialised sources, which were consulted within the timeframe and the scope of the research.

- Quality control

In order to ensure that the authors respected the EASO COI Report Methodology, a review was carried out by COI specialists from the countries listed as reviewers in the Acknowledgements section. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft of this report.

The peer-reviewing process of this report on Somalia occurred between 4 October 2017 and 20 December 2017. During that process, information from a limited number of sources was added to the text, with the purpose of complementing or updating the existing draft. These sources and information used are clearly identified by their access dates in the Annex 1: Bibliography.

Sources

- Fact-finding mission reports

Besides regular desk research, the report heavily leans on information from two fact-finding missions.

Interviews by the BFA/SEM FFM delegation were conducted in Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Hargeysa (March/April 2017), and Vienna (July 2017), with largely anonymous sources such as (I)NGOs, security and military experts, and diplomatic sources. In this report, the anonymous sources are referenced in the text as 'BFA/SEM sources'; the known sources are mentioned by name ([6]).

The FFM conducted by the Danish Immigration Service and the Danish Refugee Council in December 2016 in Nairobi is based on 12 anonymous sources: representatives from UN and other international organisations, international and local NGOs, and western embassies. In this report, they are referenced as 'DIS/DRC sources' ([7]).

As both missions have interviewed sources in Nairobi, it cannot be excluded that some of these anonymous sources may in fact have been the same. However, the interviews were held at two different points in time.

- ACLED

For data on violent incidents, the datasets from the organisation Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) have been used. ACLED collects information about incidents of violence and protests in developing states, including Somalia. In a database ACLED indicates the kind of violence, the actors, the location, the course of events and the number of fatalities (deaths). ACLED collects its information from local media sources such as Shabelle Media Network, Garowe Online, Radio Al-Furqaan, Goobjoog, Alldhacdo, Radio Kulmiye, and from

([4]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url).
([5]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia, March 2017 (url).
([6]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url).
([7]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia, March 2017 (url).

local organisations, as well as from al Shabaab media outlets (Radio Andalus, Somalimemo). The database is publicly available and is continuously updated ([8]). Additional sources have been sought to the extent possible to corroborate the ACLED findings.

It should be borne in mind that ACLED data may not always be accurate. In Al Shabaab areas or frontline areas unaccessible to regular media reporting, there may be underreporting of incidents, whereas, in areas with large media coverage and presence of NGOs, overreporting may occur.

According to ACLED's codebook (in which their methodology is explained), for incidents where the original source has reported that several or many were killed, ACLED codes the number of fatalities as 10 ([9]). This method has a significant impact on overall numbers of fatalities.

ACLED registers civilian deaths under the category 'violence against civilians', defined as follows:

> 'deliberate violent acts perpetrated by an organized political group such as a rebel, militia or government force against unarmed non-combatants. These conflict events harm or kill civilians, and are the sole act in which civilians are an actor (…)."Violence against civilians" also includes inflicting significant harm (e.g. bombing, shooting, torture, rape, mutilation etc) or accosting victims (e.g. kidnapping and disappearances). It does not include incidents in which people are not physically harmed (e.g. looting or burning, destruction of sacred spaces, and forced displacement)' ([10]).

Fatalities are counted only once. For example, in ACLED's Codebook it is stated:

> 'If summarized fatalities are reported, but events occur across several days or in multiple locations simultaneously, the total number is divided and that fraction is recorded for each day of the event (if over 1). If an odd number, the proportion of fatalities is divided by assigning the first day the additional fatality and distributed as evenly as possible. No information for number of harmed people is recorded in any other space besides the notes column, if available' ([11]).

The Norwegian COI unit LandInfo assesses the data provided by ACLED as follows:

> 'A recording in ACLED is not necessarily based on more than one source, and ACLED does not verify the information (ACLED, email 2015). This is problematic, as Somali media and organisations sometimes give conflicting information. Given the challenges associated with obtaining information, and the fact that there is no adequate overview of violence in Somalia, LandInfo nevertheless considers that ACLED's information provides an *indication* of the number of fatalities in Mogadishu, who are [sic] responsible for violence and who are victims of violence. Although ACLED provides exact figures …, the figures should be seen as estimates' ([12]).

In this EASO report, following LandInfo's assessment, the ACLED data are regarded only as estimates and indications of trends in violence.

([8]) Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre and Joakim Karlsen. 2010. Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, Journal of Peace Research 47(5), pp. 651-660; ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([9]) ACLED, Codebook, 2017 (url), p. 20.
([10]) ACLED, Codebook, 2017 (url), p. 20.
([11]) ACLED, Codebook, 2017 (url), p. 20.
([12]) LandInfo, Violence, fatalities, perpetrators and victims in Mogadishu, 27 February 2017 (url), p. 2. Emphasis by LandInfo.

Areas of control or influence

The EASO COI Report Somalia Security situation (February 2016) ([13]), makes the following distinction between 'control' and 'influence', which is followed in the current report as well:

> 'An area **controlled** by an actor implies that the actor has military presence and capacity to uphold the security, and can defend it from competing armed interests in the area. The actor has a functioning administration, such as police and judicial system.
>
> An area where an actor has **influence** implies that the actor has a military presence in the area, but there could also be competing armed interests present. The actor might have an administration in the area, but this may not be functioning' ([14]).

The BFA/SEM FFM report used for this report includes a map on the areas of influence by the main actors in Somalia: the governmental and international armed forces, Al-Shabaab, and several others ([15]).

Structure and use of the report

This report provides information on elements and indicators that may help in assessing the need for protection.

The first chapter gives a general overview of the main political-economic developments in the reporting period (January 2016 - 31 August 2017).

In the second chapter a general description of the security situation in Somalia is given. This is then explained per regional state in more detail in the third chapter. A general description of the regional states (subdivided into regions) contains information on the geography and population, on the background of the conflict, including the actors active in the regions. This is followed by a description of recent trends in the security situation, with regard to the above-mentioned indicators: the nature of the violence, frequency, targets, locations and number of fatalities.

([13]) EASO, COI Report Somalia Security Situation, February 2016 (url).
([14]) EASO, COI Report Somalia Security Situation, February 2016 (url), p. 11.
([15]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), p. 23.

Map

© UN ([16])

([16]) UN, Map No. 3690 Rev. 10, December 2011 (url).

1. Main political-economic developments

1.1. South/Central Somalia

For an extensive description of the background to the conflict in South/Central Somalia, reference is made to the EASO Country Overview report on South and Central Somalia (August 2014) ([17]) and the EASO COI Report Somalia Security situation (January 2016) ([18]).

The ongoing drought, which was prevalent throughout 2016 and into 2017, is affecting all economic activities in Somalia, in particular agriculture, pastoralism and fisheries, says the UN Security Council. As a result, the humanitarian situation has worsened and the risk of famine is high. More than half of the population (51.6 %) live below the poverty line, and so do 70 % of the internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, still according to the UN, economic growth is foreseen to increase between 2017-19 ([19]). Drought, together with floodings, land disputes and clan violence cause displacement and thus also affect the security situation ([20]).

International Crisis Group (ICG) notes that, due to the insecurity and Al-Shabaab (AS) blocking access of international aid organisations to the population under its control, and also due to insufficient funds, such aid can only reach a limited part of the country ([21]). ICG estimates that the situation of famine will not decrease in the coming year:

> 'As in 2011, the epicentre of the current humanitarian crisis is south-central Somalia where Al-Shabaab, a violent Islamist insurgency, and localised clan conflicts have compounded the drought's impact, undermined subsistence farming and cereal production, and led to crippling inflation and skyrocketing food prices, as well as mass displacement. Pockets in northern Puntland and Somaliland have also been badly hit, though the situation is far less grim than in the south' ([22]).

1.1.1. Elections

The main political developments in the reference period at the national level were the parliamentary and presidential elections at the end of 2016 and in the beginning of 2017.

On 15 October 2016, federal parliamentary elections were launched and as of 31 December 2016, 258 of the 275-seat Lower House and 43 members of the 54-seat Upper House had been elected. The Federal Parliament elects the House Speakers and the country's President ([23]). In February 2017, the electoral process for the 329 Members of the House of the People and the Upper House of the Federal Parliament was completed ([24]).

([17]) EASO, Country Overview report, South and Central Somalia, August 2014 (url).
([18]) EASO, COI Report, Somalia Security situation, January 2016 (url).
([19]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 8.
([20]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (B); UN Source (C); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; NGO working in Somalia; Somali NGO; Anonymous Source; Western Source], March 2017 (url), p. 7.
([21]) ICG, Instruments of Pain (III): Conflict and Famine in Somalia. Briefing 125/ Africa, 9 May 2017 (url), p. 4.
([22]) ICG, Instruments of Pain (III): Conflict and Famine in Somalia. Briefing 125/ Africa, 9 May 2017 (url), p. 1.
([23]) UN Secretary Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia S/2017/21, 9 January 2017 (url), p. 1; UNSOM, Factsheet on Somalia's 2016 Electoral Process, 23 October 2016 (url).
([24]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 4.

The elections were considered by the UN Secretary-General as 'major milestones on the country's path to becoming a fully functional federal State with stable political institutions' ([25]). The UN Secretary-General noted in particular:

> '… codes of conduct, secret ballots and the establishment of ad hoc implementation and dispute resolution bodies. In a sign of progress, it also featured an expanded electorate, the conduct of elections around the country for the first time in almost 50 years and the election of an upper house on the basis of geographical, not simply clan, representation' ([26]).

On 11 January 2017, Mohamed Sheikh Osman Jawari was re-elected Speaker of the House of the People (the former Federal Parliament). Abdi Hashi Abdullahi was elected Speaker of the new Upper House on 22 January 2017. Finally, presidential elections took place on 8 February 2017, resulting in Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed 'Farmajo' being elected President of the Federal Republic of Somalia. He was inaugurated on 22 February 2017 ([27]).

The outgoing President Hassan Sheik Mohamud accepted his defeat and stepped down. The new president has been characterised by analysts as 'the least corrupt ([28])' – or even 'non-corrupt and integer' ([29]).

The smooth and peaceful political change was widely welcomed with approval and optimism ([30]), while the UN Security Council pointed at 'the need to "maintain the momentum" towards democratic governance' ([31]).

1.1.2. Cabinet and Parliament

President Farmajo appointed as Prime Minister Hassan Ali Kheyre on 23 February 2017, endorsed by the Federal Parliament on 1 March 2017. On 29 March, the Parliament endorsed the new 68-member cabinet ([32]). The cabinet consists of 26 ministers (of whom 6 are women ([33])), 26 deputy ministers, 15 state ministers and one deputy prime minister ([34]).

The Federal Parliament consists of a House of the People (275 clan-based seats) and an Upper House (members elected by their respective State Assemblies). Although the parliament is still dominated by clan-rivalries, 15 % of the parliamentarians are younger than 35, and 24 % are female ([35]). Foreign Affairs notes that 'women's groups have been among the most effective peacemakers and anticorruption activists in Somalia' ([36]). One third of the parliamentarians hold dual citizenships ([37]).

([25]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 1.
([26]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia S/2017/21, 9 January 2017 (url), p. 5.
([27]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 1.
([28]) New York Times, Former Prime Minister Is Elected President of Struggling Somalia, 8 February 2017 (url).
([29]) Foreign Affairs, Securing Somalia, 20 February 2017 (url).
([30]) Al Jazeera (Ainte A.), Somalia: Another Paradigm Shift?, 11 May 2017 (url).
([31]) UN News Centre, Somalia: UN Security Council urges sustained momentum towards democratic governance, 10 February 2017 (url).
([32]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 1.
([33]) Hiiraan Online, PM Khaire announces 27 member cabinet, 21 March 2017 (url); UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 10.
([34]) Office of the Somali President, New Somali Cabinet list on Tuesday March 21, 2017 (url); SONNA, Somali PM announces the new cabinet, 21 March 2017 (url).
([35]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 1.
([36]) Foreign Affairs, Securing Somalia, 20 February 2017 (url).
([37]) Quartz Africa, The fate of fragile Somalia is now in the hands of a remarkably young, diverse parliament, 2 March 2017 url).

1.1.3. Federal developments

The Federal Republic of Somalia currently consists of six regional states in South/Central Somalia (with their respective regions): Jubbaland (Lower Juba, Middle Juba, Gedo), South West State (Lower Shabelle, Bay, Bakool), HirShabelle (Hiiraan, Middle Shabelle), Galmudug (Galguduud, southern part of Mudug), and Somaliland, Puntland, and the contested regions of Sanaag and Sool. Banaadir (Mogadishu) is not a regional state. The most recent step in the federalisation process was formed by the merging of the Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle regions into the new HirShabelle Interim Administration on 9 October 2016, with Jawhar as its capital ([38]). See the map on the next page.

One of the sources interviewed by BFA/SEM assesses that hardly any of the regional states in South/Central Somlia exercises real power over its territory: 'In Somalia, there are three functioning administrations: Somaliland, Puntland and Al-Shabaab, plus some minor players, such as the Federal Government' ([39]). The newly established states in particular only control some cities and perhaps a few kilometres into the hinterland ([40]). The Social Analyst and Regional Director of the Rift Valley Institute Mark Bradbury, interviewed by BFA/SEM, notes that there are improvements with regard to security and administration in certain areas, but that this is a slow process. The establishment of the state is the main problem. It is not only about military strength but about leadership, according to Bradbury ([41]). According to two other BFA/SEM sources, some (regional) governments are still in their initial stage. The international community supports the regional states in the state-building process ([42]).

The regional state-building process generally follows the existing clan lines: Galmudug and HirShabelle cover the Hawiye, the South West State (SWS) cover the Rahanweyn, Puntland and Jubbaland the Darod, and Somaliland is for the Dir ([43]). Mogadishu/Benadir is still undecided as it could develop into a state or into a region with special status, according to BFA/SEM sources ([44]). However, it is observed that in every regional state there are clans which are unsatisfied with the composition of clan-based power as they turn into minority clans ([45]). In reaction, some clans have created their own militias to fight against this felt marginalisation ([46]).

([38]) UN Secretary Council , Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S2017/21), 9 January 2017 (url), p. 2.
([39]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 55.
([40]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; International organisation, Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 55.
([41]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Mark Bradbury], August 2017 (url), p. 55. Mark Bradbury is a social analyst with 20 years' experience in international development and humanitarian aid. He has worked in Somalia, Somaliland, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Uganda, and Kosovo. He is author of Becoming Somaliland: Understanding Somalia and Somaliland (Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2008). He is the RVI Regional Director for East Africa and the Horn of Africa. RVI (Rift Valley Institute), *Mark Bradbury*, n.d.(url).
([42]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; International organisation, Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 55.
([43]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 55.
([44]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url) p. 56. A BFA/SEM source, an International organisation, Mogadishu, states that a decision should be made within the end of 2017.
([45]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 56.
([46]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 56.

Map of Somalia: Federal Member State and Interim Regional Administrations



Sources: This map has been prepared based on United Nations Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section, Map No. 3690 Rev. 10, December 2011, with additional content from the Rift Valley Institute and International Crisis Group, together with annotation by the author and the Africa Programme at Chatham House.

Note: Somalia refers to the internationally recognized territory of Somalia; Somaliland refers to the northern region that proclaimed independence in 1991; Puntland refers to the north-eastern Somali region that was established as a federal state in 1998. The boundaries and names shown and designations used on the map do not imply endorsement or acceptance by the author or Chatham House.

©: Chatham House. This map has been prepared based on the United Nations Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section, Map No. 3690 Rev. 10, December 2011, with additional content from the Rift Valley Institute and International Crisis Group, together with annotation by the author and the Africa Programme at Chatham House. Map reproduced with the permission of Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs ([47]).

([47]) Mosley, J., Somalia's Federal Future: Layered Agendas, Risks and Opportunities, September 2015 (url), p. 3.

In general, as BFA/SEM sources remark, none of the regional states have been established in accordance with the process laid down in the constitution. A new state can only be established when a parliament, a cabinet and a local constitution are in place and when it covers at least two regions – this is not the case for Galmudug, for example ([48]). The decision to establish a new regional state is in the hands of the National Leadership Forum, consisting of the six presidents of the states, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the President and the Governor of Benadir ([49]). The forum was established in December 2016 to discuss issues relating to the parliamentary and presidential elections ([50]).

During a high-level meeting between President Farmajo and the presidents of the federal Member States (or regional states) on 15-16 April 2017, an agreement was reached on 'the national security architecture, including on the relationship between federal and state-level security institutions and the overall size, distribution and composition, command and control, and resourcing and financing of the security forces of Somalia'. The UN assesses this agreement as 'a significant state-building achievement and a first step towards a new chapter in the rebuilding of the Somali security sector to allow it to assume increasing responsibility, as part of a conditions-based transition from AMISOM' ([51]).

1.2. Somaliland and Puntland

Parliamentary and presidential elections in Somaliland were planned for 28 March 2017 and preparations started in 2016. However, on 10 September 2016 regional President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud 'Silanyo' decreed to postpone the elections to an unspecified date, arguing that in several regions seats had to be reallocated first ([52]). The elections are now scheduled for November 2017 ([53]).

The president of Puntland, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, was elected on 8 January 2014 ([54]). The preparations for parliamentary elections started in May 2016, but were only concluded on 12 December 2016. Parliamentarians of both Lower and Upper Houses elected the Speakers of both Houses end of December ([55]).

ICG warned in November 2016 for the risk of overstretching Puntland's security forces, due to

> 'policing the long frontier with South and Central Somalia, keeping an eye on rebellious clans in Sool and Sanaag (regions also claimed by neighbouring Somaliland), or battling hostile armed groups in Galkayo (against GIA [Galmudug Interim Administration] forces), in Galgala Mountains (against Al-Shabaab) and in Qandala (against Galan's militia)' ([56]).

For more detailed information, see Section 3.2.5. Puntland.

([48]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 56.
([49]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 56.
([50]) Garowe Online, Somalia's National Leadership Forum kicks off in Mogadishu, 7 December 2016 (url).
([51]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), pp. 5-6.
([52]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/21), 9 January 2017 (url), p. 2.
([53]) VOA, Somaliland Elections on Track for November, 10 October 2017 (url).
([54]) BBC News, Somalia Puntland president: Abdiweli Ali Gas beats Farole, 8 January 2014 (url).
([55]) Garowe Online, Somalia: Puntland concludes Lower House elections, 12 December 2016 (url).
([56]) ICG, The Islamic State Threat in Somalia's Puntland State, 17 November 2016 (url).

General description of the security situation in Somalia

The general security situation will be described in this report using the following administrative divisions (some of which are in turn organised in regional states):

- Jubbaland (Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba, Gedo),
- South West State (Lower Shabelle, Bay, Bakool),
- Benadir-Mogadishu,
- HirShabelle (Middle Shabelle, Hiiraan),
- Galmudug (Galgaduud, Mudug),
- Puntland (Nugaal, Bari),
- Sanaag, Sool (contested between Puntland and Somaliland)
- Somaliland (Togdheer, Woqoodi Galbeed, Awdal).

2.1. Overview of conflict

The general security situation in Somalia is mainly determined by several factors. The main factor is the long-term armed conflict between the Somali National Army (SNA), supported by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and anti-government elements or insurgents, the main being Al-Shabaab (AS) ([57]). The other factors are: intra- and inter-clan violence, private militias and criminals. These factors are often inter-linked and hard to distinguish. Other factors influencing the security situation are the insecurity on the roads, drought, flooding and land disputes ([58]).

Several sources consider the situation in Somalia to be a non-international armed conflict ([59]).

2.2. Actors in the conflict

The BFM/SEM August 2017 report presents the following schematic overview of relevant militarily active actors (except for the police) in Somalia, according to regions ([60]).

The colours correspond to those used in the BFA/SEM map of areas of influence, July 2017:

Light blue	**Anti-AS forces**
Dark blue	**ASWJ**
Light green	**Al Shabaab**
Dark green	**Islamic State (IS)**
Red	**Somaliland**
Yellow	**Clan militias**

([57]) For more information on the background of the conflict, see EASO, Country Overview Report Somalia, August 2014 and EASO, COI Report - Somalia security situation, February 2016 (url).
([58]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); UN Source (B); UN Source (C); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; NGO working in Somalia; Somali NGO; Anonymous Source; Western Source], March 2017 (url), p. 7.
([59]) Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, The War Report 2016 - Armed Groups and International Law, March 2017 (url); UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 168.
([60]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 11.

BFA/SEM Overview of relevant militarily active actors (or police) in Somalia, by region ([61]).

	Anti-AS – in one way or the other aligned with the government										Anti-AS, un-aligned			Armed opposition	
	Somali National Army (SNA)	AMISOM	Jubbaland Defense Force) (JDF)	Interim South West Administr. ((ISWA special police	bilateral Kenyan Defense Force (KDF)	bilateral Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF)	Liyu Police	bilateral Unites States (US)	Galmudug Interim Administration (GIA)	Puntland	relevant indep. Clan militias	Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ)	Somaliland	al Shabaab	Islamic State affiliated
Lower Jubba															
Middle Jubba															
Gedo															
Bakool															
Bay															
Lower Shabelle															
Benadir-Mog.															
Middle Shabelle															
Hiiraan															
Galgaduud															
Mudug															
Nugaal															
Bari															
Sanaag															
Sool															
Togdheer															
Marodi Jeeh															
Awdal															

2.2.1. National Armed Forces

According to BFA/SEM sources, both the Somali police and army are not able to assume AMISOM's tasks when these would withdraw. The army is dependent on the international troops and it is therefore deemed very unlikely that AMISOM would withdraw any time soon ([62]). DIS/DRC sources agree that currently 'it is unrealistic for SNA to take over from AMISOM' ([63]).

([61]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 11.
([62]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation, Mogadishu; Somali source in the area of security, Addis Ababa; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; International organisation (B), Nairobi], August 2017, pp. 11, 16.
([63]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (B); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; Independent Organisation; Western Source], March 2017 (url), p. 7.

There are several problems which inhibit the operational capability of the Somali security forces:

- Payment of police and army staff occurs very irregularly and has been in arrears for many months ([64]) (especially outside Mogadishu, Middle and Lower Shabelle regions) ([65]). This has a negative impact on the security situation, leading to desertion and some members of security forces even entering Al-Shabaab ([66]). As of June 2017 payment seems to have resumed, according to a BFA/SEM source ([67]).
- There are indications of infiltration by Al-Shabaab of security forces ([68]).
- The clan-alliances of certain army and police units threaten their impartiality in dealing with local clans ([69]). On the other hand, in some cities police officers are recruited locally and deployed in their own region. There is increasing attention to clan balance within security forces, which has led to improvement of the security situation, according to a military strategic expert, interviewed by BFA/SEM ([70]).
- Continuing problems of 'corruption, mismanagement and financial constraints' have compromised the effectiveness of the SNA, according to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (UN SEMG) ([71]).
- The responsibilities and competences between the federal and regional state-level security forces, which for a long time were unclear, were regulated in April 2017 with an agreement on security sector reforms, 'including on the relationship between federal and [regional] state-level security institutions and the overall size, distribution and composition, command and control, and resourcing and financing of the security forces of Somalia' ([72]). The practical impact of this agreement is 'yet to be seen' ([73]).

A new command structure was introduced by the new president on 6 April 2017:

> 'He appointed new heads of the security services, including the National Intelligence and Security Agency, the Somali National Army, the police force and the Custodial Corps, as well as a new Mayor of Mogadishu, who also serves as Governor of Banadir' ([74]).

([64]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Somali source in the area of security, Addis Ababa; Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), pp. 11, 15.
([65]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 75.
([66]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 12.
([67]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 12.
([68]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 12.
([69]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 12. Also noted by the UN Security Council Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 19.
([70]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military Strategic Expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 12.
([71]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 5. On the abbreviation UN SEMG, see UN Security Council, Subsidiary organs, Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, Work and Mandate, n.d. (url).
([72]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2017/408, 9 May 2017 (url), p. 5.
([73]) ISSAT (International Security Sector Advisory Team), Somalia SSR Background Note, 19 July 2017 (url). The International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) provides practical support to the international community in its efforts to improve security and justice, primarily in conflict-affected and fragile states.
([74]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 3.

The new security infrastructure, which was approved by parliament on 2 May 2017, will consist of a 22 000 strong defence force, with 18 000 ground troops and 4 000 men of special forces, *Danab*. The Somali Police Force will consist of six units: *Darwish* (a paramilitary unit), a tax protection unit, diplomat guards, the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) and the coast guard ([75]).

The new police force will consist of 32 000 staff, divided into federal police and (regional) state police. According to the new Security Pact agreed to on 16 April 2017 and endorsed by 42 international partners during the London conference on 11 May 2017, the new security structures 'shall be completed within six (6) months, starting from 1 June 2017' ([76]).

2.2.1.1. Somali Police Force (SPF)

The number of Somali police officers in South/Central Somalia is difficult to establish, as they are subdivided into federal and regional state forces. A military expert interviewed by BFA/SEM gives the following figures per regional state ([77]):

- Region Benadir: 6 146 (737 women), as of August 2015. (The UN SEMG estimates the number of police in Mogadishu at 5000-6000 ([78]));
- SWS: 322 (11 women), as of August 2015; to be expanded to 1 022; estimated in July 2017: 600-700;
- Jubaland: 53 (7 women), as of August 2015; to be expanded to 753; estimated in July 2017: 500-600, probably for the most part in Kismayo;
- Galmudug: 429 (23 women), as of August 2015; to be expanded to 629; estimated in July 2017: max. 500;
- HirShabelle: 114, as of August 2015; to be expanded to 614; estimated in July 2017: at least 550.

The functioning of the Somali police is seen as problematic, especially regarding corruption, favouritism, lack of impartiality, and human rights violations. Police are seen by the population as a repressive rather than a protecting force ([79]). However, this picture is changing in several big cities (such as Jowhar, Kismayo and Belet Weyne), where police forces are locally recruited and gain the confidence of the local population. This may provide them with more relevant intelligence about AS, and makes it more difficult for AS to keep their activities secret ([80]).

Somaliland and Puntland have their own police forces in their respective areas of control (see further Chapter 3. Security situation per region) ([81]).

2.2.2.2. Somali National Army (SNA)

According to the Somali government, quoted by the UN SEMG, nearly 22,000 troops are registered, of whom more than a quarter are stationed in or on the outskirts of Mogadishu.

([75]) Goobjoog News, Parliament approves security architecture with few amends, 2 May 2017 (url).
([76]) London Somalia Conference, Security Pact, 11 May 2017 (url), Art. 17.
([77]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 12.
([78]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 89.
([79]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation, Mogadishu; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa; International organisation, Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 13.
([80]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 13.
([81]) US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 - Somalia, 3 March 2017 (url).

However, the UN SEMG notes that neither the Somali government nor the UN Monitoring Group is able to provide 'accurate information on the structure, composition, strength and disposition of either national security forces or regional and militia forces' ([82]). A military strategic expert interviewed by BFA/SEM estimates the SNA in South/Central Somalia (from the Kenyan borders to Dhuusamarreeb) at 16 000-18 000 troops ([83]).

There are ongoing efforts to create a security structure in which all military forces, including local militias, in all regions are united under the command of SNA. For this, agreements at all national and regional state levels are needed ([84]). Until now such integration only exists on paper. All regional states have their own clan-based forces. The central command in Mogadishu can only dispose of the troops in Mogadishu and partly of those in Lower Shabelle and the HirShabelle state, and has no control over the troops further away such as in SWS or Jubbaland, according to a BFA/SEM source ([85]).

The SNA consists for a large part of former clan militias which are trained and renamed into SNA, according to a BFA/SEM source. Former militia commanders get officer positions, some are nominated generals. An estimated 60 % of the soldiers belong to the Abgal (Hawiye) and Habr Gedir (Hawiye) sub-clans, and another large group is from the Murusade (Hawiye) sub-clan. The government has tried to recruit more people from other clans, which has however not been a success. Minority or smaller clans are afraid to join the army: if a soldier from a large clan kills someone, this is dealt with in the customary way and the soldier enjoys the protection of his clan. However, a soldier from a minority or smaller clan does not have such a clan protection and thus runs into serious problems when killing someone. In another example, soldiers from Mogadishu are hardly recruited for Baidoa, where the army is dominated by the Rahanweyn. If the Mogadishu soldier kills a local from Rahanweyn clan, he has to flee to avoid problems with the Rahanweyn ([86]).

A complication for the SNA is the current arms embargo that is still in place. The army is not able to purchase heavy weapons and thus remains dependent on AMISOM for weapons ([87]). On 11 May 2017, President Farmajo has asked the international community to lift the arms embargo on his country at an international conference hosted by the UK ([88]).

The Somali army does not have a good reputation among the population. On the one hand it is accused of human rights violations such as rape, robbery, illegal checkpoints with extortion, corruption, and arbitrary use of weapons ([89]), on the other hand the army is suspected of containing AS elements ([90]). The UN SEMG concludes:

> 'Although the Federal Government has committed itself to undertaking substantive security sector reform, continuing problems of corruption, mismanagement and

([82]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 74.
([83]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 13.
([84]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 14.
([85]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Somali source in the area of security, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 14.
([86]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 14.
([87]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation, Mogadishu; Somali source in the area of security, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 15.
([88]) Al-Jazeera, Farmajo calls for arms' embargo end to defeat al-Shabab, 11 May 2017 (url).
([89]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 14.
([90]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Somali source in the area of security, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 14.

> financial constraints have compromised the effectiveness of the Somali National Army. The efforts to address the issue notwithstanding, the process of identifying and registering troops, including the elimination of so-called "ghost soldiers" on the payroll, remains incomplete. […] The continuing lack of regular salary payments has contributed to an increase in withdrawals from strategic positions throughout southern and central Somalia and the subsequent, albeit temporary in some instances, return of Al-Shabaab' ([91]).

2.2.2.3. National Intelligence and Security Agency

The total number of National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) staff was estimated at 1 500 in August 2016. The agency employs intelligence officers in the larger cities of South/Central Somalia, as well as a highly efficient special unit of about 200 staff, called *gashaan* (Alpha and Bravo group) ([92]). NISA is considered a capable agency, but not as efficient as AS's intelligence service *Amniyad*, and does not enjoy much trust from the population, according to International Crisis Group, interviewed by BFA/SEM ([93]).

International Crisis Group also mentioned that NISA also recruits deserters from AS, however, the agency can never be completely sure that deserters have cut all ties with AS ([94]). A military strategic expert noted that NISA is infiltrated by AS; this does not necessarily mean that AS has staffed the NISA with its own people but rather that informants are paid to disclose NISA secrets ([95]).

UN SEMG received several reports of intimidation by NISA towards humanitarian organisations working in Somalia. In July 2016, NISA demanded all international organisations to submit 'all relevant detail regarding the staffs of your Agency/organization and any further details such as premises of operations for your agency in Mog and/or in the country' to the agency. SEMG notes that 'accompanied by ongoing intrusion of NISA humanitarian activities around staff registration, visits to humanitarian premises and attendance at humanitarian meetings, these developments caused great disquiet in the humanitarian community' ([96]).

According to Human Rights Watch, NISA has also conducted mass security sweeps despite having no legal mandate to arrest or detain. Furthermore, NISA holds detainees for prolonged periods without charge, and obstructs or curtails key due process rights, including access to legal counsel and family visits ([97]).

2.2.2.4. Regional state forces

The armed forces in the various regional states of the Federal Republic of Somalia will be discussed in Chapter 3.

([91]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), pp. 3-4.
([92]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 15.
([93]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 15.
([94]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 15.
([95]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 15.
([96]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), pp. 91, 135.
([97]) HRW, Human Rights Priorities for Somalia's New Government, 2 May 2017 (url).

2.2.2. International forces

2.2.2.1. African Union Mission in Somalia

The mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), based on the UN Security Council meeting of 14 June 2017, has been extended until 31 May 2018 ([98]).

AMISOM is composed of more than 22 000 staff (the AMISOM website mentions 22 126 uniformed staff ([99])) from the following countries (as of February 2017):

- Uganda: 6 040;
- Burundi: 5 163;
- Ethiopia: 4 324;
- Kenya: 3 944;
- Djibouti:1 885 ([100]).

In addition, all AMISOM sectors have a police component from various African countries. Finally, a third component is civilian ([101]).

The organisational structure of AMISOM and its three components is described on its website as follows:

- 'AMISOM is headed by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia (SRCC)'.
- The Military component is currently headed by a Force Commander and two deputies from partner-countries.
- The Police component is headed by the AMISOM Police Commissioner.
- The Civilian component is headed by a Chief of Staff and supervised by SRCC [Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission] 'who oversees the Political, Civil, Humanitarian, Gender and Public Information departments'.
- The Chief Administrative Officer 'heads the support component of the mission, which includes administration personnel, finance and budgeting, logistics and procurement among other issues' ([102]).

The Somali government is highly dependent of AMISOM for its survival. BFA/SEM sources comment that notwithstanding AMISOM's considerable number of troops and military superiority, AS has not been defeated ([103]). It has been noted, however, that AMISOM has to cover a very large territory with these troops and its capacity seems to have reached its limits as the UN SEMG noted, due to the incapability of the SNA to hold the conquered areas ([104]). In the conquered territories, a governmental administration is often not firmly established or consolidated ([105]). Thus, after the AMISOM/SNA troops leave the area, AS can return and take

([98]) UN Security Council, Resolution 2358, (S/RES/2358 (2017), 14 June 2017 (url).
([99]) AMISOM, Frequently Asked Questions, n.d. (url). The website has not been updated before the 2016 elections.
([100]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 16.
([101]) AMISOM, Frequently Asked Questions, n.d. (url).
([102]) AMISOM, Frequently Asked Questions, n.d. (url).
([103]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 16.
([104]) ISSAT (International Security Sector Advisory Team), Somalia SSR Background Note, 19 July 2017; UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 131; EASO, Somalia security situation, February 2016 (url), p. 24.
([105]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 16.

back their previous positions ([106]). For example, in August 2017 Leego in Bay Region was retaken by AS after AMISOM troops had withdrawn ([107]).

A main problem to establish permanent control, as noticed by BFA/SEM sources, is the fact that local administrations were not established in some of the areas taken by AMISOM. Another problem lies in the command structure; the AMISOM commander does not have sole command power but has to coordinate with the countries contributing troops to AMISOM, which has often lead to friction and lack of coordination ([108]).

In many areas, AMISOM collaborates with local militias or other forces. Its reputation varies, according to BFA/SEM sources: in territories where people feel safe, AMISOM has a better reputation than in areas where the security situation is volatile and cannot be guaranteed ([109]).

The AS attack on the AMISOM base El Adde, on 15 January 2016, demonstrated, according to the UN SEMG,

> 'the lack of coordination between countries contributing troops to AMISOM and the fractured nature of the AMISOM command and control mechanism. Even though the closest AMISOM reinforcements to El Adde were stationed in Busaar, at a base to the south-west garrisoned by Ethiopian troops, the lack of a secure AMISOM communications system prevented the Kenyan troops from contacting their Ethiopian counterparts for assistance. Instead, the closest military personnel to respond were Kenyan troops based inside Kenya, who arrived far too late to assist. The lack of effective intelligence gathering and the absence of engagement with local communities on the part of AMISOM both contributed to the effectiveness of the attack' ([110]).

2.2.2.2. Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF)

ENDF troops also operate in Somalia outside AMISOM, in particular in Hiiraan, Galgaduud, Bakool and Gedo, which are bordering Ethiopia. According to a BFA/SEM source, currently there are about 3000 bilaterally deployed Ethiopian soldiers active, apart from the Liyu Police ([111]). AS fears these Ethiopian troops the most ([112]).

It is further analysed that the Ethiopian government uses its army as a means of pressure on the Somali government by unilaterally withdrawing or moving those bilaterally deployed

([106]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), pp. 11, 131; DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: independent organisation; Somali NGO, Nairobi], March 2017 (url), p. 8.
([107]) VOA, Al-Shabab Militants Retake Strategic Town in Western Somalia, 4 August 2017 (url).
([108]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 16.
([109]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 16.
([110]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 12; see also BBC News, Al-Shabab seizes African Union base in Somalia, 15 January 2016 (url).
([111]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 17.
([112]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 17.

Ethiopian troops ([113]). As a result, in November 2016 AS was able to retake several towns in Gedo, Bakool, Bay, Hiiraan and Galgaduud ([114]).

2.2.2.3. Liyu Police of the Ethiopian Somali Regional State

The Ethiopian Somali Regional State, which borders Somalia, is unofficially deploying a special police force against AS, called *Liyu*, thus creating a buffer zone between Somalia and Ethiopia. The Liyu police is active at the Somali side of the border from Puntland till Gedo, be it in Bakool, Hiiraan or Galmudug ([115]). Police officers, ethnic Somali themselves ([116]), cross the border as far as 50-80 km into the Somali territory ([117]). As examples of areas of operation are mentioned Luuq, Xudur and Ceel Barde ([118]). Sometimes they withdraw after 24-48 hours again to Ethiopia. However, the Liyu Police always has a mobile presence in Somalia ([119]). The Ethiopian government's priority is to prevent AS influence and activities spilling over into its country ([120]).

There are numerous reports of serious human rights violations perpetrated by the Liyu police: rape, mutilations, abductions, mass murder of entire communities ([121]). Since the beginning of 2017 reports about *Liyu* activities in Somalia have strongly decreased, according to a military strategic expert, who assesses that this is due to the increasing unrest in Ethiopia ([122]).

2.2.2.4. Kenya Defense Force (KDF)

Kenya bilaterally deploys KDF troops in several areas in the south of Somalia, mainly Gedo ([123]).

2.2.2.5. United States

The US has a base for drones near Kismayo and a base for training of Somali special forces as well as for drones in Bali Doogle ([124]).

([113]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 18.
([114]) The East African, Al Shabaab gains ground as Ethiopia withdraws its troops, 5 November 2016 (url).
([115]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), pp. 19-20.
([116]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 18.
([117]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), pp. 19-20.
([118]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 20.
([119]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 18.
([120]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [International organisation (C), Nairobi; Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 18.
([121]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 20.
([122]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 19.
([123]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 18.
([124]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 18.

2.2.3. Armed groups

2.2.3.1. Al-Shabaab

'Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shahaab, shortened AS) remains the most immediate threat to peace and security in Somalia', according to the UN SEMG ([125]).

For a general overview of the command structure and organisation, reference is made to the 2016 EASO COI Report Somalia Security Situation ([126]) and the Mapping Militants project by Stanford University ([127]).

Membership

Estimations of the strength of AS by BFA/SEM sources vary between 4 000 and 9 000 ([128]) (DRC/DIS sources: 5 000-9 000 ([129])). The number of fighters in the central areas (south-east Bakool, Hiiraan, Bay, Lower Shabelle, including Mogadishu) amount to 4 000-5 000. In the Jubba-valley 2 000-2 500 men are concentrated ([130]). The AS-troops are characterized as 'fairly professional, well organized and equipped' ([131]).

AS fighters receive more intense training than an average soldier of the SNA, according to a BFA/SEM source. The group is well-organised and the military hierarchy is functioning ([132]). The highest command is with the *emir* (currently Abu Ubeida), while the regional commands are with the governors (*walis*) of AS. The commander of the *Jaysh al Usra* (AS's military wing, also known as *Jayshka* ([133])) commands special units which can be deployed transregionally and collaborate with regional troops. According to the same BFA/SEM source, AS is technically partly better equipped than the SNA and can sometimes even create a military advantage using heavier weapons against AMISOM ([134]).

There are three categories of AS members ([135]):

- the core group, the *Shura* (council): these people can hardly be motivated to surrender ([136]);

([125]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 11.
([126]) EASO, COI Report Somalia Security Situation, February 2016 (url), pp. 19-22.
([127]) 'The Mapping Militants Project identifies patterns in the evolution of militant organizations in specified conflict theatres and provides interactive visual representations of these relationships'. Stanford University, Mapping Militant organizations – Somalia, n.d. (url); Stanford University, Mapping Militant organizations – Al Shabaab, 20 February 2016 (url).
([128]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Somali source in the area of security, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p.27.
([129]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), p. 11.
([130]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 27.
([131]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 27.
([132]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017, p. 27.
([133]) IGAD, Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat, March 2016 (url), p. 14.
([134]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 27.
([135]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 27.
([136]) In August 2017, former AS-spokesman and deputy leader Mukhtar Robow defected to the government, after being in hiding since 2013. Al Jazeera, Al-Shabab's Mukhtar Robow surrenders to government, 13 August 2017 (url).

- the middle layer: people who act out of ideological conviction. These people can hardly be motivated to surrender although there are examples of deserters;
- the foot soldiers, who receive a regular salary and are only with AS for economic reasons. Should they be offered an alternative, it would be easy to motivate them to surrender ([137]).

AS has a large network of 'sympathisers, informants/spies, and other collaborators throughout Somalia' and is considered to be 'everywhere in South/Central Somalia'. DIS/DRC sources find it difficult to make a clear distinction between members and non-members of AS, as members dress and look like any other Somali person ([138]). Sometimes, AS fighters wear AMISOM uniforms to disguise themselves during attacks ([139]). A BFA/SEM source said that, while AS members in AS-controlled areas are relatively easy to identify, this is more difficult in other regions; they would not be recognised as AS members during the day and may be only active by night ([140]).

AS has an effective, relatively well-functioning administration ([141]) with 6-7 ministries and an effective police force, according to BFA/SEM sources ([142]). To a certain extent there is a rule of law in AS areas, based on two principles: fear and predictability. Taxpayers know what they get in return ([143]). One source said that they do not need armed escorts in AS areas as the group provides security there ([144]). As soon as a city or village is abandoned by AMISOM or SNA, AS immediately sets up its own administration ([145]). A DIS/DRC source notes that AS is not militarily present in all areas under its control and rules 'by remote control through fear and intimidation' ([146]).

Courts

The AS-held Sharia courts (exact number is unknown) are described by Mark Bradbury and a BFA/SEM source as well-functioning, effective and fast ([147]) and by DIS/DRC sources as 'less corrupt, efficient, and cheaper' than the governmental court system ([148]), which is characterised as 'non-functioning'. Their *de-facto* jurisdiction is not restricted to areas under AS control; for example, rulings of a Lower Shabelle sharia court are respected also in Mogadishu, where AS nominally has no control. Mogadishu citizens also go to AS courts in

([137]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 27
([138]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; NGO working in Somalia; International Organisation (A); Independent Organisation], March 2017 (url), p. 10.
([139]) Al Jazeera, Al Shabab 'planning Somalia attacks using AU uniforms' - Al Jazeera, 10 February 2016 (url).
([140]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International NGO (A), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 32.
([141]) Also noted by DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (B); Somali NGO; Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), p. 11.
([142]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu;], August 2017 (url), p. 28.
([143]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 28.
([144]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 28.
([145]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 29.
([146]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), p. 9.
([147]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Mark Bradbury, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 29.
([148]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); UN Source (B); Somali NGO; International Organisation (A)], March 2017 (url), p. 11.

Lower Shabelle, and the rulings of AS courts are respected by both parties ([149]). The latter was mentioned by a BFA/SEM source as well ([150]).

Amniyad

The *Amniyad* is the intelligence service of AS and has a good intelligence capability, according to International Crisis Group, interviewed by BFA/SEM. It concentrates on providing information and security ([151]). DIS/DRC sources characterise the Amniyad as 'rather sophisticated' ([152]).

Tactics

AS's tactical strategy in general consists of withdrawing into the countryside and cutting off road access to urban centres occupied by AMISOM and SNA. By doing so, as the UN SEMG notes, 'the group aims to undercut local support for the forces fighting against it, while reducing the AMISOM military positions to isolated and increasingly untenable islands'. AS has recaptured several towns after AMISOM/SNA withdrew their troops ([153]). But as mentioned earlier, this mainly occurred after the withdrawal of bilaterally deployed Ethiopian troops ([154]). The group has set up blockades around the main cities and attacks the main supply routes from Mogadishu to Baidoa and Belet Weyne so often that AMISOM/SNA still transport their troops and some goods by air ([155]).

AS hardly engages in direct military confrontations but conducts hit-and-run attacks and killings everywhere, also within Mogadishu ([156]). In addition, AS conducts complex attacks on targets in Mogadishu and on AMISOM, KDF and/or SNA camps (such as on 15 January 2016 in Ceel Adde ([157])).

ACLED notes on the tactics by AS: 'Prominent and deadly tactics of the sect's violence in this area have come in the way of large IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] or explosive-laden vehicles placed in crowded open air-markets markets, hotels, or military checkpoints. Often, these tactics have been used in coordination with other methods, such as organized raids following the initial explosion' ([158]).

A BFA/SEM source warns that with the increasing military pressure on AS, the fewer areas they effectively control, the more will the group rely on asymmetric warfare (abductions, attacks, checkpoints) and threats. It is observed that Al Shabaab is getting better and stronger

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([149]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), p. 11.
([150]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 29.
([151]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 29.
([152]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (B); International Organisation (A)], March 2017 (url), p. 10.
([153]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 11.
([154]) The East African, Al Shabaab gains ground as Ethiopia withdraws its troops, 5 November 2016 (url).
([155]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (B); UN Source (A)], March 2017 (url), p. 10.
([156]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); International Organisation (A); Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), p. 10.
([157]) BBC News, Al-Shabab seizes African Union base in Somalia, 15 January 2016 (url); ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([158]) ACLED, Real-Time analysis of African political violence, conflict trends No. 58, May 2017 (url).

in the use of this tactic. The increasing military pressure on AS, for example by US drones and other air strikes, is also leading to a rise in mistrust, according to another BFA/SEM source ([159]).

Infiltration

According to various sources, AS has infiltrated several governmental institutions and sectors, such as: the Federal Ministries of Finances and Education, regional state governments, police, NISA, SNA, the educational sector, telecommunications, banking, individual MPs, and business people, even Mogadishu airport ([160]). AS has the best intelligence network with confidential informants in all regions, and functions better than the NISA, says International Crisis Group, interviewed by BFA/SEM ([161]).

Recruitment

The DIS/DRC report notes on the recruitment process by AS:

> 'There is limited available data on the recruitment process to Al-Shabaab, and the process is complex and should be regarded as a continuum of voluntary and forced, with combinations of incentives and propaganda in-between. Three sources mentioned that the youth in Somalia have few possibilities regarding education and employment, which is an important factor when trying to understand recruitment to Al-Shabaab' ([162]).

Large-scale recruitments only happen in areas fully controlled by AS ([163]). Most recruitment to AS occurs through clans, often via an agreement that the clan delivers a certain amount of people ([164]). From the perspective of the clan this is not forced recruitment (although intimidation cannot be excluded) ([165]). Weaker and minority clans expect support from AS against majority clans ([166]). Some clans, for example the Bantu, have collaborated with AS to balance their political marginalisation and vulnerability ([167]) or for revenge, such as after inter-clan fighting ([168]). AS also tries to persuade parents from minority clans that it is an advantage

([159]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi; International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), pp. 29-30.
([160]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); NGO working in Somalia; Independent Organisation; Somali NGO; Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), p. 10; BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (C), Nairobi; Somali source in the area of security, Addis Ababa; International organisation (C), Nairobi; International Crisis Group, Nairobi; Western diplomatic source, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 31.
([161]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia[source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 31.
([162]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); UN Source (B); Independent Organisation; Anonymous Source; Somali NGO; International Organisation (A)], March 2017 (url), p. 20.
([163]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 51.
([164]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 52; DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: Independent Organisation], March 2017 (url), p. 21.
([165]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 52.
([166]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 52.
([167]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Mark Bradbury], August 2017 (url), p. 52.
([168]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); International Organisation (A); Independent Organisation; Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), p. 20.

for them to give one of their sons to AS. In general there is a greater incentive for members of minorities to join AS ([169]).

An individual who refuses to join AS may not necessarily get into problems, as 'one person is easily replaceable' ([170]). DIS/DRC sources noted: 'if the elders refuse to supply the demanded recruits, Al-Shabaab will use force' ([171]). Without providing concrete examples, a DIS/DRC source commented on the plausibility of negative consequences of a refusal to join AS: if AS accepts an individual refusal, some kind of compensation is required; if the person refuses this, this can have serious consequences such as being killed –which can take place by public execution ([172]). A BFA/SEM source said it would be plausible for AS to execute those who refuse recruitment, if they are considered government sympathisers. However, the source was not aware of such cases ([173]).

Because AS relies on money as well as recruits, there is sometimes a possibility for refusers to avoid recruitment by paying taxes ([174]). In towns AS focuses more on tax collection and in the rural areas on recruitment ([175]).

Economic incentives (a regular salary of USD 50-100) are important reasons to join - for about half of the AS members, according to both BFA/SEM and DIS/DRC sources ([176]). The ongoing drought has made impoverished people join AS because of the regular payment ([177]). Also some evicted IDPs in Mogadishu joined AS to make ends meet or to obtain protection ([178]). The actual closure of the Dadaab camp in Kenya would be a good basis for new recruitment, said Sunday Akoma Okello, researcher at the IPSS, Addis Ababa ([179]). Okello, interviewed by BFA/SEM, adds that young people in Kenya and Uganda who are unemployed or are unwilling to work are attracted by the income opportunities offered by AS. Only after they have joined the group are they radicalised ([180]).

Other examples of economic incentives to join AS mentioned by BFA/SEM sources are the recruitment of terminally ill people as suicide bombers. By sacrificing themselves for AS, their

([169]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 52.
([170]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 52.
([171]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: Independent Organisation], March 2017 (url), p. 21.
([172]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: UN Source (B), Independent Organisation; Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), p. 21.
([173]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 52.
([174]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), pp. 54-55.
([175]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 55.
([176]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Western diplomatic source, Nairobi; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), pp. 53-54; DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: UN Source (A)], March 2017 (url), p. 20.
([177]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; International NGO (A), Nairobi; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 54.
([178]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International NGO (A), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 54.
([179]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Sunday Akoma Okello, researcher at the IPSS, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 54.
([180]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Sunday Akoma Okello, researcher at the IPSS, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 54.

family receive a premium or a pension ([181]). The arrear of payment for the Somali security forces also has resulted in people defecting to AS ([182]).

Non-economic incentives to be recruited by AS are social status and 'even the promise of a wife' in areas under its control, say DRC/DIS sources. Peer pressure, ideology and indoctrination are other reasons to join AS ([183]). Women are also recruited, mostly 'for logistic tasks, housekeeping and sexual exploitation, as mobilisers of other women, and as wives to Al-Shabaab fighters' but not as fighters ([184]). However, there are recent examples of female suicide bombers ([185]).

Indoctrination and brainwashing are also means for acquiring AS recruits. Indoctrinated fighters are also less susceptible to leaving the group ([186]) AS therefore tries to radicalise villagers before they are recruited, according to BFA/SEM sources ([187]). Other people join IS out of religious motives, such as Kenyan Somali. Ideologically driven fighters (the middle layer) are the most difficult to reach, apart from the inner circle, although even from this group people have deserted ([188]).

Regarding indoctrination, AS recruits via mosques and visits schools, showing videos and giving the students their interpretation of Islam and jihad. The government does not control the school curriculum and AS 'imposes its curriculum upon teachers who have not sworn allegiance to Al-Shabaab' according to DIS/DRC sources. Fighting against AMISOM is justified by picturing the armed force as infidels, having non-Muslim troops in its army ([189]).

Forced recruitment

According to DIS/DRC sources, forced recruitment does take place in AS-controlled areas but 'it will most often be in relation to big operations or during and after attacks when Al-Shabaab is in need of people for logistics or to replace lost fighters' ([190]).

Two sources of BFA/SEM state that large-scale recruitements only happen in areas fully controlled by AS ([191]). There is no evidence that AS forcibly recruits in Mogadishu ([192]), nor in areas outside its control in general. Yet, forced recruitment could be conceivable, according

([181]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 54.
([182]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 54.
([183]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); UN Source (B); Somali NGO; Independent Organisation; International Organisation (A)], March 2017 (url), p. 22.
([184]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (B); Somali NGO; Independent Organisation; Anonymous source] March 2017 (url), p. 22.
([185]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (B); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; NGO working in Somalia; Independent Organisation] March 2017 (url), p. 22.
([186]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 53.
([187]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International NGO (A), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 53.
([188]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 53.
([189]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); UN Source (B); Somali NGO; International Organisation (A)], March 2017 (url), p. 20.
([190]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); UN Source (B); Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), p. 21.
([191]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Western diplomatic source, Nairobi; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 50.
([192]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa; International NGO (A), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 49.

to a BFA/SEM source, where AS has a strong presence and where AS members can approach the people ([193]).

When AS conquers a town, it happens that people are forced to join the group, as a sign of loyalty of the town to AS. Recent reports of intimidation or harassment of individuals for recruitment have been fewer. AS rather approaches entire communities ([194]). Most BFA/SEM sources said they had heard of only few or no cases of forced recruitment in the recent past ([195]). Another source added that the percentage of violently forcedly recruitments in the ranks of AS is small ([196]). One source said that forced recruitment in AS-controlled areas is still an issue ([197]).

Two occasions of recent forced recruitment were mentioned: In 2016, 1 500 new recruits were conscripted from the districts Jilib, Saakow and Xaradheere and parts of Bakool. While most recruits from Middle Juba were volunteers, in Xaradheere recruitment was in some cases forced, according to International Crisis Group, interviewed by BFA/SEM ([198]). In June 2017, AS arrested elders from Xaradheere who refused to deliver child recruits ([199]). It was added that in such cases, in the areas controlled by AS, the group sometimes goes directly to families and demands one of their sons ([200]). However, there are no reports known to a BFA/SEM source that AS would take all young men away from a village ([201]).

It was argued that, if AS would act too brutal against the population, local clan militias would turn against them, which is not in AS's interest ([202]). Other BFA/SEM sources pointed at the fact that the group is well-organised and well-equipped, adding that such a relatively professional organisation cannot be solely based on forced recruits. A very high number of forcibly recruited soldiers would weaken the organisation ([203]). In addition, forced recruitment does not fit in the AS system. Recruits are being trained for four months, and those who prove to be unfit during this training are sent home again. This does not go well with large-scale forced recruitment. Forced recruitment would only take place if this becomes necessary due to circumstances or tactical needs, e.g. when new recruits are quickly and urgently required for tactical reasons, said BFA/SEM sources ([204]).

For information on child soldiers, see Section 2.5.6. Children.

([193]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 53.
([194]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 49.
([195]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International NGO (A), Nairobi; Western diplomatic source, Nairobi; International organisation (C), Nairobi; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 49.
([196]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 49.
([197]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 49.
([198]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 48.
([199]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: security analysis department, e-mail], August 2017 (url), p. 48.
([200]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International NGO (A), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 48.
([201]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Western diplomatic source, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 49.
([202]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Western diplomatic source, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 49.
([203]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (C), Nairobi; Western diplomatic source, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 49.
([204]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Western diplomatic source, Nairobi; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), pp. 49-50.

Funding, taxes, *zakat*

Until 2015, AS gained a significant income from charcoal exports (estimated at USD 25 million per year). As the charcoal revenue diminished (ban), its reliance on taxing the illicit sugar trade, agricultural and livestock production increased in 2016 (at an estimated annual revenue of USD 12-18 million ([205]). Generally, AS income has decreased, due to the loss of the port cities of Kismayo and Baraawe, and the effects of the drought on certain AS areas; as a result, the taxes on livestock were increased ([206]).

AS extract the religious tax *zakat* (by BFA/SEM sources compared to protection money ([207])) from certain institutions and organisations and individuals such as:

- Taxi drivers in Mogadishu
- Employees of government, international organisations and NGOs; these are chosen specifically because of their high and regular incomes. However, they are not considered targets as long as they pay tax ([208]).
- Deserters, in particular women (men are more often physically threatened, see Deserters/defectors)
- Hotel owners
- Persons involved in the elections
- Business persons in Mogadishu
- Security services ([209]).

AS 'systematically' collects *zakat* throughout S/C Somalia, including in Mogadishu, according to DIS/DRC sources, while two other sources added: 'the taxation system of Al-Shabaab is considered fairer than the government's but if a businessman would refuse to pay tax he will be threatened to do so' ([210]). A BFA/SEM source added: 'if in Mogadishu there is a blast, you know that somebody has failed to pay the tax to Al-Shabaab' ([211]). However, some clan militias resist against AS tax demands, and it is not clear to which extent taxation takes place at all ([212]). Capacities of AS are not sufficient to tax every single person ([213]).

People are called by phone and summoned to pay. If they refuse to pay, they commit, in the eyes of AS, a religious crime and can then be killed as an apostate (*murtadd*). Threatened people prefer to pay a small sum and receive protection in exchange. This form of repression and extortion is increasing, according to BFA/SEM sources. Especially big businesses in

([205]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), pp. 26-27.
([206]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Western diplomatic source, Nairobi; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 32.
([207]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Somali source in the area of security, Addis Ababa; International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 33.
([208]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 33.
([209]) Examples mentioned by various sources interviewed by BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Somali source in the area of security, Addis Ababa; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; International organisation (C), Nairobi; Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa; International Crisis Group, Nairobi; Western diplomatic source, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), pp. 32-33.
([210]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); Somali NGO; Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; International Organisation (A)], March 2017 (url), p. 11.
([211]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Somali source in the area of security, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 33.
([212]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Western diplomatic source, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 32.
([213]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 34.

Mogadishu cannot be run without paying *zakat* to AS ([214]). As long as they pay, they are left in peace; this even applies to people who collaborate with the government ([215]). International Crisis Group reported that AS had granted 'amnesty' to people who were involved in the elections, at a price of USD 300. This way, AS has gathered a lot of money ([216]).

Targets

AS commits targeted killings of governmental, AMISOM and security officers, business people, clan elders, employees with NGOs and international organisations, and collaborators, all of whom are considered apostates ([217]).

Both foreign employees from international organisations and local employees receive threats and, in exceptional cases, have been killed ([218]). DIS/DRC sources mentioned that 'anybody identified to be under a contract with the UN, i.e. travelling regularly by the road to the airport of Mogadishu – and therefore assumed to be working there – can be a target'; however, 'dayworkers at government and UN facilities are not considered a target'. In addition, 'journalists, human rights activists and employees of NGOs might also be targeted depending on their activities and how distinct[ly] they criticise Al-Shabaab' ([219]).

The number of AS attacks on NGOs in the current drought situation is less than in the period 2010-12. According to BFA/SEM sources, drought-related humanitarian projects and transports are not hindered as long as there are no logos visible, adding that AS families benefit from such aid as well ([220]). It was noted that international organisations are not only threatened by AS but also by other actors such as local clans and organised crime. Sometimes employees are just murdered because of their regularly paid salaries so that other people can take over their jobs ([221]).

On average 20 killings per month in Mogadishu are attributed to AS, according to International Crisis Group, interviewed by BFA/SEM ([222]). Other sources indicated that killings may also be committed by other actors, including SNA, clans and criminals. Even some attacks with mortar grenades are presumably not attributable to AS ([223]). It is almost impossible to clearly

([214]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa; Employee of a Western Embassy, Nairobi; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), pp. 33-34.
([215]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 34.
([216]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 34.
([217]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; International Crisis Group, Nairobi; Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi; International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 34.
([218]) For an elaborated list of targeted employees of NGOs, international organisations and government, see BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Somali source in the area of security, Addis Ababa; International Crisis Group, Nairobi; International organisation (C), Nairobi; International organisation, Mogadishu; International NGO (A), Nairobi; Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), pp. 37-38.
([219]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A), Somali NGO; Independent Organisation; Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), p. 17.
([220]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International NGO (A), Nairobi; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 39.
([221]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa; International organisation (C), Nairobi; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 40; see also DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: UN Source (A)], March 2017 (url), p. 17.
([222]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 34.
([223]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 35.

distinguish between actors. There are overlaps regarding the economic interests and the clan dynamics ([224]).

AS is described by a BFA/SEM source as paranoid regarding their own operational security and is willing to set an example if needed, by killing a suspected person ([225]). There are lists of targets managed by local *walis* (governors) who decide which target will be threatened or attacked ([226]). When someone is on the list, AS will try to kill that person. The time of the killing or the person's social position does not play a role ([227]). However, the limitations of AS's area of control is to be taken into account for the decision to pursue a target ([228]). The *Amniyad* conducts the attacks, especially on higher-ranking targets. Information on targets is disseminated to other areas via the *Amniyad*, which implies that targeted persons may also be at risk when they flee to another part of the country ([229]).

AS has the capacity to pursue targets, also in Mogadishu. However, it is not clear to what extent is AS willing to actually use that capacity, nor for which persons, according to Mark Bradbury. AS will not attack someone if this will lead to negative repercussions for the group and its relationships with clan elders, for example if the targeted person is deeply integrated in the local community or enjoys strong clan support. Bradbury added that such risk assessment is not only done by AS but also by other threatening actors ([230]). An example given by other sources is a very important person sought after by AS who may run a considerable risk to travel from Luuq to Hargeisa, whereas a lower-ranking deserter would not be pursued when he would want to flee to Kenya. Usually AS sends several warnings by phone before they act – unless the victim has explicitly opposed AS ([231]).

AS usually takes responsibility for the killing of journalists, although there are reports that the government also attacks journalists ([232]).

Collaborators and spies

On the question if, for example, a tea seller who sells tea on the street to AMISOM or SNA soldiers, would be considered a collaborator by AS, some BFA/SEM sources confirmed this ([233]). International Crisis group said: 'yes, you're vulnerable if you seem to have a direct link to AMISOM, everybody who is working in this area' ([234]). Others said that the tea seller could become a target of AS, if there is an association with AMISOM/SNA, depending on the

([224]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Western diplomatic source, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), pp. 34-35.
([225]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Western diplomatic source, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 36.
([226]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 36.
([227]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 36.
([228]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 36.
([229]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 36.
([230]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Mark Bradbury, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 35.
([231]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa; Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 35.
([232]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 36.
([233]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa; Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa; International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), pp. 40-41.
([234]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 40.

area or the seller's position in the community. When a tea shop is hit, it is not for selling tea but because army, police and/or clan militia gather there ([235]).

It is unclear how AS chooses its targets and how they prioritise their attacks on targets but they are after 'anybody who supports in any way their enemy' ([236]). However, location and intensity of the alleged collaboration matter. A single tea contact in Mogadishu usually does not matter to AS, but in a village where people can easily be found and identified, such contact can make the person a target for AS ([237]). This is even more so in villages and cities in the battle front where power changes hands over and over again ([238]). In Mogadishu it is less likely to be threatened or murdered as a collaborator. Here, AS concentrates above all on government targets, according to International Crisis Group, interviewed by BFA/SEM ([239]).

There are several categories of people who possibly are regarded as collaborators by AS:

- Returnees to AS areas: especially those returning from Western countries can easily be accused of being spies. This group also risks being taxed and forcibly recruited;
- Merchants and business people who deliver or sell goods to AMISOM, e.g. sellers of mobile phones;
- Workers and service providers for AMISOM or ministries;
- Street cleaners in Mogadishu had been targets in the past;
- Hotels, although these are not individual targets but because they are gathering places for governmental and NGO staff;
- Persons regarded as spies ([240]).

Generally, according to DIS/DRC, 'travelling from AMISOM/SNA and AS areas entails the risk of falling under suspicion from both sides of being affiliated with the enemy' which can lead to 'punishment, kidnapping and interrogation, or killing' ([241]).

Deserters/defectors

International Crisis Group, interviewed by BFA/SEM, mentioned different reasons to defect from AS: 1) ideological differences about interpretation of the *Q'uran* or the implementation of the *Sharia*; 2) fear for being killed by air strikes; 3) the largest group of deserters has enough of the hard life and the ongoing battles. Regardless the reasons, AS tries to catch deserters ([242]).

([235]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International NGO (A), Nairobi; Western diplomatic source, Nairobi; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 41.
([236]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International NGO (A), Nairobi; Mark Bradbury, Nairobi; Western diplomatic source, Nairobi; International Organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; International Organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), pp. 41, 42.
([237]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International NGO (A), Nairobi; Mark Bradbury, Nairobi; Western diplomatic source, Nairobi; International Organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; International Organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), pp. 41, 42.
([238]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 42.
([239]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International NGO (A), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 41.
([240]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa; International NGO (A), Nairobi; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; Somali source in the area of security, Addis Ababa; Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 42.
([241]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: Independent Organisation; Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), pp. 9-10
([242]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 43.

Deserters with military ranks will be killed, but also simple soldiers can become targeted ([243]). AS sees all deserters as apostates (*murtadd*) who should be killed, although this is often not implemented. Defectors can also negotiate with AS and pay taxes (mainly women) ([244]). High-profiled defectors can negotiate with the government for their safety in return for information, but an average defector runs a risk of being killed by government forces, according to a DIS/DRC source ([245]).

For deserters, a trip overland from Baidoa to Mogadishu can be very dangerous ([246]). Deserters in Somaliland and Puntland are not considered vulnerable, according to International Crisis Group, interviewed by BFA/SEM ([247]). However, deserters from south or central Somalia are in a difficult position in Somaliland as they do not know who they can trust or who is close to AS. In Mogadishu, deserters are not safe, but whether or not they will become a target depends on their previous role with AS ([248]).

DIS/DRC sources, asked whether a defector could relocate safely to cities where AMISOM is present, said that AS has informants everywhere including in Mogadishu. Consequently AS would be able to find a defector anywhere. The group uses clan networks and 'bio-data' (names of father, grandfather, great-grandfather, mother, village etc.) to track down a defector ([249]).

On 13 August 2017 after fierce fighting with AS and the killing of at least 19 fighters, a former leader and spokesman of AS, Muhtar Robow, has defected to the Somali government in Hudur, Bakool, with 'dozens of fighters' ([250]), after having been in hiding for four years. Months of talks with the government preceded his surrender. Robow is, according to Al Jazeera, 'the most senior figure to have quit the group since its founding in 2001' ([251]).

Rehabilitation centres

The government has opened four UN-supported rehabilitation centres for former AS combatants in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Belet Weyne and Kismaayo ([252]). This is part of the National Programme for the Treatment and Handling of Disengaged Combatants. The centres provide religious counselling, psychosocial support and vocational training ([253]).

The rehabilitation centres only take in soldiers and middle-ranking military staff (high-ranking ex-members of AS are taken to unknown destinations. Before entering the centre, ex-AS

([243]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa; Western diplomatic source, Nairobi; Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 43; DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: UN Source (A); UN Source (C); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; NGO working in Somalia; Independent Organisation; Anonymous Source; NGO working in Somalia], March 2017 (url), p. 17.
([244]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), pp. 43, 45.
([245]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: Somali NGO], March 2017 (url), p. 18.
([246]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation, Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 44.
([247]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 44.
([248]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 44.
([249]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: NGO working in Somalia; Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), p. 17.
([250]) International Crisis Group, Crisiswatch Somalia, August 2017 (url).
([251]) Al Jazeera, Al-Shabab's Mukhtar Robow surrenders to government, 13 August 2017 (url).
([252]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); Somali NGO], March 2017 (url), p. 18; BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 45.
([253]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 6.

fighters undergo a security screening ([254]). In 2017, the number of women has strongly increased. Even entire families are now taken in. After the rehabilitation, the deserters are relocated but if they had been threatened by AS before, they will stay in the centre ([255]).

Although AS most probably knows which deserters are in the rehabilitation centres, these centres have not been attacked so far and are well protected ([256]). As of December 2016, about 100 ex-AS members have been reintegrated into Mogadishu and Baidoa, according to a DIS/DRC source who added that 'the reintegrated defectors are monitored by NISA for two years and none of these have gone back to Al-Shabaab'. However, some of these have been phoned by AS to return to AS or become a informant ([257]).

According to International Crisis Group, interviewed by BFA/SEM, defectors become targets for AS as soon as they are discharged from the rehabilitation centre. Some are contacted to gather information for AS ([258]). Other BFA/SEM sources suggested that AS does not kill the deserters in the centres because they want to use the defected fighters as double agents ([259]). There are no cases reported of persons discharged from a rehabilitation centre having been murdered ([260]). The Belet Weyne centre has an 'ambulant' system where ex-combatants come to the rehabilitation centre at the start of the day, returning to their families in the evening ([261]).

After rehabilitation, many ex-AS-deserters are recruited by the Somali security forces. Nearly 100 % of ex-combatants released from the centre in Baidoa enter the army or the police. The centre in Baidoa is even in the same premises as an SNA training facility ([262]). Working for NISA, which is infiltrated by AS, puts these deserters in a vulnerable position and the government is never sure that all contacts with AS have been broken. International Crisis Group and other BFA/SEM sources noted that several deserters function as double agents who maintain contacts with AS and even have become informants for AS ([263]).

Family members

Family members of AS defectors are in general not considered a target for AS. However, if the person that AS is targeting cannot be found, the group can instead direct its attention to a family member or spouse ([264]). If the target has been taken in or killed, there is no reason

([254]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); Somali NGO], March 2017 (url), p. 18.
([255]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 45.
([256]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi; Western diplomatic source, Nairobi; International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 46.
([257]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: UN Source (A)], March 2017 (url), p. 18.
([258]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 46.
([259]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 46.
([260]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Western diplomatic source, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 46.
([261]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Western diplomatic source, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 46.
([262]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 47.
([263]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 47.
([264]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), pp. 47-48; DIS/DRC, South

anymore to threaten or kill family members ([265]). Threats against family members of targets are only in rare cases being carried out, according to International Crisis Group, interviewed by BFA/SEM ([266]).

Forced marriage to AS members

One DIS/DRC source said that 'women are subjected to forced marriage in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab but it is unknown to what extent' and another source that 'forced marriage to Al-Shabaab fighters is occurring, and that it can happen through intimidation of the parents' ([267]).

Span of influence

With regard to the span of control or influence, reference is made to the EASO *COI Report Somalia Security situation*, February 2016 ([268]), which makes a distinction between 'control' and 'influence' (see also Introduction):

> 'An area **controlled** by an actor implies that the actor has military presence and capacity to uphold the security, and can defend it from competing armed interests in the area. The actor has a functioning administration, such as police and judicial system.
>
> An area where an actor has **influence** implies that the actor has a military presence in the area, but there could also be competing armed interests present. The actor might have an administration in the area, but this may not be functioning' ([269]).

According to BFA/SEM sources, the Areas of Influence maps of 2012 and 2017 (BFA/SEM map of areas of influence, July 2017) show virtually the same picture and the 'urban island scenario' continues to exist ([270]).The Somali government and its allies control most cities and their direct hinterland, but often have problems in establishing a functioning administration and authority ([271]).

AS has set up blockades around most towns where AMISOM/SNA are in control. AS can move around at night in most of these urban centres while the AMISOM/SNA forces stay in their barracks ([272]).

AS exercises influence or control in most rural areas and can conduct attacks in all rural areas in South/Central Somalia, even in officially government-controlled areas ([273]) and Mogadishu,

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and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), p. 18.

([265]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 47.

([266]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 48.

([267]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); UN Source (B)], March 2017 (url), p. 25.

([268]) EASO, COI Report Somalia Security Situation, February 2016 (url), p. 11.

([269]) EASO, COI Report Somalia Security Situation, February 2016 (url), p. 11.

([270]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 21.

([271]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p.21.

([272]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); Somali NGO], March 2017 (url), p. 10.

([273]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); UN Source (B); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; Somali NGO; Independent Organisation; Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url),

according to Mark Bradbury, interviewed by BFA/SEM. The latter added that AS's activities are limited by the need to maintain good relations, for example with local clan elders. When planning an attack they will weigh the possible negative consequences on these relationships ([274]).

There are few areas where AS has no or no significant presence: the area around Doolow (Gedo); central Galmudug, where AS is barely present but can penetrate; Dhusamareb (Galgaduud); Guri Ceel (Galgaduud). Gaalkacyo and Garoowe are largely free of AS ([275]). See further Security situation per region and the BFA/SEM map of areas of influence, July 2017.

In April 2017, the newly elected President 'Farmajo' called on AS to surrender within 60 days to be granted amnesty, but the group rejected the offer and instead increased its attacks on government officials ([276]). In this regard, The Jamestown Foundation assesses that AS is 'reclaiming lost ground' and connects the resurgence with 'the 2016 withdrawal of a significant number of Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) and a planned drawdown of troops with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)':

> 'Over the last 12 months, Al-Shabaab has markedly increased the tempo and sophistication of its attacks on a range of soft and hard targets in Somalia, the semi-autonomous region of Puntland and in southeast Kenya. The al-Qaeda affiliate is re-taking territory it once controlled in southern and central Somalia while threatening Puntland and southeast Kenya by moving more operatives into those regions' ([277]).

AS has killed more than 4 000 people in 2016, and thus surpassed the (considerably weakened Boko Haram) as Africa's 'most deadly terror group in 2016' according to Quartz Africa:

> 'The Somali terrorist group has become deadly in its operations, relentlessly attacking both civilian and military outposts. In its attempt to topple the weak Somali government, Al Shabaab has specifically carried out deadly attacks in the capital Mogadishu, targeting the presidential palace, the parliament, and supreme court offices. And as the country revives from a two-decade war, the group has staged numerous attacks on hotels, parks, and beachside restaurants—symbols of hope in a country bedeviled by scars of its civil war' ([278]).

For more information on AS, see the BFA/SEM report ([279]).

2.2.3.2. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

The only active Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, or IS, ISIS) group in Somalia is the fraction in Puntland, the former AS group around the Al-Shabaab North-East (ASNE) religious leader Sheikh Abdulqader Mu'min ([280]). In November 2015, Mu'min and several of his

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p. 10; BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (C), Nairobi; International Crisis Group, Nairobi; Somali source in the area of security, Addis Ababa; Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa; Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi;], August 2017 (url), p. 30.

([274]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Mark Bradbury] (url), August 2017 (url), p. 30.

([275]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), pp.21, 30.

([276]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 3; Newsweek, Somalia's Al-Shabab Militants Ramp up Attacks After Rejecting President's Amnesty Offer, 10 April 2017 (url).

([277]) Jamestown, Reclaiming Lost Ground in Somalia: The Enduring Threat of al-Shabaab, 28 July 2017 (url).

([278]) Quartz, Al Shabaab overtook Boko Haram as Africa's most deadly terror group in 2016, 1 June 2017 (url).

([279]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url).

([280]) EASO, COI Report – Somalia Security situation, February 2016 (url), pp. 21, 22.

followers were evicted from the Golis mountains and fled to the area of Iskushuban, Bari region, where he enjoys protection from his Ali Salebaan clan ([281]). AS has tried to kill Mu'min 3 times until now. International Crisis Group, interviewed by BFA/SEM, concludes that AS does not tolerate any defections ([282]).

However, more recent activities by the IS-adhering group have been reported (such as a brief conquest of Qandala end of 2016 ([283])), and in April 2017 the UN SEMG assesses that the group 'has grown significantly in strength over the reporting period ([284]). See 3.2.5. Puntland.

2.2.3.3. Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a

Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) is a militia that has significantly contributed to the relative security in the areas under its control ([285]). Formed in 1991 to protect Sufi Muslims from radical Islamist militant groups, the group has fought AS as of 2008 and took control of areas in Hiiraan and Galgaduud ([286]).

ASWJ initially (2011-12) liaised with Somalia's transitional federal government, aiming at forming its own regional state ([287]). However, in 2016 the group withdrew from the federal transition process, 'having been excluded from negotiations among regional leaders', according to UN SEMG ([288]).

The relationship of ASWJ with the Somali federal government is currently unclear, and the relationship with the regional state GIA is characterised by ongoing clashes with pro-GIA militias and mutual mistrust ([289]). With the newly elected presidents of Gamudug and of Somalia, there is an increased willingness to negotiate about ASWJ's future, according to BFA/SEM sources ([290]).

Mark Bradbury notes that ASWJ has lost its previous strength and may not get back to the same level of importance ascribed to it in past years ([291]). According to International Crisis Group and BFA/SEM sources, ASWJ has now concentrated its military and administrative presence in the region of Galgaduud, and controls Dhusamareeb (capital of Galmudug regional state), Matabaan (Hiiraan region), and, according to other BFA/SEM sources, the districts Cabudwaaq, Guri Ceel and Balanbaale in north Galgaduud ([292]). See further 3.2.5.1. Galgaduud.

([281]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), pp. 14, 50-51; BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 89.
([282]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 89.
([283]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 90.
([284]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 11.
([285]) EASO, COI Report Somalia Security Situation, February 2016 (url), p. 22.
([286]) Stanford University, Mapping Militant organizations - Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama, 18 June 2016 (url).
([287]) The EASO report characterised the group in February 2016 as a 'pro-government' militia. EASO, COI Report Somalia Security Situation, February 2016 (url), p. 22.
([288]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 21.
([289]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), pp. 24, 25; for an overview of the clashes, see ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([290]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International Organisation (A); Military-strategic expert, Vienna; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Abeba], August 2017 (url), p. 84.
([291]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Mark Bradbury, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 84.
([292]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International Crisis Group, Nairobi; Military strategic expert, Vienna; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 85.

Not much is known about the central leadership of ASWJ, as stated in a Mapping Militants project by Stanford University: 'The group seems to lack a unified leadership and instead uses multiple regional leaders. Multiple individuals have been simultaneously identified as the group's top leader' ([293]).

2.2.4. Clan conflicts

Apart from violence by insurgent groups such as AS, parts of Somalia are also hit by violence from inter-clan conflicts, leading to 'extrajudicial killings, extortion, arbitrary arrests and rape', according to Amnesty International (AI) ([294]).

ACLED reports in September 2017 that, 'while the number of lethal incidents by clan militias has remained relatively constant over time, the number of fatalities, thus the lethality of the violence has increased. This implies that more civilians have died as a result of each of their attacks' ([295]). The most violent clan militias are of Habr Gedir (Hawiye), Jejele and Marehan (Darod) sub-clans. ACLED concludes: 'In fact, the majority of new conflict actors in Somalia during the past year are clan militias, active in a variety of areas' ([296]).

ACLED continues: 'As Al Shabaab expands into new locations, the number of clan militias active in those same locales is impacted. This suggests a relationship between clan militias and Al Shabaab — namely that Al Shabaab may in fact be a 'brand' under which numerous clan militias may fight' ([297]).

International Crisis Group notes:

> 'These tensions are typically exacerbated in times of drought when massive numbers of people and livestock move across traditional clan "boundaries" in search of water and pasture. Pre-existing clan disputes tend to resurface, sometimes resulting in sporadic, low-level clashes among clan militias. This is particularly true in Sool and Sanaag regions (northern Somalia) as well as Hiiraan, Galgadud, Mudug, Lower and Middle Shabelle in south-central Somalia' ([298]).

UN SEMG analyses: 'Insecurity and fragmented authority created fertile ground for inter-clan conflicts, often manipulated or supported for political ends, directly or indirectly by international, federal or regional security forces - or by Al-Shabaab, including in Galgadud, Hiran, Sool and Sanaag, and Lower Shabelle' ([299]). For more details on these conflicts, reference is made to the respective regions in 3. Security situation per region.

2.3. Recent security trends

DIS/DRC sources differ in their assessment of the security situation. A Western source assessed that 'as of December 2016, the security situation is significantly better compared to five years ago when Al-Shabaab was dislodged from Mogadishu but that the picture over the last 12 month is more blurred'. A UN source found that 'the security situation has not

([293]) Stanford University, Mapping Militant organizations - Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama, 18 June 2016 (url).
([294]) AI, 2016/17 International Report – Somalia, 20 February 2017 (url).
([295]) ACLED, Real-Time analysis of African political violence, Conflict Trends No. 61, September 2017 (url), p. 8.
([296]) ACLED, Real-Time analysis of African political violence, Conflict Trends No. 61, September 2017 (url), p. 8.
([297]) ACLED, Real-Time analysis of African political violence, Conflict Trends No. 61, September 2017 (url), p. 9.
([298]) ICG, Instruments of Pain (III): Conflict and Famine in Somalia, 9 May 2017 (url).
([299]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 160.

improved compared to 2015 and deemed that in certain areas the situation has worsened'. Another source said 'that it seems as if all actors are comfortable with [the] status quo' ([300]).

According to UN SEMG: 'Contrary to prevailing narratives of successful counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts, the [UN] Monitoring Group assesses that the security situation has not improved during the current mandate' ([301]).

AI states in its 2016/17 report that AMISOM and the Somali federal government 'consolidated their control through the federal administrations in Galmudug, Jubbaland and South West states' ([302]). DIS/DRC sources state that 'AMISOM/SNA has some degree of military control of most urban centres, and Al-Shabaab is in control of, or at least has influence over, most rural areas in S/C Somalia and has a hidden presence in most urban centres' ([303]). Adding to this, the enforcement of government authority continues to pose a problem and the administrative influence often only extends several (estimations by BFA/SEM sources vary between 5 and 30 km) kilometres from the town/city centre ([304]).

HRW in its annual report notes: 'Civilians in Somalia, enduring abuses by all warring parties and dire humanitarian conditions, continue to bear the brunt of the country's long-running conflict' ([305]).

ACLED, in its May 2017 Conflict trends report, covering the period September 2016 - May 2017, notes 'a relatively stable level of Al-Shabaab activity, with notable spikes of activity over the last weeks of October 2016 and mid-January 2017'. ACLED further notes that since September 2016 'the population centres of Mogadishu as well as areas in the immediate south-west along the southern tail of the Shebelle River […] account for over 40 percent of all violent Al-Shabaab activity in the region'([306]).

ACLED's Conflict trends report of July 2017, covering the period February 2017 -June 2017, notes that AS is moving towards the north, 'where fatalities peaked in June following an attack on Puntland forces at Af-Urur. Al-Shabaab's recent movements into the Puntland may be motivated by ideological competition with the Islamic State, whose influence around the town of Qandala grew in recent months' ([307]).

ACLED's Conflict trends report of September 2017, covering the period April - August 2017, reveals that Somalia is currently 'the most conflict-affected country in Africa with 1,537 organised violent events' and the most reported fatalities (3 287) until September 2017. Of these fatalities, 56% result from battles, which percentage has decreased in recent years.

The number of fatalities resulting from remote violence (IEDs) as well as violence against civilians have increased. AS remains the primary perpetrator for both types of violence. The increased use of IEDs 'could point to a shift in strategic tactics by the group'. The number of deaths per event (lethality of violence) against civilians has been rising since 2013. The groups

([300]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: Western source; UN Source (B); Somalia Country Director of a humanitarian agency], March 2017 (url), p. 7.
([301]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 11.
([302]) AI, The state of the world's human rights, 2017 (url), p. 326.
([303]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); (B); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; Somali NGO; Independent Organisation; Anonymous Source; Western Source], March 2017 (url), p. 7.
([304]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; International organisation (B), Nairobi; International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 21.
([305]) HRW, World Report 2017 - Somalia, 12 January 2017 (url).
([306]) ACLED, Real-Time analysis of African political violence, Conflict trends No. 58, May 2017 (url).
([307]) ACLED, Real-Time analysis of African political violence, Conflict Trends No.60, July 2017.

that caused the highest number of civilian deaths per violent event are not AS but clan militias. Finally, ACLED mentions 'Unidentified armed groups (UAGs)' which also are very active in Somalia. 'Thus far this year they have been second only to Al Shabaab' ([308]).

2.4. Impact of the conflicts on state, law and order, and possibilities for protection

2.4.1. The judiciary

As stipulated in Chapter 9, Article 108 of the Provisional Constitution of Somalia, the judicial framework includes a constitutional court, federal government courts, and federal Member State (regional) courts. At the federal government level the federal High Court will serve as the highest court and at the federal Member State level the federal Member State High Court will serve as the highest court ([309]). These institutions have yet to be established ([310]).

Somalia, including the self-proclaimed republic of Somaliland, is characterised by legal pluralism where a civil law system is combined with Sharia law and the customary law *xeer* ([311]). Most disputes and crimes, particularly in rural parts of the country, are dealt with through customary law (*xeer*) where the payment of compensation (*mag/diya*) is a pivotal element ([312]). In Somaliland, where the clan system is quite homogeneous, crimes such as murder are first negotiated within the clan system. If no solution is found, the courts will be involved. The *xeer* has a rule that, when a clan cannot comprehend an act, the perpetrator is handed over to the police ([313]).

The application of Sharia law is also widespread, especially in the sphere of family law and law of succession ([314]).

According to DIS/DRC sources, 'the government has no effective legal system and … the official court system of Somalia [is] non-functioning' ([315]).

The regional government of Puntland and the republic of Somaliland control most of their respective jurisdictions and both have functioning administrations ([316]). In both Puntland and Somaliland, mobile courts have been established to increase their respective judicial reach. In

([308]) ACLED, Real-Time analysis of African political violence, Conflict Trends No. 61, September 2017 (url), p. 9.
([309]) Somalia, *Provisional Constitution*, 1 August 2012 (url), p. 33.
([310]) Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 – Somalia, n.d. (url).
([311]) Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2017 – Somalia, n.d. (url); CIA, The World Factbook Somalia, last updated 5 October 2017 (url).
([312]) Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2017 – Somalia, n.d. (url); EASO, COI report – South and Central Somalia Country overview, August 2014, pp. 28, 54.
([313]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Employee of international organisation, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 100.
([314]) EASO, COI report – South and Central Somalia Country overview, August 2014 (url), p. 41; LandInfo, Somalia: Ekteskap og skilsmisse, 23 April 2014 (url), p. 6; Abdullahi, Mohamed Diriye, Culture and Customs of Somalia, 2001, p. 142; Somaliland Law, Somaliland family & personal law, n.d. (url).
([315]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A), Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), p. 11.
([316]) US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 – Somalia, 3 March 2017 (url, p. 1; BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 55.

the case of Somaliland it is highlighted that these courts function relatively well and have improved the citizens' access to the formal judicial system ([317]).

The regional states of Jubbaland, South West, HirShabelle and Galmudug exert control over parts of their respective jurisdictions ([318]). In the period January-April 2017, there has been a 'geographical increase in justice delivery with mobile courts for the first time in Jubaland and South West', according to UN Security Council ([319]).

In areas controlled by AS, 'there [i]s no functioning formal judicial system', according to US Department of State's (US DoS) Report on Human Rights Practices in Somalia in 2016 ([320]). However, DIS/DRC sources stated that 'AS (…) administers an unknown number of Sharia courts and their de facto jurisdiction is (…) not restricted to areas under its control' ([321]). As an example, it was mentioned that 'even in Mogadishu certain people go to Al-Shabaab courts in Lower Shabelle, when the federal government's courts do not deliver fair verdicts' ([322]). A BFA/SEM source stated that the formal (governmental) judiciary is considered weak and corrupt, and some people prefer to settle their disputes in an AS court. In case of property disputes, even inhabitants of Mogadishu go to AS courts. Such AS courts are either held in a mobile manner or outside the city ([323]). According to US DoS 'Sharia courts defendants generally did not defend themselves, present witnesses, or have an attorney represent them' ([324]).

The US DoS Country report on Terrorism 2016 points at Somalia's problems with ID-documents:

> 'Somalia's porous borders contributed to regional insecurity as al-Shabaab and others continued to move throughout the region mostly undetected. Most countries do not recognize Somali identity documents, leaving Somalia with few options for travel document verification and regional partners unable to properly vet Somali travelers. Somalia does not have a central or shared terrorist screening watchlist, nor does it possess biographic and biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry' ([325]).

2.4.2. Security forces and state protection

According to US DoS, the 'civilian authorities did not maintain effective control of security forces'. The same source continues: 'Security forces abused civilians and often failed to prevent or respond to societal violence. Although authorities sometimes used military courts

([317]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation, Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), pp. 86, 94.
([318]) US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 – Somalia, 3 March 2017 (url), p. 1; BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), pp. 23, 78.
([319]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 7.
([320]) US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 – Somalia, 3 March 2017 (url), p. 11.
([321]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security situation [source: UN Source (A); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), p. 11.
([322]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security situation [source: UN source], March 2017 (url), p. 11. See also 2.2.3.1. Al-Shabaab (Courts).
([323]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 77.
([324]) US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 – Somalia, 3 March 2017 (url), p. 11.
([325]) US DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism *2016*, July 2017 (url).

to try individuals believed to be responsible for abuse, they generally did not investigate abuse by police, army, or militia members; a culture of impunity was widespread' ([326]).

Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports in its World Report 2017 on Somalia: 'The military court in Mogadishu continues to try cases that are not legally within its jurisdiction and in proceedings falling short of international fair trial standards'. In the same report HRW reports: 'Civilians in Somalia, enduring abuses by all warring parties and dire humanitarian conditions, continue to bear the brunt of the country's long-running conflict. Government commitments to improve security in areas under its control, and build capacity of rule-of-law institutions, bore limited results in 2016' ([327]).

Amnesty International (AI) reports in its 2017 report on human rights: 'Government-aligned militias continued to carry out extrajudicial killings, extortion, arbitrary arrests and rape' ([328]). AI does not mention the security forces of the Somali government explicitly, but states: 'All parties to the conflict were responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law' ([329]).

2.4.3. Detention and death penalty

Prison and detention facilities are generally deemed to be inadequate and characterised by 'poor sanitation and hygiene, inadequate food and water, and lack of medical care' but there is few up-to-date and reliable information on the subject ([330]). US DoS reports: 'Conditions were better in Central Mogadishu Prison, but overcrowding was a problem. Two new facilities--Garowe Prison in Puntland (completed in 2014) and Hargeisa Prison in Somaliland (completed in 2011)--met international standards and reportedly were well managed' ([331]).

There are no reports on prison and detention conditions in areas controlled by AS and in some remote areas under control of 'traditional authorities' but according to US DoS the conditions in such areas are 'believed to be harsh and at times life threatening'. It is reported that those detained by Al-Shabaab were incarcerated for 'minor "offenses", such as smoking, having illicit content on cell phones, listening to music, watching or playing soccer, wearing a brassiere, or not wearing a hijab' ([332]).

Somalia, including Somaliland, applies the death penalty ([333]). According to information from Death Penalty Worldwide, based on media reports, 12 executions have been carried out in 2017 by military courts, 11 of which occurred in April 2017. Puntland has executed 'at least 12 prisoners' in 2017 ([334]).

According to HRW and AI, most death sentences are related to association with AS ([335]).

([326]) US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 – Somalia, 3 March 2017 (url), p. 7.
([327]) HRW, World Report 2017 – Somalia, 12 January 2017 (url).
([328]) AI, The state of the world's human rights - Somalia, 2017 (url), p. 327.
([329]) AI, The state of the world's human rights - Somalia, 2017 (url), p. 326.
([330]) US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 – Somalia, 3 March 2017 ((url), p. 5.
([331]) US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 – Somalia, 3 March 2017 (url), p. 5.
([332]) US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 – Somalia, 3 March 2017 (url), p. 6.
([333]) AI, The state of the world's human rights - Somalia, 2017 (url), p. 328; Cornell Law school, Death penalty database, 11 October 2017 (url).
([334]) Death Penalty Worldwide, Somalia, partly last updated 18 October 2017 (url).
([335]) HRW, World Report 2017 - Somalia, 12 January 2017 (url); AI, The state of the world's human rights, 2017 (url), p. 328.

2.5. Impact of the violence on the civilian population

2.5.1. Civilian fatalities

According to ACLED's data on violent incidents in Somalia, in the time period of January 2016 to 31 August 2017, an estimated 1 419 civilians were killed in 1 054 events registered under the category 'violence against civilians'. The total number of estimated fatalities during the same period was 8 367 (from 4 157 incidents[336]) making approximately 1 out of 6 killed persons a civilian ([337]).

In its September 2017 report, covering incidents in the period April-August 2017, ACLED notes that the proportion of reported fatalities stemming from battles (although still 56 % in 2017) is decreasing in recent years. By contrast, fatalities from remote violence and violence against civilians have increased, with AS as the primary perpetrator. AS is still responsible for high levels of political violence and a large share of violence against civilians; the rate and number of fatalities resulting from their attacks have remained relatively constant. In contrast, the lethality of violence (number of deaths per violent event) by the various clan militias is increasing ([338]) (see also 2.2.4. Clan conflicts).

According to several sources interviewed by the Norwegian COI unit LandInfo (January 2016) in a February 2017 report on violence, fatalities, perpetrators and victims in Mogadishu, AS does not, in general, target civilians ([339]). DIS/DRC sources also stated that AS mainly attacks high profile targets and 'civilians who do not belong to any of the abovementioned categories are not considered targets' ([340]). Sources underlined that 'for the civilian population the highest risk is being in the wrong place at the wrong time and become collateral damage' ([341]). As mentioned previously by BFA/SEM sources, civilians that may risk being targeted by AS are those considered collaborators, spies, or apostates, such as governmental, AMISOM and security officers, business people, clan elders, and employees of NGOs and international organisations ([342]).

2.5.2. Socio-economic life

Reliable estimates on most human development indicators are limited. Furthermore, existing data is influenced by considerable statistical uncertainties. It is, nonetheless, evident, that Somalia's economy to a large extent is based on livestock, agriculture, forestry, fisheries,

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[336] As mentioned in the introduction, ACLED codes incidents for which the number of fatalities is not known, as 10 fatalities. This was the case in 100 incidents for 2016 and in 53 incidents for 2017. So of the total 4 157 incidents with 8 367 fatalities in the reporting period, 153 incidents have an unknown number, but coded as 10, of fatalities.
([337]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([338]) ACLED, Real-Time analysis of African political violence, Conflict Trends report No. 61, September 2017(url), p. 9.
([339]) LandInfo, Somalia: Violence, fatalities, perpetrators and victims in Mogadishu, 27 February 2017 (url), p. 7.
([340]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); Independent Organisation], March 2017 (url), p. 19.
([341]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (B); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), p. 12.
([342]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; International Crisis Group, Nairobi; Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi; International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 36.

remittances and telecommunication ([343]). Livestock accounts for approximately 40 % of GDP and 50 % of export income and remittances account for approximately 35 % of GDP ([344]).

Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world and an estimated 43 % of a population of 12.3 million 'live in extreme poverty (less than 1 USD a day)' ([345]). Somalia's GDP per capita is USD 284, which is the fifth lowest in the world ([346]).

Accurate unemployment rates are according to CIA World Fact Book not available but one DIS/DRC source stated that the unemployment rate is high, which the source deemed as a main reason in understanding AS recruitment ([347]). Various sources estimate the unemployment rate to be between 50-66 % ([348]).

Information on literacy rates and expected years of schooling are according to UNDP's Human Development Report on Somalia not available ([349]). However, estimates suggest an overall literacy at 37.8 % for the population in general and as low as 25.8 % for women ([350]).

2.5.3. Life under Al-Shabaab

When living in areas controlled by AS, people have to comply with 'the Al-Shabaab way of life ("play by the rules of Al-Shabaab"), otherwise they would be at risk' as DIS/DRC sources put it ([351]), some of them adding: 'Severe sanctions can be carried out against civilians who do not obey to the rules and ideology of AS. For instance, not dressing or behaving in accordance with al-Shabaab rules can lead to arrest and corporal punishment' ([352]).

When AS takes a new territory, an AS administration is put in place. This suggests, according to a BFA/SEM source, that the group had established a shadow administration already in advance ([353]). AS also establishes Sharia courts in the areas under its control, which are described by Mark Bradbury and another BFA/SEM source as well-functioning and

([343]) Ahali, A.Y.E. and Ackah, I. 'Are they predisposed to the resource curse? Oil in Somalia', 2015, p. 234; CIA, The World Factbook Somalia, last updated 5 October 2017 (url).
([344]) CIA, The World Factbook Somalia, last updated 5 October 2017 (url); UNICEF, The situation of Women and Children in Somalia, n.d. (url).
([345]) UNICEF, The situation of Women and Children in Somalia, n.d. (url).
([346]) UNICEF, The situation of Women and Children in Somalia, n.d. (url).
([347]) CIA, The World Factbook Somalia, last updated 5 October 2017 (url); DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: UN Source (A)], March 2017 (url), p. 26.
([348]) UNDP, Somalia Human Development Report 2012: Empowering youth for peace and development, 28 September 2012 (url); Fortune of Africa, Unemployment in Somalia, n.d. (url); Business Insider, With 66% unemployment, Mogadishu, Somalia is the world's most fragile city, 28 September 2016 (url).
([349]) UNDP, Human Development Report on Somalia, 2016 (url).
([350]) IndexMundi, Somalia Literacy, 2001 (url); Hiiraan, 10 Countries With the Worst Literacy Rates in the World, 9 September 2013 (url).
([351]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; International Organisation (A); International Organisation (B); Western Source], March 2017 (url), p. 23.
([352]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), p. 23.
([353]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 29.

effective ([354]). DIS/DRC sources describe the AS courts as 'less corrupt, cheaper, and efficient' ([355]).

According to a DIS/DRC source, 'in the rural areas, there is little difference between Al-Shabaab's rules and the already existing traditional norms'. As an example, 'the dress code for women is the same under Al-Shabaab as under other actors'. The source however underlined, that the AS modus operandi is 'more brutal and ideological' ([356]).

A DIS/DRC source mentioned that 'even though Al-Shabaab's interpretation of Islam is strict it is not completely foreign to Somalis' ([357]). Other sources concurred by assessing that 'it is a broad perception that people are better off under Al-Shabaab, among other reasons because Al-Shabaab does not discriminate on the basis of clan affiliation' and because 'Al-Shabaab establishes some kind of justice' ([358]). This picture of AS as a provider of justice is also mentioned by BFA/SEM sources, one source specifying that in areas controlled by AS you 'do not need armed escorts [as] they provide security' ([359]).

2.5.4. Freedom of movement

According to Article 21 in the Provisional Constitution of Somalia 'every person lawfully residing within the territory of the Federal Republic of Somalia has the right to freedom of movement, freedom to choose their residence, and freedom to leave the country' ([360]). Early 2017, Somali forces removed 10 illegal roadblocks in Lower Shabelle ([361]). However, clan militias and AS restrict freedom of movement. In the regions of Gedo, Bay, Bakool and Hiiraan, AS and other non-state militias continue to 'ban commercial activities' and hamper 'the delivery of humanitarian assistance', according to US DoS ([362]).

On road safety, several DIS/DRC sources stated:

> 'In general, travelling by road in S/C Somalia is not easy and is regarded as risky and expensive. Main roads in S/C Somalia are only partly controlled by AMISOM/SNA and in some areas Al-Shabaab is in full control of the roads. According to a UN source, al-Shabaab controls most of the main supply routes in S/C Somalia. Al-Shabaab, and in certain areas also other armed actors, have checkpoints throughout S/C Somalia and public transportation vehicles will be stopped and passengers questioned and/or taxed. Day-to-day activities and business life for civilians, however, continue underneath the conflicts and travelling for locals is considered less problematic compared to profiled persons. Travelling between AMISOM/SNA and al-Shabaab areas entails the risk of falling under suspicion from both sides of being affiliated with the enemy. Such suspicion can lead to punishment, kidnapping and interrogation, or killing. For AMISOM/SNA, the lack of security on roads restricts the movement of

([354]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Mark Bradbury], August 2017 (url), p. 29.
([355]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); UN Source (B); Somali NGO; International Organisation (A)], March 2017 (url), p. 11.
([356]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: Somali NGO], March 2017 (url), p. 23.
([357]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: Western source], March 2017 (url), p. 23.
([358]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); UN Source (B); International Organisation (A)], March 2017 (url), p. 23.
([359]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; International Organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 28.
([360]) Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012 (url), p. 5.
([361]) Goobjoog.com, Somali forces removes 10 roadblocks in Lower Shabelle, 3 January 2017 (url).
([362]) US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 – Somalia, 3 March 2017 (url), p. 22.

> goods on main supply routes. Therefore, AMISOM/SNA continues to airlift troops and some of the key life sustenance items. Especially the main supply routes from Mogadishu to Baidoa and Belet Weyne, respectively, may be affected by Al-Shabaab attacks. According to a Somalia Country Director of a humanitarian agency, the roads from Mogadishu to Beled Weyne, Baidoa, and Kismayo, respectively, are partly controlled by AMISOM' ([363]).

The Logistics Cluster, led by the World Food Programme, shows the road system and roads accessibility in its Access Constraints Maps. The 14 June 2017 map ([364]) shows a considerable increase in inaccessible roads in south Somalia compared to April 2017 ([365]).

International Crisis Group reports in May 2017 that 'Al-Shabaab maintains an active military presence in much of the South's droughtstricken countryside, and its violence and other destabilising activities constitute the greatest impediment to the delivery of relief to drought victims' ([366]).

2.5.5. IDPs, refugees, and returnees

DIS/DRC sources note: 'The security situation is also affected by floods, drought, land disputes, and clan violence, all of which cause displacement' ([367]).

According to the UNHCR-led Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN) Somalia, the total number of displacements as of August 2017 is 1 280 000. IDPs from Lower Shabelle (387 000) and Bay (248 000) constitute more than half of all IDPs in Somalia, including Somaliland. Bay (240 000) and Lower Shabelle (175 000) together with Benadir (269 000) also receive the highest numbers of IDPs ([368]).

In 2016, the total number of IDPs was 307 000 with 168 000 being displaced in October and November only. The October displacement was primarily related to conflict, confined to Lower Shabelle, whereas the November displacement was mostly drought-related, affecting Mudug, Galgaduud and Hiiraan ([369]). During the first half of 2017, the predominant cause of displacement, with a peak in March, has been the ongoing drought (770 000) and 127 000 have been displaced due to conflict ([370]).

ICG reports on 9 May 2017: 'In many urban centres in South/Central Somalia food is increasingly scarce and available only at prices internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the very poor simply cannot afford' ([371]). The same report states: 'Most IDPs, both new and older, live in makeshift camps in major cities and towns. With few if any employment opportunities, they typically survive on remittances from relatives abroad and international assistance' ([372]).

([363]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: Independent Organisation; Anonymous Source; UN Source (A); UN Source (B); UN Source (C); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; Somali NGO], March 2017 (url), p. 10.
([364]) Logistic Cluster, Somalia - Access Constraints Map, 14 June 2017 (url).
([365]) Logistic Cluster, Somalia - Access Constraints Map, 7 April 2017 (url).
([366]) ICG: Instruments of Pain (III): Conflict and Famine in Somalia, 9 May 2017 (url).
([367]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (B); UN Source (C); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; NGO working in Somalia; Somali NGO; Anonymous Source; Western Source], March 2017 (url), p. 7.
([368]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).
([369]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).
([370]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).
([371]) ICG, Instruments of Pain (III): Conflict and Famine in Somalia, 9 May 2017 (url), p. 3.
([372]) ICG, Instruments of Pain (III): Conflict and Famine in Somalia, 9 May 2017 (url), p. 6.

The conflict is a driver for people fleeing Somalia, as is documented by a project called 4Mi (Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism Initiative), initiated by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS). Between September 2014 and August 2017, 1 244 Somali migrants and refugees who had fled Somalia have been interviewed; information was collected regarding profiles, drivers, routes, and protection issues faced on the journey ([373]).

According to an analysis by 4Mi, respondents reported the following violent incidents that they experienced themselves or witnessed en route: 83 deaths in Somalia and 574 violent or sexual assaults in Somalia. In these assaults, which often were the main drivers for their departure, the following perpetrators were identified (in percentage of reported incidents): 47 % Border guards or Police, 22 % Local communities, 15 % Smugglers, brokers, or traffickers, 5 % Military, 1 % Other migrants and 10 % Others ([374]).

The number of registered refugees in Somalia as of 31 May 2017 was 12 705, and that of registered asylum-seekers was 13 376 ([375]).

The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) which conducts research on the conditions for peaceful relations between states, groups and people', wrote in 2015 that the number of people returning from the diaspora to South/Central Somalia had considerably increased since 2011-2012. PRIO notes: 'While no statistics are available, full daily flights into Mogadishu offered by Turkish Airlines and the visibility of diaspora investments in business and real estate suggest that return to Mogadishu is now much more frequent than it was a few years ago' ([376]).

In March 2017, a summit was organised by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Nairobi to discuss the situation of Somali refugees. The convention adopted the Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and Reintegration of Returnees in Somalia ([377]), 'which commits to developing a comprehensive regional approach to facilitate durable solutions and to strengthen the protection environment for Somali refugees in host countries in the region' ([378]).

Between January and June 2017, '28,757 Somali refugees from Kenya were voluntarily repatriated to Somalia by UNHCR as part of its programme and benefited from an enhanced return package' ([379]).

2.5.6. Children

According to UNICEF, an estimated 10 % of all marriages are contracted before the girl's 15th birthday, and about half of the girls marry before they are 18 ([380]). There is no available information regarding the average age of marriage for boys. The legal age for marriage in Somalia is 18 for both males and females, but if her parents agree, a girl can marry at 16 ([381]).

([373]) RMMS, 4 Mi – Migrant Incidents – Country profiles, n.d. (url).
([374]) RMMS project manager, e-mail correspondence with EASO, 21 September – 16 October 2017.
([375]) UNHCR, Operational Portal Refugee situations, n.d. (url),
([376]) PRIO, Back in Business? Diaspora Return to Somalia, 2015 (url), p. 2
([377]) IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development), Communiqué Nairobi Declaration on Somali Refugees, 25 March 2017 (url).
([378]) RMMS, Regional Mixed Migration in East Africa and Yemen in 2017, Quarter 1, 2017 (url).
([379]) Operational Portal Refugee situations (Highlights, 15 September 2017), n.d.
([380]) UNICEF, Country programme document: Somalia, 18 July 2017 (url), p. 4.
([381]) Girls not brides, Child marriage around the world: Somalia, n.d. (url).

Contrary to what is stipulated in the provisional constitution of Somalia (Chapter 2, Article 30), education is neither free, compulsory nor universal, according to US DoS ([382]). UNICEF notes that 'Somalia has one of the world's lowest proportions of primary-age children attending primary school. More than half of all children are out of school; children who attend primary school tend to start at a later age, with girls' participation consistently lower than boys' ([383]). Adding to this, the majority of children who attend primary school are enrolled in *madrassas* and not formal schools ([384]).

However, improvement in school enrolment can be noted, as in most urban areas in southern Somalia, schools are being reopened ([385]). International Organization for Migration (IOM), in a study on youth employment and migration, found that of the youth between the ages of 14 and 30 who were interviewed in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa, 33 % did not have any education, but this percentage decreases with younger cohorts (17 %). Since the departure of Al Shabaab, many more schools have been opened. Access to education is best in Mogadishu, according to the IOM study ([386]).

Child soldiers

The UN Security Council December 2016 report on children and armed conflict in Somalia discusses grave violations committed against children, often with impunity. All parties in the conflict conduct abduction and recruitment of child soldiers. AS, ASWJ and the SNA are mentioned specifically for child recruitment and use. Between 2010 and 2016, 6 163 child soldiers have been identified. The main perpetrator is AS (4 313 or 70 % of the total number of child soldiers between 2010-16, with a peak in 2012), followed by SNA (920) ASWJ (346), regional states' security forces (193) and unknown (351) ([387]). According to a UN source interviewed by DIS/DRC, the number of child soldiers recruited by AS was 903 in 2015 and 1 560 in the first nine months of 2016 ([388]).

It is generally known that AS forcibly recruited child soldiers in the past. BFA/SEM sources gave one example from March 2016, in which AS troops, after having landed on the Puntland coast, were taken and imprisoned (many others killed). Of the 46 prisoners a large number were children, who told they had simply been asked by AS to come along and found themselves in an AS training camp ([389]).

The UN SEMG notes 'an overall rise in the number of instances of recruitment and use of child soldiers verified by the United Nations, in particular by Al-Shabaab in Lower Juba, Middle Juba, Lower Shabelle and Bakool' ([390]). This concerns often very young children, between 8 and 15

([382]) Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012 (url), p. 7; US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 – Somalia, 3 March 2017 (url), p. 35.
([383]) UNICEF, Country programme document: Somalia, 18 July 2017 (url), p. 4.
([384]) UNICEF, Country programme document: Somalia, 18 July 2017 (url), p. 4; US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 – Somalia, 3 March 2017 ((url), p. 35.
([385]) Muhammad Fraser-Rahim, Somalia is still fragile, but fragile is progress, 14 April 2016 (url).
([386]) IOM/AltaI consulting, Youth, employment and migration in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa, February 2016, (url), pp. 28, 31.
([387]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Somalia (S/2016/1098), 22 December 2016 (url), p. 5.
([388]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: UN Source (B)], March 2017 (url), p. 21.
([389]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa; Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa; Western diplomatic source, Nairobi; International Organisation (C), Nairobi; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), pp. 48, 50; Horseed Media, Puntland ends anti-al Shabaab military operations, over 200 militants killed, 24 March 2016 (url).
([390]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 34.

years old, according to the UN SEMG, adding that in 2016 AS has used increasing force in its recruitment of children ([391]).

In its May 2017 report, the UN Secretary-General notes: 'Continued abductions by Al-Shabaab for recruitment purposes were reported, and there was an alarming incident of "graduation" of 167 boys, aged between 10 and 13, from a training centre in Lower Shabelle region' ([392]). In August 2017, VOA Somali reports that more than 100 children have arrived in the coastal town of Adale. The fleeing children resisted new AS recruitment campaigns ([393]).

2.5.7. Sexual and Gender-based violence

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is a prevalent issue in the conflict areas of Somalia. In particular ethnic minorities, IDPs and people living in areas under AS are at a heightened risk of sexual exploitation. Sexual violence is particularly widespread within IDP camps, with some camp administrators (gate keepers) reported to have forced girls and women to perform sex acts in exchange for food, clothing, and shelter ([394]).

According to US DoS in its 2016 report,

> 'Government forces, militia members, and men wearing uniforms raped women and girls. While the army arrested some security force members accused of such rapes, impunity was the norm. Al-Shabaab also committed sexual violence, including through forced marriages. AMISOM troops committed sexual abuse and exploitation, including rape' ([395]).

The UN Secretary-General verified information on conflict-related sexual violence against 200 girls and 1 boy in the period January-September 2016. Perpetrators mentioned were: 'unknown armed elements' (55), clan militia (60), AS (21), ASWJ (3), SNA (59) and AMISOM (3). In the last quarter of 2016, 14 incidents of conflict-related sexual violence were registered, amongst which five gang rapes, 'allegedly committed by Al-Shabaab, the Interim South-West Administration of the Puntland Army, and the Somali national police' ([396]). In two of these cases perpetrators were prosecuted, while in three others the suspects were released due to clan pressure or lack of evidence. The rape of of a boy by an AS fighter was punished (by AS) by stoning the perpetrator to death ([397]).The UN registered 28 cases in its next reporting period (January-30 April 2017) ([398]).

According to Human Rights Watch, 'AMISOM took measures to strengthen its capacity to follow up on sexual exploitation and abuse'. In 2016 the UN reported allegations of gang-rape by 14 AMISOM soldiers of two girls in the Galguduud region. AMISOM investigation found the allegations unfounded ([399]). Somali citizens interviewed by International Refugee Rights

([391]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 147.
([392]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 10.
([393]) VOA, Somali Children Flee Al-Shabab Recruitment, 7 August 2017 (url).
([394]) US DoS, 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report Special Case Somalia, 27 June 2017 (url).
([395]) US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 – Somalia, 3 March 2017 (url).
([396]) UN SG, Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, S/2017/249, 15 April 2017 (url), p. 27.
([397]) UN SG, Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, S/2017/249, 15 April 2017 (url), p. 27.
([398]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 9.
([399]) HRW, World Report 2017 - Somalia, 12 January 2017 (url).

Initiative (IRRI) in early 2017 mentioned various abuses committed by AMISOM, including incidents of sexual exploitation and arbitrary detention ([400]).

It should be noted that there is much underreporting of sexual violence, as women fear reprisal and police is reportedly reluctant to investigate cases ([401]). Moreover, 'traditional approaches to dealing with rape tended to ignore the survivor's situation and instead sought resolution or compensation for rape through a negotiation between clan members of the perpetrator and survivor. Some survivors were forced to marry perpetrators' ([402]).

The number of reported cases of rape and sexual violence is rising in drought-affected areas, and is connected to the current drought, according to UNICEF and other partners cited in a media report: 'Between November [2016] and March [2017], UNICEF and partners responded to about 300 cases of rape, sexual assault and gender related violence on average each month. In June [2017], however, the number tripled, with 909 reported cases. So far, that's the highest number of reported cases in a single month in 2017', according to UNICEF ([403]). The organisation notes that due to the drought, women travel longer distances to find food and other necessities (such as firewood), which makes them vulnerable to violence, 'even from the people meant to protect them during a time of food insecurity'. Perpetrators mentioned are community members but also undefined armed people ([404]).

Somalia has a law against rape, punishable by 5-15 years inprisonment. However, as US DoS noted, 'the government did not effectively enforce the law. There are no laws against spousal violence, including rape. Military court sentences for rape include death' ([405]).

A bill prohibiting sexual offences was adopted in Puntland on 20 August 2016, and similar bills against sexual offences are to be passed by the Somalia and Somaliland parliaments ([406]). Other mechanisms to fight sexual and gender-based violence, as mentioned by the UN, are:

> 'A protocol for the clinical management of rape is in place to enhance the quality of care and 17 "one-stop centres" have been established across the country. The protocol includes referrals to safe houses, which provided temporary protection to 61 survivors during the first half of 2016. Other efforts to address sexual violence include the provision of free legal services and the establishment of mobile courts.
>
> Despite these improvements, obtaining convictions remains a challenge: families tend to withdraw complaints in favour of reaching settlements outside the formal system, which benefits clans rather than survivors. In response, the Government has developed a traditional dispute resolution policy to encourage sexual violence cases to be brought before the courts ([407]).

The UN further mentioned the establishment in 2016 of the Women and Child Protection Unit within the police, 'in line with a new approach that aims to bolster gender balance and capacity', as 'another positive development' ([408]).

([400]) IRRI, "They Say They're Not Here to Protect Us", 31 May 2017 (url).
([401]) CNN, In Somali drought, women fighting sexual predators as well as hunger, 14 July 2017 (url).
([402]) US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 – Somalia, 3 March 2017 (url).
([403]) CNN, In Somali drought, women fighting sexual predators as well as hunger, 14 July 2017 (url).
([404]) CNN, In Somali drought, women fighting sexual predators as well as hunger, 14 July 2017 (url).
([405]) US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 – Somalia, 3 March 2017 (url).
[406] UN SG, Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, S/2017/249, 15 April 2017 (url), p. 27.
[407] UN SG, Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, S/2017/249, 15 April 2017 (url), p. 27.
[408] UN SG, Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, S/2017/249, 15 April 2017 (url), p. 27.

2.5.8. Health

As mentioned in 2.5.2. Socio-economic life, reliable data on most human development indicators is unavailable or attached with significant statistical uncertainties. This naturally also applies to the issue of health. Some estimates and assessments are, however, available.

According to LandInfo, 'Somalia has a poor health and health services situation' compared to most other African countries and 'an estimated 80 % of the population has no access to health care'. Somalia does not have a national health authority which is able to provide health care to the population. LandInfo notes that 'evidence suggests that access to treatment and medications is best in larger cities, particularly in Mogadishu' ([409]).

According to UNDP's 2016 Human Development Report on Somalia, life expectancy in Somalia is 55.7 years ([410]). Somalia has a high fertility rate with an estimated 6.2 births per woman in the years 2010-2015, and a high maternal mortality with '1,000 per 100,000 compared to 360 in Kenya' ([411]). The infant mortality is 137 per 1 000 live births, which is the third highest in the world ([412]).

2.5.9. Drought and food security

Somalia is regularly afflicted by periods of drought, as noted by ICG in a report from 9 May 2017: 'A combination of protracted armed conflict and climatic as well as environmental stresses has made the country highly vulnerable to periodic large scale famine'. The current drought has been 'provoked by two consecutive years of failed *Deyr* (October-December) and *Gu* (April-June) rains' ([413]). ICG summarises the food security situation as follows:

> 'Subsistence farming in the Shabelle and Juba river valleys has all but collapsed; prices of staple grains and legumes (maize, sorghum and beans) have doubled; and millions of livestock have perished. Deforestation (partly fuelled by the charcoal trade), soil erosion, coupled with diminishing volumes of water in the three major rivers – Shabelle, Janale and Juba – in turn have severely undermined subsistence farming in the fertile riverine belts. Somalis also blame insufficient local production of traditional coarse grains on land grabbing by businessmen connected to powerful clans and the switch to cash crops, such as lemons and sesame seed, especially in Lower Shabelle' ([414]).

The UN Secretary General in his May 2017 report states: 'The humanitarian situation deteriorated at an alarming pace and the risk of famine continues in 2017'. He estimates that '6.2 million people face acute food insecurity, and nearly 3 million require urgent life-saving assistance' ([415]). UNHCR notes in its factsheet, covering July 2017:

> 'Humanitarian situation remains to be fragile; severe food consumption gaps, ongoing conflict, insecurity and loss of livelihood remain the main contributing factors.

([409]) LandInfo, Somalia: Children and youth, 11 June 2015 (url), p. 13.
([410]) UNDP, Human Development Report on Somalia, 2016 (url).
([411]) UNDP, Somalia Human Development Report 2012, 28 September 2012 (url); LandInfo. Somalia: Medical treatment and medication, 14 August 2014 (url), p. 5.
([412]) UNICEF, Country programme document: Somalia, 18 July 2017 (url), p. 2.
([413]) ICG, Instruments of Pain (III): Conflict and Famine in Somalia, 9 May 2017 (url), p. 2.
([414]) ICG, Instruments of Pain (III): Conflict and Famine in Somalia, 9 May 2017 (url), p. 2.
([415]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 11.

> Internal displacement continues to be a key driver of humanitarian and protection needs. Newly-displaced people faced heightened protection risks. Until the beginning of the *Deyr* rain (October), severe drought is expected to deepen that may increase vulnerability of the persons of concern' ([416]).

The risk of famine persists but is 'not yet a reality', according to OCHA in September 2017 ([417]).

'The drought has affected all economic activities in Somalia, including pastoralism, agriculture and fishery. Weak public capital investment is a critical binding constraint on protecting livelihoods from climate-related shocks in a weather-dependent economy. Basic water infrastructure and management could also have mitigated the current drought' according to the UN Secretary-General ([418]). The drought, leading to diminishing natural resources, also presumably has an escalating effect on conflict dynamics in Middle Shabelle and Sool, according to a BFA/SEM source ([419]).

AS is responding differently to the current drought compared to the previous one in 2010-2012, said a BFA/SEM source. Generally, AS is allowing NGOs to deliver drought-related aid to areas under its control, as long as there is no logo of an NGO or donor shown. After all, AS families also benefit from food aid ([420]). The number of AS attacks on the UN went down in the past four years. However, the recent increased UN activities in the drought-stricken areas causes anxiety regarding potential attacks by AS ([421]).

The Jamestown Foundation also reports that AS had distributed food aid to the local populations, and helped farmers irrigating their fields, in the most drought-affected areas in Bay, Bakool, Mudug, Hiiraan and Galgaduud. This food aid is considered by Jamestown as a new and necessary strategy by AS, using it as a publicity campaign to win the hearts of the rural population in their control, so that they can continue their military activities. 'With AMISOM troops remaining in towns and ports, Al-Shabaab is believed to be re-grouping in these rural areas to launch attacks, coordinated from its base in Jilib' ([422]).

ICG, however, still underlines the issue of access restrictions created by AS, clan militias and disgruntled government and federal state forces. It cites an incident in which inhabitants in Waajid (Bay region) who transported relief food on donkey carts were detained by AS, their food burnt. AS warned them not to accept food from 'crusaders and apostates', referring to foreigners and the Somali government ([423]).

([416]) UNHCR, Somalia, Factsheet, 1-31 July 2017, 12 September 2017 (url).
([417]) UN OCHA, Somalia: Humanitarian Dashboard - August 2017, 18 September 2017 (url), p. 1.
([418]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 7.
([419]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), pp. 81, 102.
([420]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International NGO (A), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 39.
([421]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 39.
([422]) Jamestown, Al-Shabaab Plays on Aid Distribution Role to Win Over Desperate Somalis, 7 April 2017 (url).
([423]) ICG, Instruments of Pain (III): Conflict and Famine in Somalia, 9 May 2017 (url), p. 1.

3. Security situation per region

In this chapter, an overview of the security situation is given by regional state and region, based on the following elements (as indicated in the section on Introduction):

- Nature of the violence
- Number/ kind of incidents
- Number of casualties

The security situation in Somalia is complex and remains volatile. Numerous parties are involved and it can be difficult to clearly distinguish between them, as overlapping economic and clan interests blur the picture. This has been discussed in the previous chapter, in particular 2.3. Recent security trends ([424]). There exist, however, significant regional variations and in the present chapter each region will be discussed individually.

3.1. Geographical overview of the security situation

BFA/SEM map of areas of influence, July 2017

BFA/SEM produced a map on areas of influence in its FFM report (August 2017), based on information from sources from their FFM in March 2017, non-public sources and in consultation with a military strategy expert in Vienna ([425]). The map is reproduced on the next page. The map is explained and annotated by the BFA/SEM in their FFM report as follows ([426]):

> 'It is not possible to give a complete and comprehensive picture of the situation; the territorial limits are relative, but approximate (e.g. problem of varying influence by day and night; fluctuation along relevant supply lines).
>
> To provide a clear structure of the map, the (conflict) parties operating on Somali soil were categorised:
>
> a) All forces associated in any manner with the Somali government and at the same time combating AS, were summarised as 'anti-Al Shabaab forces'. This category includes federal forces (SNA) and regional state forces (such as Jubbaland, Galmudug and Puntland) as well as AMISOM and bilaterally engaged troops (and therefore de facto also the Liyu Police).
> b) The ASWJ was not included in this category as, while it is combating al Shabaab, the relationship with the federal government is currently unclear.
> c) Some clans have relative independence, which is also ensured with militias. This primarily relates to the Warsangeli (Sanaag), parts of the Dulbahante (Sool) and the so-called Macawusleey militia in Hiiraan. None of these militias is affiliated with Somaliland, a Somali regional state, with the Somali federal government or with AS; they operate independently, but have limited resources'.

([424]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Western diplomatic source, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 35; DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; Western Source; Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), p. 7.
([425]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), p. 22.
([426]) The quote is translated from German by EASO and translation has been approved by the authors. For the original quote in German see: BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), pp. 24-27.



© BFA/SEM, August 2017.

'Operational Areas

d) Operational areas in which the highlighted parties have relevant influence (monochrome): this is where the parties have access to significant resources (armament, troops, financing, structure, administration, etc.) to ensure a longer-term influence. These are the Republic of Somaliland, Puntland, in some cases also Galmudug, AMISOM in tandem with the Somali government or with regional states; Ethiopian forces in the border area; Al Shabaab; Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a in central Somalia.
e) Some areas (crosshatched), predominantly in South/Central Somalia, are under the influence of two relevant parties.
f) All of the cities and towns entered in the map have been assigned to one of the aforementioned parties. They are not crosshatched […]. To the extent known, AMISOM bases or garrisons of bilaterally engaged troops have been assigned to the cities. In the cities without this kind of presence, there is an SNA presence or alternatively security forces of the individual regional states, or Somaliland.
g) Operational areas in which smaller parties have limited influence (dotted line): these are areas in which, besides the aforementioned relevant parties, other parties with limited resources are active as well. The relevance of their influence in these operational areas fluctuates and depends on the available resources and their use' ([427]).

BFA/SEM includes the below annotation on the content of the map in its FFM report ([428]):

a) 'The map displayed shows the well-known fragmented picture of Somalia. Large parts of northern Somalia are made up of the consolidated entities of Somaliland and Puntland.
b) The eastern third part of the regions of Sool and Sanaag is disputed between Puntland and Somaliland.
c) In the districts of Buuhoodle, Laascaanood, Xudun and Taalex there are sporadic disputes between Somaliland and individual Dulbahante militias […]
d) In the district of Laasqoray, neither Somaliland nor Puntland have significant influence; parts of the district are *de facto* self-administered by the local Warsangeli.
e) In the region of the Galgala [Golis] Mountains, on the border between Somaliland and Puntland, an AS group has been established for many years. From there, this group carries out, mostly small, operations in the surrounding area.
f) Islamic State is establishing a presence in the northern part of Bari region, in the districts of Qandala and Iskushuban; its range is limited due to clan dynamics and resources.
g) Regular conflicts between local clans occur in Galkacyo, on the border between Puntland and Galmudug.

Galmudug:

h) Parts of the regions of Mulug and Galguduud are assigned to the regional state of Galmudug. Galmudug already borders AS areas and the range of influence is aligned to the Hobyo-Dhusamareb axis. The districts of Xaradheere and Ceel Dheere are under the control of al Shabaab; this is also true for the district of Ceel Buur. Following the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in March 2017, the town of Ceel Buur was re-occupied by AS.

([427]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), pp. 24-25.
([428]) The quote is translated from German by EASO and translation has been approved by the authors. For the original quote in German see: BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), pp. 25-27.

i) ASWJ has established itself in the district of Dhuusamarreeb. The relationship between ASWJ and Galmudug as well as with the Somali government remains unclear. However, the group is a declared adversary of AS. Dhuusamarreeb is home to the northernmost base of the bilaterally deployed Ethiopian troops.

The following can be stated for the remaining parts of South/Central Somalia:

j) The regional capital Buale (Middle Jubba) as well as the district capitals of Saakow, Jilib (Middle Jubba), Jamaame (Lower Jubba), Sablaale, Kurtunwaarey (Lower Shabelle), Diinsoor (Bay) and Tayeeglow (Bakool) are under the control of AS. The latter two towns were previously occupied by bilaterally engaged Ethiopian troops, but these have withdrawn, primarily for political reasons.
k) All other regional and district capitals are held by anti-AS troops. Many of the towns are also AMISOM garrison towns.
l) Some of the towns and positions are of particular strategic relevance, whether this is to keep supply or deployment routes clear or to secure the relevant hinterland.
m) The situation of towns that were held by bilaterally engaged Ethiopian troops (Xudur, Ceel Guur, Tayeeglow, Diinsoor) has proven to be problematic in the past. Ethiopia has continuously used its troops to exert pressure on the Somali government and/or international donors. While Ethiopia will not simply withdraw from towns, which are occupied together with AMISOM contingents or which are of strategic importance for its own troops or its own situation, the bilaterally occupied towns of Xudur and Maxaas are particularly exposed.
n) The extent to which Somali troops will be able to hold the areas and FOBs [Forward Operational Bases] in Eel Leheli, Goof Gaduud, Afcad, Adan Yabaal, Wabxo, Miir Taqwo, Biyo Cado, Abdale Birole and Badhaade [these are areas indicated on the map by green/blue stripes] without foreign support remains to be seen.
o) The map also shows FOBs in small villages and protected positions along important supply routes, to which an AMISOM garrison has also been assigned. In contrast to the aforementioned towns, in most cases, these kinds of garrisons cannot be referred to as permanent (exceptions include K50 and Berdale).
p) The range of the relevant garrison differs and cannot be assessed in detail. However, in many cases, the effective influence of AMISOM and the Somali allies remains focussed on the town itself, although more extensive excursions may occur in some cases.
q) Al Shabaab controls vast tracts of the rural areas and uses guerrilla activities to isolate several towns, some of which appear as islands in AS-territory.
r) In rare cases, larger combat units of AS infiltrate the towns. In general, the penetration is terminated by AMISOM and Somali allies within hours (past examples include Afgooye, and Qoryooley).
s) In some towns, undercover AS-agents infiltrate the towns. In some parts of Mogadishu, influence differs depending on the time of day.
t) The Liyu police, often in cooperation with local militias, operates on the Ethiopian border' ([429]).

More detailed information on the security information and violent incidents by region and regional state is presented in the following Section 3.2. Security situation by region and regional state.

([429]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), pp. 25-27.

3.2. Security situation by region and regional state

In this chapter, the security situation is described by region during the reporting period, including the kind of violence and the actors involved, the areas of control (or influence) and the impact on the local population, including access to food.

The regions are listed from south to north and subdivided into regional states and regions: Jubbaland (Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba, Gedo), Banaadir (Mogadishu), South West State (Lower Shabelle, Bay, Bakool), HirShabelle (Hiiraan, Middle Shabelle), Galmudug (Galguduud, southern part of Mudug), Somaliland, Puntland (Bari, Nugaal).

The following maps, compiled by EASO on the basis of ACLED data, give a quick overview of the number of violent incidents and resulting number of deaths ('fatalities') per region from January 2016 and 31 August 2017 ([430]).



Figure 1 Number of violent incidents over the year 2016 and the first 8 months of 2017, source: ACLED data ([1]).

([430]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).



Figure 2: Number of fatalities resulting from violent incidents over the year 2016 and the first 8 months of 2017; source: ACLED data ([431]).

In the following sub-chapters these data are further elaborated. As mentioned in the Introduction, the ACLED data should be merely regarded as estimates and indicating a trend. It should be borne in mind that ACLED data may not always be accurate. In Al Shabaab areas or frontline areas unaccessible to regular media reporting, there may be underreporting of incidents, whereas, in areas with large media coverage and presence of NGOs, overreporting may occur.

For more information on ACLED's methodology, refer to its Codebook ([432]).

Where data are available, a distinction is made by ACLED between violence against civilians and military-based violence. However, as mentioned in Section 2.5.1. Civilian fatalities, the

([431]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([432]) ACLED, Codebook, 2017 (url).

number of civilian fatalities mentioned under 'violence against civilians' are not *per se* only civilians; and on the other hand, civilians are also victims in attacks against military targets ([433]).

3.2.1. Jubbaland State

Jubbaland State is headed by President Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam 'Madobe', former warlord of the Ras Kamboni militia ([434]). Jubbaland State covers the regions Lower Jubba (Jubbada Hoose), Middle Jubba (Jubbada Dhexe), and Gedo ([435]). BFA/SEM sources consider the Jubbaland State administration 'ahead of the other regional states' and add that government and ministries are functioning; the establishment of the police and judiciary is in process and supported by international funds ([436]). The Jubbaland military is considered superior to those in other parts of the country. However, it is also noted that Madobe does not have the capacity to control all of Jubbaland (AS is present in and controls large, in particular rural, parts of the state ([437]) and therefore he cooperates with the AMISOM troops from Kenya and Ethiopia ([438]).

BFA/SEM sources noted that the regional government has reached an understanding with the clans Ogaden, Marehan, Harti and Rahanweyn. This has certainly contributed to stability and security in Jubbaland ([439]). International Crisis Group mentioned an agreement between the Ogaden and Marehan ([440]). In Kismayo, a partial reconciliation took place and a Marehan was appointed as deputy to Madobe ([441]).

3.2.1.1. Lower Jubba

Short description of the region

Lower Jubba is the southern-most region of Somalia, bordering Kenya to the west, Gedo to the north and Middle Jubba to the north-east. The region covers four districts: Kismayo, Jamaame, Afmadow and Badhaadhe. The regional capital is the seaport city of Kismayo. Other urban areas include Buur Gaabo, Dhobley, Tabta, Xagar, Bilis Qooqaani. The Bajuni Islands belong to the region as well.

The main population groups are Ogaden and Harti (from the Darod clan family), a Biyomaal group (Dir) and several Hawiye sub-clans ([442]).

([433]) See also LandInfo, Somalia: Violence, fatalities, perpetrators and victims in Mogadishu, 27 February 2017 (url), p. 6.
([434]) EASO, COI Report Somalia Security Situation, February 2016 (url), p. 32.
([435]) Jubaland State [website], n.d. (url).
([436]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation, Mogadishu; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 59.
([437]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (B), Nairobi; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), pp. 57, 59.
([438]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 57.
([439]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; International organisation (B), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 57.
([440]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 57.
([441]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Organisation (B), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 57.
([442]) EASO, COI report - South and Central Somalia Country overview [clan maps based on Lewis 1955, Abikar 1999], August 2014 (url), pp. 52-53.

The 2014 Population Estimation Survey conducted by UN Population Fund and Somali authorities estimated the population of the Lower Jubba region in 2014 at 489 307 inhabitants, of which 172 861 are urban, 161 512 are rural, 124 334 are nomads and 30 600 are IDPs ([443]). More recent population estimates are not available; however, the figures may be affected by drought, conflict and returnees in recent years ([444]). See also Section 2.5.5. IDPs, refugees, and returnees.

Background on the conflict and actors in Lower Jubba

The main actors in Lower Jubba are AS and anti-AS forces ([445]).

According to DIS/DRC sources, 'in Lower Jubba the control can be regarded as shared between the Jubaland administration and AS, with AS in full control of all rural areas and the Jubbaland administration in control of some urban centres' ([446]). The term 'full control' by AS is not used by other sources; see the BFA/SEM map of areas of influence, July 2017 where the situation along the Kenyan border is more blurred.

The Kismayo city centre is considered by DIS/DRC sources 'AMISOM/SNA controlled and [...] the city of Kismayo a relatively safe place. […] As of December 2016 there have been no attacks in Kismayo for some time' ([447]). There is a certain level of rule of law in Kismayo and the security situation has significantly improved, according to many BFA/SEM sources ([448]). The city is considered one of the three safest places in South/Central Somalia, and the safest place to return to ([449]). Bradbury noted that civilians can move freely and relatively safely in Kismayo ([450]). There are currently no open clan conflicts in Kismayo, although these may be simmering under the surface ([451]).

DIS/DRC sources noted that the Jubbaland State government is able to keep Kismayo relatively safe due to 'a rather strict control of new arrivals in the city through an extended network of informants. Newcomers, including returnees, are perceived as a potential threat'. It was further noted that 'people from Dadaab are able to return to Kismayo but it would be more complicated for Somalis who had been living in Europe to return to Kismayo' ([452]).

([443]) UNFPA, Population Estimation Survey 2014, Somalia, October 2014 (url), p. 31.
([444]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).
([445]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), pp. 83-84.
([446]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), p. 14.
([447]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; NGO working in Somalia; International Organisation (B); Independent Organisation, March 2017 (url), p. 15. BFA/SEM sources also mentioned that there have been hardly any attacks or assaults in Kismayo. BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (B), Nairobi; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 59.
([448]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; International NGO (A), Nairobi; International organisation, Mogadishu; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa; Military strategic expert, Vienna; International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 58.
([449]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International NGO (A), Nairobi; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 58.
([450]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Mark Bradbury, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 58.
([451]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; Western diplomatic source, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 60.
([452]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: Anonymous Source; UN Source; Western Source], March 2017 (url), p. 14.

AS does not have an organisational structure nor operational presence in Kismayo and is active only to a limited extent ([453]). However, a BFA/SEM source considered it very likely that there is a hidden presence of AS in Kismayo, for example via family members acting as a support or logistics network ([454]). AS has an economic interest in continous operation of the Kismayo port, which is used for supplying its bastion in Middle Juba ([455]).

Outside Kismayo, the picture of control is less clear (see also the BFA/SEM map of areas of influence, July 2017).

Jubbaland Authority exercises power not only in Kismayo but also (to a certain extent) in Afmadow and Bilis Qoqani (whereas the area between these cities is under AS influence, according to International Crisis Group) ([456]). Jubbaland troops in these two places are under the command of Kismayo whose chain of command works relatively well ([457]). Jamaame district is under AS control ([458]). Badhaade has changed sides several times: in January 2016 given up by KDF, in December 2016 under AS control and in June 2017 occupied by Jubbaland troops ([459]).

The Kenyan AMISOM contingent works together with local communities and militias to push AS out of the area. These activities have improved the security in the region and contributed to a more quiet situation along the Kenyan-Somali border. There is a Kenyan AMISOM army base in Dhobley ([460]). Additional AMISOM KDF bases are located in Afmadow, Dif, Tabta, Bilis Qooqaani, Hoosingow, Didir Lafcad, Academia and Luglaaw, and in Kismayo's old and new airports ([461]).

AMISOM forces in Kismayo consist of 1000 Ethiopian, 200-250 Burundi and 400-500 Kenyan troops. As mentioned earlier, there are also US forces at Kismayo international airport from where drones can be flown ([462]).

Recent security trends and violent incidents

During the reporting period of 1 January 2016 to 31 August 2017, ACLED ([463]) registered 305 incidents in Lower Jubba, and estimates the number of fatalities at 1 084 ([464]).

([453]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Mark Bradbury, Nairobi; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 59.
([454]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Western diplomatic source, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 60.
([455]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 60.
([456]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation, Mogadishu; International Crisis Group], August 2017 (url), pp. 57, 61.
([457]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 57.
([458]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), p. 16; BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group], August 2017 (url), pp. 57, 61.
([459]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), p. 16; BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 62.
([460]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; International organisation (C), Nairobi; International NGO (A), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), pp. 58, 62.
([461]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 62.
([462]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 , pp. 60-61.
([463]) For more explanation about this source of information, refer to the Introduction of this report.
([464]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).

ACLED data	2016		Jan-31 Aug 2017		2016-31 Aug 2017	
Region	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**
Jubbada Hoose	188	648	117	436	305	1084

Most of these incidents led to few fatalities but in about 20 incidents more than 10 fatalities were reported. Some of these incidents are unverified and might be based on propaganda. Most of these incidents concern attacks by AS on military targets or attacks by AMISOM/KDF/SNA on AS. Fatalities mentioned are mostly AS fighters ([465]).

It should be noted that in areas where Kenyan forces and AS are present, there are disputing claims and counter-claims by each side about casualty figures and numbers killed; Kenya does not release casualty figures on its side ([466]) and AS numbers are often very different from official reports ([467]). Consequently, numbers often appear as a range, and accurate, verified figures are difficult to obtain.

Some of the most violent incidents reported (some numbers unverified):

According to ACLED's anonymous local sources, on 9 January 2016 AS fighters conducted a hit-and-run attack against the AMISOM/KDF contingent base in Badhaadhe town. Somali forces reacted with gunfire, killing 19 of the attackers ([468]).

An AS base at Abdidhoore village (40 km west of Kismaayo) was hit (by a suspected US air strike) in the morning of 2 April 2016. Residents reported that the base was completely destroyed and saw five dead bodies lying near the village which were later buried. Further reports indicate that over 20 AS fighters were killed in the bombing ([469]).

On 24 May 2016, AS forces ambushed a SNA and AMISOM-KDF convoy near Dhobley, during which 25 AS-fighters were killed, including a junior commander ([470]).

A convoy transporting KDF troops was targeted in a roadside bomb explosion outside Liboi town near the Somali border on 3 June 2016. The bomb blast destroyed one of vehicles in the convoy, causing unidentified fatalities. As is believed to be behind the attack ([471]).

According to Shabelle Media Network, on 22 October 2016, Al Shabaab raided Afmadhow, attacked a police station and killed three officers. Local forces were able to hold ground until the KDF reinforced them ([472]). Kenyan forces claimed that more than 140 AS-fighters were killed by KDF-soldiers during the 22 October attack in Afmadhow area in Lower Jubba. The gun battle lasted for three hours([473]). Garowe Online reported that there were heavy clashes leading to 'more than 100' AS were killed([474]). These numbers could not be verified further.

([465]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([466]) BBC News, Africa highlights: Kenyan forces 'kill 57 militants' in Somalia, Eritrea rejects Ethiopia attack claim, 2 March 2017 (url).
([467]) Reuters, Somalia's al Shabaab says kills dozens of Kenyan troops in raid on base 27 January 2017 (url).
([468]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([469]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([470]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([471]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([472]) Shabelle Media Network, Somalia: Al Shabaab Raids Afmadow Police Station, 3 Killed, 23 October 2016 (url).
([473]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([474]) Garowe Online, Somalia: Allied forces kill more than 100 militants in Southern Somalia, 31 October 2016 (url).

On 18 December 2016 Jubbaland troops launched a military offensive on AS training camps in Janay Abdalia and Berhani, 60 km west of Kismayo. At least 15 AS fighters were killed ([475]).

According to ACLED, a complex AS attack was launched on 27 January 2017 on a Kenyan military base near Kulbiyow. The attackers managed to briefly overtake the base, killing between 51 and 57 soldiers. Military equipment was also captured ([476]). Other sources say an AS spokesmen claimed 51 ([477]), 57 ([478]) to 66 ([479]) Kenyan troops were killed, while a witness in the town stated 40 soldiers were killed ([480]).

Kenyan forces claimed that they killed at least 57 AS-fighters and recovered a large cache of weapons on 2 March 2017 as AMISOM and Somali forces attacked one of their camps outside Afmadhow ([481]). AS disputed the claim, saying none of their fighters had been killed ([482]).

On 13 March 2017, 10 civilians were killed and three captured by AMISOM Kenyan forces in a village named Buloshid in the outskirts of Kismayo. Another 18 people were injured by the troops. The motivation is not known ([483]).

On 21 April 2017, Kenyan AMISOM forces attacked and overran an AS camp at Badhaadhe with artillery fire and ground forces, claiming to have killed 52 AS fighters([484]).

On 17 July 2017 early morning, KDF fighter jets conducted an airstrike against suspected AS positions in the Golosha Mountains. Reports indicated the jets missed their targets, hitting a nearby settlement. At least four civilian died ([485]).

On 1 August 2017, a VIED was detonated at a car wash in Kismayo killing 11 people and injuring more than 10 ([486]).

On 13 August 2017, an airstrike was launched against an AS hideout in an area 40 km north of Kismayo. An AS pick-up with an unspecified number of fighters on board was destroyed ([487]).

Violence against civilians

In 2016, 24 incidents were characterised as 'violence against civilians'. ACLED estimates the number of civilian fatalities at 50 ([488]). Between January to 31 August 2017, 17 such incidents and 26 fatalities were reported ([489]). Some of the most violent examples reported (some numbers unverified):

([475]) Garowe Online, Somalia: Jubbaland forces clash with Al-Shabaab fighters near Kismayo, 15 killed, 18 December 2016 (url).
([476])ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([477]) VOA, Al-Shabab captures military base in Somalia before withdrawing, 27 January 2017 (url).
([478]) Guardian (The), Witnesses say dozens killed in al-Shabaab attack on Kenyan troops, 27 January 2017 (url); Hiraan Online, Al-Shabaab launch major attack on a KDF base in Kulbiyow, 27 January 2017 (url).
([479]) Reuters, Somalia's al Shabaab says it kills dozens of Kenyan troops in raid on base, 27 January 2017 (url).
([480]) Guardian (The), Witnesses say dozens killed in al-Shabaab attack on Kenyan troops, 27 January 2017 (url).
([481]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url); Reuters, Kenyan forces battle al Shabaab militants in Somalia, 2 March 2017 (url).
([482]) Reuters, Kenyan forces battle al Shabaab militants in Somalia, 2 March 2017 (url).
([483]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([484]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url); Reuters, Kenyan forces say 52 al Shabaab fighters killed in Somalia, 21 April 2017 (url).
([485]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([486]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([487]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([488]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([489]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).

On 23 March 2016, in Buur Gaabo AS shot at a group of people who were cutting vegetation to be used for the burning of charcoal. Three people were killed ([490]).

On 5 August 2016, AS attacked a coal camp in Buuilo Xaaji killing four labourers and injuring seven others and destroyed four trucks loaded with coal ([491]).

On 17 December 2016, AS attacked and killed nine civilians near Kismayo. Later, Jubbaland forces together with civilians pursued the attackers, killing three ([492]). A similar incident occurred two days later, resulting in an estimated 10 fatalities ([493]). Summarising these clashes, VOA reported on 26 December 2016, that in the two previous weeks of clashes between between AS and local clans over livestock taken as *zakat*, 20 people had been killed, according to regional officials and local people ([494]).

On 25 December 2016, Hawiye/Gajecel militiamen killed two Hawiye/Ormale clansmen at a water source in a grazing area of Feer Sagaro (approximately 58 km north-west of Kismaayo) ([495]).

On 5 February 2017, an AS media outlet reports that AS executed four persons accused of spying for the US and Kenya ([496]).

Road security

According to a DIS/DRC source, while the security situation is still fragile, especially for people not originating from Kismayo, local people 'can move freely and carry out their day-to-day activities'. Another source stated that 'it is not safe to travel by road in some areas in Lower Juba' ([497]). Road transport from Mogadishu to Kismayo occurs although it is difficult. AS is present in the outskirts of Kismayo urban centre. Therefore, the road to and from the Kismayo airport, which is located outside Kismayo city centre, is exposed ([498]).

3.2.1.2. Middle Jubba

Short description of the region

The region is located in the southern part of Somalia and borders Gedo to the north and north-west, Bay to the north-east, Lower Shabelle to the east and Lower Jubba to the south. It has three districts: Bu'aale, Jilib and Saakow (or Saaxo). The regional capital is Bu'aale.

([490]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([491]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([492]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([493]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url); Garowe Online, Somalia: 10 people killed in heavy fighting near Kismayo, 21 December 2016 (url).
([494]) VOA, Al-Shabab seizes Somali Herders' livestock, 26 December 2016 (url).
([495]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([496]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url); Reuters, Somalia's al Shabaab executes four men accused of spying, 6 February 2017 (url).
([497]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia {sources: Independent Organisation; NGO working in Somalia] , March 2017 (url), p. 14.
([498]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia {source: International Organisation (B)] , March 2017 (url), pp. 14, 15.

The region has a very diverse population in terms of clan representation: Biyomaal (Dir), Bartire (Darod), Aulihan (Ogaden), Gosha (Bantu), Barsame, Jilid, Dirisamo, Sheikhal, Ajuran and Galjaal (Hawiye), and Dabarre and Tunni (Rahanweyn) ([499]).

According to the 2014 Population Estimation Survey undertaken by the UN Population Fund and Somali authorities, 362 921 inhabitants live in Middle Jubba, divided into 56 242 urban and 148 439 rural people, 131 240 nomads and 27 000 IDPs ([500]). More recent population estimates are not available; however, the figures may be affected by drought, conflict and returnees in recent years ([501]). See also Section 2.5.5. IDPs, refugees, and returnees.

Background on the conflict and actors in Middle Jubba

Middle Jubba is 'regarded as fully controlled by AS' by DIS/DRC sources ([502]).The region is considered a 'bastion' of AS. The group has a strong presence in the Jubba valley ([503]). The BFA/SEM report mentions the towns of Buaale, Saakow and Jilib under AS control ([504]).AS deploys 2 000-2 500 fighters, distributed over an area from Lower Jubba to Gedo. Neither AMISOM, nor the Somali government or one of its allied groups operate any bases in the region ([505]).

Recent security trends and violent incidents

During the reporting period of 1 January 2016 to 31 August 2017, ACLED ([506]) registered 50 incidents in Middle Jubba, which resulted in an estimated 193 fatalities, the large majority in 2016 ([507]). Incidents in Middle Jubba may be underreported.

ACLED data	2016		Jan-31 Aug 2017		2016-31 Aug 2017	
Region	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**
Jubbada Dhexe	41	167	9	26	50	193

The most violent incidents were attacks on AS positions and convoys, including targeted airstrikes by drones, war planes and airborne units ([508]). Some examples of such incidents:

Between 11 and 13 August 2016, Somali and US military forces raided an AS base in Saakow, recovering weapons and reportedly killed more than 30 AS fighters. AS leader Abu Ubeida was

([499]) EASO, COI report - South and Central Somalia Country overview [clan maps based on Lewis 1955, Abikar 1999], August 2014 (url), pp. 52-53.
([500]) UNFPA, Population Estimation Survey 2014, Somalia, October 2014 (url), p. 31.
([501]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).
([502]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); UN Source (B); NGO working in Somalia; International Organisation (A); Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), p. 15.
([503]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 62.
([504]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), p. 25.
([505]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 62.
([506]) For more explanation about this source of information, refer to the Introduction of this report.
([507]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([508]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).

suspected to be either killed or captured ([509]), however this rumour was denied by the US commander ([510]).

In 2017 there were no incidents with more than 8 fatalities. The largest incident occurred on 11 June 2017, in Saakow, when an airstrike targeted an AS training camp. News reports mention 8 dead and the destruction of the camp ([511]).

Several other attacks on AS positions and convoys were carried out in 2017. For example on 13 July 2017, an AS camp in Kunya Barow was destroyed and several prisoners were freed, while unverified information suggests that the spokesman of AS, Sheikh Ali Dheere, 'may have been killed' ([512]). A US spokesman did not specify which AS fighters had been killed ([513]).

On 17 August 2017, a US drone targeted a high-profile AS leader in Bulu Sheikh, 10 km from Jilib, killing seven people. The victims were AS fighters, according to the government and US sources; according to other sources, citing local residents, they were civilians, all members of the same family ([514]).

Violence against civilians

ACLED recorded 10 incidents on violence against civilians in 2016 and four in 2017 (respectively 14 and 6 fatalities) ([515]).

On 12 April 2016, AS hijacked seven civilian vehicles (trucks and civilian mini-buses) from Bu'aale town to transport fighters towards Afmadow. ACLED sources indicated that AS was planning a complex attack in one of the JDF and AMISOM-controlled towns and villages in Lower Jubba to respond to the airstrikes against them ([516]).

On 6 October 2016 a clan dispute (Rahanweyn-Ogaden) over land resulted in one death ([517]).

On 21 October 2016, AS publicly executed three people suspected of being Western spies in Saakow ([518]).

On 1 January 2017, AS publicly executed a 76-year old civilian man over accusations of working with the Jubbaland government ([519]).

On 10 January 2017, AS executed two people in Bu'aale over charges of homosexuality ([520]).

([509]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d; AllAfrica, Somalia: U.S. Special Forces Kill Al-Shabaab Militants, 15 August 2016 (url).
([510]) New York Times, Somali Forces, Backed by U.S., Kill Shabab Militants in Raid, 16 August 2016 (url).
([511]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([512]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([513]) US News, US, Somalia Forces Raid Al-Shabab, Kill Several: Official, 13 July 2017 (url).
([514]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url); US Africa Command, U.S. conducts three strikes against al-Shabaab, 17 August 2017 (url); CNN, US troops call in airstrike after they come under fire in Somalia, 17 August 2017 (url); Shabelle Media Network, Somalia: At Least 7 Civilians Killed By Airstrike in Southern Somalia, 17 August 2017 (url); Somalia Newsroom, PHOTOS: Al-Shabaab and AFRICOM dispute outcome of drone strikes, 18 August 2017 (url); Radio Shabelle, At least 7 civilians killed by airstrike in Southern Somalia, 17 August 2017 (url).
([515]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d; ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([516]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d; AllAfrica, Somalia: U.S. Special Forces Kill Al-Shabaab Militants, 15 August 2016 (url).
([517]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([518]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([519]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([520]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).

3.2.1.3. Gedo

Short description of the region

The Gedo region is the second-largest region in Somalia. It is located in the south-west and borders with Kenya to the south-west, Ethiopia to the north-west and other Somali regions: Bakool to the north, Bay to the east and Middle Jubba and Lower Jubba to the south, respectively.

The region consists of 6 districts with their capitals of the same name: Garbahaarey, Luuq, Doolow, Belet (Bulo) Xaawo, Ceel Waaq and Baardheere. The regional capital is Garbahaarey.

The main population groups include the Darod sub-clans Marehan and Ogaden (Awlihan), while the Rahanweyn and Gobaweyne minorities settle at the bank of the river Jubba. There are also several Hawiye groups: Ajuran, Awramale, Ribi and Garre ([521]).

A 2014 Population Estimation Survey undertaken by UNFPA and Somali authorities estimated the population in the Gedo region at 508 405 inhabitants: 109 142 are urban inhabitants and 177 742 are rural inhabitants, 144 793 are nomads and 76 728 are IDPs ([522]). More recent population estimates are not available; however, the figures may be affected by drought, conflict and returnees in recent years ([523]). See also Section 2.5.5. IDPs, refugees, and returnees.

Background on the conflict and actors in Gedo

The SNA forces and multiple militias in Geda are considered by a BFA/SEM source an 'island of loyalty' to the Somali federal government. The locally dominant Marehan (Darod) traditionally have good relations with the Ministry of Defense ([524]). Some of their militias have joined the SNA forces in Gedo ([525]). The Jubbaland Administration, mainly consisting of the Ogaden (Darod) sub-clan (which is rival to the Marehan ([526]) has a limited influence, although it has recently installed a Marehan governor in Gedo ([527]).

A BFA/SEM source describes the towns of Luuq and Garbahaarey as 'islands of stability', where progress and development take place ([528]). The safest towns in Gedo are Dhobley, Doolow (although considered less safe than Dhobley], and Bulo Xawo ([529]). Baardheere is under control of AMISOM and Ethiopian troops ([530]). DIS/DRC sources also mention the urban

([521]) EASO, COI report - South and Central Somalia Country overview [clan maps based on Lewis 1955, Abikar 1999], August 2014 (url), pp. 52-53.
([522]) UNFPA, Population Estimation Survey 2014, Somalia, October 2014 (url), p. 31.
([523]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).
([524]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 63.
([525]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 63.
([526]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 21.
([527]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 63.
([528]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Organisation (B), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 63.
([529]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; Military strategic expert, Vienna; International NGO (A), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 63.
([530]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 64.

centres of Baardheere, Garbahaarey and Luuq under AMISOM control ([531]).The Ethiopian Liyu Police are active in the Luuq district ([532]).

Kenyan AMISOM troops have bases in Bakhtiti, Buusaar, Faan Weyn, Buulo Garas (Baardheere), Belet Xawo and Dhamaso. Ethiopian AMISOM bases are located in Belet Xawo and Garbahaarey. Ethiopian forces not integrated into AMISOM ('bilateral') have bases in Baardheere, Buurdhuubo, Doolow and Luuq ([533]).

Large parts of the country between the garrison towns are AS territory ([534]). However, some parts of Gedo are considered relatively or entirely free from AS. Mentioned are: Dhobley, Doolow, Luuq and the direct border area with Ethiopia ([535]).

The situation in the northern border area with Kenya, between Mandera and Ceel Waaq has reportedly improved. After negotiations between Kenya and the Marehan clans, the situation has de-escalated ([536]).

Recent security trends and violent incidents

During the reporting period of 1 January 2016 to 31 August 2017, ACLED ([537]) registered 229 incidents in Gedo, which resulted in an estimated 753 deaths.

ACLED data	2016		Jan-31 Aug 2017		2016-31 Aug 2017	
Region	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**
Gedo	133	490	96	263	229	753

Most incidents resulted in zero to two fatalities but several incidents had higher numbers ([538]). There were 10 incidents in 2016 and 6 in 2017 with an unknown number of fatalities. As mentioned before, ACLED codes such cases by 10 fatalities. In addition, for at least 10% of the fatalities, the sources used by ACLED are media outlets of AS.

Some examples of incidents with high number of known fatalities:

On 15 January 2016, AS conducted a complex attack at the AMISOM/KDF base in Ceel Adde near Garbahaarey. Vehicles loaded with explosive devices blasted the access gate away while other AS fighters stormed and overran the base. AS claimed to have captured the base and seized heavy military arsenal. There was fierce fighting with KDF army which lasted for several hours ([539]). Only four days later could KDF rescue troops retake full control of the camp ([540]). The number of fatalities from both sides were contested, but ACLED, citing Associated Press,

([531]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; Somali NGO], March 2017 (url), p. 15.
([532])BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 64.
([533]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 64.
([534]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 64.
([535]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; International NGO (A), Nairobi; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; International organisation (B), Nairobi; International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 64.
([536]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 64.
([537]) For more explanation about this source of information, refer to the Introduction of this report.
([538]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([539]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([540]) IPI, The battle at El Adde: the Kenyan Defence forces, al-Shabaab, and unanswered questions, July 2016 (url).

mentions 180-200 Kenyan fatalities ([541]). The Ceel Adde base was the third AMISOM base overrun by AS within seven months ([542]).

In retaliation air strikes later that month, at least 12 civilians were killed, houses, livestock and water holes were destroyed and at least 8 600 people fled the Ceel Adde area ([543]).

In the months thereafter (January-July 2016), many clashes between AS and AMISOM Kenyan forces occurred in Gedo, causing numerous fatalities from both sides.

On 28 June 2016, KDF struck AS positions in Gedo, killing 40 militants, according to Shabelle News ([544]).

On several occasions in 2017, KDF AMISOM forces bombed AS camps and meetings, killing dozens of AS fighters and commanders.

On 16 January 2017 AS were driven out of Nus Dariiq and several villages between Beled Hawo and Ceel Waaq ([545]).

On 26 March 2017, KDF claimed to have killed 31 AS fighters in a raid on two bases in Baadhaade district. Ground forces were supported by armed helicopters and artillery fire ([546]). The numbers could not be verified.

On 3 July 2017, AMISOM attacked AS in Birta-Dheere south of Garbahaarey. Fighting erupted between security forces and AS fighters during an operation aimed at removing landmines. 14 AS militants and 3 government soldiers died ([547]).

On 16 July 2017, a KDF airstrike against a High Value Target (HVT) meeting in Kabis, reportedly killed 40 AS militants. Several senior AS commanders were amongst the deaths, according to Garow Online ([548]).

On 29 July 2017, KDF jets bombed an AS base near Garbahaarey. ACLED mentions zero fatalities, but according to Strategic Intelligence News, 'dozens' of AS members, mostly newly recruited trainees were killed ([549]).

Violence against civilians

ACLED recorded 20 incidents on violence against civilians in 2016 (causing 13 deaths) and 12 in 2017 (12 deaths) ([550]). The source of one incident mentioned by ACLED in 2017 is the AS media outlet Somalimemo.

([541]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([542]) IPI, The battle at El Adde: the Kenyan Defence forces, al-Shabaab, and unanswered questions, July 2016 (url); EASO, COI Report Somalia Security situation, February 2016 (url), pp. 20-21.
([543]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 169; ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([544]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); Shabelle News, KDF kills 40 Al-Shabaab militants in airstrikes, 29 June 2016 (url).
([545]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([546]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([547]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([548]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url); Garowe Online, Somalia: KDF strikes al Shabaab base, kills 40 militants, 16 July 2017 (url).
([549]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url); SIN, KDF Jets Bombard on an Al-Shabaab Base near Garbaharey in Somalia, 31 July 2017 (url).
([550]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url)

In 2016 there were several attacks on a parliamentarian, a judge, a traditional elder and the bodyguard of a district commissioner ([551]).

On 18 March 2016, AS ambushed a truck transporting *khat*, took the driver and burnt the cargo and vehicle. The same occurred on 23 May 2016 and 1 December 2016 ([552]).

On 30 July 2017, AS attacked four local NGO workers transporting child nutrition packages on donkeys. One NGO worker was kidnapped, and USD 1 500 demanded from family relatives. ACLED noted that 'authorities believe Al Shabaab kidnappings are an indication of the group's financial problems' ([553]).

Road security

Reports on road incidents are rare in the area between Doolow and Luuq. According to BFA/SEM sources, road connections south of Garbahaarey are unsafe and susceptible to AS attacks ([554]).

3.2.2. Banaadir/Mogadishu

Short description of the region

Benadir (or Banaadir) region historically refers to the coastal region in south Somalia. The administrative region Benadir is much smaller than that historical region and covers only Somalia's capital Mogadishu. Benadir is bordered by the Somali regions of Middle Shabelle and Lower Shabelle as well as the Indian Ocean. Mogadishu, governed by the mayor who is also the governor of the Benadir region, is divided into 16 districts, each headed by a district commissioner ([555]).

The traditionally dominant clans in Mogadishu are the Abgal, and Habr Gedir groups (Hawiye). There are also Murosade (Hawiye) and minorities such as Yibr (*sab*) and Sheikhal. The original inhabitants of Mogadishu are known as Reer Hamar who, according to the political analyst Joakim Gundel in a lecture on Somalia (2009), 'can be regarded as minorities in terms of language and culture'. Many of them live in the old, historical districts of Mogadishu ([556]).

The dominant clan family in Mogadishu is the Hawiye with several sub-clans (Abgal, Habr Gedir and Murusade) but this is not in all neighbourhoods the case, as a DIS/DRC source explained. Some neighbourhoods, for instance are dominated by the Darod. If a Darod would go to another neighbourhood with a different dominant clan, he or she might be vulnerable ([557]). Other sources said that there are many different clans in Mogadishu and that 'it was not unusual to see Somalis of westernised appearance in Mogadishu' ([558]).

([551]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([552]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([553]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([554]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 64.
([555]) EASO, COI report - South and Central Somalia Country overview, August 2014 (url), p. 15. As of April 2017, the new governor and mayor of Mogadishu is Thabit Abdi Mohamed. GaroweOnline, Newly appointed Mayor of Mogadishu arrived the capital, 13 April 2017 (url).
([556]) ACCORD, Clans in Somalia, December 2009, p. 17.
([557]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), p. 12.
([558]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: Anonymous Source; Western Source], March 2017 (url), p. 12.

The high level of violence In Mogadishu is particularly problematic for minority clans and IDPs, and especially single women without a network, who do not enjoy effective clan protection ([559]).

According to a BFA/SEM source, the Abgal are nowadays the clan who primarily decide on land ownership in Mogadishu. The Rahanweyn, Bantu and *sab* hardly own land. The Benadiri are said to be in a better situation as they have long historic connections with Mogadishu ([560]).

According to the 2014 Population Estimation Survey undertaken by UN Population Fund and Somali authorities, the total population of Banadir region was estimated in 2014 at 1 650 227 inhabitants, including 369 288 IDPs ([561]). More recent population estimates are not available; however, the figures may be affected by drought, conflict and returnees in recent years ([562]). See also Section 2.5.5. IDPs, refugees, and returnees. The CIA Factbook currently estimates the population of Mogadishu at 2.1 million ([563]).

Background on the conflict and actors in Banaadir

Mogadishu is 'to some extent' under the control of AMISOM and the federal government of Somalia ([564]) and its administration is relatively present and active ([565]). The AMISOM presence has to a certain extent a deterrence effect on AS, and makes it more difficult (but not impossible) for AS to enter the city ([566]).

AS has no military camps in Mogadishu but the city is under constant threat by AS. Mogadishu is infiltrated by AS, 'including Mogadishu International Airport and Villa Somalia [the presidential residence and seat of the government]', according to DIS/DRC sources ([567]). AS has the capacity to target people and conduct complex attacks inside Mogadishu on a regular basis ([568]). Several sources added that although AS does not have a military presence in Mogadishu, the group does collect taxes and deliver verdicts ([569]).

According to a DIS/DRC source, 'there are certain neighbourhoods where the government has little or no presence and during the night half of Mogadishu is not controlled by the government'. The outskirts of the city are presumably controlled by AS during night ([570]). BFA/SEM sources also state that AS has a tangible presence in Mogadishu, mostly in the northern suburbs where there are less security forces. In the night, these areas are controlled

([559]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: Anonymous Source; Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), p. 12.
([560]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 73.
([561]) UNFPA, Population Estimation Survey 2014, Somalia, October 2014 (url), p. 31.
([562]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).
([563]) CIA, The World Factbook – Somalia, last updated 5 October 2017 (url).
([564]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: UN Source (A); International Organisation (A)], March 2017 (url), p. 11.
([565]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation, Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 73.
([566]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 73.
([567]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); UN Source (B); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; NGO working in Somalia], March 2017 (url), pp. 10, 12.
([568]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); International Organisation (A); Anonymous source], March 2017 (url), p. 10.
([569]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); UN Source (B), Somali NGO; International Organisation (A)], March 2017 (url), p. 12.
([570]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: UN Source (B)], March 2017 (url), p. 12.

by AS ([571]). In the districts of Dayniile, Heliwaa and Yaqshiid, AS flags are even visible during the day, according to International Crisis Group, adding that these districts are not controlled by the government ([572]). However, another source denies that AS is openly or easily identifiable anywhere in the city at day time. This only takes place at night and only in the outer districts ([573]). Potential AS targets, for example elders who had been involved in the election process, do not stay in these parts of the city at night ([574]).

Security forces in Mogadishu consist of the Somali Police Force (SPF), AMISOM police and army, Somali National Army (SNA) and National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). The SPF functions significantly better than several years ago and is present in every district in Mogadishu, according to BFA/SEM sources. AMISOM police regularly conducts patrols and collaborates with the SPF. AMISOM has a battalion from Uganda and one from Burundi, military staff and approximately 300 police officers. Finally, the UN Guard Unit is based in Mogadishu to protect UN institutions. The SNA also has bases at critical points in the city, staff permanent checkpoints and patrols in all districts ([575]).

NISA with its special *Gashaan* unit is responsible for anti-terror operations; it also carries out targeted campaigns, for example against the AS *Amniyad (*[576]*)*.

However, the various security forces in Mogadishu are not big enough to guarantee a sufficient presence in every part of the town. The forces are also vulnerable for infiltration by AS, according to a BFA/SEM source ([577]). The security forces regularly conduct house searches, where human rights violations regularly occur ([578]).

A new development, initiated by the new government, is the creation of a separate joint security unit (the Mogadishu Stabilisation Mission, MSM) to expel radical cells. The unit counts 1 500 soldiers, of which 600 are from SNA, trained by the United Arab Emirates, and further from SPF and NISA. The unit is of mixed clan composition ([579]).

The security situation in Mogadishu in the second quarter of 2017 seems to have improved, according to a BFA/SEM source, and Ramadan 2017 saw relatively few incidents. Security forces had been paid their outstanding wages prior to Ramadan, so to improve their motivation, and parts of the SNA have been moved outside the capital to reduce incidents by undisciplined soldiers ([580]). In addition, in the framework of the Mogadishu Stabilisation Mission, security forces have started disarming the population, including illegal militias (of clans, business people and gangs). The government also installed CCTV cameras along the major roads to enhance security ([581]).

As Mogadishu is home to a large number of potential AS targets (government/international community-related persons), the largest number of targeted attacks take place in the capital.

([571]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), pp. 74, 75.
([572]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 75.
([573]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 75.
([574]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 75.
([575]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 76.
([576]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; Security analysis department, email], August 2017 (url), p. 76.
([577]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 76.
([578]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International NGO (A), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 75.
([579]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 77.
([580]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 75.
([581]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 75.

For the civilian population in Mogadishu, who is normally not a target, the main risk is to be 'in the wrong place at the wrong time', say DIS/DRC sources ([582]). Other sources added: 'Mogadishu has been the scene of several attacks with a number of civilian casualties but terror attacks against e.g. market places with no presence of high value targets are deemed unusual' ([583]).

AS kills on average 20 people per month in the capital, said International Crisis Group in Nairobi, interviewed by BFA/SEM. Although such attacks are primarily targeting government-related persons or buildings, a BFA/SEM source indicated that when a hotel is attacked, it can be assumed that the owner did not pay the required taxes to AS ([584]).

In addition to AS attacks, politically motivated clan violence and criminal acts are also contributing to the level of violence in Mogadishu ([585]). Land disputes are also increasingly leading to violent incidents ([586]). In this regard it is noted that not all attacks and killings in Mogadishu are really the work of AS. In some instances AS has been held responsible while the attacks had been carried out on behalf of business owners, according to a BFA/SEM source ([587]).

Recent security trends and violent incidents

During the reporting period of 1 January 2016 to 31 August 2017, ACLED ([588]) registered 939 incidents in Banaadir, which resulted in an estimated 1 244 deaths – which makes Banaadir the region with the highest number of incidents, although with a lower estimation of fatalities than Lower Shabelle ([589]).

ACLED data	2016		Jan-31 Aug 2017		2016-31 Aug 2017	
Region	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**
Banaadir	527	681	412	563	939	1244

The large majority of recorded incidents (about 80-90 %) cause less than 2 fatalities. In 2016 there were 52 incidents with more than 2 fatalities, causing an estimated 422 deaths (and ten incidents with an unknown number of fatalities which ACLED codes as 10).

In the first eight months of 2017 there were 32 incidents with more than two fatalities, causing an estimated 319 deaths ([590]).

([582]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (B); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; Independent Organisation; Anonymous source], March 2017 (url), pp. 12, 13.
([583]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (B); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), p. 12.
([584]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International Crisis Group, Nairobi; Western diplomatic source, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 74.
([585]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), p. 12.
([586]) RVI/HIPS, Land Matters in Mogadishu, Settlement, ownership and displacement in a contested city, 2017 (url).
([587]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 74.
([588]) For more explanation about this source of information, refer to the Introduction of this report.
([589]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([590]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).

All districts of Mogadishu may be affected by violence, according to LandInfo ([591]).

DIS/DRC sources note a decline in number of incidents since 2013, but with more fatalities per incident. This is due to a change in tactics by AS from simple grenade attacks to large scale attacks and complex attacks at market places or hotels. It was further noted that 'the number of attacks in the second half of 2016 has doubled compared to the first half of 2016' in Mogadishu ([592]).

LandInfo made an analysis of the violent incidents and fatalities([593]) recorded by ACLED in Mogadishu for 2016 ([594]). Table 1 shows that AS is involved in about 1/3 of the recorded incidents resulting in about 60 % of the deaths. The majority of all recorded incidents was perpetrated by 'unknown perpetrators' ([595]).

'Table 1: Recorded violent incidents and recorded fatalities', 2016 ([596]).

Perpetrators	Recorded incidents	Recorded fatalities
Unknown	282	186
Al Shabaab	173	399
Government forces	53	94
Clan militia	2	2
Total	510	681

Table 2 shows that about 40 % of all the recorded incidents in Mogadishu in 2016 were against civilians. The 204 attacks resulted in 256 fatalities, 'of which the majority was probably civilians' according to LandInfo. The table also shows that AS was involved in about 1/4 of the recorded attacks against civilians but caused about half of all deaths. Nearly 2/3 of the attacks were committed by 'unknown perpetrators' ([597]).

'Table 2: Violence against civilians' 2016 ([598]).

Perpetrators	Registered attacks against civilians	Registered killed
Unknown	134	108
Al Shabaab	51	130
Government forces	19	18
Total	204	256

([591]) LandInfo, Somalia: Violence, fatalities, perpetrators and victims in Mogadishu, 27 February 2017 (url), p. 4.
([592]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); NGO working in Somalia; Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), pp. 11-12.
([593]) LandInfo, Violence, fatalities, perpetrators and victims in Mogadishu, 27 February 2017 (url), p. 6.
([594]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([595]) LandInfo, Violence, fatalities, perpetrators and victims in Mogadishu, 27 February 2017 (url), p. 6.
([596]) LandInfo, Violence, fatalities, perpetrators and victims in Mogadishu, 27 February 2017 (url), p. 6.
([597]) LandInfo, Violence, fatalities, perpetrators and victims in Mogadishu, 27 February 2017 (url), p. 6.
([598]) LandInfo, Violence, fatalities, perpetrators and victims in Mogadishu, 27 February 2017 (url), p. 6.

Some examples of the most violent incidents as recorded by ACLED:

On 25 July 2016, at least 13 people were killed when two vehicles packed with explosives exploded near an AMISOM base in the Somali capital, near a UN office ([599]).

On 31 July 2016, AS fighters launched a complex attack against a police outpost in Hodan. Four police officers, five civilians, and four AS members were killed in the exchange of gunfire ([600]).

In August 2016, several AS attacks on hotels in Mogadishu occurred, killing dozens of people. On 30 August, a VBIED detonated at the Somali Youth League Hotel, near Villa Somalia, killed at least 20 (security personnel, members of parliament and civilians) and injured more than 50 people ([601]).

On 1 October 2016, AS launched an attack at a restaurant close to the NISA headquarters and the Jilaow prison where AS fighters are often held. AS said the security forces and prison guards were targeted ([602]).

On 5 November 2016, AS exploded a suicide car bombing targeting Somali forces at Sayidka junction, Mogadishu. Somalimemo, a media outlet of AS, reported about 20 casualties ([603]). According to the SNA spokesman, two soldiers were killed and five injured. Reuters notes, 'Al-Shabab usually gives far lower numbers of casualties on its side and much higher death tolls for the security forces' ([604]).

On 11 December 2016, an AS suicide car-bomb targeted a police post at the entrance of the Port of Mogadishu. At least 20 people died ([605]).

On 9 and 10 April 2017, four AS attacks caused the death of at least 12 SNA soldiers and 18 civilians ([606]). According to ACLED, attacks took place inside a Somali military base near Jazeera Training Camp (killing 5 soldiers) and two hours later near the Ministry of Defense in Dayniile (killing 15 people including soldiers). At the end of the day, an attack took place in the Bakara market (killing 3 soldiers) ([607]).

On 20 June 2017, an AS VBIED rammed the Wadajir District Administration Headquarters. Seventeen people, including a number of government officials, died in the attack ([608]).

On 30 July 2017, a VBIED detonated between Makka al Mukarama Hotel and the Wabeeri Police Station after being chased by security forces. In the attack 15 were killed, and others injured. AS are suspected to be the perpetrators ([609]).

Violence against civilians

In 2016, ACLED recorded 144 violent incidents against civilians with 215 deaths, and in the first eight months of 2017, 158 incidents with 300 fatalities. Most incidents led to zero to two

([599]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([600]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([601]) US DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, July 2017 (url).
([602]) US DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism *2016*, July 2017 (url).
([603]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([604]) Reuters, Al Shabaab claims fatal car bomb attack near Somali parliament, 5 November 2016 (url).
([605]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([606]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 3.
([607]) ACLED, ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([608]) ACLED, ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([609]) ACLED, ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).

fatalities but nine incidents in 2016 and nine in 2017 have much higher number of fatalities ([610]).

As was mentioned before, some of these attacks such as on hotels or restaurants frequented by many government officials, do not directly target non-governmental civilians as AS 'mainly attacks high profile targets'. The civilian fatalities are often 'in the wrong place at the wrong time' ([611]). LandInfo concludes that 'the general population are not the target of Al-Shabaab's attacks' ([612]). International Crisis Group specified that AS in Mogadishu primarily targets the government ([613]).

On 21 January 2016, a complex AS attack was launched against two restaurants, starting with a car bomb at the entrance of the restaurants, after which fighters entered from the beach side shooting at customers. Security guards from the restaurants exchanged fire until NISA and Gaashaan forces arrived and took over the operation. Later that evening several more hand grenades exploded. In total, more than 25 people were reportedly killed and many more wounded ([614]).

On 26 February 2016, a vehicle loaded with explosives detonated between SYL Hotel and peace garden (Xamar Weyne district) after NISA forces instructed the driver to stop at a checkpoint. After the explosion, gunmen tried to storm SYL hotel but they were stopped and killed by the hotel guards. After a while another car bomb exploded outside the nearby peace garden. More than 15 civilians and five NISA officers were killed. According to SPF, the explosives were estimated to be 200kg, the biggest explosion Mogadishu experienced thus far ([615]).

In early June 2016, AS launched a siege on the Ambassador Hotel in Mogadishu that lasted two days, killing 25, including two members of Parliament and many more injured. AMISOM forces killed all attackers ([616]).

On 25 June 2016, AS gunmen stormed and fired at a restaurant in the Somali capital Mogadishu after a suicide car bomb earlier exploded at the restaurant. Between 10-15 people were reportedly killed. The siege led to a counter attack from security forces, where at least two soldiers died ([617]).

On 30 August 2016, an AS car bomb detonated at a hotel near Villa Somalia, killing 26 ([618]).

On 26 November 2016, an AS car bomb exploded at a police checkpoint next to a busy market in Wabeeri ([619]). Reuters mentions 10 fatalities, Goobjoog news mentions 20 ([620]).

([610]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([611]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); Independent Organisation; UN Source (B); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), pp. 12-13.
([612]) LandInfo, Somalia: Violence, fatalities, perpetrators and victims in Mogadishu, 27 February 2017 (url), pp. 6-7.
([613]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 74.
([614]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([615]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([616]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([617]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([618]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([619]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([620]) Reuters, Suspected car bomb kills at least 10 people in Somali capital, 26 November 2016; Goobjoog News, Somali forces arrest suspect in deadly market attack, 26 November 2016.

On 25 January 2017, an AS suicide bomber drove a VBIED into the popular Dayah hotel in central Mogadishu; heavily armed gunmen fired their way in, followed by another blast. The number of fatalities grew to 38 in the following weeks ([621]).

On 19 February 2017, a suspected AS car bombing at a Wadajir market killed 39 people and injured an unknown number ([622]).

On 13 March 2017, Hotel Wehliye in Mogadishu was attacked. The target of the attack, which was later claimed by AS, was likely government officials, who were present at the time of the attack. According to the ACLED source, the AS media outlet Somalimemo, 30 were killed but this figure could not be confirmed by other sources. Reuters mentions 'at least 13' deaths ([623]).

On 10 May 2017, a clan elder who was a former SWS electoral delegate was killed. AS is believed to be responsible. On the same day, a well-known elder, an electoral delegate in HirShabelle State in 2016, was also killed. The perpetrators were unknown ([624]).

On 24 May 2017, 6-8 people were killed and 15 others were wounded by a remote AS car bomb explosion targeting a restaurant at Mogadishu's beach front. Later reports claimed 15 people died ([625]).

On 14-15 June 2017, a complex two-day attack occurred at the Posh restaurant in Hodan District. A VBIED detonated at the entrance gate of the restaurant followed by gunfire inside the hotel. The explosion of the VBIED damaged another restaurant adjacent to the Posh Restaurant. At least seven AS fighters, dressed in military uniforms, stormed into the restaurants and held over 20 people hostage. Security forces cordoned off and cleared the area. At least 17 (later reports mention 31) people were killed, of whom were 7 AS fighters and the rest civilians ([626]).

3.2.3. South West State

South West State (Interim South West Administration, ISWA) consists of the regions Lower Shabelle (Shabellaha Hoose), Bay, and Bakool and is headed by President Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan (elected 17 November 2014 ([627]). ISWA is still under development and government structures are weak, ministries are only existing on paper, and there are hardly any civil servants, according to a BFA/SEM source ([628]). Apart from the regional capital Baidoa which has some administrative staff, there are only 'rudimentary' administrations in the towns of Bay and Bakool which are not under AS control. These administrations have often been negotiated and organised by Ethiopia which also monitors and protects them ([629]).

([621]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([622]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url); Reuters, Car bomb kills at least 13 in Somali capital: police, medics, 13 March 2017.
([623]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d (url).
([624]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([625]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url)
([626]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url); Independent, Somalia restaurant siege: Al-Shabaab militants massacre 31 civilians in Mogadishu, 15 June 2017 (url); Reuters, At least 20 people being held hostage in Somalia's capital after suicide bomb attack, 14 June 2017 (url).
([627]) Garowe Online, Somalia: Former parliament speaker elected Southwest State President, 17 November 2014 (url).
([628]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation, Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 66.
([629]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 67.

In March 2017, opposition members were preparing a no-confidence motion against the president, accusing him of neglecting the drought crisis and instead pursuing his own interests ([630]). The motion was not debated within the reporting period of the current report.

The ISWA has some control in Baidoa, but according to UN SEMG, 'the city remains largely isolated from the rest of the region, and the Administration has little, if any, grip on the endemic conflict in the Lower Shabelle region'. Unsatisfied Aulihan (Ogaden/Darod) sub-clan members declared an independent 'Upper Bakool' State, in an attempt to gain greater representation in the ISWA, as UN SEMG notes ([631]).

The ISWA has its own police force and a small army. The SWS Police Force (SWSPF) is stationed in Baidoa, Qansax Dheere and in Bakool. The paramilitary SWS Special Police Force (SWSSPF) is based in Baidoa, Buur Hakaba and Goof Gaduud ([632]).

3.2.3.1. Lower Shabelle

Short description of the region

The region lies along the coast in south Somalia. It borders Middle Jubba to the south, Bay to the north-west, Middle Shabelle to the east, and Banadir in the south-east. It also has a small border with Bakool and Hiiraan in the north. The region is divided into 7 districts: Wanla Weyne, Afgooye, Qoryooley, Marka (or Merka), Kurtunwaarey, Sablaale and Baraawe. The regional capital is Merka.

The population of the region consists of predominantly Tunni and Elai (Rahanweyn), Tunni Torre, Biyomaal (Dir) and various groups from the Hawiye clan family: Galjeel, Gerra, Abgal, Sheikhal, Hirab, Barsane, Sogow and Qabes. In Marka, but also in other parts of Lower Shabelle, each district has its own clan composition ([633]).

According to the 2014 Population Estimation Survey undertaken by UN Population Fund and Somali authorities, the region is inhabited by 1 202 219 persons, of which 215 752 consist of urban population, 723 682 rural, 159 815 nomads and 102 970 IDPs ([634]). More recent population estimates are not available; however, the figures may be affected by drought, conflict and returnees in recent years ([635]). See also Section 2.5.5. IDPs, refugees, and returnees.

Background on the conflict and actors in Lower Shabelle

Lower Shabelle is a very complicated region, according to Mark Bradbury, interviewed by BFM/SEM, with regard to the clan composition, access to resources and the relationships with the federal government and the SWS. AS tries to exploit these conflicts for its own purposes,

([630]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 2; AMISOM Daily media monitoring, President Farmaajo Asks Parliament To Approve New Cabinet As MPs Fault Line Up [source: Goobjoog News], 27 March 2017.
([631]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 21.
([632]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), pp. 67, 71.
([633]) EASO, COI report - South and Central Somalia Country overview [clan maps based on Lewis 1955, Abikar 1999], August 2014 (url), pp. 52-53.
([634]) UNFPA, Population Estimation Survey 2014, Somalia, October 2014 (url), p. 31.
([635]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).

he and International Crisis Group noted ([636]). Clan conflicts in the triangle Afgooye-Mogadishu-Merka occur mainly between Habr Gedir, Biyomaal and Rahanweyn ([637]). AMISOM is also involved in the clan conflicts, and supports sometimes Habr Gedir, sometimes Biyomaal, 'always the contrary of what AS supports', according to International Crisis Group, interviewed by BFA/SEM ([638]).

DIS/DRC sources also characterise the situation in Lower Shabelle by 'clan conflicts and resource based conflicts and […] there is a diverse array of actors in Lower Shabelle including Al-Shabaab, SNA, clan militias, and AMISOM' ([639]).

ACLED in its September 2017 Conflict trend report, notes that AS is continuing expanding into new locations, for example in Lower Shabelle and with these actions 'putting more civilians at greater risk. As Al Shabaab expands into new locations, the number of clan militias active in those same locales is impacted. This suggests a relationship between clan militias and Al Shabaab - namely that Al Shabaab may in fact be a 'brand' under which numerous clan militias may fight' ([640]).

The Afgooye-Mogadishu-Merka triangle forms the operational focus of AS and is described by BFA/SEM sources as 'the most violent area in all of Somalia'. The area in and around Afgooye is where most attacks and assaults take place, as is also shown by ACLED data ([641]). Three key participants are indicated in the triangle: AMISOM, militias and AS - the SNA is not mentioned ([642]). Al Shabaab hides in the hills west and north-west of Afgooye as well as north of Qoryooley, from where it launches attacks to the south and east ([643]).

AS has invaded Afgooye several times, chased SNA out, and has withdrawn many times as well. AS performs mainly hit-and-run-attacks to Afgooye. According to a BFA/SEM source, AS wants to constantly remind the SNA that AS is able to overrun its bases but it is unwilling to take up the fight with AMISOM. The latter has an important Ugandan base in Afgooye, constantly occupied by 250-800 troops ([644]). In general AS has enhanced its presence in Afgooye town and district, and orders the inhabitants by phone calls and SMS to meet AS outside the town to pay their taxes ([645]).

According to DIS/DRC sources, Sablaale and Kurtunwarey are controlled by AS and the urban centres of Afgoye and Qoryooley are under AMISOM control, however 'the control is unstable

([636]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, [sources: Mark Bradbury; International Crisis Group, Nairobi] , August 2017(url), pp. 67-68.
([637]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Mark Bradbury; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 67.
([638]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 68.
([639]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security situation [sources: Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; NGO working in Somalia; Anonymous Source, March 2017], (url), p. 13.
([640]) ACLED, Real-Time analysis of African political violence, Conflict Trends No. 61, September 2017 (url), p. 9.
([641]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 67; ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url); DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security situation [sources: Anonymous source; UN source (B)], March 2017 (url), p. 13.
([642]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 67.
([643]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 67.
([644]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 68.
([645]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 68.

and Al-Shabaab controls the rural areas' ([646]). Baraawe has been quiet for the past few months, say BFA/SEM sources; it has an Ugandan AMISOM base ([647]).

DIS/DRC sources call the control of Merka 'disputed and uncertain' ([648]). Merka has a functioning administration and a District Commissioner, appointed by the SWS. It further has a police force and a police station, but no SNA forces stationed in the city ([649]). The town has changed hands several times since 2013 between AS and AMISOM/SNA and is primarily under the influence of Biyomaal and Habr Gedir militias ([650]). AMISOM's Ugandan troops are based on the outskirts of Merka and occasionally (only in daytime ([651])) patrol the city ([652]).

A DIS/DRC source noted: 'As of December 2016, Al-Shabaab has a permanent presence in the city, but does not have a strong control and has not set up a local administration. The current control of Marka [Merka] is a mix between Al-Shabaab control and a vacuum of power' ([653]). Merka was described as 'loosely under control of Al Shabaab', in the sense that local clan militias allow AS to operate courts and levy *zakat* in certain areas outside Biyomaal territory, but not control the administration ([654]). According to a BFA/SEM source, there is no force which has been able to consolidate it's power in Merka ([655]).

A BFA/SEM source noted that in the past the Biyomaal did support AS to counter the pressure from Habr Gedir. Parts of the Biyomaal have now turned against AS which, in turn, has cracked down on Biyomaal militias in the past few months. Biyomaal were displaced from several Biyomaal villages between Merka and Afgooye ([656]). Parts of the Biyomaal militia, formerly called Biyomaal Resistance Movement, are now operating as the Lower Shabelle People's Guard (LSPG) in the area between Merka and Afgooye. LSPG forces are concentrated in K50 and K60 areas, supported by the AMISOM bases there. The Biyomaal also serve as protection for the IDP camp at K50, where many of their clansmen expelled by AS have been displaced ([657]).

A BFA/SEM source identified the following towns as systemically relevant (for military purposes): K50 and Afgooye, both functioning as buffers for Mogadishu, and Bali Doogle. In the latter town, extensive SNA forces are stationed, including the Danaab special forces unit of the SNA. Bali Doogle is also home to US forces and a US drone base ([658]).

([646]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: Somalia Country Director of a humanitarian agency; NGO working in Somalia], March 2017 (url), pp. 13, 14.
([647]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 69.
([648])DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: International Organisation (B):42; Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency:19; NGO working in Somalia:25; Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), p. 13.
([649]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), pp. 67-68.
([650]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), p. 13; BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 69.
([651]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), p. 13.
([652]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 68.
([653]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), pp. 13-14.
([654]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 69.
([655]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 68.
([656]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), pp. 69, 70.
([657]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 69.
([658]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 70.

Recent security trends and violent incidents

During the reporting period of 1 January 2016 to 31 August 2017, ACLED ([659]) registered 748 incidents in Lower Shabelle, which resulted in an estimated 1 471 deaths – which is the highest number of fatalities in Somalia, but less incidents than Banaadir/ Mogadishu. The fatality numbers include mainly combattants.

ACLED data	2016		Jan-31 Aug 2017		2016-31 Aug 2017	
Region	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**
Shabellaha Hoose	458	897	290	574	748	1471

The large majority of recorded incidents cause less than 2 fatalities. In 2016, 95 incidents caused more than 2 fatalities, with an estimated 769 deaths. Of these, 29 incidents had unknown numbers of fatalities, coded as 10.

In 2017 there were 53 incidents with more than 2 fatalities, causing an estimated 341 deaths. Of these incidents, 13 incidents had an unknown number of fatalities which ACLED codes as 10.

These are mainly clashes between AMISOM/SNA/SWSPF and AS, but also clan-related conflicts occurred ([660]). It should be noted that underreporting in AS-areas in Lower Shabelle might occur due to the lack of independent media sources.

Some examples of the most violent incidents:

On 1 April 2016, unidentified drones bombed an AS meeting in Janaale and killed dozens of AS fighters and higher ranking AS officials ([661]).

On 10 June 2016, AS executed four of their own fighters accusing them of conspiring with the CIA ([662]).

On 11 July 2016 early morning, AS overran an SNA military base in Laanta Buur, by a suicide bomb car at the main entrance, followed by hundreds of heavily armed attackers. AS claimed to have killed more than 30 soldiers but this number could not be verified. In addition, weapons and military trucks were seized. The same base had been attacked three months before as well ([663]).

On 18 October 2016, AS attacked Afgooye by a car-bombing followed by an assault. They briefly took control of a part of the city but it was reconquered by AMISOM. As a result 20-35 people died ([664]).

On 29 October 2016, Biyomaal militia clashed with AS fighters in Barire, an AS stronghold, and managed to take over the village but retreated later. The militia was also involved in a fight with AS two weeks later, when AS confiscated 50 goats and 30 cows from nomadic families. The alerted Biyomaal militia managed to get back the livestock and killed AS fighters ([665]).

([659]) For more explanation about this source of information, refer to the Introduction of this report.
([660]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([661]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([662]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([663]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); VOA, Somalia: Al-Shabab Attacks Military Base, 11 July 2016, available at: (url).
([664]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([665]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).

In January and May/June 2017, various clashes between AS and SNA/AMISOM took place in and around Afgooye town over control of the area, which AS is trying to recapture. Between 23-25 February 2017, major clashes between clan militias over control of power and resources in Merka, capital of Lower Shabelle, occurred, causing fatalities on both sides ([666]).

On 4 May 2017, a senior AS leader, Moalim Osman Abdi Badil, and three other fighters were killed during a joint operation with SNA against AS ([667]).

On 10 June 2017, in a joint offensive by SNA, AMISOM and US advisors, the areas of Bariire, Aw Dheegle, Janaale and Mubarak were conquered from AS, killing six AS fighters and two SNA soldiers ([668]).

On 30 July 2017, A US drone attack killed Ali Mohamed Hussein, also known as Ali Jabal, the highest-level AS commander killed in 2017, according to the US Africa Command. The attack occurred near Tortoroow, an AS stronghold in Lower Shabelle ([669]).

On 19 August 2017, after heavy fighting, AMISOM and SNA captured the town of Bariire, a strategic AS base. Seven civilians were killed when they fled the town and their vehicle ran over a land mine ([670]).

Violence against civilians

In 2016, 86 violent incidents against civilians occurred resulting in an estimated 119 deaths, and in 2017 there were 59 incidents with an estimated 95 fatalities ([**671**]).

An unknown number of civil fatalities fell after an AS attack at an SNA base near KM50 on 1 May 2017. Five AS fighters died. After the attack, AS burned several civilian homes in the area, killing children and adults alike ([672]).

On 8 July 2017, SNAF opened fire at a civilian bus, killing eight. The reason for the attack is not known ([673]).

On 25 August 2017, a US drone strike targeted an AS location 20 km north-west of Bariire. Ten people were killed who were reportedly civilians, including three children, although US Africa Command and SNA denied the victims were civilians. The next day, villagers protested against the violence. The US has opened an investigation into the attack ([674]).

Road security

BFA/SEM sources note that the road from Mogadishu to Baidoa – in the towns along the route as well as outside these towns – is vulnerable. Many 'not-so legal activities' are going on and it is often impossible to say which actors are active. Besides AS, a number of other groups are also involved in incidents, such as the SNA. The security on the main road from Mogadishu

([666]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url); Hiiraan Online, Clan militia's clash in Merca, 25 February 2017 (url).
([667]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url); Reuters, Somali government says kills senior al Shabaab chief: statement, 7 May 2017 (url).
([668]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([669]) CP24, U.S. confirms airstrike killed al-Shabab commander in Somalia, 4 August 2017 (url).
([670]) VOA, Somalia Forces Capture Key al-Shabab Town of Bariire, 19 August 2017 (url).
([671]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([672]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([673]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([674]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url). Reuters, U.S. forces in Somalia raid; three children reported among dead, 25 August 2017 (url).

towards Baraawe has improved to the axis Shalambood - Qoryooley. However, the last part of the route remains insecure, due to the presence of AS ([675]). Nevertheless, people do travel in and out AS areas, despite the security challenges in the areas, according to LandInfo ([676]).

3.2.3.2. Bay

Short description of the region

Bay region borders with Bakool to the north, Lower Shabelle to the east and south-east, with Middle Jubba to the south-west and Gedo to the west. It consist of 4 districts: Baidoa, Buur Hakaba, Qansax Dheere and Diinsoor. Smaller towns are Bardaale and Ufurow. The regional capital is Baidoa, also referred to as Baydhabo.

The region is mainly inhabited by Rahanweyn and small Hawiye groups: Awramale, Doqondiide, Hawadle and Sheikhal in the south and Jajele, Sogow, Garre and Dirisamo in the east ([677]).

According to the 2014 Population Estimation Survey undertaken by UN Population Fund and Somali authorities, the division of population in the Bay region is as follows: 93 046 urban inhabitants, 463 330 rural settlers, 195 986 nomadic and 39 820 IDPs, making a total of 792 182 ([678]). More recent population estimates are not available; however, the figures may be affected by drought, conflict and returnees in recent years ([679]). See also Section 2.5.5. IDPs, refugees, and returnees.

Background on the conflict and actors in Bay

The security situation in Baidoa has improved in the months before August 2017, according to BFA/SEM sources. The town is described as 'relatively safe'. Security forces regularly carry out security operations and raids. The operational capability of the SWS Police Force (SWSPF) has improved after local officers were recruited ([680]).

According to BFA/SEM sources, AS controls the entire Bay region apart from the garrison towns, mainly centered in the area to the east of the road between Baidoa and Waajid ([681]). The SWS government has no further influence and control than a few kilometres from Baidoa, relying on Ethiopian AMISOM troops ([682]). DIS/DRC sources note: 'Most urban centres, including Diinsoor and Baidoa, are controlled by AMISOM/SNA/ISWA' and assess Baidoa town as 'relatively safe' although 'more insecure' than Kismayo ([683]). AS is regarded by one source

([675]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International organisation, Mogadishu; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 70.
([676]) LandInfo, Report Somalia: Practical issues and security challenges associated with travels in Southern Somalia, 4 April 2016 (url).
([677]) EASO, COI report - South and Central Somalia Country overview [clan maps based on Lewis 1955, Abikar 1999], August 2014 (url), pp. 52-53.
([678]) UNFPA, Population Estimation Survey 2014, Somalia, October 2014 (url), p. 31.
([679]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).
([680]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; International NGO (A), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 71.
([681]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 71.
([682]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International NGO (A), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 71.
([683]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; NGO working in Somalia; International Organisation (B); Anonymous Source], March 2017 (url), p. 16.

as *de facto* controlling the elders of the community of Diinsoor, although the town is officially under AMISOM control. Diinsoor is not considered safe ([684]).

As mentioned before, the SWS Police Force (SWSPF) is stationed in Baidoa, Qansax Dheere and in Bakool. The SWS Special Police Force (SWSSPF), joined by a paramilitary group, are based in Baidoa, Buur Hakaba and Goof Gaduud ([685]). Pro-government troops are stationed in the following bases: 900-1 000 SNA soldiers in Bay (Baidoa and other AMISOM garrison towns); AMISOM bases in Berdale (ENDF), Baidoa (ENDF), Buur Hakaba (ENDF), Awdiinle (ENDF) and Leego (UPDF); other bases in Qansax Dheere and Bush Madina. Diinsoor was vacated by bilaterally engaged Ethiopian troops in October 2016. A BFA/SEM source identified the towns of Berdale**,** Baidoa**,** Buur Hakaba as systemically relevant ([686]).

Recent security trends and violent incidents

During the reporting period of 1 January 2016 to 31 August 2017, ACLED ([687]) registered 296 incidents in Bay, which resulted in an estimated 709 deaths ([688]).

ACLED data	2016		Jan-31 Aug 2017		2016-31 Aug 2017	
Region	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**
Bay	179	427	126	326	296	709

The majority of incidents resulted in zero to two fatalities but several incidents had higher numbers. In 2016, there were 44 incidents with more than two fatalities per incident, causing an estimated 352 fatalities; in 2017, 35 such incidents caused an estimated 281 fatalities in total. These figures include incidents for which the number of fatalities is not known and which is coded by ACLED as 10. This occurred in 2016 in four incidents and in 2017 in five incidents. For some other incidents with more than 10 fatalities, the sources used by ACLED were media outlets of AS ([689]).

Some most violent incidents include:

On 21 June 2016, ISWA soldiers attacked AS fighters in a village in Qansax-Dheere district, forcing AS to retreat from the village. ISWA soldiers briefly took control of the village but later withdrew, returning to their base. Nine AS fighters and five ISWA soldiers were reportedly killed in the attack ([690]).

On 1 July 2016, SWSPF (South West Special Police Forces) attacked AS and pushed them out of Gurban village in Diinsoor district. The attack was part of a routine security operation targeting AS in the area ([691]).

In October-November 2016, an ongoing battle between AS and government forces for control of the village Goof-Gaduud caused 23 deaths. Goof Gaduud is a SNA base and was attacked in

([684]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: Somali NGO], March 2017 (url), p. 16.
([685]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 71.
([686]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 72.
([687]) For more explanation about this source of information, refer to the Introduction of this report.
([688]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([689]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([690]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([691]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).

January and August 2016 as well; it has changed sides several times ([692]). The place was the scene of fights and attacks in May and July 2017 as well ([693]).

AS threatened and killed persons connected with the government, army or regional state police, for example on 1 March 2017 they shot a female delegate of MP election near Baidoa, and on 24 February 2017 abducted a man because he allegedly had a relationship with the SWS police force ([694]).

On 2 February 2017, Somali forces recaptured Lalatan Jirow (Baidoa district), killing several AS fighters. The day before, AS ambushing a military convoy near Baidoa killed an unknown number of soldiers ([695]).

On 18 March 2017 seven AS fighters died in a gun battle with Somali troops near Qansax Dheere ([696]).

Violence against civilians

Of the total number of incidents, 32 incidents of violence against civilians were reported in 2016 and 21 in 2017 (91, respectively 18 fatalities) ([697]).

On 28 February 2016, a minibus filled with explosives exploded near Dahabshiil office in Baidoa where locals assembled. A few seconds later a suicide bomber exploded his suicide vest in the very popular Beder restaurant. The restaurant is frequented by traditional elders, politicians, and members of the diaspora. Reportedly, 37 people died in the two attacks and 50 were seriously injured; other sources say 55 people died ([698]).

On 17 July 2016, ENDF forces, after a shooting with AS in War Diinle, opened fire indiscriminately on civilians and killed 14, as claimed by witnesses ([699]).

On 26 January 2017, AS allegedly executed three persons in Yaaq Baraawe accused of collaborating with the CIA 'and other intelligence agencies', according to the pro-AS website Somali Memo, cited by BBC and ACLED ([700]).

On 13 March 2017, AS burnt two donkey carts carrying food in Laba-Warood near Diinsoor on accusation of transporting goods to ENDF/SNA-controlled areas, and took the two drivers to an unknown location. They also beheaded two *khat* dealers on 27 May 2017 ([701]).

On 28 May 2017, a man accused of adultery was publicly stoned to death in Raama Cadday village ([702]).

On 7 June 2017 a member of a Diinsoor women's group was shot in her home in Diinsoor district, allegedly because of her connections with the local administration ([703]).

([692]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([693]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([694]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([695]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([696]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([697]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([698]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); Al Jazeera, Al-Shabab attack: 30 civilians killed in south Somalia, 29 February 2016 (url).
([699]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([700]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url); BBC, Somali militants 'kill three CIA spies', 26 January 2017 (url).
([701]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([702]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([703]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).

Road security

AS controls the connection from Baidoa to Buur Hakaba towards Bali Doogle, and runs checkpoints at all roads leaving Baidoa, according to International Crisis Group, interviewed by BFA/SEM ([704]). Civil traffic takes the Baidoa – Buur Hakaba – Wanla Weyne road, but military traffic runs the risk of AS attacks ([705]).

UN SEMG also observes: 'One of the most significant impediments to humanitarian access during the mandate continued to be Al-Shabaab's violent enforcement of blockades of urban areas controlled by anti-Al Shabaab forces, particularly in parts of Bay, Bakool and Hiran' ([706]). However, according to BFA/SEM sources, contrary to the 2012 crisis, AS generally allows NGOs to deliver aid to areas under its control ([707]).

3.2.3.3. Bakool

Short description of the region

The Bakool region borders Ethiopia to the north, Gedo to the west, Bay to the south and Hiiraan to the east. It also has a short border with Lower Shabelle. It consists of five districts: Xudur, Tayeeglow, El Barde, Rab Dhuure and Waajid. On the Ethiopian border lies the smaller town of Yeed. The regional capital is Xudur (or Hudur).

The region is largely inhabited by various Rahanweyn groups: Hadama, Jiron, Lisan, Garwale, Luwai, Jelible, Gelidle, Reer Dumal, Ashraf. The Jajele (Hawiye) live in the north ([708]).

The population in the Bakool region was estimated in 2014 to be 367 226, divided into 61 928 urban, 134 050 rural, 147 248 nomads and 24 000 IDPs ([709]). More recent population estimates are not available; however, the figures may be affected by drought, conflict and returnees in recent years ([710]). See also Section 2.5.5. IDPs, refugees, and returnees.

Background on the conflict and actors in Bakool

According to DIS/DRC sources, in December 2016 Tayeeglow and Rab Dhuure were controlled by AS. In addition, the towns Xudur, Ceel Barde and Waajid are under ENDF control ([711]). However, on 24 July 2017, AS vacated Rab Dhuure ([712]).

The SWS governor for Bakool has influence only in Xudur, according to BFA/SEM sources. An SNA brigade is stationed in Xudur, which is under the command of the 60th division in Baidoa ([713]). An area of about 20-kilometre along the Somali-Ethiopian border is described as

([704]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 72.
([705]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 72.
([706]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 131.
([707]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International NGO (A), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 39.
([708]) EASO, COI report - South and Central Somalia Country overview [clan maps based on Lewis 1955, Abikar 1999], August 2014 (url), pp. 52-53.
([709]) UNFPA, Population Estimation Survey 2014, Somalia, October 2014 (url), p. 31.
([710]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).
([711]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: International Organisation (B); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; NGO working in Somalia], March 2017 (url), p. 16.
([712]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([713]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 72.

free of AS ([714]). The Ethiopian Liyu Police is also active in this area ([715]). In addition, independent clan militias operate in the border area, who do not feel loyal to the Rahanweyn-dominated SWS ([716]).

AMISOM (ENDF) bases are located in Yeed, Rab Dhuure, Garas Weyne and Buur Dhuxunle. in addition, Ethiopia's bilaterally engaged troops have bases in Ceel Barde, Xudur and Waajid. The Ethiopian Liyu Police are located in Abeesale, Ato and Ceel Barde ([717]).

Recent security trends and violent incidents

During the reporting period of 1 January 2016 to 31 August 2017, ACLED ([718]) registered 143 incidents in Bakool, which resulted in an estimated 349 deaths ([719]).

ACLED data	2016		Jan-31 Aug 2017		2016-31 Aug 2017	
Region	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**
Bakool	102	259	41	90	143	349

Most incidents resulted in zero to two fatalities but in 2016 there were 24 incidents with more than two fatalities, resulting in an estimated 222 fatalities in total, and in 2017 seven such incidents resulting in an estimated 66 fatalities in total. These figures include several incidents for which the number of fatalities was unknown, coded by ACLED as 10 fatalities. This occurred in 2016 six times, and in 2017 one time ([720]).

Some examples of violent incidents, occurring mainly between AMISOM/SNA and AS:

In the second half of February 2016, operations were conducted in Xudur district against AS. Operations continued the first half of 2016 ([721]).

On 22 April 2016, SNA forces conducted security operations around Rab Dhuure and pushed AS out of the villages of Warcaddoy, Goobad and Gumuro. On 1 July 2016 AS took back control of Rab Dhuure and Buur Dhuxunle without any casualities ([722]).

AMISOM/ENDF and SNA forces conducted joint security operations in Waajid district against AS, mainly between March and May 2016, resulting in several fatalities from both sides. In some instances, such as on 25 March in Waajid town, on 6 April 2016 in Laanta Garaska and on 13 May 2016 in El-Malable, AS retreated from the area. In June and July 2016, several AS attacks were carried out on ENDF bases in Waajid district ([723]).

([714]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 73.
([715]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 73.
([716]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 73.
([717]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 73.
([718]) For more explanation about this source of information, refer to the Introduction of this report.
([719]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([720]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([721]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([722]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([723]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).

On 24 April 2016, ISWA forces attacked and conquered an AS base in Yowkoyow village (Xudur). On 30 July 2016 military forces attacked AS positions in Garas Weyne and pushed AS out ([724]).

On 2 December 2016, heavy fighting between AS and Somali troops in Duuray caused 11 deaths from SNA side and two from AS ([725]).

On 3 January 2017, Moro Gabey was taken from AS and two alleged AS 'spies' were killed ([726]).

On 30 January 2017, AS withdrew from Buur Dhuxunle after ENDF forces sent convoys with troops and goods to the area ([727]).

On 15 May 2017, AS attacked SNA soldiers guarding a public commercial truck near Baano village, Xudur, on the road between Qurac Joome and Xudur. Three AS and three SNA fightes were killed and the truck was burnt ([728]).

On 17 June 2017, AS attacked an SNA base in Ceel Leheli, Xudur district. Two soldiers and seven AS fighters were killed ([729]).

On 24 July 2017, AS vacated Rab Dhuure while the ENDF convoy was approaching the town ([730]).

On 9 August 2017, AS attacked positions held by fighters loyal to the former AS leader Sheikh Muhtar Ali Robow, who defected a few days later to the Somali government ([731]). There were 27 deaths reported. The fighting between Robow's forces and AS took place near Abal in Bakool ([732]).

Violence against civilians

Of all violent incidents, 16 were due to violence against civilians in 2016 and 10 in 2017 (21, respectively 13 fatalities) ([733]).

In January 2016, several incidents were reported involving AS execution or maltreatment of civilians because of alleged collaboration with ENDF/AMISOM. AS executed an elder who had been criticising the security situation in his town Rab Dhuure due to AS ([734]).

On 1 May 2017, AS opened fire at a pastoralist family in Ceel Barde district, killing a woman and several livestock. Motives for the attack was unknown ([735]).

Road security

The government has to some extent control over the roads between Xudur, Ceel Barde, Yeed and Waajid. However, it is very difficult for the administration to reach the population in

([724]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([725]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([726]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([727]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([728]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([729]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([730]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([731]) Al Jazeera, Al-Shabab's Mukhtar Robow surrenders to government, 13 August 2017 (url).
([732]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([733]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([734]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url).
([735]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).

Bakool, as AS controls large parts of the region, says a BFA/SEM source ([736]). UN SEMG also observes: 'One of the most significant impediments to humanitarian access during the mandate continued to be Al-Shabaab's violent enforcement of blockades of urban areas controlled by anti-Al Shabaab forces, particularly in parts of Bay, Bakool and Hiraan' ([737]). However, according to BFA/SEM sources, contrary to the 2012 crisis, AS generally allows NGOs to deliver aid to areas under its control ([738]).

3.2.4. HirShabelle

The regional state HirShabelle consists of the regions Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle. The establishment of the HirShabelle State was long disputed because both Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle wanted to form their own separate regional state ([739]). Furthermore, the state formation seems to have reignited old clan conflicts and one BFA/SEM source mentioned that the Hawadle (Hawiye) clan feels marginalised in the new structure ([740]).

HirShabelle's President Ali Abdulahi Osoble was elected on 20 February 2017. The HirShabelle parliament confirmed the new cabinet of 52 ministers on 11 March 2017 ([741]). However, the new government is to a large extent based in Mogadishu and its power reach is restricted to parts of Middle Shabelle and Jowhar ([742]).

The road connecting Jalalaqsi and Mogadishu via Jowhar is considered relatively secure. The road from Jalalaqsi to Buulo Barde functions as the supply route of Buulo Barde but is susceptible to AS attacks. The road from Buulo Barde through Halgan to Belet Weyne crosses AS territory and is therefore even more susceptible to AS attacks. Civilian traffic is able to pass through AS territory ([743]).

3.2.4.1. Hiiraan

Short description of the region

Hiiraan consists of the three districts: Belet Weyne, bordering Ethiopia to the north; Buulo Barde (Bulo Burto), south of Belet Weyne; and Jalalaqsi, south of Buulo Barde bordering Middle Shabelle to the south and south-east. The regional capital is Belet Weyne and besides the other two district capitals, Buulo Barde and Jalalaqsi, other towns are Halgan, Maxaas and Matabaan. The Shabelle River flows from Ethiopia through Belet Weyne and Buulo Barde into Middle Shabelle.

Hiiraan is mainly inhabited by Hawiye clans. The territory north of the Shabelle River is dominated by the Hawadle sub-clan, while the Jajele, Galja'el and Baadi Adde sub-clans mainly

([736]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 73.
([737]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea: Somalia S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 131.
([738]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International NGO (A), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 39.
([739]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 78.
([740]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 78.
([741]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 2.
([742]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; International organisation, Mogadishu; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 78.
([743]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 79.

inhabit the territory south of the river. The minority group Makane (Bantu/Jareer) lives along the northern part of the Shabelle river ([744]).

According to the 2014 Population Survey Estimate by UNFPA and Somali authorities, Hiiraan totalled 520 685 inhabitants divided into 252 609 nomads, 135 537 rural inhabitants, 81 379 urban inhabitants and 51 160 IDPs ([745]). More recent population estimates are not available; however, the figures may be affected by drought, conflict and returnees in recent years ([746]). See also Section 2.5.5. IDPs, refugees, and returnees.

Background on the conflict and actors in Hiiraan

The main armed actors in Hiiraan, according to the BFA/SEM map of areas of influence, July 2017, are SNA, AMISOM, ENDF and AS. Liyu Police, ASWJ and an unknown number of clan militias have more limited influence. SNA and allied forces control the urban centres of Belet Weyne, Buulo Barde and Jalalaqsi and the towns of Feerfeer, Farlibaax, Halgan, Maxaas and Afcad ([747]).

The Liyu Police is active in the border area with Ethiopia, in a 30-40 kilometre-wide border strip west of Belet Weyne. AS only has a small presence in that specific area ([748]). As of June 2017, the Liyu Police has a presence in the town of Farlibaax ([749]).

The western parts of Hiiraan are AS territory. the area west of the main road as well as the area between Maxaas and Adan Yabaal. To the north, AS territory extends as far as the road from Belet Weyne to Dhuusamarreeb, but AS has no access to this road and the areas north of it. AS presence in Belet Weyne is almost irrelevant, with few reported incidents, according to a BFA/SEM source ([750]).

According to DIS/DRC sources, 'the control of Belet Weyne city is divided by the Shabelle River with the western part affected significantly by clan fights between the Hawiye sub-clans Jajeleh [Jajele] and Galje'el and the eastern part predominantly controlled by a Hawadle sub-clan'. The source further notes that 'AMISOM is present in both parts but AS has significant freedom of movement in the western part of the city, exploiting the abovementioned clan conflict. On the eastern side of the river, AS activities are limited' ([751]). In December 2016 Ceel Cali was controlled by AS ([752]).

The clan composition has not changed but according to a BFA/SEM source, the clan militias have been driven out of Belet Weyne and are no longer recognised as relevant actors in the city ([753]). The same source states that the Belet Weyne administration is relatively strong and enjoys the support of the population. The police forces are locally recruited ([754]).

([744]) EASO, COI report - South and Central Somalia Country overview [clan maps based on Lewis 1955, Abikar 1999], August 2014 (url), pp. 52-53.
([745]) UNFPA, Population Estimation Survey 2014, Somalia, October 2014 (url), p. 31.
([746]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).
([747]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), p. 23.
([748]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 78.
([749]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategy expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 80.
([750]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 79.
([751]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), p. 15.
([752]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: International Organisation (B); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; NGO working in Somalia], March 2017 (url), p. 16.
([753]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategy expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 80.
([754]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 79-80.

The town of Matabaan is controlled by Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ), an autonomous militia (see 2.2.3.3. Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a). In general, AS is assessed to have a limited presence in Hiiraan, except for the western and rural parts of the region ([755]).

In north-eastern Hiiraan, a self-defence militia known as Macawuusleey is in control of a few villages. The militia has taken up arms against AS and has in several occasions proven effective ([756]).

Djibouti AMISOM troops operate bases in Belet Weyne, Buulo Barde and Jalalaqsi. SNA is stationed in Belet Weyne, Wabxo and along the road to Jalalaqsi. ENDF bases are located in Belet Weyne. Bilaterally engaged Ethiopian troops (outside AMISOM) have bases in Belet Weyne and Maxaas and possibly in Afcad. At the border with Ethiopia, the Liyu police controls Farlibaax and AMISOM has a base in Feerfeer. Ethiopian troops vacated the forward operating bases (FOB) Ceel Cali, Moqokori and Halgan; the latter was re-occupied by AMISOM and SNA in May 2017. Moqokori and Ceel Cali are under AS control ([757]).

Recent security trends and violent incidents

During the reporting period of January 2016 to 31 August 2017, ACLED ([758]) has registered 292 incidents in Hiiraan, which resulted in an estimated 810 fatalities. The large majority of the incidents caused two or less fatalities. In 2016, there were 22 incidents with more than two fatalities per incident, causing an estimated 515 fatalities; in 2017 this was 22 incidents, causing an estimated 170 fatalities ([759]). In the two incidents mentioned below (Raso and Halgan, on 6 March and 9 June 2016 respectively), the count of fatalities raised to an estimated 398, amounting to nearly half of all fatalities registered during the reporting period.

Of several incidents the number of fatalities is not known, which is coded by ACLED as 10 fatalities. This occurred in 2016 in four cases, in 2017 in eight cases.

ACLED data	2016		Jan-31 Aug 2017		2016-31 Aug 2017	
Region	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**
Hiiraan	157	590	135	220	292	810

Hiiraan is affected by inter and intra clan fighting and a significant share of the recorded incidents are clan-related ([760]). Especially the rivalling Hawiye sub-clans, Jajele and Galja'el, have been involved in a range of killings ([761]).

Some examples of the most violent incidents:

([755]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 78.
([756]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; Military strategy expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 79.
([757]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 80.
([758]) For more explanation about this source of information, refer to the Introduction of this report.
([759]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([760]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: UN Source (A); Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency], March 2017 (url), p. 15; ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([761]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url); ACLED, Real-Time analysis of African political violence, Conflict Trends No. 61, September 2017 (url), p. 8.

On 6 March 2016, a US drone struck what was believed to be an AS training camp in Raso, Buulo Barde, reportedly killing 150 AS fighters ([762]).

On 9 June 2016, an AS car-bombing and subsequent raid on an ENDF/AMISOM base in Halgan, Buulo Barde district, resulted in many fatalities. ACLED number them with 248 ([763]). This incident is also reported by UN SEMG which mentions that at least 30 soldiers were killed, however, it is not made clear whether AS fatalities are included ([764]).

Besides the clan killings between the Hawiye sub-clans Jajele and Galja'el, other recorded clan clashes have been reported between the Hawiye sub-clans Hawadle and Habr Gedir, the Hawiye sub-clans Murusade and Hawadle, between the Dir and Hawadle, between members of the Galje'el (Hawiye sub-clan) and between members of the Hawadle (Hawiye sub-clan) ([765]).

The deadliest clan clash reported in 2017 involved militias from Habr Gedir and Hawadle on 15 June 2017 in Banyaaley, Belet Weyne district, resulting in 25 fatalities ([766]).

Violence against civilians

During the reporting period of 1 January 2016 to 31 August 2017, ACLED has categorised 47 incidents of violence against civilians in 2016 with an estimated 50 fatalities, and 39 incidents in 2017 ([767]). Some examples:

On 20 May 2017, Jajele militias attacked on the outskirts of Baar Gacanlaawe, killing four civilians. The militias also stole two herds of camels and abducted a child before escaping. Galja'el clan militias responded by heavy gunfire, severely injuring three Jajele militias ([768]).

On 10 July 2017, SNA soldiers opened fire against a civilian minibus, with an unknown number of fatalities ([769]).

3.2.4.2. Middle Shabelle

Short description of the region

Middle Shabelle consists of four districts: Balcad, Jowhar, Cadale and Adan Yabaal. Besides the regional capital of Jowhar and the other three district capitals, other settlements are among others Fiidow, Mahadaay, Rage Ceelle and Warsheikh.

Middle Shabelle is mainly inhabited by the Hawiye sub-clans: Abgal, Hawadle, Murusade, Galja'el and Baadi Adde. On the west bank of the Shabelle River around Jowhar the Bantu minority group Shiidle live ([770]).

According to the 2014 Population Survey Estimate by UNFPA and Somali authorities, Middle Shabelle counted 516 036 inhabitants of which 114 348 were urban inhabitants, 249 326 rural

([762]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([763]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([764]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), p. 13.
([765]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url); ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([766]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([767]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([768]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([769]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([770]) EASO, COI report - South and Central Somalia Country overview [clan maps based on Lewis 1955, Abikar 1999], August 2014 (url), pp. 52-53.

inhabitants, 100 402 nomads and 51 960 IDPs ([771]). More recent population estimates are not available; however, the figures may be affected by drought, conflict and returnees in recent years ([772]). See also Section 2.5.5. IDPs, refugees, and returnees.

Actors in the conflict and areas of influence

The armed actors in Middle Shabelle are SNA, AMISOM, AS and Abgal (Hawiye) sub-clan militias ([773]).

According to DIS/DRC sources 'the urban centres of Jowhar, Balcad, and other larger urban centres in Middle Shabelle are under AMISOM control but the control is unstable and Al-Shabaab controls the rural areas' ([774]).

Middle Shabelle has been quiet until mid-2016 but the number of incidents have increased since. According to BFA/SEM sources this is partly due to the creation of the HirShabelle State and Jowhar as its capital, and perhaps partly triggered by the drought as well ([775]). Jowhar is relatively quiet, said International Crisis Group ([776]). There are hardly any significant AS activities in Jowhar ([777]).

Burundi AMISOM troops have bases in Mahadaay, Bulo Cadad, Jowhar, Garsaale, Kaxyalo, Warsheikh, Balcad, Rage Ceelle and Cadale. New bases were established in Miir Taqwo (SNA), Biyo Cado (SNA) and Ceel Baraf (together with SNA). Adan Yabaal was taken by the ENDF in 2016; it now has an SNA base, possibly also housing AMISOM or ENDF troops. A BFA/SEM source characterised the area between Adan Yabaal and the coast as 'bandits country', where AS is present on a small scale ([778]).

Recent trends in violence

During the reporting period of January 2016 to 31 August 2017, ACLED ([779]) has registered 243 incidents in Middle Shabelle, which resulted in an estimated 458 fatalities ([780]). Of these incidents, 11 have an unspecified number of fatalities which are coded by ACLED as 10.

ACLED data	2016		Jan-31 Aug 2017		2016-31 Aug 2017	
Region	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**
Shabellaha Dhexe	112	235	131	223	243	458

([771]) UNFPA, Population Estimation Survey 2014, Somalia, October 2014 (url), p. 31.
([772]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).
([773]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), p. 23; ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([774]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; NGO working in Somalia], March 2017 (url), p. 14.
([775]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 81.
([776]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 81.
([777]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 81.
([778]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 81.
([779]) For more explanation about this source of information, refer to the Introduction of this report.
([780]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).

With a few exceptions, the large majority of incidents resulted in zero to two fatalities. In 2016, there were 30 incidents with more than two fatalities each, causing an estimated 202 deaths. In 2017, there were 26 such incidents, causing an estimated 155 fatalities.

Some examples of the most violent incidents:

On 1 May 2016 AS attacked SNA in the village Ruun-Nirgood and unconfirmed reports indicated that more than 20 SNA soldiers were killed. AS claimed the killing of 50 Somali ([781]). Goobjoog News mentioned the death of 15 soldiers and 10 AS. The attack came after SNA and AMISOM had captured Masjid-Ali-Gaduud, Nuurdugle, Geedi-her, Tawakal, Towfiiq and Qahira localities in Middle Shabelle ([782]).

On 9 August 2016, following an SNA takeover of Madah-Kisi near Jowhar fighting between SNA and AS resulted in an unspecified number of fatalities ([783]).

Even though most of the incidents with high numbers of fatalities are related to clashes between AMISOM/SNA and AS, Middle Shabelle was also affected by intra-clan violence. Especially Abgal (Hawiye) sub-clans are mentioned several times in the ACLED dataset as fighting with each other (see also the previous section) ([784]). As an example, two Abgal (Hawiye) sub-clan militias Celi Cumar and Cabdalle Caroone clashed on 12 July 2017 in Bur-Dheere, Cadale, leaving 12 people dead ([785]).

In the second quarter of 2017, violent clashes occurred between several Abgaal sub-clans, but also with the minority group Shiidle (Bantu), leaving about 100 people dead ([786]).

Violence against civilians

During the reporting period, ACLED has categorised in 2016 18 incidents as violence against civilians with 28 civilian fatalities, and in 2017 23 incidents with 23 civilian fatalities ([787]).

On 15 May 2016, AS executed four civilians on charges of spying for SNA ([788]).

A BFA/SEM source identified the towns of Jowhar, Balcas and Warsheikh as systemically relevant ([789]).

Road security

The main route from Mogadishu to Jowhar is more secure than in the past ([790]). Also the security of the main supply routes in AMISOM-sector 5 (Middle Shabelle) has significantly improved ([791]).

([781]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([782]) Goobjoog News, Somali army soldiers killed in base attack in Middle Shabelle by Al-Shabaab- military source, 1 May 2016 (url).
([783]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([784]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([785]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([786]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 81.
([787]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([788]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([789]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 81-82.
([790]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 81.
([791]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 13.

3.2.5. Galmudug

The Galmudug Interim Administration (GIA) consists of the regional states Galgaduud and part of Mudug (the northern part is part of Puntland). GIA is considered by BFA/SEM sources weaker than ASWJ and by comparison significantly weaker than the administrations of Puntland and Jubbaland. The administration is centred in Cadaado and the area around it ([792]). With an estimated 300-500 security personnel, it may be able to fend off an attack by AS on its regional capital Cadaado and to stop an AS advance in that direction ([793]).

In addition to Cadaado, GIA controls the main supply route and the area between this route towards the Ethiopian border. Traffic between Belet Weyne and Garoowe is unimpeded by AS ([794]).

3.2.5.1. Galgaduud

Short description of the region

Galgaduud consists of five districts: Ceel Dheere, Ceel Buur, Dhuusamarreeb, Abudwaaq and Caadado. Besides the regional capital of Dhuusamarreeb and the other four district capitals, other settlements are among others Bud Bud, Wabxo, Guriceel and Balanbaale.

Galgaduud is mainly inhabited by the Habr Gedir (Hawiye) sub-clans Suleiman, Ayr and Duduble and the Murusade (Hawiye) clan. The Marehan (Darod) sub-clan is also present in the border area to Ethiopia ([795]).

According to the 2014 Population Survey Estimate by UNFPA and Somali authorities, Galguduud counted 569 434 inhabitants of which 214 024 were nomads, 183 553 urban inhabitants, 119 768 IDPs and 52 089 rural inhabitants ([796]). More recent population estimates are not available; however, the figures may be affected by drought, conflict and returnees in recent years ([797]). See also Section 2.5.5. IDPs, refugees, and returnees.

Background on the conflict and actors in Galgaduud

The main armed actors in Galgaduud are AS, Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a (ASWJ), and to a lesser extent SNA, Liyu Police and a number of clan militias are active ([798]). DIS/DRC sources noted:

> 'The security situation in Galguduud is very blurred with several actors involved: Galmudug regional forces (GIA), Al-Shabaab, and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ). […]

([792]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 82.
([793]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa; Somali source in the area of security, Addis Ababa; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 82.
([794]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 82.
([795]) EASO, COI report - South and Central Somalia Country overview [clan maps based on Lewis 1955, Abikar 1999], August 2014 (url), pp. 52-53.
([796]) UNFPA, Population Estimation Survey 2014, Somalia, October 2014 (url), p. 31.
([797]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).
([798]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), p. 23.

> GIA has weak links to the federal government in Mogadishu and […] ASWJ is a government allied militia but the loyalty is not without reservations' ([799]).

ASWJ (for a description see Section 2.2.3.3. Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a) has an unclear relationship with the federal and regional government (characterised by clashes with pro-GIA militias and mutual mistrust) ([800]). The group has its own administration in the region of Galgaduud, supported by Ethiopia, says the International Crisis Group, interviewed by BFA/SEM ([801]). However, ASWJ has lost strength over the past years and will probably not regain its previous importance, according to political analyst Mark Bradbury interviewed by BFA/SEM ([802]).

ASWJ controls Dhuusamarreeb city and its surrounding area, where it has a strong presence. The group consists of an estimated 600-800 men who also perform police tasks ([803]).ASWJ also controls the district of Cabudwaaq up to the town of Cabudwaaq, Guriceel and Balanbaale, as well as Matabaan in Hiiraan ([804]). Dhuusamarreeb also houses bilateral ENDF forces, and an SNA brigade in the outskirts of the city. ASWJ does not fight these SNA forces, as both consist of locally recruited soldiers, according to a BFA/SEM source ([805]).

Bilaterally engaged Ethiopian troops withdrew from their FOB in Bud Bud and Ceel Buur in April 2017 ([806]). The Ethiopian Liyu Police is active along the border with Ethiopia ([807]).

Dhuusamarreeb and Guriceel are described as among the few areas in South/Central Somalia where AS has no significant presence ([808]). AS controls or at least exerts influence over most of Ceel Dheere and Ceel Buur districts including both district capitals ([809]).

Recent security trends and violent incidents

During the reporting period of January 2016 to 31 August 2017, ACLED ([810]) has registered 154 incidents in Galgaduud, which resulted in an estimated 419 fatalities ([811]).

ACLED data	2016		Jan-31 Aug 2017		2016-31 Aug 2017	
Region	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**
Galgaduud	95	305	59	114	154	419

([799]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [sources: Somalia Country Director of a Humanitarian Agency; NGO working in Somalia], March 2017 (url), p. 16.
([800]) Stanford University, Mapping Militant Organizations - Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama, 18 June 2016 (url); BFA BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), pp. 24, 84.
([801]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 84.
([802]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Mark Bradbury, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 84.
([803]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 85.
([804]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International Crisis Group, Nairobi; Military strategic expert, Vienna; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 85.
([805]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 85.
([806]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Somali source in the area of security, Addis Ababa; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 82.
([807]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 82.
([808]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 31.
([809]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), p. 23.
([810]) For more explanation about this source of information, refer to the Introduction of this report.
([811]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).

The majority of incidents resulted in zero to two fatalities. In 2016, 29 incidents had more than two fatalities, causing in total an estimated 268 deaths. In 2017, 13 incidents resulted in more than two fatalities, in total an estimated 81 deaths ([812]).

Some examples of the most violent incidents:

On 2 March 2016, ASWJ and a pro-Galmudug militia clashed in Dhuusamarreeb with an unknown, but more than seven fatalities ([813]). According to ACLED, the pro-Galmudug militia was led by 'a former SNGF [SNA] commander, who switched sides last year' ([814]).

On 5 April 2016, AS ambushed an ENDF/AMISOM convoy in Ulajarad, Ceel Buur, but the number of fatalities could not be established ([815]).

On 23 April 2016, 10 people were reported killed after the Liyu Police clashed with local residents in Dhac Dheer ([816]).

ASWJ clashed with a local clan militia on 5 June 2017 near Herale. The fighting allegedly occurred after ASWJ tried to disarm the militia ([817]). Another incident, also related to the town Herale, occurred when a dispute led to a two-day armed clash on the 20-21 July 2017 between ASWJ and Galmudug forces ([818]).

Between 17-19 August 2017, 16 people were killed and 37 injured in fightings between rival militias in Herale ([819]).

Violence against civilians

ACLED reported 27 incidents in 2016 and 22 in 2017 as violence against civilians and recorded 43, resp. 24 resulting fatalities ([820]). Many of these incidents are clan-related.

As part of a clan feud, two men from Dalal (Darod/Marehan sub-clan) were killed on 29 March 2017 by armed men from the Wagardha (Darod/Marehan sub-clan). Similarly, two men from the Saleeban (Hawiye/Habr Gedir sub-clan) were killed on 18 July 2017 by militia men from the Wagardha (Darod/Marehan sub-clan) near Galinsoor ([821]).

3.2.5.2. Mudug

Short description of the region

The region Mudug is divided between Galmudug and Puntland; the division splits Galkacyo. Mudug consists of five districts: Xarardheere, Hobyo, Galkacyo, which is the regional capital,

([812]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([813]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([814]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([815]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([816]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([817]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([818]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([819]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([820]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([821]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).

Galdogob and Jariiban. Other settlements are among others Amara, Afbarwaaqo, Garaad and Balibusle ([822]).

In the south, Mudug is mainly inhabited by the Sa'ad, a Habr Gedir (Hawiye) sub-clan. The north is mainly inhabited by the Omar Mohamoud, a Majerteen (Darod) sub-clan ([823]).

According to the 2014 Population Survey Estimate by UNFPA and Somali authorities, Mudug totalled 717 863 inhabitants with 381 493 being urban inhabitants, 185 736 nomads, 79 752 rural inhabitants and 70 882 IDPs ([824]). More recent population estimates are not available; however, the figures can be affected by drought, conflict and returnees in recent years ([825]). See also Section 2.5.5. IDPs, refugees, and returnees.

Background on the conflict and actors in Mudug

The main armed actors in Mudug are GIA, Puntland authorities, AS and, around Galkacyo, clan militias ([826]). The Liyu Police are only active along the Ethiopian border ([827]).

The divided city of Galkacyo 'has been the scene of armed clashes between Puntland and GIA, which have led to massive displacements […] However, as of December 2016, fragile peace exists', according to a DIS/DRC source ([828]). According to a BFA/SEM source, the southern part of the city of Galkacyo is actually not controlled by GIA forces but rather by a local clan militia (Sa'ad) aligned with GIA ([829]). The city is largely free of AS ([830]).

AS has extended its presence north along the coast. The coastal town of Hobyo is controlled by GIA but the town is isolated and is located at the edge of AS territory ([831]). AS only has a total of 600-800 fighters in all of the GIA, which means that the presence of AS is sporadic. This includes for instance the coastal town of Xarardheere ([832]).

Recent security trends and violent incidents

During the reporting period of January 2016 to 31 August 2017, ACLED ([833]) has recorded 218 incidents in Mudug, which resulted in an estimated 681 fatalities ([834]).

ACLED data	2016		Jan-31 Aug 2017		2016-31 Aug 2017	
Region	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**

([822]) PGN, Approximate Territorial Control, 25 August 2017 (url).
([823]) EASO, COI report - South and Central Somalia Country overview [clan maps based on Lewis 1955, Abikar 1999], August 2014 (url), pp. 52-53.
([824]) UNFPA, Population Estimation Survey 2014, Somalia, October 2014 (url), p. 31.
([825]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).
([826]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), p. 23.
([827]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 82.
([828]) DIS/DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation [source: UN Source (B)], March 2017 (url), p. 16.
([829]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), pp. 83-84.
([830]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi; Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), pp. 31, 84.
([831]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa; Military strategic expert, Vienna] August 2017 (url), pp. 82, 83.
([832]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 83.
([833]) For more explanation about this source of information, refer to the Introduction of this report.
([834]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).

Mudug	135	475	89	106	218	681

Galkacyo was the most affected district in the overall reference period, counting 318 out of 475 recorded fatalities in 2016, and 85 out of 106 recorded fatalities in 2017.

The large majority of incidents resulted in zero to two fatalities but in 2016, 35 of the 135 incidents resulted in more than two fatalities per incident, causing an estimated 423 fatalities in total. In 2017, out of 89 incidents, 8 resulted in more than two fatalities, causing an estimated 42 fatalities in total.

Some of the most violent incidents include:

The Liyu Police and a Sa'ad (Hawiye/Habr Gedir) clan militia clashed due to a land dispute on 23 April 2016 in Dabdheere, Galkacyo district. Casualty figures are disputed but local media reported that 20 people died and 40 people were injured ([835]).

In northern Galkacyo on 21 August 2016, AS detonated two IEDs, which killed 27 people, including 10 SNA soldiers ([836]).

During a flare-up of hostilities between GIA and Puntland forces in Galkacyo city lasting from mid-October to mid-November 2016 more than hundred people were killed ([837]).

In the time span of 23 November to 27 November 2016, AS clashed with local pastoralists who refused to pay *zakat*. The clashes occurred in Dumaaye village in Xarardheere ([838]). This dispute between AS and local pastoralists led on 28 November 2016 to a clash between AS and GIA forces leaving 26 killed ([839]).

On 2 July 2017, a clan feud between Sa'ad (Hawiye) and Wagardha (Darod/Marehan) resulted in a clash at Saaxo vicinity with three people reported killed ([840]). Other clan violence in 2017 with recorded fatalities were related to clashes between Saleeban (Hawiye/Habr Gedir) and Dir; between Sheikhal (Hawiye) ([841]) and Sa'ad (Hawiye); and between Omar Mohamoud (Darod) and Sa'ad ([842]).

Violence against civilians

Of the total number of incidents, ACLED has categorised 92 incidents as violence against civilians and has estimated 106 resulting fatalities (41 incidents in 2016 with 52 fatalities; in 2017 51 incidents with 54 fatalities – one incident with an unknown number of fatalities, coded as 10) ([843]). Many of these incidents are believed to be clan-related.

([835]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([836]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([837]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([838]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([839]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([840]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([841]) Sheikhal has no agnate link to Hawiye but is closely associated with Hawiye. See EASO, COI report – South and Central Somalia Country overview, August 2014 (url), pp. 46-47.
([842]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([843]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).

3.2.5. Puntland

Short description of the region

Puntland is a self-proclaimed, autonomous, federal regional state with political power exercised by the Harti clan. The government capacity is characterised as 'weak' and 'dysfunctional' ([844]). According to several BFA/SEM sources, the security situation is somewhat stable – apart from the Galgala mountains and Bossaso - and the security forces are functioning ([845]). Another source said: 'The situation in Garoowe and Bossaso is fairly ok' ([846]).

Puntland consists of the two regions Bari and Nugaal and the northern part of Mudug including the northern part of Galkacyo ([847]). Besides the capital of Garoowe and the economic hub Bossaso, other settlements are among others Qandala, Caluula, Qardho and Bandarbeyla.

Puntland is almost exclusively inhabited by the Majerteen (Darod) sub-clans Osman Mohamoud, Isse Mohamoud, and Omar Mohamoud. Small pockets of territory are inhabited by Jambele (Hawiye), Dir and the minority group Jaaji ([848]).

According to the 2014 Population Survey Estimate by UNFPA and Somali authorities, Puntland counted 1 112 210 inhabitants divided into 610 714 urban inhabitants, 346 461 nomads, 96 530 rural inhabitants and 58 505 IDPs ([849]). More recent population estimates are not available; however, the figures may be affected by drought, conflict and returnees in recent years ([850]). See also Section 2.5.5. IDPs, refugees, and returnees.

Background on the conflict and actors in Puntland

The main armed actors in Puntland are the Puntland Defense Force/Darawish (PDF), which consists of at least 3 000 soldiers; the Puntland Police, which in 2015 comprised 3 610 officers; the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), which consists of approximately 1 200 officers; the presidential guard based in Garoowe, which consists of 300-400 troops ([851]).

Other active groups are AS-Galgala, which consists of an estimated 200 fighters; and an Islamic State affiliated group of a few hundred fighters ([852]).

The Islamic State-affiliated group led by Sheikh Mumin (see also 2.2.3.2. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) has its core area in the Iskushuban district, Bari region. The group is further present in the areas south of the port town of Qandala, which is home to the Ali Saleeban sub-

([844]) Höhne, M.V. Between Somaliland and Puntland - Marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions, 2015, (url), p. 150; Bamberger, J. G. and Skovsted, K. Concessions and Conflicts: Mapping Oil Exploration in Somalia and Ethiopia, 2016 (url).
([845]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; Western diplomatic source, Nairobi; International NGO (A), Nairobi; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), pp. 85, 86.
([846]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation, Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 86.
([847]) ICG, Galkayo and Somalia's Dangerous Faultlines, 10 December 2015 (url).
([848]) EASO, COI report - South and Central Somalia Country overview [clan maps based on Lewis 1955, Abikar 1999], August 2014 (url), pp. 52-53.
([849]) UNFPA, Population Estimation Survey 2014, Somalia, October 2014 (url), p. 31.
([850]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).
([851]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 87-88.
([852]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), pp. 90, 93.

clan (Darod/Majerteen) of which Sheikh Mumin is a member ([853]). This clan tie is the basis of support for Sheikh Mumin and his Islamic State group within the Ali Saleeban territory. However, according to International Crisis Group, interviewed by BFA/SEM, only about 30 of the approximately 200 militiamen have joined IS for ideological reasons. As a result, Mumin relies more on recruits from South/Central Somalia; and his group is growing. The Ali Saleeban see their support as a political instrument to exert pressure on the Puntland government, said International Crisis Group ([854]).

The activities of IS in Puntland are still limited although the bomb attack in Bossasso in May 2017 raised concerns about its increased capacities ([855]). Until now, IS has not represented a problem or a huge threat ([856]).

AS activities in Puntland are overall limited but there has been an increase in activities during the first months of 2017 ([857]). The group operates in and around the Galgala Mountains. From there, the group infiltrates Bossaso where smaller attacks occur regularly ([858]). Garoowe, on the other hand, is almost free of AS ([859]).

The Puntland police recruit their officers from local clan militias and deploy them in their respective home areas which are considered by a BFA/SEM source as a main reason for the relative peace in Puntland ([860]).

BFA/SEM summarises: 'In Puntland, the main threat to general safety is the presence of AS in the Galgala Mountains and that of an ISIS affiliated group in the North Eastern part' ([861]). ACLED notes in May 2017 that the presence of an IS-affiliated group in Bari has created a new security dynamic in the region ([862]).

Recent security trends and violent incidents

During the reporting period of January 2016 to 31 August 2017, ACLED ([863]) recorded 283 incidents in Puntland of which 236 were in Bari. The overall fatalities estimation was 473 of which 388 occurred in Bari ([864]). Of these incidents, eight had unknown fatalities, coded by ACLED as 10.

ACLED data	2016	Jan-31 Aug 2017	2016-31 Aug 2017

([853]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; International Crisis Group, Nairobi; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 90.
([854]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International Crisis Group, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), pp. 89, 90.
([855]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; Western diplomatic source, Nairobi; International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 91.
([856]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi; International organisation (C), Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 91.
([857]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: International Crisis Group, Nairobi; International organisation, Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), pp. 92-93.
([858]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 92.
([859]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 92.
([860]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 87.
([861]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), p. 7.
([862]) ACLED, Real-Time analysis of African political violence – Conflict trends report no. 58, May 2017 (url).
([863]) For more explanation about this source of information, refer to the Introduction of this report.
([864]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).

Region	incidents	fatalities	incidents	fatalities	incidents	fatalities
Bari	135	146	101	242	236	388
Nugaal	32	81	15	4	47	85

The majority of incidents resulted in an estimated zero to two fatalities with a few exceptions.

Some examples of the most violent incidents:

A five-day battle in March 2016 in Nugaal between PDF and AS resulted in around 100 fatalities and the capture of 106 AS fighters. ACLED mentions 200-300 fatalities but this number could not be verified ([865]).

During the first week of December 2016, PDF clashed several times with Mumin's IS group in and around Qandala in order to recapture the port town. The IS group was expelled from Qandala on 7 December. ACLED estimated 45 deaths; while a Puntland official said 30 pro-IS fighters were killed and 35 injured ([866]). More than 22 700 people were internally displaced since the IS group entered Qandala in late October and an additional 3 000 since the start of the military operation against the group ([867]).

On 6 June 2017, AS conducted its first larger attack on a PDF base in Af-Urur, which allegedly led to 50 PDF and around 23 AS fatalities ([868]).

Clashes and skirmishes between various sub-clans have been reported but the casualty number per event was mostly zero to two. The conflicts occurred among others between the Majerteen sub-clans Ali Saleeban and Ugaar Saleeban; between the Majerteen sub-clans Ali Saleeban and Osman Mohamoud; between the Wabeeneeye (Majerteen) and the Dubeys (Warsangeli); between the Isse-Mohamoud (Majerteen) and Jama-Siyad (Dulbahante); and between members of the Gadabursi ([869]).

Violence against civilians

Of the 283 incidents in total, ACLED registered 110 as violence against civilians and has estimated 66 resulting fatalities ([870]). Most of these incidents are believed to be clan-related. Few incidents are related to AS or IS, of which the following is the most violent:

On 23 May 2017 a suicide bomber later identified as part of the Islamic State group attacked the Jubba Hotel in Bossaso killing six people ([871]).

([865]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); Radio Dalsan, Somali Regional State Displays Alshabaab Prisoners Of War, 22 March 2016 (url); Bloomberg, Somalia's Puntland Says It Repelled Al-Shabaab Raids on Coast, 22 March 2016 (url); Puntland Mirror, After seven years of deadly combat Al-Shabab is still threat to Puntland, 9 June 2017 (url).
([866])ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); VOA, Forces Retake Somali Town Held by Pro-Islamic State Fighters, 7 December 2016 (url).
([867]) OCHA, Somalia Flash Update - Humanitarian impact of fighting in Qandala, Puntland, 6 December 2016 (url).
([868]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([869]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url); ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([870]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([871]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).

3.2.6. Sool and Sanaag

Short description of the regions

Sool and Sanaag are located in the borderlands between Somaliland and Puntland. Sanaag in the north along the Gulf of Aden; Sool in the south bordering Puntland to the east and Ethiopia to the south.

Sool is inhabited primarily by Dulbahante and Sanaag primarily by Warsangeli, both of which are Darod sub-clans. Both sub-clans are part of the Harti confederation together with the Majerteen clans of Puntland ([872]).

According to the 2014 Population Survey Estimate by UNFPA and Somali authorities, Sanaag counted 544 123 inhabitants of which 159 717 were urban inhabitants, 352 692 nomads, 30 804 rural inhabitants and 910 IDPs. Sool counted 327 428 inhabitants of which 187 632 were nomads, 120 993 urban inhabitants, 13 983 rural inhabitants and 4 820 IDPs ([873]). More recent population estimates are not available; however, the figures may be affected by drought, conflict and returnees in recent years ([874]). See also Section 2.5.5. IDPs, refugees, and returnees.

Background to the conflict and actors in Sool and Sanaag

The borderlands of Somaliland and Puntland have been contested for decades. Both regions have overlapping and conflicting territorial claims. While Somaliland defines its borders according to the territory of the former British Somaliland, Puntland defines its borders according to clan affiliation ([875]). In addition, local clan politics and the scarcity of resources due to the recent drought play a role as well ([876]).

At the same time, 'both the Dulbahante and the Warsangeli are founding fathers and co-signatories of the Republic of Somaliland declaration of independence of 1991' which creates 'a blurred picture of political loyalty' ([877]). People are constantly switching sides, according to Mark Bradbury ([878]). Political affiliation is changeable and members of a single household might support different political entities ([879]).

The main armed actors are the Somaliland Army and Puntland Defence Forces. To a lesser extent. independent clan militias from Dulbahante, including the Khatumo State militia, and Warsangeli, the Liyu Police and AS-Galgala are active ([880]).

The government of Somaliland controls most of both Sool and Sanaag. The easternmost part of both regions is according to BFA/SEM sources controlled by Puntland or local clans allied

([872]) EASO, COI report - South and Central Somalia Country overview [clan maps based on Lewis 1955, Abikar 1999], August 2014 (url), pp. 52-53.
([873]) UNFPA, Population Estimation Survey 2014, Somalia, October 2014 (url), p. 31.
([874]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).
([875]) Höhne, M.V. Between Somaliland and Puntland - Marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions, 2015, pp. 14, 21; Bamberger, J.G. and Skovsted, K. Concessions and Conflicts: Mapping Oil Exploration in Somalia and Ethiopia, 2016 (url), p. 25.
([876]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 102, .
([877]) Bamberger, J.G. and Skovsted, K. Concessions and Conflicts: Mapping Oil Exploration in Somalia and Ethiopia, 2016 (url), p. 13; see also Höhne, M. V. Between Somaliland and Puntland - Marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions, 2015, (url), p. 8.
([878]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Mark Bradbury], August 2017 (url), p. 103.
([879]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Local NGO employee (2), Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 103.
([880]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), p. 23.

with Puntland ([881]).The Liyu police operate from time to time in the southern part of Sool but does not have a permanent presence. AS has a cell in the Galgala Mountains in the border area in the north ([882]).

Khatumo state

Khatumo is a self-declared state with an administration in Buhodle, Togdheer, led by Ali Khalif ([883]). The administrative strength is extremely limited and only enjoys sporadic support from the Dulbahante clan ([884]). According to a BFA/SEM source, the Khatumo state never really had a strong presence in its claimed territory and 'they never exerted much ground authority' ([885]).

There has been almost no armed activity during 2017 related to the conflict between Somaliland and Puntland, but the situation in eastern Somaliland (border area with Khatumo state) remains fragile. This is due to conflicts between local clans (predominantly Dulbahante sub-clans e.g. Qayaad and Barhasame) that have been escalated during 2017, most likely because of the drought and related scarcity of resources. ([886]).

Recent security trends and violent incidents

During the reporting period of January 2016 to 31 August 2017, ACLED ([887]) has recorded 158 incidents in Sool and Sanaag, which resulted in and estimated 113 fatalities ([888]).

ACLED data	2016		Jan-31 Aug 2017		2016-31 Aug 2017	
Region	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**
Sanaag	56	38	13	7	69	45
Sool	58	27	31	40	89	67

According to BFA/SEM, the Sool districts of Xudun, Taleex and Laascaanood have seen sporadic clashes between different Dulbahante militias and Somaliland ([889]). There have also been clashes between Dulbahante sub-clan militias. As an example of the most violent

([881]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 88.
([882]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa; Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), pp. 92, 102.
([883]) UN SEMG, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2016/919, 31 October 2016 (url), pp. 143, 157.
([884]) Bamberger, J. G. and Skovsted, K. Concessions and Conflicts: Mapping Oil Exploration in Somalia and Ethiopia, 2016 (url), p. 10; BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 104.
([885]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia[source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), p. 102.
([886]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; Employee of international organisation, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 102.
([887]) For more explanation about this source of information, refer to the Introduction of this report.
([888]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([889]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url), p. 25.

incidents, two Dulbahante sub-clans clashed on 3 June 2016 in Dharkein Genyo near Laascaanood resulting in 10 fatalities and 30 injured ([890]).

In a similar episode on 9 April 2017, 13 people were killed in Saaxdheer near Laascaanood when two Dulbahante sub-clans clashed. Clan conflicts occurred among others between Dulbahante and Warsangeli; Dulbahante and Faqashiini; Qayaad and Barhasame; and Habar Jeelo/Biciido and Habar Yonis clan ([891]).

Violence against civilians

Of the 158 incidents in total, ACLED categorised 42 as violence against civilians and estimated 24 resulting fatalities ([892]). Most of these fatalities are due to clan-related violence or violence amongst civilians.

3.2.7. Somaliland

Short description of the region

Since 1991, Somaliland has been a self-proclaimed, unrecognised, *de facto* independent republic with a multi-party democracy. 'Somaliland has a working political system, government institutions, a police force and its own currency' ([893]). However, the government has shown autocratic tendencies and the decision by the *guurti* (House of Elders) to postpone the presidential, parliamentary and *guurti* elections till 13 November 2017 has been criticised by both opposition parties and the international community ([894]). Demonstrations, amongst others addressing the postponement have taken place ([895]).

Somaliland consists of five regions: Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sanaag and Sool. Besides its self-proclaimed capital Hargeysa, other towns are the regional capitals of Borama, Burco, Ceerigaabo and Laascaanood, and the important port town of Berbera.

Somaliland, excluding Sool and Sanaag, is mainly inhabited by the Isaaq clans Habar Awal, Habar Yonis, Habar Jeelo and Idagala, and to the west in Awdal the Dir clans Gadabursi and Issa ([896]). This clan representation makes Somaliland more homogeneous than South/Central Somalia but the clan still plays a central role in politics, business and everyday life ([897]).

According to the 2014 Population Survey Estimate by UNFPA and Somali authorities, the three regions Awdal, Togdheer and Woqooyi Galbeed totalled 2 636 629 inhabitants of which 1 574 285 were urban inhabitants, 643 993 nomads, 340 011 rural inhabitants and 78 340 IDPs ([898]). Somaliland's capital Hargeisha had a population of 760 000 people in 2015 ([899]).

([890]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([891]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([892]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([893]) BBC News, Somaliland profile, 26 May 2016 (url).
([894]) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408), 9 May 2017 (url), p. 3; The National, Somaliland Presidential Election date announced, 11 June 2017 (url).
([895]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 95.
([896]) EASO, COI report - South and Central Somalia Country overview [clan maps based on Lewis 1955, Abikar 1999], August 2014 (url), pp. 52-53.
([897]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Hargeysa; Western diplomatic source; International Organisation, Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 100.
([898]) UNFPA, Population Estimation Survey 2014, Somalia, October 2014 (url), p. 31.
([899]) CIA, CIA World Factbook – Somalia, last updated 5 October 2017 (url).

More recent population estimates are not available; however, the figures may be affected by drought, conflict and returnees in recent years ([900]). See also Section 2.5.5. IDPs, refugees, and returnees.

In order to fight crime and terrorism, a number of permanent roadblocks were put in place throughout Somaliland, including three roadblocks between Hargeysa and the Ethiopian-Somaliland border town of Wajaale and 10-15 roadblocks between Laascaanood and Hargeysa. These roadblocks are manned by the police ([901]).

Background on the conflict and actors in Somaliland

The main armed actors in Somaliland are the Somaliland Army (SLA), which comprises four to five divisions, and the Somaliland Police Force (SPF), which consist of approximately 6 000 officers. These forces control most of Somaliland unchallenged – apart from the contested areas Sanaag and Sool ([902]). Other armed units under government control are the Special Police Unit responsible for the protection of international organisations and NGOs, the Rapid Reaction Unit, the National Coast Guard and the National Security Service ([903]). The Liyu Police are reported to operate on the Somaliland side of their common border, in Buuhoodle ([904]).

The conflict with Puntland about Sanaag and Sool, in addition to the drought, is highlighted as the main threat in Somaliland ([905]).

There have been no recorded terror attacks by AS in Somaliland since 2008 and the group is deemed incapable of executing targeted assassinations in Somaliland ([906]). In the disputed areas in eastern Somaliland, around Laascaanood, there have been cases where AS has tracked down deserters ([907]). As mentioned in 2.2.3.3. Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a, deserters from South/Central Somalia are in a difficult position in Somaliland as they do not know who they can trust or who is close to AS ([908]). However, there have never been reports from Hargeysa of an AS deserter being killed ([909]). According to BFA/SEM sources it must be assumed that AS has a covert presence in Somaliland, including Hargeysa, but its capacities are low ([910]).

([900]) UNHCR, Displacements Monitored by UNHCR Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN), 2017 (url).
([901]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Hargeysa; Employee of international organisation, Hargeysa; Local NGO employee (1), Hargeysa; Local NGO employee (2), Hargeysa; own observations], August 2017 (url), p. 96.
([902]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Military strategic expert, Vienna; International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu; Employee of international organisation, Hargeysa; Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), pp. 97, 98, 102.
([903]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Military strategic expert, Vienna], August 2017 (url), p. 99.
([904]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 20.
([905]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: International organisation (A), Nairobi and Mogadishu], August 2017 (url), p. 94.
([906]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Employee of international organisation, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 105.
([907]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO, Nairobi], August 2017 (url), p. 107.
([908]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 44.
([909]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [source: Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa; Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa], August 2017 (url), p. 107.
([910]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia [sources: Somali employee of an international NGO, Nairobi; Representative of an international NGO active in Somalia, Hargeysa; Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa], August 2017 (url), pp. 106, 108.

For more information on the security issues in Somalialand, see the BFA/SEM report ([911]).

Recent security trends and violent incidents

During the reporting period of January 2016 to 31 August 2017, ACLED ([912]) registered 242 incidents in Somaliland (excluding Sool and Sanaag), which resulted in an estimated 65 fatalities ([913]).

ACLED data	2016		Jan-31 Aug 2017		2016-31 Aug 2017	
Region	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**	**incidents**	**fatalities**
Awdal	36	2	9	0	45	2
Togdheer	82	38	37	18	119	56
Woqooyi Galbeed	46	2	32	5	78	7

All but four incidents resulted in zero to two fatalities, one incident had an unknown number of fatalties, coded by ACLED as 10. Some of the incidents with higher number of fatalities are:

On 17 June 2016, the Khatumo militia (Dulbahante) attacked the Somaliland army in Widhwidh, Togdheer, with an unknown number of fatalities ([914]).

On 12 July 2016, two Ethiopians were killed in Buuhoodle, Togdheer. AS is suspected to be behind the attack ([915]).

On 12 October 2016, clan militias from Sa'ad (Hawiye/Habr Gedir sub-clan) and Wagardha (Darod sub-clan) clashed in Bali Cad, Togdheer. 10 people were killed ([916]).

On 10 January 2017, alleged tension between Dulbahante and Habar Jeelo resulted in the killing of two men from Habar Jeelo in Burco town ([917]).

Violence against civilians

Of the 242 incidents, ACLED has recorded 36 incidents in 2016 as violence against civilians, estimating 19 deaths as a result, and in 2017, 8 incidents with an estimated 8 fatalities ([918]).

([911]) BFA/SEM, Sicherheitslage in Somalia, August 2017 (url).
([912]) For more explanation about this source of information, refer to the Introduction of this report.
([913]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([914]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([915]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([916]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 –2016), n.d. (url).
([917]) ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).
([918]) ACLED, ACLED Version 7 (1997 – 2016), n.d. (url); ACLED, Realtime Data (2017), n.d. (url).

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Real-Time analysis of African political violence – Conflict Trends report no. 58, May 2017 (http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ACLED_Conflict-Trends-Report_No.58-May-2017_pdf.pdf), accessed 8 September 2017.

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Annex 2: Terms of Reference

Acknowledgements
Glossary and Abbreviations
Disclaimer
Introduction and Methodology
Reference period January 2016-August 2017

Introduction on Somalia
Main political-economic and security developments since January 2016
Elections 2017
Federalism process and the way it impacts the security situation

1. **General description of the security situation since January 2016**
   - 1.1. General overview of recent conflicts in Somalia
     - 1.1.1.Short history of the conflict
   - 1.2. Actors in the conflict
     - 1.2.1.State's armed forces (army, police, intelligence…)
       - Structure of troops
       - Visual identification
       - Enlisting, defecting
     - 1.2.2.International forces (AMISOM)/ethiopian troops
       - Command Structure
       - Visual identification
     - 1.2.3.Armed groups (Al Shabaab, ASWJ, clan militias, others…)
       - Command Structure
       - Organisation
       - Visual identification
       - Recruiting, defecting/deserting
       - Popular support/means of income
     - 1.2.4.Clan conflicts
   - 1.3. Recent security trends and armed confrontations
     - Fighting tactics, attacks, military operations, guerilla
     - Use of weapons, drones
   - 1.4. Impact of the conflicts on State, Law & Order, possibilities for protection **K**
     - Judiciary
     - Security forces and state protection
       - Detention, death penalty
   - 1.5. Impact of the violence on the civilian population
     - 1.5.1. Civilian fatalities
     - 1.5.2.Socio-economic life
     - 1.5.3.Life under Al Shabaab
     - 1.5.4.Freedom of movement
     - 1.5.5.Refugees, IDPs, returnees
     - 1.5.6.Children
     - 1.5.7.Health
   - 1.6. Geographical overview of the security situation
     - Mogadishu
     - Other parts of Somalia

2. Description of the security situation per region (adm. division):

Per region and regional state: Jubbaland, Mogadishu, South West State, HirShabelle, Galmudug, Somaliland, Puntland

Subdivided into regions: Lower Jubba, Gedo, Bay-Bakool, Middle Juba, Lower Shabelle, Benadir-Mogadishu, Middle Shabelle, Hiiraan-Gagaduud, Ximan-Xeeb, Galmudug, Puntland, Somaliland, Sool/Sanaag.

2.1. Short description of the region (terrain, urban areas, population)
2.2. Background to the violence
2.3. Actors in the conflict and areas of influence (long-term)
2.4. Recent trends in violence and impact on the population
Nature of the violence (weapons, shootings, ground battles, snipers, death squads)
Number /kind of incidents (+ some examples)
Number of victims (death and injured) Civilians/Military staff/fighters
Population displacements
Food security

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