COI QUERY

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COI QUERY RESPONSE – Syria

Major human rights, security, and socio-economic developments

1. Territorial control

The transitional government nominally controlled most of Syrian territory, with the main exceptions being the predominantly Druze-controlled Sweida governorate and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and areas in Quneitra and Dar'a governorates.[1] The integration of areas formerly controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria into state structures was declared complete in August, alongside the announced dissolution of the SDF.[2] (for further information see the section on Developments in the relation between the transitional government and SDF)

2. Political developments

On 12 July, Syria's transitional People's Assembly (Parliament) held its inaugural session. The 210-seat body comprises 70 members directly appointed by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and 140 selected through indirect elections, with women accounting for around 10 % of its membership[3] and minorities for around 14 %.[4] Three seats reserved for representatives from Sweida remained vacant due to the transitional government's lack of control over the governorate.[5] The elected portion of Parliament was overwhelmingly Arab and Sunni Muslim. The president utilised his 70 appointments to manually improve diversity by adding professional elites, religious figures, Kurds, Christians, and Alawites, although analysts point to the fact that they are not viewed as representative of their communities.[6] Most other

[1] LiveUamap, Syria, 31 August 2026, url
[2] AFP, Syrian Kurds announce completion of civil, military integration with Damascus, 20 August 2026, url; AP, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces group says it has dissolved after merging with the Syrian army, 26 August 2026, url; Rudaw, US Syria envoy hails 'historic' SDF dissolution, 26 August 2026, url
[3] Security Council Report, August 2026 Monthly Forecast, 3 August 2026, url
[4] International Crisis Group, Syria's new parliament can build institutions and trust, 27 July 2026, url
[5] Security Council Report, August 2026 Monthly Forecast, 3 August 2026, url
[6] Haid, H., Syria's parliament must now earn its legitimacy, Al Majalla, 8 July 2026, url; International Crisis Group, Syria's new parliament can build institutions and trust, 27 July 2026, url

appointees were professionals, revolutionary figures, traditional leaders, and members of armed factions.[7]

The Parliament has formal powers to propose, adopt, amend and repeal legislation, ratify treaties, approve the budget, and question ministers. However, its ability to oversee or constrain executive power is limited, as it cannot dismiss ministers, compel changes in government policy, or remove the government through a vote of no confidence.[8] The Parliament will serve a 30-month term.[9] In July, President Sharaa appointed the Supreme Constitutional Court, composed of seven judges, including two women.[10] The Parliament or other bodies had no role in the process.[11]

In August, the U.S. removed Syria from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, ending a decades-old designation that carried heavy economic restrictions.[12]

Political developments related to the situation in Sweida governorate

Sweida governorate continues to face a political and security stalemate, with relations between local actors controlling most of the province and the transitional government characterised by mutual distrust. Some local actors continue to call for independence or integration with Israel, while longstanding grievances, particularly regarding accountability, remain unresolved despite the start of trials against some alleged perpetrators of the July 2025 violence.[13]

Developments in the relation between the transitional government and SDF

On 20 August, the leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi announced the completion of the integration of Kurdish-led civil, security and military institutions into state institutions.[14] On 25 August, he further announced the dissolution of the SDF forces following their integration into state institutions[15] in a move welcomed by the U.S.[16] and the UN Office of

[7] Haid, H., Syria's parliament must now earn its legitimacy, Al Majalla, 8 July 2026, url
[8] International Crisis Group, Syria's new parliament can build institutions and trust, 27 July 2026, url
[9] AP, Syria's new parliament holds first session since ouster of ex-President Assad, 12 July 2026, url
[10] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria Claudio Cordone Briefing to the Security Council, 21 July 2026, url, p. 1
[11] HRW, Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Syrian Arab Republic, 16 July 2026, url
[12] France24, US removes Syria from state sponsor of terrorism list, 25 August 2026, url
[13] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, 27 August 2026, url
[14] AFP, Syrian Kurds announce completion of civil, military integration with Damascus, 20 August 2026, url
[15] AP, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces group says it has dissolved after merging with the Syrian army, 26 August 2026, url; Rudaw, US Syria envoy hails 'historic' SDF dissolution, 26 August 2026, url
[16] Enab Baladi, International Reactions Welcome SDF Dissolution, Integration, 26 August 2026, url

the Special Envoy for Syria (OSES).[17] Abdi was subsequently appointed as adviser to interim president al-Sharaa[18], while other prominent SDF leaders were appointed to positions in the Parliament and the senior roles within state security structures in northeast Syria.[19]

The transitional government assumed control of major oil and gas infrastructure in northeast Syria, with former employees integrated into the Syrian Petroleum Company. The transitional government also assumed administrative and operational control of Qamishli International Airport Border, while border crossings previously administered by the SDF were incorporated into the national customs system.[20]

Over 20 000 public employees from the Kurdish-led administration in northeast Syria were integrated into state structures[21] including 1 400 health-sector employees and a further 700 employees from the region's electricity institutions.[22] In terms of military integration, about 10 000 SDF fighters had already joined the Syrian security structures, with senior SDF officials saying the final total could reach around 12 000.[23] Around 6 000 SDF fighters joined four newly created MoD brigades while 4 000 were reportedly assigned to Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) units.[24] The integration centred on brigades based in Hasaka, Qamishli, Derik, and Kobane (Ayn al-Arab), each led by former SDF officers. Three brigades were initially placed under the Syrian army's 60th Division and one under the 72nd Division, but subsequent restructuring brought all of them under the newly formed 2nd Corps. SDF-affiliated Internal Security Forces (Asayish) are envisaged to join the MoI. In early June, authorities announced that more than 9 000 Asayish members, including 1 000 women, would undergo interviews as part of the process of integration into the state security forces in Hasaka governorate[25] although by August no official figure was released on how many were ultimately integrated.[26] Another 1 500 Asayish members are envisaged to join the MoI and serve in Kobane (Ayn al-Arab).[27] The MoI also completed core administrative procedures to absorb the Sutoro forces, originally a Christian, specifically Syriac, protection force established under the People's Protection Units (YPG), into the Internal Security apparatus.[28] Former SDF

[17] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, 27 August 2026, url
[18] AFP, Mazloum Abdi, from champion of Syria Kurdish autonomy to presidential adviser, 27 August 2026, url
[19] International Crisis Group, A Pivotal Moment in Uniting Post-Assad Syria, 17 September 2026, url
[20] FDD, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces announce its dissolution, 25 August 2026, url
[21] Rudaw, Over 20,000 Rojava employees integrated into Syrian state structure: official, 27 August 2026, url
[22] FDD, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces announce its dissolution, 25 August 2026, url
[23] FDD, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces announce its dissolution, 25 August 2026, url
[24] Margolin, A., Tabler, A., After the SDF: What Comes Next for Northeast Syria and U.S. Policy, TWI, 31 August 2026, url
[25] Enab Baladi, 9,000 Asayish Members Nominated for Integration, Including 1,000 Women, 5 June 2026, url; Rudaw, Damascus releases over 1,200 SDF-linked detainees, Asayish integration interviews on agenda: official, 3 June 2026, url
[26] FDD, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces announce its dissolution, 25 August 2026, url
[27] Margolin, A., Tabler, A., After the SDF: What Comes Next for Northeast Syria and U.S. Policy, TWI, 31 August 2026, url
[28] Etana Syria, Brief: SDF integration progresses, YPJ future uncertain, 18 August 2026, url

members integrated in the state structure now receive their salaries from the transitional government.[29]

In late July, state Internal Security vehicles patrolled several main streets in Hasaka city without SDF accompaniment for the first time since the integration agreement was reached.[30] Deployment of state security forces in Kobane (Ayn al-Arab) was also reported.[31]

The two sides have not yet reached agreement on the integration of the SDF's Women's Protection Units (YPJ) into state security structures. The transitional government has rejected proposals to incorporate the all-female force into the military, which currently excludes women from combat units, and has instead proposed placing YPJ members under the MoI which has begun recruiting women into police forces. While SDF and YPJ leaders have indicated openness to this arrangement in principle, they have sought to preserve the YPJ's organisational coherence and specialised counter-terrorism role.[32]

As of early September, SDF began to hand over heavy weapons and equipment to MoD forces in Hasaka governorate.[33]

An analysis by International Crisis Group noted that the transitional government has so far pursued a relatively light-touch integration of Kurdish military and security forces, allowing SDF and Asayish units to retain much of their organisational structure under commanders appointed by the central government. This has meant that Kurdish residents' day-to-day interactions with state security forces in the northeast have largely remained with Kurdish personnel operating within an integrated chain of command, including following the deployment of additional government forces to Hasaka city on 1 September. This approach has extended central state authority while maintaining local security arrangements and reportedly reducing Kurdish concerns about non-Kurdish forces. However, the agreements reached so far do not clearly specify the duration or longer-term terms of these arrangements, leaving uncertainty over whether the transitional government may seek to further centralise authority over time.[34]

[29] Etana Syria, Brief: SDF dissolution & integration underway, 29 September 2026, url
[30] Etana Syria, Brief: SDF integration progresses, YPJ future uncertain, 18 August 2026, url
[31] SANA, Internal Security forces reinforce deployment in Ayn al-Arab, detain suspects, 12 September 2026, url; Waters, G., Rebuilding Security in New Syria: Year 2, Week 37, Syria Revisited, 23 August 2026, url
[32] International Crisis Group, A Pivotal Moment in Uniting Post-Assad Syria, 17 September 2026, url
[33] Enab Baladi, SDF Begins Handing Heavy Weapons to Syrian Defense Ministry, 3 September 2026, url
[34] International Crisis Group, A Pivotal Moment in Uniting Post-Assad Syria, 17 September 2026, url

3. Governance

Judiciary

In September, the Parliament formally abolished the Assad-era Counter-Terrorism Court and annulled its rulings. The transitional government had already treated the court as defunct and dismissed the 67 judges who had served on it in June 2025.[35] Syria faces a complex legal and administrative process in addressing the consequences of more than 90 000 cases previously handled by the now-abolished Anti-Terrorism Court, including confiscated property, legal restrictions and related official records. The legislation abolishing the court also establishes mechanisms, including specialised judicial committees, to review and address the effects of its previous rulings.[36] The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) documented at least 10 767 people prosecuted before the Anti-Terrorism Court as of October 2020, across approximately 90 560 cases, alongside 3 970 property seizure orders. More broadly, it recorded at least 40 602 seizure and confiscation orders issued between 2012 and 2024 under the former regime's property confiscation system, reportedly affecting around 320 000 people.[37]

By November 2025, the authorities claimed to have lifted over 5 million of the travel bans measures related to issues including draft evasion or security reasons imposed by the Assad government on more than 8 million Syrians.[38] The travel bans affected those who were viewed as opponents of the Assad government and were wanted criminally and judicially.[39] Authorities reported that remaining cases included about 1.15 million state employees whose status was under reviews, contractors linked to security and military bodies under investigation for possible abuses, individuals subject to police records for violations or criminal cases, and persons banned from travel by the Ministry of Finance.[40]

Despite the transitional government's efforts to address the situation of persons wanted by the former regime, including by lifting travel bans and repealing decisions issued by exceptional courts such as the Counter-Terrorism Court[41], issues remain concerning individuals facing pending criminal charges and cases involving personal claims arising from the conflict.[42] Criminal cases involving personal claims are particularly difficult to resolve due to their technical complexity and having to navigate a long bureaucratic process which involves multiple agencies. Some individuals learned while abroad that criminal complaints

[35] Reuters, Syria parliament votes to abolish Assad-era terrorism court, nullify rulings, 16 September 2026, url
[36] Arab News, Syria faces challenge of restoring rights after abolition of Assad-era Anti-Terrorism Court, 21 September 2026, url
[37] SANA, Syrian Network for Human Rights welcomes abolition of Terrorism Court, 16 September 2026, url
[38] Enab Baladi, Syrian Interior Ministry removes five million names from travel ban lists, 20 November 2025, url; SANA, Interior Ministry is removing restrictions imposed by former regime – Spokesperson, 20 November 2025, url
[39] Enab Baladi, Can judiciary deliver justice to those deprived of civil rights?, 2 May 2025, url
[40] Enab Baladi, Syrian Interior Ministry removes five million names from travel ban lists, 20 November 2025, url
[41] Asharq Al-Awsat, Thousands of Syrians Face Legal Fallout From Assad-Era Cases, 24 September 2026, url
[42] Asharq Al-Awsat, Thousands of Syrians Face Legal Fallout From Assad-Era Cases, 24 September 2026, url; DIS, Security Situation, Return and Documents, December 2025, url, p. 28

had been filed against them, while others were unable to identify any complainant. Some returnees also discovered that arrest warrants had been issued against them on criminal charges and were subsequently informed by judicial offices that the relevant case files had been lost or damaged, despite the proceedings remaining active. Those affected cited poor interoperability between databases and limited experience among newly appointed staff as factors contributing to these difficulties. Activists proposed establishing independent judicial committees and a unified database for dealing with such cases.[43]

In February 2026, presidential decree No. 39/2026 granted general amnesty for crimes committed before its issuance date.[44] It applied 'to prisoners and convicted persons from both the Assad era and the current period' meeting certain conditions such surrendering weapons, voluntarily surrendering within a specified timeframe, or resolving one's legal status within the following months. It excluded individuals convicted of 'grave violations against the Syrian people', serious terrorism offences, certain intentional homicide offences, drug trafficking, and specified crimes under military and security legislation.[45] It is unclear how many people benefited from the amnesty and whether it covered individuals with pending criminal cases dating from the Assad era. As of September 2026, there were still reports of individuals experiencing difficulties related to criminal charges involving personal claims dating from the Assad era.[46]

Human rights violations in detention

In 2026, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (UNCOI) identified nine reported cases of death in detention.[47] Deaths in custody, potentially resulting from torture[48], have also been reported, including the case of Muhammad Ghmeira, a member of the Syrian Civil Defense. He was arrested in August in Latakia governorate on allegations of theft and detained for three days, during which his family was unable to contact him. Ghmeira suffered from haemophilia and died after several days in hospital following his release.[49] A MoI commission of inquiry found that Ghmeira had died as a result of physical abuse during interrogation.[50] Authorities detained seven individuals who were present at

[43] Asharq Al-Awsat, Thousands of Syrians Face Legal Fallout From Assad-Era Cases, 24 September 2026, url
[44] SANA, President al-Sharaa issues Decree No. 39 for 2026 granting general amnesty, 18 February 2026, url
[45] Al-Khatib, H., In Syria, an Amnesty Decree Without Justice?, TWI, 8 April 2026, url
[46] Asharq Al-Awsat, Thousands of Syrians Face Legal Fallout From Assad-Era Cases, 24 September 2026, url
[47] OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url
[48] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, 27 August 2026, url
[49] SNHR, SNHR Condemns the Death of Mohammad Ghmeira Following His Detention at Al-Haffah Police Station and Calls for an Independent and Transparent Investigation, 19 August 2026, url
[50] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, 27 August 2026, url

police station during his detention and referred the interrogator who had slapped Ghmeira to prosecution.[51]

An investigative report by Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ)[52] covering the period June 2025 – June 2026 documented continued reports of severe beatings, electric shocks, humiliation, threats, deprivation of basic necessities and deaths in custody involving multiple security and military actors, including in official and undisclosed detention facilities, at checkpoints, and during transfers and interrogations. STJ testimonies indicated that some detainees were reportedly treated on the basis of their identity, area of origin, previous service or content found on their phones, rather than specific individual conduct. Collective labels such as 'SDF member', 'follower of al-Hijri', 'Druze', 'Assad supporter' or 'regime remnant' reportedly influenced the treatment of some detainees in place of individualised investigations. Acts of ill-treatment were reportedly carried out by government security forces as well as by tribal actors.[53]

4. Security situation

Central Syria

During the reference period, central Syria experienced localised sectarian abuses and community tensions, fuelled by wartime grievances, including housing disputes and property seizures.[54] Killings by unidentified gunmen of individuals accused of having links to the former government, particularly Alawites, were also reported, predominantly in Homs governorate[55] and, to a lesser extent, in Hama governorate.[56] (for further details see section on Alawites)

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) noted that the security environment remains fragile in parts of Homs governorate, including the eastern

[51] New Arab (The), Syrians fear the return of Assad's prisons as death of young detainee sparks anger, 27 August 2026, url
[52] The report draws on 19 testimonies from survivors, relatives and eyewitnesses, alongside official statements, human rights and media reports and open source material, and examines 14 cases of torture or deaths in custody documented between June 2025 and June 2026. STJ, Syria: Alarming Evidence that Torture Persists and the Machinery of Violence Is Being Rebuilt after Assad (June 2025–June 2026), August 2026, url, p. 4
[53] STJ, Syria: Alarming Evidence that Torture Persists and the Machinery of Violence Is Being Rebuilt after Assad (June 2025–June 2026), August 2026, url, pp. 4, 10, 12
[54] Waters, G., Quiet Violence in Hama's al-Ghab Plains, Syria Revisited, 23 July 2026, url; Waters, G., Rebuilding Security in New Syria: Year 2, Week 37, 23 August 2026, url; Waters, G., Civil Peace Challenges in Northwest Hama, Syria Revisited, 11 September 2026, url
[55] SJAC, An Absence of Justice: Escalating Violence in Transitional Homs, 9 September 2026, url
[56] Waters, G., Quiet Violence in Hama's al-Ghab Plains, Syria Revisited, 23 July 2026, url; Waters, G., Rebuilding Security in New Syria: Year 2, Week 37, 23 August 2026, url; Waters, G., Civil Peace Challenges in Northwest Hama, Syria Revisited, 11 September 2026, url

Badiya. It also pointed to widespread presence of unexploded ordnance (UXOs) and explosive remnants of war (ERW).[57]

The security situation in the governorates of Latakia and Tartous was characterised by isolated incidents involving landmines and clashes between clashes government forces and unidentified armed actors.[58]

Northern Syria

The 29 January 2026 integration agreement and has ended armed confrontations between the transitional government and the SDF.[59] In northeast Syria, the integration process of SDF-controlled military and civilian institutions into state structures made significant progress. The SDF announced its dissolution and integration into the Syrian military. Further steps were taken to integrate military, police and civilian administrative structures in Hasaka.[60] Tensions between local Kurdish communities in areas formerly controlled by the SDF and government forces occasionally escalated over localised incidents involving the killing of former SDF fighters, attacks on Kurdish returnees[61], and increases in fuel prices.[62]

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) attacks on government security personnel were reported during the reference period in Deir Ez-Zor, Raqqa[63], Aleppo[64], Idlib and Hasaka governorates.[65] Incidents involving landmines and UXOs were particularly prominent in areas of northern Syria which experience contamination with explosive remnants of war, including Deir Ez-Zor, Aleppo, Raqqa and Idlib governorates.[66] Deir Ez-Zor is one of the governorates most affected by explosive ordnance contamination in Syria, restricting safe movement and access to agricultural land, residential areas and essential services while posing significant risks to civilians. Deir Ez-Zor city also remains among Syria's most heavily damaged urban centres, with approximately 80 % of its buildings damaged or destroyed.[67] In Aleppo and Raqqa governorates, widespread UXO and ERW contamination restricts safe movements and

[57] UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Homs Governorate Profile | June 2026, 7 July 2026, url, pp. 1-2
[58] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 1 October 2025, url
[59] International Crisis Group, A Pivotal Moment in Uniting Post-Assad Syria, 17 September 2026, url
[60] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, 17 September 2026, url, p. 2
[61] International Crisis Group, A Pivotal Moment in Uniting Post-Assad Syria, 17 September 2026, url
[62] AP, Tensions flare in Syria's Kurdish northeast as government integration deal moves forward, 16 September, 2026, url; International Crisis Group, A Pivotal Moment in Uniting Post-Assad Syria, 17 September 2026, url
[63] New Arab (The), Syria struggling to deal with attacks on security forces, 24 August 2026, url
[64] Security Council Report, July 2026 Monthly Forecast, 1 July 2026, url
[65] New Arab (The), Syria struggling to deal with attacks on security forces, 24 August 2026, url
[66] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 1 October 2025, url
[67] UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Deir-ez-Zor Governorate Profile | June 2026, 7 July 2026, url, pp. 1, 3

access, impeding returns.[68] Social tensions linked to return and displacement dynamics were also reported.[69]

Southern Syria

In Sweida governorate, sporadic clashes between transitional government forces and local Druze armed groups were reported during the reference period. Clashes between government forces and the Druze militant faction National Guard were reported in late June but did not escalate into a wider confrontation.[70] Government forces and the National Guard exchanged fire around Tal al-Hadid on 1-3 July, reportedly killing two people and injuring dozens. The government accused the National Guard of initiating the confrontation, which erupted shortly after President al-Sharaa appointed two Sweida figures opposed to the faction to the parliament.[71]

The tensions related to the student examinations ignited again clashes in late August between the National Guard and transitional government forces[72], involving mortar and heavy machine-gun fire which reportedly led to two civilians and one National Guard fighter killed. Both sides accused the other of initiating the fighting, but neither made territorial gains, and the situation returned to calm by early September.[73]

Recurring security incidents in Sweida included clashes between local armed groups. In July, the OSES reported that intra-Druze fighting led to five people being killed while kidnappings, retaliatory attacks, organised crime and drug trafficking were continued sources of instability in Sweida governorate.[74] On 28 August, a personal dispute escalated into an armed confrontation near the provincial government building in Sweida city, reportedly injuring four people, including one seriously. Civilians and members of the National Guard were among those wounded.[75]

In western Dar'a and Quneitra governorates, Israeli ground activity intensified in June, with regular incursions across a wide area involving military patrols, temporary checkpoints, and

[68] UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Ar-Raqqa Governorate Profile | June 2026, 7 July 2026, url, p. 3; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Aleppo Governorate Profile | June 2026, 7 July 2026, url, p. 3
[69] UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Ar-Raqqa Governorate Profile | June 2026, 7 July 2026, url, p. 3; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Aleppo Governorate Profile | June 2026, 7 July 2026, url, p. 3
[70] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria Claudio Cordone Briefing to the Security Council, 21 July 2026, url, pp. 2-3
[71] OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url
[72] Enab Baladi, Suwayda: One Killed, Several Wounded in Clashes Between Interior Ministry Forces and National Guard, 1 September 2026, url
[73] International Crisis Group, Suweida's Exam Standoff Triggers Fresh Clashes in Southern Syria, 4 September 2026, url
[74] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria Claudio Cordone Briefing to the Security Council, 21 July 2026, url, pp. 2-3
[75] Enab Baladi, Suwayda: One Killed, Several Wounded in Clashes Between Interior Ministry Forces and National Guard, 1 September 2026, url

searches of homes and agricultural properties. More than 60 Israeli soldiers reportedly entered Jubata al-Khashab in one of the largest documented incursions, while near-daily operations in Jamleh and repeated incursions west of Abidin indicated particularly concentrated activity in these areas. Israeli forces also continued to temporarily detain Syrian citizens in the south-west. Most detainees were eventually released, albeit after several hours of questioning. Israeli forces also blocked farmers from accessing agricultural land in parts of Dar'a governorate.[76] In late June, Israeli forces established military position in the area of Ma'ariyeh in western Dar'a prompting neighbouring communities to confront them. Israel responded with artillery strikes and heavy machine-gun fire although not casualties were reported. The escalation led to the displacement of 400 to 500 residents from the towns of Abidin and Ma'ariyeh.[77] In July, Israeli forces continued to conduct regular ground incursions in western Dar'a and Quneitra, while artillery attacks on communities along the Quneitra border reportedly occurred weekly, although no casualties were reported. Several long-term detainees from south-west Syria held by Israel were also released during the month.[78]

Targeted killings and assassination attempts remained a recurring security concern in south-west Syria, primarily affecting civilians and former opposition figures. Although most attacks caused injuries rather than deaths, at least three people were reportedly killed. Armed confrontations also continued, driven by criminal activity, narcotics trafficking, personal disputes and local rivalries, with incidents reported in Assem, Al-Hirak, Al-Lajat, Mahajjeh and Sahem (Dar'a governorate).[79] Targeted killings increased in July while armed confrontations related to family disputes and ties to the former regime continued to be reported.[80]

Government forces conducted regular targeted raids and arrest operations across Dar'a governorate, primarily targeting former regime affiliates, criminal suspects and individuals accused of past security violations. Other arrests involved suspects allegedly responsible for assassinations, grenade attacks, collaboration with former regime security services and other criminal offences.[81]

Damascus

An Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) analysis of the period between the fall of the Assad regime and beginning of July 2026 noted that Damascus recorded the lowest level of post-transition violence in Syria. However, some security risks persist, including isolated

[76] Etana Syria, Brief: Recent developments in south-west Syria, 19 June 2026, url
[77] Etana Syria: Israeli attacks on western Daraa, 6 July 2026, url
[78] Etana Syria, Brief: Israel operates unchecked in south-west Syria, interim authorities target traffickers, 7 August 2026, url
[79] Etana Syria, Brief: Recent developments in south-west Syria, 19 June 2026, url
[80] Etana Syria, Brief: Israel operates unchecked in south-west Syria, interim authorities target traffickers, 7 August 2026, url
[81] Etana Syria, Brief: Recent developments in south-west Syria, 19 June 2026, url

mass-casualty attacks, targeted violence against civilians, protest-related disruption, and temporary restrictions on movement around sensitive sites and key access routes.[82]

During the reference period, Damascus witnessed improvised explosive device (IED) attacks by non-state armed groups targeting civilians. In June 2026, the head of the Palace of Justice in Babila, east of Damascus, was severely injured in a car bombing claimed by ISIL.[83] On 2 July, a bomb explosion at a café near the Syrian Palace of Justice in Damascus killed nine people and injured 22, with no group claiming responsibility.[84] Victims included lawyers originating from different governorates.[85] On 7 July, two further explosions near a hotel where French President Emmanuel Macron was staying injured 18 people.[86] Syrian authorities subsequently announced the arrest of individuals allegedly responsible, whom they said were affiliated with ISIL.[87]

Amid nationwide demonstrations calling for accountability for Assad-era crimes, dozens of protesters in Damascus on 16 June entered or attempted to enter the predominantly Alawite neighbourhoods of Mazzeh 86 and Ish al-Warwar. Local media reported property damage and injuries to civilians in Mazzeh 86, while security forces sealed off Ish al-Warwar to prevent protesters from entering.[88] According to ACLED, a major factor driving civilian targeting in the capital after the fall of Assad is related to retaliatory violence against involved individuals linked to the former government or security apparatus, and against Alawite civilians with no reported direct ties to the former regime.[89]

Damascus's operating environment is closely linked to security developments in the surrounding Rural Damascus governorate, which encircles the capital. These dynamics primarily affect access and movement, particularly along routes to the airport and around the capital's southern and southeastern outskirts where pockets of Druze-majority areas have at times resisted government control.[90] Rural Damascus witnesses a higher number of security incidents than Damascus, mainly involved killings of civilians by unidentified armed actors, criminal activity and contamination with ERW.[91] UNOCHA identified contamination with explosive remnants of war, house, land, and property (HLP) challenges, gender-based violence (GBV) and early marriage as the main protection considerations in Rural Damascus.[92]

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[82] ACLED, Reengaging Damascus: Syria's capital offers opportunity, but not without risk, 7 July 2026, url
[83] Enab Baladi, Islamic State Claims Attack on Babila Judicial Official, 18 June 2026, url
[84] BBC News, Bomb blast at Damascus cafe kills nine, Syrian state media say, 3 July 2026, url
[85] Nair, A., Damascus Blast Leaves Nine Dead and Dozens Injured, New Lines Magazine, 2 July 2026, url
[86] Reuters, Bomb attack rocks Damascus during Macron visit, 7 July 2026, url
[87] Security Council Report, Syria August 2026 Monthly Forecast, 3 August 2026, url; France24, Syria arrests IS group-linked suspects over Damascus bombings during Macron visit, 10 July 2026, url
[88] International Crisis Group, Curbing Reprisals in Syria, 24 August 2026, url; HRW, Syria: Mob Violence Against Groups Linked to Assad Era, 22 June 2026, url
[89] ACLED, Reengaging Damascus: Syria's capital offers opportunity, but not without risk, 7 July 2026, url
[90] ACLED, Reengaging Damascus: Syria's capital offers opportunity, but not without risk, 7 July 2026, url
[91] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 6 October 2026, url
[92] UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Rural Damascus Governorate Profile | June 2026, 7 July 2026, url, p. 1

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant insurgency

ISIL maintained up to 3 000 fighters, mainly in Syria, although the actual figure may be higher due to recruitment among prison escapees and families associated with the group. Between 15 000 – 20 000 individuals with alleged links to ISIL who had previously been held at Al Hol camp remained unaccounted for following the camps closure in February 2026. UN Security Council Member States assessing that more than 1 000 may have joined ISIL, other armed groups or transitional government forces.[93] Syrian authorities disrupted ISIL activity through arrests, weapons seizures and the dismantling of cells across several governorates, detaining more than 235 operatives and preventing planned attacks.[94] In its assessment covering the period from April to the end of June 2026, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessed the ISIL threat in Syria as limited. It noted that ISIL attacks declined following the departure of U.S. forces from Syria in April, although the group continued to target Syrian government forces, indicating that it retained the capacity to conduct lethal attacks.[95]

ISIL reportedly intensified attacks against government forces during the first months of 2026. Between 17 February and 19 March, more than 30 attacks reportedly killed 29 people, including 23 military personnel, with incidents concentrated mainly in Deir Ez-Zor, Raqqa and Aleppo and additional attacks reported in Idlib, Hasaka and Homs.[96] In June, ISIL claimed several attacks against government security forces in Aleppo, Raqqa and Rural Damascus governorates, which resulted in casualties among security personnel.[97] The Syrian authorities attributed the July IED attacks in Damascus near the hotel president Macron was staying in Damascus to ISIL affiliates.[98]

International involvement

Israel

Israeli military activity in Syrian territory continued, with regular ground incursions, patrols, raids and searches contributing to displacement among local residents.[99] Military incursions

[93] UN Security Council, Thirty-eighth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2026/651], 10 August 2026, url, paras 56-58
[94] UN Security Council, Thirty-eighth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2026/651], 10 August 2026, url, para 56
[95] USDOD, Lead IG Report to the U.S. Congress I April 1, 2026–June 30, 2026, 25 August 2026, url, p. 5
[96] New Arab (The), Syria struggling to deal with attacks on security forces, 24 August 2026, url
[97] Security Council Report, July 2026 Monthly Forecast, 1 July 2026, url
[98] Security Council Report, Syria August 2026 Monthly Forecast, 3 August 2026, url; France24, Syria arrests IS group-linked suspects over Damascus bombings during Macron visit, 10 July 2026, url
[99] OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url

were reported particularly in Quneitra and Dar'a governorates.[100] In the context of its military activities in Syria, hundreds of residents including minors were interrogated and detained by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The UNCOI stated that as of September, it had identified 49 people, including two children, who were detained by the IDF on Syrian territory, with some transferred to Israel. Some were reportedly held incommunicado, raising concerns about possible torture and ill-treatment.[101]

Reports indicate extensive ecological and economic damage to forests, agricultural livelihoods and property[102] resulting from Israeli military operations, including allegations of aerial herbicide spraying over agricultural and grazing areas in Quneitra governorate.[103]

In August, Israeli warplanes struck the Abu al-Duhur air base in Idlib governorate, causing no casualties. Israel stated that the attack was intended as a warning against the deployment of Turkish military personnel at the site[104], which it considers a security threat.[105] Türkiye rejected Israel's claim regarding the deployment of Turkish military personnel, while Syrian authorities denied having plans to establish a Turkish military presence at the site.[106] Israel has sought restrictions on Turkish support for the Syrian military as part of broader security guarantees.[107]

Israel has stated that its military operations in Syria are intended to safeguard its national security and protect the Druze minority.[108] The transitional government has pursued a de-escalatory and diplomatic approach towards Israel, despite Israel's expanded occupation of territory in southern Syria and its impact on local communities.[109] The U.S.-mediated Israeli-Syrian talks aimed at reaching a bilateral security agreement have made no progress.[110]

On 9 September, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited an Israeli military position on Mount Hermon inside Syrian territory. Netanyahu stated that Israel had established 'absolute control' over the area extending from the mountain's summit south to the Yarmouk

[100] OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url; Security Council Report, August 2026 Monthly Forecast, 3 August 2026, url; Etana Syria, Brief: Israel operates unchecked in south-west Syria, interim authorities target traffickers, 7 August 2026, url
[101] OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url
[102] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, 27 August 2026, url; OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url
[103] OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url
[104] International Crisis Group, On Our Radar, 21 August 2026, url
[105] Security Council Report, September 2026 Monthly Forecast, 1 September 2026, url
[106] Security Council Report, September 2026 Monthly Forecast, 1 September 2026, url
[107] International Crisis Group, On Our Radar, 21 August 2026, url
[108] Security Council Report, August 2026 Monthly Forecast, 3 September 2026, url
[109] Security Council Report, September 2026 Monthly Forecast, 1 September 2026, url
[110] International Crisis Group, On Our Radar, 21 August 2026, url

River and west towards the Mediterranean. Defence Minister Israel Katz indicated that Israeli forces would remain in the area, describing it as a 'security zone'.[111]

US-led coalition

The U.S. does not have a military presence in Syria, engaging with the Syrian transitional government from mainly from Jordan and Türkiye to establish closer military alignment and to enable mine-clearance, training operations, force protection, and counter-ISIL operations.[112] The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) reported that U.S. forces killed an ISIL leader in an airstrike in northwest Syria in June.[113] The Syrian government has not commented on the airstrike.[114] U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth stated that the Operation Inherent Resolve mission[115] will end by 30 September 2026.[116]

Türkiye

Türkiye reportedly maintains around 20 000 troops[117] at multiple military bases and positions in northern Syria[118], particularly Idlib and Aleppo governorates.[119] According to Syrian army sources, only a few of these bases have been evacuated since Assad's fall, with Türkiye reportedly insisting on maintaining its military presence until what it considers the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) threat in Syria is addressed.[120] Türkiye is a leading partner of the Syrian army and police, providing training to thousands of fighters, weapons, and ongoing advisory support.[121]

Russia

In August, the transitional government and Russia agreed on a memorandum of understanding concerning Russia's presence in Syria. Under the agreement, the civilian facilities of the previously Russian controlled Hmeimim air base (Latakia governorate) and

[111] Security Council Report, Syria: Briefing and Consultations, 15 September 2026, url
[112] USDOD, Lead IG Report to the U.S. Congress I April 1, 2026–June 30, 2026, 25 August 2026, url, p. 10
[113] USCENTCOM, CENTCOM Forces Kill Senior ISIS Leader in Syria, 24 June 2026, url
[114] Shafaq News, US-led Coalition strike kills suspected ISIS member northern Syria, 20 June 2026, url
[115] The OIR mission has been 'advise, assist, and enable partner forces until they can independently maintain the enduring defeat of ISIS in Iraq and designated areas of Syria, and to set conditions for long-term security cooperation frameworks with partners in those countries'. USDOD, Lead IG Report to the U.S. Congress I April 1, 2026–June 30, 2026, 25 August 2026, url, p. 4
[116] USDOD, Lead IG Report to the U.S. Congress I April 1, 2026–June 30, 2026, 25 August 2026, url, p. 5
[117] FDD, 5 Things To Know About Turkey's Relationship with Syria, 26 August 2026, url
[118] FDD, 5 Things To Know About Turkey's Relationship with Syria, 26 August 2026, url
[119] FDD, 5 Things To Know About Turkey's Relationship with Syria, 26 August 2026, url
[120] Tsurkov, E., Uneasy Allies: The Real Relationship Between Turkey and Syria's New Rulers, NLM, 10 June 2026, url
[121] Tsurkov, E., Uneasy Allies: The Real Relationship Between Turkey and Syria's New Rulers, NLM, 10 June 2026, url

Tartous naval base will be transferred to Syrian government management, while the military facilities at both bases will be transformed into joint training and qualification centres.[122]

Security incidents

Between 1 June and 30 September 2026, ACLED documented 921 security incidents Syria: 237 of these were coded as battles, 350 as explosions/remote violence, and 334 as violence against civilians. The highest number of security incidents documented by ACLED occurred in the months of July and June (see Table 1).[123] Between 1 June and 30 September 2026, ACLED recorded the highest number of security incidents in the governorates of Dar'a (125), Sweida (108), Aleppo (106), and Deir Ez-Zor (102). The lowest number of security incidents were recorded in the governorates of Tartous (3), Latakia (13) and Damascus (20).

Governorate	June 2026	July 2026	August 2026	September 2026	Total
Hasaka	20	18	17	18	**73**
Aleppo	31	33	21	21	**106**
Raqqa	14	10	14	6	**44**
Sweida	23	21	38	26	**108**
Damascus	4	7	3	6	**20**
Dar'a	29	32	26	38	**125**
Deir Ez-Zor	23	34	28	17	**102**
Hama	23	19	11	15	**68**
Homs	12	24	8	20	**64**
Idlib	12	9	9	3	**33**
Latakia	2	9	1	1	**13**
Quneitra	18	16	15	30	**79**
Rural Damascus	14	23	27	19	**83**
Tartous	0	0	1	2	**3**
Total	**225**	**255**	**219**	**222**	**921**

Table 1. Number of ACLED security events coded 'battles', 'explosions/remote violence' and 'violence against civilians' recorded between 1 June and 30 September 2026. Breakdown by governorate[124]

[122] Security Council Report, Syria September 2026 Monthly Forecast, 1 September 2026, url; Al Jazeera, Putin and al-Sharaa discuss Russia-Syria relations, deal on military bases, 26 August 2026, url; AP, Syria will take back control from Russia of 2 key Mediterranean bases under a new deal, 9 August 2026, url

[123] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 6 October 2026, url

[124] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 6 October 2026, url



Figure 1. ACLED security events coded 'battles', 'explosions/remote violence' and 'violence against civilians' on governorate level recorded between 1 June and 30 September 2026

According to ACLED data, most security incidents recorded in Deir Ez-Zor governorate between 1 June – 30 September 2026 involved killings of civilians by unidentified armed men, at times suspected of being ISIL members. Incidents coded 'explosions/remote violence' involved mainly landmines and UXOs as well as IED attacks attributed to unidentified armed groups. Battles involved clashes between tribal actors and to a lesser extent between ISIL and government forces.[125]

In Hasaka governorate most security incidents involved killings of civilians by unidentified armed men and to a significantly lesser extent, isolated reports of killings and detention of civilians attributed to SDF/YPG. Localised armed clashes between tribal actors were also reported.[126]

In Aleppo governorate, most incidents coded 'battles' involved clashes between local gunmen and to a lesser extent between ISIL and security forces. Incidents coded 'explosions/remote violence' involved mainly landmines and UXOs. Incidents coded 'violence against civilians'

[125] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 6 October 2026, url
[126] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 6 October 2026, url

were mainly attributed to unidentified actors who were involved killings of civilians for unknown reasons.[127]

In Idlib governorate, most security incidents recorded by ACLED were attributed to landmines and UXOs, followed by suspected drone strikes on ISIL targets by the US-led Coalition against ISIL and assassinations of civilians by unknown gunmen.[128]

In Raqqa governorate, most incidents mainly landmines and UXOs and to a lesser extent clashes between ISIL and security forces.[129]

In the governorates of Homs and Hama, most security incidents recorded by ACLED were coded 'violence against civilians' and were mainly attributed to unidentified actors who were involved killings of Alawites and other civilians for unknown reasons. Landmines and UXOs constituted the majority of events coded 'explosions/remote violence'.[130]

In the governorates of Latakia and Tartous, most security incidents recorded by ACLED involved clashes between government forces and unidentified armed actors and landmines.[131]

In Damascus governorate, most security incidents recorded by ACLED were coded 'explosions/remote violence' and involved attacks by unidentified actors on civilians, usually for unknown reasons. In Rural Damascus, most security incidents recorded by ACLED involved killings of civilians by unidentified armed actors for unknown reasons as well as incidents involving landmines planted during the conflict. Armed clashes between local gunmen stemming from disputes or criminal activities and Israeli artillery strikes in the area of Beit Jinn were also reported.[132]

In Dar'a governorate, most security incidents coded 'explosions/remote violence' and 'violence against civilians' were mainly attributed to Israeli military incursions and to a lesser extent to attacks by unidentified armed groups on civilians, for unknown reasons. Incidents coded as 'battles' involved clashes between government security forces and unknown gunmen and between local armed groups.[133]

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[127] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 6 October 2026, url
[128] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 6 October 2026, url
[129] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 6 October 2026, url
[130] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 6 October 2026, url
[131] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 6 October 2026, url
[132] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 6 October 2026, url
[133] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 6 October 2026, url

In Sweida governorate, most security incidents were attributed to clashes between government forces and Druze militias, as well as infighting between Druze militias. Incidents coded 'violence against civilians' mainly involved abductions, detentions and physical assaults of civilians by members of Druze militias, as well as attacks on civilians by unidentified armed actors.[134]

In Quneitra governorate, most security incidents were mainly attributed to Israeli forces, including airstrikes and artillery strikes, and arrest and detentions of civilians.[135]

Civilian fatalities

During the reference period of this query (June – September 2026), SNHR documented 217 civilian fatalities across Syria. Most of them were recorded in the governorates of Idlib (43), Hama (43) and Homs (40).[136] The vast majority of civilian fatalities documented by SNHR over the reference period were attributed to gunfire by unidentified perpetrators, followed by explosions involving landmines and ammunition depots, and, to a significantly lesser extent, to actions by transitional government forces.[137] For instance, the largest number of fatalities documented in Idlib governorate in September were the result of an explosion at a munitions depot in Sarmada, which killed 19 MoD members, according to SNHR.[138]

[134] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 6 October 2026, url
[135] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 6 October 2026, url
[136] SNHR, Civilian fatalities dataset covering the period from 1 June to 30 September 2026 provided by courtesy of SNHR in an email, 30 September 2026
[137] Analysis by EUAA based on SNHR, Civilian fatalities dataset covering the period from 1 June to 30 September 2026 provided by courtesy of SNHR in an email, 30 September 2026; SNHR, Quarterly Report on Victims of Unlawful Killing and Violence-Related Civilian Deaths in Syria, 1 October 2026, url, pp. 7-8
[138] SNHR, Quarterly Report on Victims of Unlawful Killing and Violence-Related Civilian Deaths in Syria, 1 October 2026, url, p. 7

Governorate	June 2026	July 2026	August 2026	September 2026	Total
Hasaka	1	-	-	-	**1**
Aleppo	2	4	2	9	**17**
Raqqa	4	7	3	-	**14**
Sweida	-	2	2	3	**7**
Damascus	-	10	1	-	**11**
Dar'a	4	6	5	3	**18**
Deir Ez-Zor	2	5	2	-	**9**
Hama	14	11	10	5	**40**
Homs	3	20	8	8	**39**
Idlib	4	9	5	25	**43**
Latakia	3	3	1	-	**7**
Quneitra	1	-	1	-	**2**
Rural Damascus	4	4	1	-	**9**
Tartous	-	-	-	-	**-**
Total	**41**	**82**	**41**	**53**	**217**

Table 2. Number of civilian fatalities recorded by SNHR (June – September 2026). Breakdown by governorate.[139]

[139] SNHR, Civilian fatalities dataset covering the period from 1 June to 30 September 2026 provided by courtesy of SNHR in an email, 30 September 2026



Figure 2. Number of civilian fatalities recorded by SNHR (June – September 2026). Breakdown by governorate.[140]

Between 8 December 2024 and early September 2026, more than 1 400 explosive ordnance incidents have been documented across Syria, resulting in nearly 2 500 civilian casualties, including 880 deaths. More than two-thirds of the incidents occurred in agricultural and grazing areas.[141] Between 17 July and 27 August 2026, UNOCHA reported 22 deaths and 47 injured due to explosive ordnance incidents.[142]

Deir Ez-Zor remained the most affected governorate by explosive remnants-related incidents and fatalities.[143] Meanwhile, several explosions at ammunition depots led to significant casualties during the reference period. On 1 September, an ammunition-laden vehicle reportedly exploded in Binnish (Idlib governorate), killing five people[144], while on 9 September

[140] SNHR, Civilian fatalities dataset covering the period from 1 June to 30 September 2026 provided by courtesy of SNHR in an email, 30 September 2026
[141] UNOCHA, Today's top news: Nepal, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Ukraine, Colombia, 4 September 2026, url
[142] UNOCHA, Mr. Indrika Ratwatte, Acting ASG for Humanitarian Affairs, on behalf of Mr. Tom Fletcher, USG for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator – Briefing to the Security Council on Syria, 27 August 2026, url
[143] UNHCR, Syria: Protection and Reintegration Insights. Voices of returnees and host communities across Syria April-June 2026, 4 August 2026, url, p. 24
[144] Al Jazeera, At least five killed as ammunition-laden vehicle explodes in Syria's Idlib, 1 September 2026, url

an explosion at a temporary weapons depot near Sarmada (Idlib governorate) killed at least 14 people and injured 11 others.[145] In September, 11 soldiers were killed in an explosion of a weapons cache at an army site in Deir Ez-Zor governorate.[146] Overall, Reuters documented at least 16 explosions at ammunitions storage facilities since the fall of the Assad government.[147]

Displacement and return

As of 17 September 2026, there were around 5.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Syria, 76 % residing in host communities and 24 % inside IDP sites. Most IDPs were located in Idlib (21 %), Rural Damascus (21 %), Aleppo (21 %), and Damascus (11 %) governorates.[148]

For the months of June and July 2026, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated around 15 000 total newly displaced individuals across Syria. Aleppo was the main governorate of origin, accounting for 47 % and 28 % of displacement movements recorded during these months, respectively. Key drivers of displacement included changing security, housing and service conditions, as well as localised security incidents, including theft and burglary, and the threat posed by mines and unexploded ordnance.[149] Israeli military activity in southern Syria led to displacement among local residents[150] particularly in western Dar'a governorate.[151]

In terms of IDP returns, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 2 021 875 individuals returned to their homes since December 2024. Most IDP returns were recorded in Aleppo (26 %), Idlib (23 %), Hama (20 %), Homs (11 %), and Deir Ez-Zor (7 %) governorates.[152]

[145] AP, Warehouse explosion in northwestern Syria kills at least 14, 9 September 2026, url
[146] Al Jazeera, Syria says blast at military site in Deir Az Zor killed 11, 19 September 2026, url
[147] Reuters, Syrian ammunition depot explodes in fourth such blast this month, 21 September 2026, url
[148] UNHCR, Comprehensive Overview of IDPs and IDP Returns Dashboard, 17 September 2026, url
[149] IOM, Syrian Arab Republic: Population Mobility and Baseline Assessment — Round 17 (01 - 30 June 2026), 21 July 2026, url, p. 4; IOM, Syrian Arab Republic: Population Mobility and Baseline Assessment — Round 18 (01 - 31 July 2026), 10 August 2026, url, p. 4
[150] OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url
[151] Etana Syria: Israeli attacks on western Daraa, 6 July 2026, url
[152] UNHCR, Comprehensive Overview of IDPs and IDP Returns Dashboard, 17 September 2026, url



Map 1. UNHCR, Locations of IDPs and IDP returnees by governorate[153]

[153] UNHCR, Comprehensive Overview of IDPs and IDP Returns Dashboard, 17 September 2026, url

5. Human rights developments related to certain profiles and groups of the population

Individuals perceived to have supported the former government

In the first half of June, protests calling for accountability for crimes committed under Bashar al-Assad's former government took place in several Syrian cities, with some escalating into mob violence targeting minorities and individuals associated with the former government.[154] Alawites were particularly targeted, with sectarian slogans and attacks reported in Damascus.[155] Sunni-on-Sunni violence also occurred, targeting Sunnis alleged to be former regime figures. On 14-15 June, mobs in Idlib city and its surrounding area reportedly killed two men accused of being pro-regime paramilitary fighters.[156] On 16 June, initially peaceful protests in Palmyra (Homs governorate) turned violent[157], with attacks on property and stone throwing leaving eight people injured. Authorities' efforts to contain mob attacks have been deemed insufficient to deter further incidents, amid perceptions of limited accountability for perpetrators.[158]

The MoI announced in June that it was holding 5 989 former military personnel under the Assad regime in detention, including 1 483 enlisted personnel, 42 major generals, 172 brigadier generals, and other from various military ranks.[159] During the reference period, the transitional government's security forces have carried out arrests targeting individuals alleged to have been involved in human rights violations under the Assad regime. These included arrests of alleged perpetrators in massacres and chemical attacks carried out during the war[160], as well as high-level army and intelligence officers.[161] Syrian authorities also announced they had arrested approximately 70 % of the pilots who participated in bombing civilian areas

[154] Security Council Report, July 2026 Monthly Forecast, 1 July 2026, url; International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch Syria June 2026, n.d., url
[155] International Crisis Group, Curbing Reprisals in Syria, 24 August 2026, url
[156] International Crisis Group, Curbing Reprisals in Syria, 24 August 2026, url; HRW, Syria: Mob Violence Against Groups Linked to Assad Era, 22 June 2026, url
[157] International Crisis Group, Curbing Reprisals in Syria, 24 August 2026, url; Waters, G., Palmyra Rises Again, Syria Revisited, 14 August 2026, url; New Arab (The), From justice to vengeance? Syria grapples with post-Assad anger, 18 June 2026, url
[158] International Crisis Group, Curbing Reprisals in Syria, 24 August 2026, url
[159] SANA, Al-Baba: Accountability is not merely a popular demand, but an official commitment, 15 June 2026, url
[160] HRW, Questions & Answers: Syria's First and Future Trials for Assad-Era Crimes, 23 August 2026, url
[161] New Arab (The), Syria detains three generals amid campaign against Assad-era figures, 7 September 2026, url; AA, Syria arrests former Assad-era military intelligence general, 3 July 2026, url; AP, Lebanon extradites ex-Assad general to Syria for trial over alleged crimes, 20 August 2026, url; Waters, G., Rebuilding Security in New Syria: Year 2, Week 41, Syria Revisited, 21 September 2026, url

during the former Assad regime.[162] Arrest of former pilots continued to be reported in September.[163]

The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) assessed that the accountability process remains focused largely on senior figures and high-profile crimes, while local-level violations involving individuals from local former security and militia structures have not been systematically investigated or prosecuted. This in turn is viewed as contributing to maintaining conditions in which informal or retaliatory punishment persists.[164]

In August, the Fourth Criminal Court in Damascus, which is tasked to hear cases related to transitional justice[165], has sentenced ousted president Bashar al-Assad to death in absentia, after convicting him of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity during the civil war. The court also sentenced six former military and security officials in absentia to death, including Bashar al-Assad's younger brother, Maher.[166] Assad's cousins Atef Najib and Wassim al-Assad who were tried in person were also sentenced to death.[167] Ahmad Hassoun, Syria's top cleric under the Assad regime, was tried in person and received a life sentence[168] for crimes including inciting sectarian strife and exploiting his position.[169]

SJAC noted that the transitional justice trials took place in the absence of a legislative framework governing the process, including a transitional justice law[170], which remains pending[171], and clearly defined institutional responsibilities.[172] It identified shortcomings in the trials including rushed proceedings, heavy reliance on witness testimony, insufficient evidence, and inadequate legal representation for defendants.[173] OSES noted that fair trial safeguards should be strengthened by reinforcing effective legal representation, and 'ensuring a full appeal on the facts, not just on points of law'.[174] Syrian officials stated that the

[162] New Arab (The), Syria 'arrests 70% of Assad-era pilots' involved in bombing, 23 August 2026, url
[163] Al Alarabiya, Syria arrests nine former pilots over alleged war crimes under al-Assad, 11 September 2026, url
[164] SJAC, An Absence of Justice: Escalating Violence in Transitional Homs, 9 September 2026, url
[165] SJAC, Syria's New 'Transitional Justice Court': Understanding the Fourth Criminal Court, 12 May 2026, url
[166] Enab Baladi, Bashar, Maher al-Assad and Atef Najib Sentenced to Death, 11 August 2026, url; BBC News, Ousted Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad sentenced to death in absentia, 11 August 2026, url
[167] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, 27 August 2026, url
[168] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, 27 August 2026, url
[169] New Arab (The), Syria sentences Assad-era mufti Ahmed Hassoun to life imprisonment, 24 August 2026, url
[170] SJAC, Fair-trial shortcomings in Syria's transitional justice process, 26 August 2026, url
[171] EU Statement – UN Security Council Arria-formula meeting: Transitional Justice and Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic, 21 July 2026, url
[172] SJAC, Fair-trial shortcomings in Syria's transitional justice process, 26 August 2026, url
[173] SJAC, Major Flaws in the Trial Against Atef Najib, 11 August 2026, url; SJAC, Fair-trial shortcomings in Syria's transitional justice process, 26 August 2026, url
[174] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, 27 August 2026, url

authorities aim to conduct around 500 trials over the next five years concerning crimes committed during the Assad era.[175]

Individuals opposing or perceived to be opposing the transitional government

Freedom of expression

Compared to the situation under the Assad government, conditions for freedom of expression and for individuals who are critical against the authorities have improved.[176] While no systematic arrest campaigns targeting critics of the transitional government were reported[177] reaction to criticism of the government reportedly remains fluid and context dependent.[178] While the government has been tolerating many critics, it has detained other critics, particularly those criticising government officials, businessmen, or reconstruction spending. Such detentions have often been triggered by private complaints rather than centralised censorship directives and have relied on Assad era laws.[179]

Syrian authorities have used Assad-era provisions on defamation, insult and cybercrime against peaceful online criticism and civic activism.[180] In particular, Syria's 2022 Cybercrime Law criminalises a broad range of expression that may be protected under international human rights law. Articles 24, 25, 27-29 and 31 impose penalties for broadly defined offences, including insult or contempt, undermining the prestige of the state, undermining confidence in the national currency or financial system, and insulting religions or sacred symbols or inciting hatred or violence. The law also criminalises defamation, despite international human rights standards generally favouring civil rather than criminal sanctions for defamation.[181]

In June, the Ministry of Information published a video in which it identified six categories of prohibited content in publications and media: disclosure of sensitive military, security or state information; incitement to violence or disorder; insulting religions or religious symbols; content promoting hatred or discrimination; violations of privacy, defamation or insults against individuals or institutions; and the publication of false, misleading or unverified information, including rumours considered harmful to the national economy. The restrictions also prohibit

[175] Amos, D., Syria Is Hoping To Hold 500 War Crimes Trials in the Next Five Years. Here's How the First One Is Going, Pulitzer Center, 27 May 2026, url
[176] DIS, Syria. An update, June 2026, url, p. 41; Abdulghany, F., Roth, K., Assessing Syria's Progress Since Assad, Opinio Juris, 20 February 2026, url; AI, Syria: A year after Assad's fall, the rights of survivors and families must guide transition, 8 December 2025, url
[177] DIS, Syria. An update, June 2026, url, p. 43-44; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs: General Country of Origin Information Report on Syria, January 2026, url, p. 118
[178] DIS, Syria. An update, June 2026, url, p. 41
[179] Zelin, A., Assad's Speech Laws Are Putting Syria's Security and Reconstruction at Risk, TWI, 28 August 2026, url
[180] HRW, Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Syrian Arab Republic, 16 July 2026, url; Zelin, A., Assad's Speech Laws Are Putting Syria's Security and Reconstruction at Risk, TWI, 28 August 2026, url; SJAC, The Weaponization of Inherited Legislation to Restrict the Civic Space in Syria's Transition, 15 July 2026, url
[181] AI, Syria: Suspend use of Assad-era cybercrime law pending reform, 24 July 2026, url

material deemed contrary to public morals or ethical standards. A Ministry of Information official stated that the video was not intended to constitute a list of restrictions, but rather to provide guidance and raise awareness by summarising general provisions contained in Syrian media codes and legislation governing media work. Many of the provisions comprised in the six categories of prohibited content are partly based on Assad-era laws.[182]

The pattern of enforcement of these laws in the post-Assad period has reportedly shifted from initially targeting Assad loyalists towards selectively targeting government critics. Most arrests in 2026 have involved activists and ordinary citizens rather than journalists.[183]

Amnesty International documented five cases of journalists and activists detained for their online expression between January and June 2026, for periods of up to seven days, under the 2022 Cybercrime Law. All five were arrested under provisions criminalising peaceful online expression through broadly and vaguely defined offences, including 'undermining the prestige of the state', 'undermining the state's financial standing', and 'electronic defamation'. All five were released after periods of detention and investigation ranging from 24 hours to seven days, although three faced formal state charges and two were subject to private complaints that were later withdrawn following public pressure. Proceedings against one journalist and two activists formally charged by prosecutors reportedly remained ongoing, leaving them at continued risk of prosecution.[184]

In June 2026, Ibrahim Sheikh al-Shabab and Yasser Abbas were detained after representing Damascus residents in efforts to seek compensation related to Decree 66, an Assad-era measure associated with property confiscation[185], and protesting the decision to resume reconstruction in Marota city.[186] The Damascus governorate filed complaints against them under inherited legislation, including the 2022 Cybercrime law and a 2011 decree regulating demonstrations. At their first hearing, both were reportedly charged with undermining state authority, incitement, spreading false information online, and damaging the reputation of a public institution.[187] They were subsequently released with the charges retained and a trial scheduled for September.[188]

In June 2026, British-Syrian activist Hassan Akkad was detained in Damascus following his campaign demanding accountability over pledged relief funds. Hassan Akkad returned to Syria following the fall of Assad and launched an online campaign questioning whether prominent businessmen had fulfilled pledges to support reconstruction and relief efforts. In

[182] Al-Tamini, A., Controversy over Restrictions Issued by Syria's Ministry of Information, Middle East Forum, 1 July 2026, url
[183] Zelin, A., Assad's Speech Laws Are Putting Syria's Security and Reconstruction at Risk, TWI, 28 August 2026, url
[184] AI, Syria: Suspend use of Assad-era cybercrime law pending reform, 24 July 2026, url
[185] SJAC, The Weaponization of Inherited Legislation to Restrict the Civic Space in Syria's Transition, 15 July 2026, url
[186] Haid, H., Syria's civic opening is being tested one lawsuit at a time, 17 June 2026, Al Majalla, url
[187] SJAC, The Weaponization of Inherited Legislation to Restrict the Civic Space in Syria's Transition, 15 July 2026, url
[188] Zelin, A., Assad's Speech Laws Are Putting Syria's Security and Reconstruction at Risk, TWI, 28 August 2026, url

June 2026, complaints were filed against him, including one alleging defamation after he questioned whether businessman Moussa al-Omar had honoured a USD 10 000 pledge to Homs, while two further complaints were reportedly filed by companies linked to businessman Mohammad Hamsho. Akkad was detained by masked officers from the cybercrime branch on 17 June without a warrant being presented, and although he was subsequently released after al-Omar withdrew his complaint[189] amid significant public pressure[190], the complaints filed by Hamsho-linked companies remained active and the status of any further proceedings was unclear.[191]

The arrest of media activist Bakkar Hamidi by the Military Police on 12 July 2026 prompted protests and raised concerns over the authorities' handling of allegations of sectarian incitement. Hamidi, known for publicly identifying individuals suspected of involvement in former regime abuses, was reportedly detained over social media posts portraying Alawite and Murshidi communities in rural Hama as complicit in such violations. The absence of an official explanation for his arrest contributed to perceptions that the detention targeted a prominent revolutionary voice amid continued frustration over the slow and incomplete accountability process for former regime crimes.[192]

Media activist Mazen Arja was detained for 63 days in 2025 by the police in Idlib after criticising on Facebook the construction of a mosque in a public park and was detained again for 22 days in May 2026 following participation in a civic sit-in in Damascus, while activist Raed Hamdo was detained in June 2026 after a local official complained about a Facebook post criticising the local administration.[193] On 21 July 2026, Mazen Arja was arrested again after appearing before the Cybercrime Branch in Damascus in response to a summons. Publicly available information suggested that his detention may have been linked to his announcement of his intention to run for president.[194]

In August, Syrian political opposition figure Toni Daniel was arrested in Latakia after publicly criticising alleged administrative and financial corruption within the Engineers Syndicate and the performance of local officials. He was reportedly detained in front of the syndicate building by individuals in a civilian vehicle, without prior notice or a judicial summons. Activists, lawyers and human rights advocates described the detention as arbitrary and said it appeared to be linked to a personal complaint, possibly under the cybercrime law enacted during the Assad

[189] SJAC, The Weaponization of Inherited Legislation to Restrict the Civic Space in Syria's Transition, 15 July 2026, url
[190] AI, Syria: Suspend use of Assad-era cybercrime law pending reform, 24 July 2026, url
[191] SJAC, The Weaponization of Inherited Legislation to Restrict the Civic Space in Syria's Transition, 15 July 2026, url
[192] Haid, H., Syria cannot counter incitement with opaque and selective arrests, Al Majalla, 15 July 2026, url
[193] SJAC, The Weaponization of Inherited Legislation to Restrict the Civic Space in Syria's Transition, 15 July 2026, url
[194] AI, Syria: Suspend use of Assad-era cybercrime law pending reform, 24 July 2026, url

era.[195] He was released after nearly 24 hours when the complaint was dismissed. A lawsuit filed against him by an individual over a post he published on Facebook was dismissed.[196]

On 26 June, the Ministry of Justice issued Circular No. 26 to introduce procedural safeguards in cybercrime cases including requiring judicial authorisation before specialised cybercrime investigations and limiting pretrial detention, wanted notices and searches to exceptional circumstances.[197] It also announced a review of the 2022 Cybercrime Law.[198] However, the circular did not amend or repeal its broadly worded speech-related offences, leaving peaceful critics vulnerable to complaints, detention and prosecution.[199] Despite the introduction of Circular No. 26 cases of arrests of activists continued after its issuance. Many cases were initiated through private complaints by well-connected individuals while releases often appear to depend on public pressure rather than legal safeguards. Safeguards introduced by the Ministry of Justice were also circumvented by other state institutions enforcing the arrests.[200]

Sectarian incitement also remains a significant issue on Syrian social media, but there have been relatively few reported arrests for content targeting groups such as Druze, Alawites and Shia.[201] By contrast, reported arrests linked to online publications have more often concerned criticism of officials and businessmen, raising concerns that provisions prohibiting content such as 'rumours that harm the national economy' may be used to restrict critical reporting and scrutiny of influential individuals.[202]

Journalists

There were no reports of widespread targeting of journalists by the transitional government for their published criticism.[203] During the reference period, there were sporadic cases of journalists being arrested by transitional government security forces, which are presented below.

Journalists Eva Maria Michelmann and Ahmed Polad, a German and a Kurdish-Turkish journalist working for an Istanbul-based News Agency and TV, were arrested in January 2026 by transitional government forces, during the takeover of Raqqa.[204] Their whereabouts remained unknown until April. Subsequently, Michelmann was released in June following

[195] Syrian Observer (The), After Criticising Corruption, Toni Daniel Arrested in Lattakia, 7 August 2026, url
[196] SOHR, After 24 hours of detention and dismissal of lawsuit filed against him | Activist Tony Daniel released, 6 August 2026, url
[197] AI, Syria: Suspend use of Assad-era cybercrime law pending reform, 24 July 2026, url
[198] HRW, Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Syrian Arab Republic, 16 July 2026, url
[199] HRW, Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Syrian Arab Republic, 16 July 2026, url
[200] Zelin, A., Assad's Speech Laws Are Putting Syria's Security and Reconstruction at Risk, TWI, 28 August 2026, url
[201] Al-Tamini, A., Controversy over Restrictions Issued by Syria's Ministry of Information, Middle East Forum, 1 July 2026, url; Zelin, A., Assad's Speech Laws Are Putting Syria's Security and Reconstruction at Risk, TWI, 28 August 2026, url
[202] Al-Tamini, A., Controversy over Restrictions Issued by Syria's Ministry of Information, Middle East Forum, 1 July 2026, url
[203] DIS, Syria. An update, June 2026, url, p. 43; EUAA, Syria: Country Focus, July 2026, url, pp. 42-43
[204] CPJ, CPJ demands transparency as German reporter confirmed detained in Syria, 27 April 2026, url

lobbying from the German government whilst Polad remained in detention without access to legal council or additional details about his wellbeing.[205] During her detention, Michelmann stated she was denied access to legal counsel, interrogated and accused of having ties to SDF. Syrian authorities disputed her claims, stating that she was identified as affiliated with the SDF and did not possess documentation confirming her status as a journalist.[206] In September, Polad was transferred to Türkiye, where he stated that he had been subjected to torture while in detention in the prisons of the Syrian transitional government.[207]

In August, a journalist was detained for several hours after a complaint was submitted against him for posting a WhatsApp message concerning Sawt al-Sham radio's loss of its headquarters to Agriculture Minister Basel Hafez al-Suwaidan.[208]

Reporting on sensitive events may carry particular risks for foreign journalists according to researcher Al Tamimi. Some journalists who covered the coastal massacres or events in Sweida reportedly experienced difficulties in renewing permits, while others retained access despite critical reporting, indicating inconsistent enforcement. Access can also reportedly be negotiated, with journalists identifying Information Minister Hamza al-Mustafa as a point of contact for resolving delays or apparent permit rejections. Particularly sensitive topics reportedly include foreign fighters who joined the rebellion against Assad, economic networks involving figures close to the presidency, and issues concerning transgender people and alleged harassment by security forces. The result is not outright censorship but an ambiguous environment in which the absence of formal bans or clear rules makes explicit restrictions on press freedom difficult to establish.[209]

Individuals perceived to be opposing the SDF/YPG

During the reference period, very limited information was available on isolated cases of arbitrary arrest and detention of civilians reported in Hasaka governorate, which were attributed to SDF or elements associated with it. The available reports did not provide further details, and no corroborating information could be identified among the other sources consulted.[210] For instance, SNHR did not report any arbitrary arrests carried out to the SDF in

[205] CPJ, SCM, Joint Submission by the Committee to Protect Journalists and the Syrian Centre for Media and Freedom of Expression, 17 July 2026, url, para 25
[206] CPJ, German journalist recounts 5-month detention in Syria, urges colleague's release, 8 September 2026, url
[207] Syrian Observer (The), After eight months of torture in Transitional Government prisons, journalist Ahmed Polad transferred to Türkiye, 14 September 2026, url
[208] Zelin, A., Assad's Speech Laws Are Putting Syria's Security and Reconstruction at Risk, TWI, 28 August 2026, url; Enab Baladi, توقيف الصحفي حمزة عباس لساعات في دمشق [Journalist Hamza Abbas detained for several hours in Damascus], 3 August 2026, url
[209] Al-Tamimi, A., 'Guided Freedom': Syria's Ministry of Information and Foreign Journalists, 6 May 2026, url
[210] EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 6 October 2026, url

its quarterly report covering July-September 2026.[211] Among the sources consulted, no further information could be found regarding the situation of individuals perceived to be opposing the SDF/YPG.

Children

Children without civil documentation

Under Syria's 1969 Nationality Law (Legislative Decree No. 276), nationality is generally acquired through a Syrian father, while Syrian mothers can confer nationality on their children only in limited circumstances, such as when the father's identity is unknown. Although the existing nationality law provides for Syrian nationality for children whose father is unknown or whose parents are both stateless, these provisions have not been applied in practice historically.[212]

Gender-based discrimination in nationality law remains a key driver of statelessness, particularly affecting women whose children were born from unregistered marriages and who subsequently became widowed.[213] Women whose husbands are missing or deceased, as well as those married to foreign nationals, face significant administrative barriers in registering their children. This issue is particularly prominent in north-western Syria where many foreign fighters were located.[214] Tens of thousands of foreign fighters participated in the Syrian civil war, with several thousand estimated to have remained in the country following the fall of the Assad government.[215] During the conflict, some foreign fighters married Syrian women through religious or informal ceremonies that were never officially registered and had children. When the men were subsequently killed, disappeared or returned to their countries of origin, the women were left without legal proof of marriage, preventing them from registering their children. Some women reportedly register children under the name of a male relative instead in order to obtain papers.[216]

Children without Syrian nationality face barriers to public education and state healthcare[217] and, as adults, are excluded from formal employment, increasing their exposure to informal and potentially exploitative work. They may also face significant obstacles to inheriting or

[211] SNHR, The Third Quarterly Report on the Toll of Detention and Release Cases in Syria in 2026, 2 October 2026, url, pp. 5-7
[212] Syria Direct, Nationality law reform: Who has the 'right to have rights' in the new Syria?, 10 June 2026, url; DK, DIS, Syria, Situation of Certain Groups, December 2025, url, p. 46 [SWPM]
[213] OHCHR, Gendered impact of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic on women and girls, 12 June 2023, url, p. 12
[214] DK, DIS, Syria, Situation of Certain Groups, December 2025, url, p. 46 [SWPM]
[215] Zelin, A., Managing the Muhajirin: The Future of Syria's Foreign Fighters, CTC, August 2026, url
[216] DK, DIS, Syria, Situation of Certain Groups, December 2025, url, p. 46 [SWPM]
[217] Arab Reform Initiative, Citizenship Through the Mother: Why Syria's Nationality Law is a Social Protection Crisiss, 20 August 2026, url; OHCHR, Gendered impact of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic on women and girls, 12 June 2023, url, p. 12

retaining property owned by their Syrian mothers, as restrictions on foreign nationals' ownership of real estate can apply to children who cannot acquire Syrian nationality, limiting the intergenerational transfer of property in mixed-nationality families.[218]

Administrative and legal barriers to civil documentation and housing, land and property (HLP) rights remain widespread, with many communities experiencing difficulties obtaining or renewing relevant documents.[219] An assessment of 1 200 Syrian households across nine governorates found that 62 % of surveyed Syrian families had incomplete legal identity documentation for at least one member. The proportion was even higher among families who had returned since the fall of the Assad regime.[220] Returnees and camp-based IDPs are particularly affected due to expired, missing or unrecognised documents and limited access to civil registries.[221]

Children are frequently reported to lack birth certificates, including generations of returnees from neighbouring countries who were never registered. Barriers encountered in registering children include limited information, costs, missing documents, unavailable civil registries and cadastral offices, insufficient legal aid, and insecurity and distance.[222] Unregistered children face restricted access to assistance and essential services, difficulties registering vital events, and restrictions on freedom of movement, while also facing an increased risk of statelessness.[223]

Child recruitment

The UNCOI stated that following the hostilities between the transitional government and SDF in January 2026, some missing SDF-aligned fighters and others who were killed during the hostilities were reportedly underage.[224]

The Secretary-General's latest annual report on children and armed conflict, covering developments in 2025, recorded the recruitment and use of 254 children (237 boys and 17 girls), most by the SDF and its components including the Kurdish People's Protection Units and Women's Protection Units (YPG/YPJ) (135), Syrian government forces (46), HTS (43) and former SNA factions (18) prior to their dissolution and the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth

[218] Arab Reform Initiative, Citizenship Through the Mother: Why Syria's Nationality Law is a Social Protection Crisis, 20 August 2026, url
[219] UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (April 2026), 2 April 2026, url, p. 38
[220] NRC, Information, Counselling, and Legal Assistance (ICLA) programme Legal Needs Assessment, March 2026, url, p. 6
[221] UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (April 2026), 2 April 2026, url, p. 38
[222] UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (April 2026), 2 April 2026, url, p. 38
[223] UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (April 2026), 2 April 2026, url, p. 38
[224] OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url

Movement (8). The report clarified that 'most grave violations attributed to Syrian government forces occurred before the formal establishment of the current Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on 29 March 2025' and expressed concern that members of the SNA and HTS have been integrated into Syria's forces without addressing past violations. It further noted that the transitional government has committed to ensuring that children are not integrated into its forces, to preventing recruitment, and to ensuring that violators of children's rights are held accountable.[225]

The Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement was reportedly still active in areas under nominal SDF control[226] as of August 2026.[227] Isolated reports of case child recruitment carried out by the group were documented in March[228] as well as a reported case of abduction of a girl in June 2026.[229]

Among the sources consulted, no further information was found on cases of child recruitment during the reference period.

Ethno-religious minorities

Alawites

Over several days in mid-June, demonstrations calling for accountability for former regime figures escalated into vigilante and mob violence in several parts of Syria.[230] Protests that began in Deir Ez-Zor on 10 June 2026 spread to Aleppo, Idlib, Raqqa, Hama, Damascus and areas around Homs. Names and photographs of alleged former regime figures, many of whom belonging to the Alawite minority, were circulated online. While some protests remained peaceful, others involved attacks on homes and businesses, physical assaults and in two cases, killings of people accused of links to the former regime. While Sunni individuals accused of former regime affiliations were also targeted across the country, Alawites were particularly targeted, with sectarian slogans and attacks reported in Damascus.[231] On 15-16 June, mobs chanting anti-Alawite slurs gathered outside Damascus Alawite-majority neighbourhoods of Ish al-Warwar and Mezzeh 86, the latter drawing an estimated crowd of hundreds. Dozens of masked men stormed Mezzeh 86, damaging homes and shops and

[225] UN Security Council, Children and armed conflict. Report of the Secretary-General, 16 June 2026, url, para 198, 208
[226] DIS, Syria. An update, June 2026, url, p. 67 [van Wilgenburg]
[227] Enab Baladi, Syrian Government Prepares to Take Control of al-Hasakah, 16 August 2026, url; Asharq Al-Awsat, Syrian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Integration Process Following SDF Dissolution Is Moving Toward Completion, 4 September 2026, url
[228] Syria Direct, Child recruitment persists despite SDF-Damascus integration agreement, 17 June 2026, url
[229] SJAC, Human Rights Violations in Syria, 27 July 2026, url
[230] HRW, Syria: Mob Violence Against Groups Linked to Assad Era, 22 June 2026, url; New Arab (The), From justice to vengeance? Syria grapples with post-Assad anger, 18 June 2026, url
[231] International Crisis Group, Curbing Reprisals in Syria, 24 August 2026, url

injuring residents, including a shopkeeper who was beaten and stabbed.[232] The authorities' response was reportedly inconsistent, with effective intervention to prevent violence in some areas, while in others intervention came too late to prevent injuries and property damage.[233]

During the reference period, killings of Alawites by unidentified armed individuals were reported, particularly in Homs governorate.[234] In some cases, the victims were former soldiers[235], while in others they were civilians, including women and children.[236] International Crisis Group reported that gunmen on motorcycles continued targeting Alawites, with at least a dozen killings reported in Homs and Hama governorates in late May and early June.[237] On 29 June, an Alawite shrine in the village of al-Arida in Homs governorate, was the target of an arson attack by unidentified individuals.[238] The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) documented 100 Alawites killed in what it labelled 'sectarian crimes' between January and mid-August 2026. The majority of victims were recorded in Homs (43), Hama (19) and Latakia (14) governorates, while the remaining cases were documented in Rural Damascus, Tartous, Damascus and Aleppo.[239] SJAC documented at least 83 incidents of violence involving 102 killings since May 2025 in Homs, while noting that the actual number is likely significantly higher.[240]

A SJAC investigation into the assassinations in Homs since December 2024 revealed 'a sustained pattern of violence that reaches beyond those accused of affiliation with the former government'. While some killings targeted individuals accused of having links to the former government, including officers, alleged informants, and members of security-linked networks, others involved individuals with no established political or security-related profile, including women, students, and persons with disabilities. According to SJAC, a common feature of these attacks was that most victims were Alawites and that most incidents were concentrated in specific neighbourhoods, including Wadi al-Dhahab, Akrama, al-Zahraa, al-Sabil, al-

[232] International Crisis Group, Curbing Reprisals in Syria, 24 August 2026, url; HRW, Syria: Mob Violence Against Groups Linked to Assad Era, 22 June 2026, url
[233] International Crisis Group, Curbing Reprisals in Syria, 24 August 2026, url
[234] L'Orient Today, In Homs, the triple murder of an Alawite family revives accusations of sectarian crimes, 21 July 2026, url; OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url; Syrian Observer (The), Woman Killed, Son Critically Injured in Sectarian Shooting in Homs, 28 July 2026, url; SOHR, Sectarian violence | Unidentified gunmen kidnap and kill young man in western Homs, 5 September 2026, url
[235] Waters, G., Rebuilding Security in New Syria: Year 2, Week 30, Syria Revisited, 6 July 2026, url
[236] L'Orient Today, In Homs, the triple murder of an Alawite family revives accusations of sectarian crimes, 21 July 2026, url; OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url; Syrian Observer (The), Woman Killed, Son Critically Injured in Sectarian Shooting in Homs, 28 July 2026, url
[237] International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch Syria June 2026, n.d., url
[238] Syrian Observer (The), Arson Targets Alawite Shrine in Rural Homs, 1 July 2026, url
[239] SOHR, Since the beginning of 2026 | 100 members of Alawite community killed in sectarian crimes in several Syrian provinces, 17 August 2026, url
[240] SJAC, Vigilante Violence Against Alawis in Homs, 10 September 2026, url

Muhajirin, al-Abbasiya, al-Waer, and Karam al-Lawz. These neighbourhoods are associated with Alawite, Shia, and Murshidi communities.[241]

Most killings in Homs involved direct shootings carried out by masked men travelling in pairs or small groups on motorcycles or in small vehicles, using pistols, silencers, grenades or other light weapons. A second pattern involved abductions followed by the discovery of victims' bodies in isolated locations, including orchards, junctions and roadsides. In most cases, available information does not allow for a definitive determination of motive for the killings, with several incidents also involving robbery, vehicle theft or ransom demands, reflecting broader patterns of opportunistic violence linked to economic hardship. Several testimonies collected by SJAC indicated that some killings may have involved individuals linked to, or claiming links with, security structures.[242]

Vigilante killings of Alawites were also reported in Hama governorate's al-Ghab plains, reportedly linked to war-time grievances including housing disputes and seizures of property.[243] Alawite families from Hama, some of whom fled following the fall of the former government and the violence in March 2025, remain displaced, with only limited returns reported. Members of the Alawite and Shia communities have also reported the seizure of their homes and other assets, including in Hama and Homs respectively.[244] In Homs, several testimonies collected by SJAC indicated growing sectarian pressure in mixed villages and neighbourhoods, reportedly contributing to the displacement of families following threats or renewed attacks. Security campaigns involving the confiscation of property belonging to former power figures were sometimes followed by attacks by armed actors without formal government ties, further contributing to fear and insecurity. One witness reported that only a small number of Alawite families remained in their neighbourhood after most had sold their homes and left.[245]

SJAC noted that the security forces response to incidents in Homs has varied across cases, with arrests or investigative measures announced following some high-profile incidents. Security forces have at times taken measures to protect Alawite residents, including preventing an attack by unidentified armed groups in al-Zahraa. However, these measures have not prevented repeated incidents involving armed actors operating with considerable freedom, while limited public follow-up on many cases has raised concerns over whether perpetrators were identified or prosecutions pursued.[246] By contrast, SOHR stated that authorities have not announced the arrest or prosecution of any alleged perpetrators of

[241] SJAC, An Absence of Justice: Escalating Violence in Transitional Homs, 9 September 2026, url
[242] SJAC, An Absence of Justice: Escalating Violence in Transitional Homs, 9 September 2026, url
[243] Waters, G., Quiet Violence in Hama's al-Ghab Plains, Syria Revisited, 23 July 2026, url; Waters, G., Rebuilding Security in New Syria: Year 2, Week 37, 23 August 2026, url; Waters, G., Civil Peace Challenges in Northwest Hama, Syria Revisited, 11 September 2026, url
[244] OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url
[245] SJAC, An Absence of Justice: Escalating Violence in Transitional Homs, 9 September 2026, url
[246] SJAC, An Absence of Justice: Escalating Violence in Transitional Homs, 9 September 2026, url

killings against Alawites countrywide[247], raising concerns over the effectiveness of investigations and accountability.[248] Additionally, there were reports that some complainants withdrew their complaints after receiving threats.[249] In September, a Syrian court issued the first verdicts concerning the killing of Alawites during the March 2025 coastal violence, sentencing a former government forces member to 20 years in prison, while two supporters of the former government received death and life sentences respectively. The trial, which opened in November 2025, involved 14 defendants, seven members of government forces and seven alleged supporters of former President Bashar al-Assad, accused of involvement in the massacres.[250]

In its September 2026 briefing to the Human Rights Council, the UNCOI stated that localised sectarian abuses, intimidation and perceptions of marginalisation among Alawites continue to be reported.[251]

The level of representation of minorities, including Alawites, within local security forces and broader institutions, such as communal councils, reportedly affects the level of security experienced by these communities.[252] Since Assad's fall, recruits to the security forces have been predominantly Sunni, with Alawites remaining mostly unrepresented.[253] Minority recruitment is concentrated along the coast[254], where intercommunal tensions are lower due to a less brutal civil war there. Local police have rehired around 300-400 former regime officers in coastal areas, including up to 200 Alawites in Latakia and Tartous. However, these numbers are still low given Alawites' significant, sometimes majority, population share in these areas. In central Syria, where the war was more violent and communal relations remain more strained, minorities are even less represented. In Homs, in particular, Alawites are reportedly not represented at all among security force personnel. Alawites serving in local police forces in Hama and the coastal areas are mainly assigned to administrative duties and are generally not permitted to carry firearms.[255]

[247] SOHR, Since the beginning of 2026 | 100 members of Alawite community killed in sectarian crimes in several Syrian provinces, 17 August 2026, url
[248] SOHR, Since the beginning of 2026 | 100 members of Alawite community killed in sectarian crimes in several Syrian provinces, 17 August 2026, url; OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url
[249] OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url
[250] France 24, Syrian court issues first sentences over 2025 massacres of Alawites, 17 September 2026, url
[251] OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url
[252] International Crisis Group, Curbing Reprisals in Syria, 24 August 2026, url
[253] ISW, The New Syrian Army: Order of Battle, 14 November 2025, url, pp. 11, 30; Tabler, Andrew J., Cutting Through the Fog of War (and Peace) in Syria, TWI, 10 February 2026, url; International Crisis Group, Curbing Reprisals in Syria, 24 August 2026, url
[254] International Crisis Group, Curbing Reprisals in Syria, 24 August 2026, url; Waters, G., Building Syria's New Ministry of Interior, Centre for Statecraft and National Security, June 2026, url, pp. 19-20
[255] International Crisis Group, Curbing Reprisals in Syria, 24 August 2026, url

Improved security in some minority areas has been facilitated by proactive local officials and community mobilisation, including efforts to strengthen cooperation between residents and security forces. Examples include locally initiated security training in Latakia, and arrangements negotiated by the Ismaili Council in Salamiyah (Hama governorate), where close coordination with local authorities and community volunteers has contributed to relatively stable security and rapid responses to incidents.[256]

Druze

During the reference period, the Druze community was affected by sporadic attacks by non-state armed groups[257], tensions and occasional clashes between the transitional government and local Druze armed groups controlling parts of Sweida governorate[258], and acts of repression targeting individuals who criticised these armed groups.[259]

On 6 August, an IED planted on a minibus detonated in the Druze-inhabited Jaramana suburb (Rural Damascus governorate), injuring around 14 people.[260] A little-known group, Minbar Ansar al-Rasoul, claimed responsibility for the attack, using anti-Druze rhetoric and threatening further attacks.[261] In August, an incident involving the desecration of Christian graves was reported in al-Sawara al-Kubra in northern Sweida, an area under government control, following earlier reports of similar incidents involving Druze graves.[262] No further information on these incidents was provided by the source.

Tensions between the transitional government and local forces controlling most of Druze-majority Sweida escalated in late August. The immediate dispute concerned a government decision requiring around 13 000 students who had missed June examinations to sit them in government-held areas outside Sweida city, which was opposed by the de facto Druze-led local administration led by Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri and allied armed groups.[263] Earlier in May, only around 1 500 Druze students reportedly reached examination centres in Damascus and Rural Damascus amid restrictions imposed by Druze authorities. This prompted protests by students and residents calling for an exceptional examination session to be held in Sweida city. In response, the transitional government announced an exceptional examination session in August and established examination centres in areas under its control in the northern Sweida countryside, rather than in Damascus, Rural Damascus or Sweida city.

[256] International Crisis Group, Curbing Reprisals in Syria, 24 August 2026, url
[257] France24, Minibus explosion in Damascus suburb wounds 14 people, 7 August 2026, url
[258] SJAC, The right to education under fragmented control in Suwayda, 3 September 2026, url
[259] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, url, 17 September 2026, p. 3
[260] France24, Minibus explosion in Damascus suburb wounds 14 people, 7 August 2026, url
[261] International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch August 2026, n.d., url
[262] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, 27 August 2026, url
[263] International Crisis Group, Suweida's Exam Standoff Triggers Fresh Clashes in Southern Syria, 4 September 2026, url

This decision required students to travel through checkpoints manned by armed groups where factions affiliated with the National Guard exercised control over access.[264]

The 'Shahba Operations Room', an armed group affiliated with the National Guard announced road closures and opposed the examination arrangements. On 29 August, forces allied with the National Guard reportedly attacked buses carrying students to the examination centres, forcing them to turn back.[265] Only 150 of the total eligible students managed to ultimately attend the examinations.[266]

The tensions related to the student examinations ignited clashes in late August between the National Guard and transitional government forces[267], involving mortar and heavy machine-gun fire which reportedly led to two civilians and one National Guard fighter killed. Both sides accused the other of initiating the fighting, but neither made territorial gains, and the situation returned to calm by 1 September.[268]

In September the UNCOI stated that in relation to Sweida that 'it continues to receive reports of alleged occupation, seizure, looting, as well as informal property transfers'. The source did not provide details on the alleged perpetrators or victims of these actions.[269]

Opponents of al-Hijri have reportedly been forced to leave Sweida governorate, abducted or killed, while clashes between different Druze militias and small-scale civilian protests have also occurred. Al-Hijri loyalists have additionally prevented some Druze civil servants from working with ministries in Damascus.[270] In August, Atef Huneidi, a notable from al-Majdal in western Sweida, was reportedly expelled from the governorate after being detained by groups affiliated with al-Hijri's National Guard. His detention followed a public statement criticising al-Hijri's remarks describing Sweida as 'an integral part of Israel'. National Guard-affiliated fighters reportedly raided his home, detained him, and beat relatives and neighbours who attempted to intervene.[271]

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[264] SJAC, The right to education under fragmented control in Suwayda, 3 September 2026, url
[265] International Crisis Group, Suweida's Exam Standoff Triggers Fresh Clashes in Southern Syria, 4 September 2026, url; Enab Baladi, Suwayda Students Blocked From Reaching Exam Centers, 29 August 2026, url; SJAC, The right to education under fragmented control in Suwayda, 3 September 2026, url
[266] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, url, 17 September 2026, p. 3
[267] Enab Baladi, Suwayda: One Killed, Several Wounded in Clashes Between Interior Ministry Forces and National Guard, 1 September 2026, url
[268] International Crisis Group, Suweida's Exam Standoff Triggers Fresh Clashes in Southern Syria, 4 September 2026, url
[269] OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url
[270] DW, Kurds say yes, Druze still say no to united Syria, 28 August 2026, url
[271] New Arab (The), US envoy Barrack condemns violence in Syria's Suweida after militias torture, expel Hijri critic, 6 September 2026, url; Arab Weekly (The), US seeks state authority, Druze guarantees in Syria's Sweida, 7 September 2026, url; OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, url, 17 September 2026, p. 3

Christians

During the reference period there was scarce information regarding the situation of Christians in Syria. In July, the OSES made reference to an incident involving the desecration of Christian graves that was reported in al-Sawara al-Kubra in northern Sweida, an area under government control, following earlier reports of similar incidents involving Druze graves.[272] No information regarding the perpetrators was provided. The assassination of a Christian man in Homs in August prompted several countries to condemn the incident as an alleged anti-Christian act. Several days later, Homs authorities stated that the suspect had confessed to the killing and attributed it to a personal dispute dating back to 2012.[273]

In an interview with France24, SNHR noted that it had recorded only isolated incidents targeting Christians following the fall of the Assad regime and that it had found no evidence of an 'official state policy' targeting Christians.[274] According to an analysis by Syrian researcher Al Tamimi, Christians have generally experienced a more favourable situation than other minorities under the transitional government, partly because they were less closely associated with the former regime, Iran and Hezbollah. They have been able to celebrate religious occasions publicly, and did not faced significant pressure from authorities to change social customs or adopt more conservative forms of dress.[275] By contrast, a foreign academic interviewed in 2026 by the Christian legal advocacy group European Centre for Law and Justice (ECLJ) noted that Christians are frequently portrayed as supporters or remnants of the former regime, exposing them to intimidation, discrimination or violence, although such incidents are not always explicitly framed in religious terms. He also observed that authorities appear more cautious in their treatment of Christians, partly due to sustained international attention, but considered this relative restraint insufficient to constitute effective protection.[276]

In its submission to the 54th session of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) focusing on the situation of Christians in Syria, ECLJ identified the following as the main concerns raised during interviews conducted in 2026 with religious leaders, humanitarian organisations, and a foreign academic specialising in Syrian affairs: respecting freedom of conscience, the ability to change religion, pressure on Christian converts, and perceived Islamisation of public life. Interviewed sources described instances of Islamic preaching encouraging conversion in predominantly Christian neighbourhoods, including by unidentified groups or young men, with limited intervention by local authorities despite resulting tensions. Other concerns include pressure on women regarding veiling, increased Islamic references in school curricula, reported restrictions on female civil servants' appearance, and requirements for couples to

[272] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, 27 August 2026, url
[273] France24, Anti-Christian murder in Syria? No indication he was killed because of his faith, 3 September 2026, url
[274] France24, Anti-Christian murder in Syria? No indication he was killed because of his faith, 3 September 2026, url
[275] Al Tamimi, A., 'Minorities in the New Syrian Order', Hoover Institution, 3 August 2026, url
[276] ECLJ, Status of Human Rights in Syria for the 54th Session of the Universal Periodic Review, July 2026, url, para 26

carry marriage certificates to demonstrate their marital status. Some interviewees viewed these developments as contributing to perceptions that certain religious identities and practices are less accepted in the public sphere.[277]

Kurds

The 29 January integration agreement between the transitional government and the SDF provided for the return of IDPs to Kurdish-majority areas in northeast Syria. It identified Afrin, Sheikh Maqsoud (Aleppo governorate) and Ras Al-Ain/Sere Kaniye (Hasaka governorate) as areas requiring measures to facilitate the return of predominantly Kurdish displaced persons.[278] Displacement remains a particularly sensitive issue in northern Syria, where both Kurdish and Arab communities experienced large-scale displacement during the civil war. Tens of thousands of Kurds were displaced when Turkish-backed Syrian opposition forces captured Afrin, Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad from Kurdish-led forces, while thousands of Arabs also fled during SDF advances. Some of the resulting demographic changes remain in place, continuing to contribute to ethnic tensions.[279]

Around 100 000 people from the Ras al-Ain area have reportedly applied to return, although human rights groups have alleged that homes and property were subsequently seized or looted and that some fighters and their families settled in the area.[280] Returns of Kurdish IDPs to Ras al-Ain were recorded during the reference period. A first organised convoy of 410 Kurdish families returned to Ras al-Ain in early August. The transitional government provided each family with USD 10 000 to renovate homes that had been occupied by armed groups.[281] The returns were temporarily suspended following reports that returnees came under attacks by an unidentified armed group[282], alongside reports of property disputes involving returning Kurdish families and occupying residents.[283] The Internal Security Forces in Hasaka described the incidents as a 'brawl' between the returnees and the residents arising from the return of displaced families without prior coordination, stating that its forces intervened to disperse those involved. However, an investigation by the human rights organisation Synergy Association for Victims indicated that an armed group of more than 30 individuals attacked Kurdish returnees and vehicles associated with the return process at several locations, with witnesses stating that the group searched for Kurdish returnees and vehicles with unfamiliar licence plates and issued threats based on perceived Kurdish identity or perceived political

[277] ECLJ, Status of Human Rights in Syria for the 54th Session of the Universal Periodic Review, July 2026, url, paras 16-17
[278] Bodette, M., The SDF-Damascus Deal and the Kurdish Question: Prospects for Peace, Kurdish Peace Institute, 9 February 2026, url
[279] International Crisis Group, A Pivotal Moment in Uniting Post-Assad Syria, 17 September 2026, url
[280] Al Monitor, Return of displaced Syrian Kurds to hometown suspended after violence, 10 August 2026, url
[281] Rudaw, Return to Sari Kani brings hope, fear for displaced Kurdish families, 9 September 2026, url
[282] Al Monitor, Return of displaced Syrian Kurds to hometown suspended after violence, 10 August 2026, url; Synergy Hevdesti, Return Under Threat: Violations Against Returnees to Ras al-Ayn/Serê Kaniyê, 26 August 2026, url
[283] Shafaq News, 700 Syrian displaced families return to Ras al-Ain, 9 September 2026, url

affiliation. Most documented attacks targeted Kurdish returnees, while two incidents also involved Arabs accompanying Kurdish families.[284] Syrian security authorities said several people involved in the attacks were arrested and that returns would resume once adequate security guarantees were in place.[285]

The violence triggered protests and tensions in other Kurdish-majority areas.[286] In Qamishli, demonstrators attempted to enter the security forces' headquarters, while in Ayn al-Arab/Kobane protesters reportedly attacked government offices and removed a Syrian flag. Authorities subsequently imposed a curfew in Ayn al-Arab/Kobane and arrested people accused of involvement in the unrest.[287]

In early September, returns to Ras al-Ain resumed, with a convoy of approximately 700 families returning to the area.[288]

Returns of IDPs to Afrin (Aleppo governorate) continued to be reported during the reference period through government-organised convoys and independent returns. According to the spokesperson of the local administration, as of June 2026 eight organised convoys facilitated the return of an estimated 15 000 people to Afrin, while additional IDPs returned independently. The spokesperson estimated that around 8 000 families had returned in total, with only 1 000 - 2 000 families still unable to return, and claimed that 90-95 % of Afrin's population had returned to their areas.[289] Further organised returns of IDPs to Afrin were reported, including 1 700 families in June and a further 1 000 families in July.[290]

Local sources reported that residential buildings in areas of Afrin that came under Turkish military control were demolished and converted into military bases, reportedly leaving residents without compensation.[291] Turkish forces were reported to have withdrawn from bases in Basileh, Jieh[292] and Jalbara[293] villages, although they reportedly maintain military

[284] Synergy Hevdesti, Return Under Threat: Violations Against Returnees to Ras al-Ayn/Serê Kaniyê, 26 August 2026, url
[285] Al Monitor, Return of displaced Syrian Kurds to hometown suspended after violence, 10 August 2026, url
[286] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, 27 August 2026, url
[287] Al Monitor, Return of displaced Syrian Kurds to hometown suspended after violence, 10 August 2026, url
[288] Shafaq News, 700 Syrian displaced families return to Ras al-Ain, 9 September 2026, url
[289] Syria Direct, The living and the dead return home to Afrin, 24 June 2026, url
[290] SANA, 1,700 families return to Afrin from Qamishli as repatriation efforts continue, 11 June 2026, url; SANA, Final group of displaced Afrin families returns home from northeast Syria, 16 July 2026, url
[291] Syrian Observer (The), Turkish forces withdraw from bases in Afrin countryside as residents return to destroyed homes, 22 July 2026, url
[292] SOHR, After eight years of control | Turkish forces withdraw from military base in Afrin countryside, 13 July 2026, url; Syrian Observer (The), Turkish forces withdraw from bases in Afrin countryside as residents return to destroyed homes, 22 July 2026, url
[293] SOHR, After more than eight years | Turkish forces withdraw from Jalbara Village in Afrin countryside and Internal Security enters, 9 August 2026, url

sites in parts of Rajo district and several villages in the Afrin area.[294] Local sources continued to report obstacles for returnees in reclaiming property, addressing demolished or occupied property, and extortion attempts.[295]

SOHR reported on cases of arrests Kurdish civilians at checkpoints in Raqqa governorate, without providing further information on the reasons for the arrests.[296] Another case involved a Kurdish man who was arrested in Raqqa governorate by the security forces reportedly for being affiliated with the SDF.[297] SOHR also reported on seizure of farmland belonging to Kurds in Tal Abyad (Raqqa governorate) which it attributed to former Syrian National Army fighters.[298] No further information regarding the treatment of Kurds in Raqqa governorate could be found among sources consulted.

Developments related to Kurdish-language education

The transitional government and SDF have reached an agreement on Kurdish-language education, under which schools in areas with significant Kurdish populations would provide three hours of Kurdish-language instruction and a fourth hour of Kurdish activities each week. For the 2026–27 academic year, four core subjects - social studies, history, geography and philosophy - would also be taught in Kurdish, although it remained unclear whether this arrangement would continue beyond the academic year. While the agreement represented an expansion of Kurdish-language education compared with Damascus's previous position, Kurdish organisations, including some aligned with the SDF, subsequently called for further expansion.[299] In September, protests demanding full Kurdish-language education took place in Kurdish-majority areas.[300]

[294] SOHR, After eight years of control | Turkish forces withdraw from military base in Afrin countryside, 13 July 2026, url; Syrian Observer (The), Turkish forces withdraw from bases in Afrin countryside as residents return to destroyed homes, 22 July 2026, url
[295] Syrian Observer (The), Turkish forces withdraw from bases in Afrin countryside as residents return to destroyed homes, 22 July 2026, url; ANHA, Human rights report tracks ongoing abuses against Kurds in Afrin, 16 June 2026, url
[296] SOHR, Systematic discrimination | 15 Kurdish civilians arrested and kidnapped in Al-Raqqah in two weeks, 19 July 2026, url
[297] SOHR, Several accusations such as "belonging to SDF" | Arbitrary detention against Kurdish young men in Al-Raqqa and countryside, 20 July 2026, url; ANHA, Kurdish man arrested at General Security checkpoint in Raqqa, 21 July 2026, url
[298] SOHR, Amid threats to landowners | Gunmen continue to seize 300 hectares of land belonging to Kurdish farmers in Tel Abyad countryside, 6 August 2026, url
[299] International Crisis Group, A Pivotal Moment in Uniting Post-Assad Syria, 17 September 2026, url
[300] Rudaw, Kobane protesters urge Damascus to reverse limits on Kurdish-medium education, 3 September 2026, url; Kurdistan24, Hundreds Protest in Qamishlo for Full Kurdish-Language Education, 22 September 2026, url

Former SDF members

Following the 29 January integration agreement between the transitional government and the SDF, thousands of former SDF members were integrated into Syrian MoD brigades.[301] In September, the UNCOI stated that following the hostilities between the transitional government and SDF in January 2026 hundreds of SDF-aligned fighters remain missing despite multiple prisoner exchanges and the handover of bodies and remains.[302] In early June, the Deputy Governor of Hasaka stated that more than 1 200 SDF-affiliated individuals had been released from the custody of the Syrian transitional government in the framework of the 29 January 2026 integration agreement between the two sides.[303]

On 15 September, the transitional government announced the release of an additional 49 formers SDF members. Authorities noted their commitment to release individuals detained solely on the basis of their membership in the SDF, while stating that cases involving individuals with pending charges had not yet been resolved.[304]

During the reference period, isolated incidents involving the targeting of former Kurdish SDF members by non-state actors were reported. A recently integrated former Kurdish SDF soldier serving in the Syrian army was killed near Hasaka in September by an Arab local[305], allegedly in retaliation for the soldier's involvement in the earlier killing of several members of the Bagara tribe.[306] The authorities reportedly arrested suspects.[307] The incident triggered protests and unrest in Kobane, with authorities detaining a number of protesters[308] amid altercations that reportedly left some security personnel injured.[309]

The killing of the former SDF soldier occurred several weeks after unidentified gunmen attacked a post in Tawil Harb village south of Qamishli, killing two members of the Syrian army's Qamishli Brigade, composed of former SDF fighters, and injuring two others.[310]

[301] Margolin, A., Tabler, A., After the SDF: What Comes Next for Northeast Syria and U.S. Policy, TWI, 31 August 2026, url
[302] OHCHR, Statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic accompanying its Oral Update to the 63rd Session of the Human Rights Council, 8 September 2026, url
[303] Rudaw, Damascus releases 49 SDF members as total detainees freed tops 1,200, 16 September 2026, url
[304] Rudaw, Damascus releases 49 SDF members as total detainees freed tops 1,200, 16 September 2026, url
[305] Waters, G., Rebuilding Security in New Syria: Year 2, Week 40, Syria Revisited, 13 September 2026, url; Rudaw, Kurdish soldier's sister recounts moments before brother's killing near Hasaka, 13 September 2026, url
[306] Rudaw, Kurdish soldier's sister recounts moments before brother's killing near Hasaka, 11 September 2026, url
[307] OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, 17 September 2026, url, p. 3
[308] Rudaw, At least three killed in Kobane violence amid protests over Kurdish soldier's killing, 12 September 2026, url
[309] International Crisis Group, A Pivotal Moment in Uniting Post-Assad Syria, 17 September 2026, url
[310] Rudaw, At least three killed in Kobane violence amid protests over Kurdish soldier's killing, 12 September 2026, url

Stateless Kurds

In the framework of implementing Presidential Decree No. 13 of 2026, Syrian authorities announced that by 22 May 2026 they had received 2 892 family applications for the naturalisation of 10 516 individuals since applications opened on 6 April 2026 at dedicated centres in Damascus, Aleppo, Hasaka, Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor. In response to continued demand, the application period was extended by an additional 15 days at selected centres after the initial one-month implementation period.[311]

On 11 June 2026, the General Administration for Civil Affairs announced the completion of the application submission process and the start of application reviews by the competent committees as part of the nationality restoration process. It also announced interviews for applicants and granted an additional unspecified deadline for Syrians residing abroad whose applications had been submitted by relatives to complete the required procedures.[312] Interview centres were announced across eight cities including Darbasiyeh, Hasaka and Qamishli.[313]

There were documented cases in which Kurdish applicants were recorded as 'Syrian Arabs' on nationality application forms by MoI employees, despite Decree No. 13 of 2026 recognising Kurds as a constituent component of the Syrian people and affirming their cultural and linguistic identity. Following complaints, the classification was reportedly discontinued and replaced with 'Syrian' in registration procedures and related documents.[314]

Individuals perceived to have transgressed religious/moral laws, norms or codes

During the reference period no major developments were observed in relation to the introduction or implementation of religious/moral laws, norms or codes.

Sources interviewed by the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) in April 2026 indicated that Syrians returning from abroad have generally not faced harassment or discrimination from authorities or local communities based on appearance, dress, lifestyle or behaviour perceived as 'westernised'. SNHR reported no documented cases of such treatment across several governorates, while other sources indicated that authorities generally do not regulate personal dress or lifestyle choices. However, some returnees may face reduced social acceptance in poorer communities heavily affected by the conflict, where resentment towards

[311] UNHCR, UNHCR welcomes efforts to address statelessness among Kurdish communities in Syria, 4 June 2026, url
[312] Synergy Hevdesti, Between Hope and Challenges: Restoring Nationality to Stateless Kurds in Syria, 23 June 2026, url
[313] Etana Syria, Brief: Recent developments in north-east Syria, 15 July 2026, url
[314] Synergy Hevdesti, Between Hope and Challenges: Restoring Nationality to Stateless Kurds in Syria, 23 June 2026, url

those who left Syria during the war can create social tensions, although these have not generally resulted in violence.[315]

6. Socio-economic situation

Syria is facing rising inflation, particularly affecting food[316] and fuel prices.[317] In September, protests erupted across Syria after the government announced a temporarily raise on the price of gasoline, diesel and other petroleum products in response to global shortages linked to the war in Iran and to a major overhaul at a refinery in Syria. The increases ranged from 9 % for cooking gas to 25 % for gasoline to 40 % for diesel.[318] The increase in fuel prices was the second since the beginning of September. Protests have been particularly prominent in northeastern Syria, the country's main agricultural region and a significant oil-producing area. Demonstrations in Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor have taken on a more confrontational character, with protesters blocking major roads.[319] Price increases in the northeast have been particularly acute in recent months, partly as a result of the integration process. Under the former SDF-linked administration, subsidised fuel and other forms of support were granted, whereas the transitional government has reduced these subsidies as it has expanded central control and pursued greater fiscal discipline.[320]

In a positive development, the Alouk Water Station located in Hasaka governorate countryside officially reopened on 22 July 2026 after being shut down for almost seven years restoring drinking water access for more than 500 000 people in northeast Syria.[321]

The cost of living remains high, with the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) more than 30 % higher year-on-year in June 2026. Despite an increase in the public-sector minimum wage in May, it covered only 47 % of the MEB and around 75 % of its food component. National average retail prices for wheat flour and rice were also 34 % and 32 % higher than a year earlier, respectively.[322] As of June 2026, Damascus governorate recorded the third highest

[315] DIS, Syria. An update, June 2026, url, p. 54
[316] New York Times (The), Syrians Protest as Surge in Fuel Prices Adds to Cost-of-Living Crisis, 14 September 2026, url; Al Jazeera, 'People don't have money': Syrian fuel hikes deepen economic pain, 16 September 2026, url
[317] New York Times (The), Syrians Protest as Surge in Fuel Prices Adds to Cost-of-Living Crisis, 14 September 2026, url; International Crisis Group, A Pivotal Moment in Uniting Post-Assad Syria, 17 September 2026, url; OSES, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, 17 September 2026, url, p. 2
[318] New York Times (The), Syrians Protest as Surge in Fuel Prices Adds to Cost-of-Living Crisis, 14 September 2026, url
[319] New Arab (The), Fuel protests sweep through Syria, posing growing challenge for Damascus, 14 September 2026, url
[320] International Crisis Group, A Pivotal Moment in Uniting Post-Assad Syria, 17 September 2026, url
[321] WHO, Health Sector Bulletin July 2026, 3 August 2026, url, p. 4; Enab Baladi, Syria: Alouk Water Station Reopens After Years of Shutdown 23 August 2026, url
[322] FAO, GIEWS Country Brief: Syrian Arab Republic, 28 August 2026, url

MEB costs out of all governorates (after Sweida and Tartous governorates) with 29 367 SYP (around USD 260) while also recording the second highest month-on-month price increase of 4.3 %.[323]

Acute food insecurity remains a major concern, particularly in northeastern and northwestern Syria, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization. High food and transport costs, currency depreciation, limited livelihood opportunities and climate-related risks such as flooding continue to erode household purchasing power and constrain access to food, with IDPs particularly vulnerable due to reduced humanitarian assistance and limited income-generating opportunities. In southern Syria, high prices and localised insecurity continue to affect livelihoods and food access.[324] After a nationwide bread subsidy programme that had assisted millions daily was discontinued in May 2026[325] bread prices increased by 18 % while reduction in food assistance provided by the World Food Programme (WFP) led to increased pressure on vulnerable households, exacerbating community tensions.[326]

Funding shortfalls have forced the WFP to halve both food assistance and operational coverage, reducing the number of people receiving assistance from 1.3 million to 650 000 and its geographic coverage from 14 to seven governorates, despite an estimated 7.1 million people facing acute food insecurity in Syria.[327] The number of people requiring humanitarian assistance is projected at 6-7 million between October 2026 and January 2027.[328]

An IOM assessment of conditions for return in Damascus governorate, based on data collected between April and May 2026, found that 39 % of surveyed communities reported that most or all residents had access to safe drinking water. Access to waste management and sewage services was reported in 81 % and 91 % of communities, respectively. Regarding healthcare, around 75 % of surveyed communities had access to primary healthcare facilities, compared with only 32 % that had access to specialised healthcare facilities. Access to primary and secondary education was reported in 99 % and 91 % of surveyed communities, respectively.[329]

Mobility and admittance

Damascus and Aleppo airports remained operational during the reference period.[330] As of 28 August, there were no direct flights operating between Damascus and Aleppo cities.[331]

[323] WFP Syria Monthly Market Price Bulletin, June 2026 - Issue 138, 30 July 2026, url, p. 4
[324] FAO, GIEWS Country Brief: Syrian Arab Republic, 28 August 2026, url
[325] WFP, WFP scales back food assistance in Syria amid funding shortfalls, 13 May 2026, url
[326] WFP, Syria Country Brief August 2026, 23 August 2026, url, p. 1
[327] WFP, Syria Country Brief August 2026, 23 August 2026, url, p. 1
[328] FAO, GIEWS Country Brief: Syrian Arab Republic, 28 August 2026, url
[329] IOM, Syrian Arab Republic: Communities of Return Index - Rural Damascus Governorate, April 2026 | Round 5, 25 July 2026, url, p. 5
[330] SANA, Syria rebuilds aviation network as airlines return, airports expand, 13 September 2026, url
[331] FlightConnections, Flights from Damascus to Aleppo, as of 28 August 2026, url

European air connections with Damascus continued to expand with flights from Amsterdam resuming in July.[332] Direct flights from Damascus to Vienna and Copenhagen are scheduled to start from 21 September.[333]

According to sources interviewed by DIS in April 2026, settling outside one's area of origin is reportedly common, including for seeking employment. However, social and security-related factors influence the decision to settle in one area or another. Housing access and settlement patterns in Syria are influenced by local trust networks, familiarity and perceived security risks. Landlords may favour tenants from the same locality or social background, while members of certain communities may face difficulties securing housing in areas dominated by other groups. For example, STJ assessed that Kurds are generally unlikely to settle in Arab-dominated areas such as Raqqa, Tel Abyad and Deir Ez-Zor due to Kurdish-Arab tensions. However, a Syria expert considered financial circumstances to be a more common factor than sectarian discrimination in accessing housing, while noting that minorities and single women may still encounter difficulties. These dynamics vary geographically, with settlement across different communities generally more feasible in major cities such as Damascus and Aleppo, despite localised tensions in some neighbourhoods. Settlement patterns may also be influenced by local security conditions and intercommunal relations. In areas affected by ethnic or sectarian tensions, individuals may prefer to settle in locations where they have family ties, established social networks, or support from their wider community.[334]

7. Returns from abroad

Over 1.8 million Syrian refugees returned between 8 December 2024 and 17 September 2026.[335] Since the fall of the Assad government, Syrian refugees returned mainly from Lebanon (40 %) Türkiye (39 %), and Jordan (17 %), with smaller numbers from Iraq (2 %), Egypt (2 %) and other countries. Most returns from abroad have been recorded to Damascus, Idlib, Aleppo, Rural Damascus, Homs, and Hama.[336]

In 2026, UNHCR recorded 268 000 returns from abroad during the first quarter of the year and 131 000 during the second quarter of 2026.[337] Most returnees from abroad surveyed by UNHCR reported returning spontaneously (88 %), accompanied by their immediate family (89 %) and to the same location they had lived before fleeing Syria (76 %).[338] Most returnees from abroad did not carry out prior visits before returning (78 %) relying on information from

[332] SANA, Syria rebuilds aviation network as airlines return, airports expand, 13 September 2026, url
[333] Kurdistan24, Syrian Airlines to Fly Direct to Vienna and Copenhagen From September 21, 25 August 2026, url
[334] DIS, Syria. An update, June 2026, url, pp. 49-50
[335] UNHCR, Comprehensive Overview of Refugee Returnees, 17 September 2026, url
[336] UNHCR, Comprehensive Overview of Refugee Returnees, 17 September 2026, url
[337] UNHCR, Syria: Protection and Reintegration Insights. Voices of returnees and host communities across Syria April-June 2026, 4 August 2026, url, p. 8
[338] UNHCR, Syria: Protection and Reintegration Insights. Voices of returnees and host communities across Syria April-June 2026, 4 August 2026, url, pp. 8-9

family and community networks to make their decision.[339] The main pull factors for returnees from abroad were perceived improved security conditions (57 %), family unity and reunification (55 %), and the desire to access/recover HLP (41 %).[340]



Map 2. UNHCR, Syrian refugee returnees by governorate[341]

The main barriers to return cited in a 2026 UNHCR survey were limited access to housing (43 %) and basic infrastructure (including electricity and water) (37 %), lack of resources to return (28 %) and security concerns (28 %).[342] Food and nutrition remained the most commonly reported need across returnees from abroad (65 %). Refugee returnees reported particularly

[339] UNHCR, Syria: Protection and Reintegration Insights. Voices of returnees and host communities across Syria April-June 2026, 4 August 2026, url, pp. 12-13
[340] UNHCR, Syria: Protection and Reintegration Insights. Voices of returnees and host communities across Syria April-June 2026, 4 August 2026, url, p. 10
[341] UNHCR, Comprehensive Overview of Refugee Returnees, 17 September 2026, url
[342] UNHCR, Syria: Protection and Reintegration Insights. Voices of returnees and host communities across Syria April-June 2026, 4 August 2026, url, p. 12

high needs for employment (60 %) and shelter (53 %) compared with IDP returnees and host communities.[343]

Access to humanitarian assistance remained limited between April-June 2026, with only 33 % of households reporting access, down from 45 % in Q1, while the proportion unable to access assistance increased from 55 % to 67 %. NGOs and community groups remained the main providers, accounting for 38 % and 37 % of assistance respectively, followed by UN agencies (20 %) and government actors (6 %).[344] UNHCR and its partners provided immediate protection and basic assistance at border crossings, including transportation for vulnerable individuals, legal counselling and referrals. In areas of return, post-return monitoring and support through community centres continued, although increasing demand placed additional pressure on existing services and resources. Between January and July 2026, UNHCR provided return and reintegration cash assistance for around 100 000 individual returnees from abroad.[345]

Several sources interviewed by DIS in April 2026 generally did not report systematic state discrimination or adverse treatment of returnees based on when they left Syria during the conflict. They were not aware of cases in which individuals who departed later in the conflict, including from former government-controlled areas, were questioned, prosecuted or otherwise subjected to repercussions upon return because of perceived support for the former government. Many Syrians were able to return without being stopped or questioned on this basis.[346]

Sources interviewed by DIS also indicated that individuals who left Syria later in the conflict, particularly from former government-controlled areas, may face community-level suspicion or be perceived as sympathetic to the former government or 'silent supporters'. Such perceptions, including informal accusations against those who travelled to and from Syria during the conflict, may contribute to tensions within families and local communities. However, potential risks associated with the timing of departure were reportedly more likely to arise from local disputes, family feuds or community accusations than from systematic government policies, and no concrete cases of authorities imposing repercussions on such returnees were reported.[347]

[343] UNHCR, Syria: Protection and Reintegration Insights. Voices of returnees and host communities across Syria April-June 2026, 4 August 2026, url, p. 23
[344] UNHCR, Syria: Protection and Reintegration Insights. Voices of returnees and host communities across Syria April-June 2026, 4 August 2026, url, p. 24
[345] UNHCR, Syria Operational Update - July 2026, 31 August 2026, url, p. 3
[346] DIS, Syria. An update, June 2026, url, p. 48
[347] DIS, Syria. An update, June 2026, url, p. 48

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