


Lebanon: Country Focus



Lebanon: Country Focus

Country of Origin Information Report

November 2025



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The review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of the EUAA.





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Disclaimer

This report was written according to the [EUAA COI Report Methodology \(2023\)](#). The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care within a limited timeframe. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

'Refugee', 'risk' and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

Neither EUAA nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report.

On 19 January 2022, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) became the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). All references to EASO, EASO products and bodies should be understood as references to the EUAA.

The drafting of this report was finalised on 26 September 2025. Any event taking place after this date is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the methodology section of the Introduction.





Glossary and abbreviations

| Term | Definition |
|----------------------------|---|
| ACLED | Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project |
| Blue Line | Demarcation line established by the United Nations in June 2000 to confirm Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon. It extends approximately 120 kilometres from the Mediterranean Sea to the Shebaa Farms area and is used by UNIFIL as a reference for monitoring activities along the Lebanese and Israeli border. |
| Confessional system | Lebanon's system of proportional power-sharing among religious communities, also called sectarian power-sharing, confessional democracy, or, in academic terms, consociational democracy |
| Domicide | Mass destruction of homes |
| DPAR | Directorate of Political Affairs and Refugees |
| HJC | High Judicial Council (Supreme Judicial Council) |
| GBV | Gender-Based Violence |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| ISF | Internal Security Forces (Lebanese National Police) |
| LAF | Lebanese Armed Forces |
| LF | Lebanese Forces: Christian political party in Lebanon that originated as a militia during the civil war (1975-1990) and is now a right-leaning party opposed to Syrian influence and Hezbollah |





| Term | Definition |
|--------------------------------|---|
| LGBTIQ | Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer |
| March 8 Alliance | Pro-Syrian/Iranian Lebanese political coalition led by Hezbollah |
| March 14 Alliance | Anti-Syrian Lebanese political coalition |
| <i>Majlis al-nuwwab</i> | Arabic term for the Lebanese parliament (Chamber of Deputies) |
| NACC | National Anti-Corruption Commission |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| PFLP GC | Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command |
| PIJ | Palestinian Islamic Jihad |
| PLO | Palestine Liberation Organization |
| Shebaa Farms | Disputed territory at Lebanon–Syria–Israel border |
| Sabra | A neighbourhood in Beirut near the Shatila Palestinian refugee camp that became an informal extension of it after 1948 due to population displacement and informal housing. |
| Shatila | A Palestinian refugee camp in Beirut established after the 1948 displacement, located near the Sabra neighbourhood, which later became an extension of Sabra through population growth and informal settlement. |
| Taif Agreement | 1989 accord that ended the Lebanese Civil War, revising the 1943 National Pact |
| UNIFIL | United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon |





Introduction

The purpose of this report is to provide relevant information in view of the assessment of international protection, including refugee status and subsidiary protection. This report intends to capture a selection of the main issues relevant to international protection in the assessment of claims from Lebanese nationals.

The report covers the period of 1 May 2024–26 September 2025.

Methodology

This report was jointly drafted by ACCORD and EUAA and reviewed by EUAA and national COI departments in EU+ countries, as mentioned in the [Acknowledgements](#) section.

This report is produced in line with the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2023)¹ and the EUAA COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2023).²

Defining the terms of reference

The terms of reference (ToR) of this report were defined by EUAA based on identified information needs, and external consultations with COI experts in the EUAA COI Specialist networks. The ToR for this report can be found in [Annex 2: Terms of Reference](#).

Collecting information

The information gathered is a result of research using public, specialised paper-based and electronic sources, as well as interviews with experts until 26 September 2025. Some limited additional information was added during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control process, until 10 October 2025.

Quality control

To ensure that the authors respected the EUAA COI Report Methodology and that the ToR were comprehensively addressed, a review was carried out by COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the [Acknowledgements](#) section. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft of this report, which was finalised on 10 October 2025. EUAA also performed the final quality review and editing of the text.

¹ EUAA, EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, February 2023, [url](#)

² EUAA, Writing and Referencing Guide for EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, February 2023, [url](#)





Sources

In accordance with EUAA COI methodology, a range of different published documentary sources have been consulted on relevant topics for this report. These include: COI reports by governments; information from civil society, advocacy groups, humanitarian organisations, and NGOs; international and NGO human rights reports; reports produced by various bodies of the United Nations; Lebanon and regionally based media and social media; academic publications and think tank reports and specialised sources covering Lebanon. All information from these sources was consulted within time constraints.

In addition to using publicly available documentary sources, three oral sources were contacted for this report. Sources were assessed for their background, publication history, reputability and current ground-level knowledge. All oral sources are described in [Annex 1: Bibliography](#).

Sources on security incidents and civilian casualties

Data of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)³ has been used for information on security events and fatalities.

ACLED is a project that collects, analyses and maps information on ‘dates, actors, locations, fatalities, and types of all reported political violence and protest events around the world’.⁴ The EUAA downloaded the ACLED curated data files on Middle East, including Lebanon, on 26 September 2025, which are used in this report.

ACLED records six event types: battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, protests, riots and strategic developments.⁵

For the analysis of the security situation in Lebanon in this report, only battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians were included as incidents. ACLED uses the following definitions of these event types:

- **Battle:** ‘a violent interaction between two politically organized armed groups’ which occur ‘at a particular time and location’, ‘between armed and organised state, non-state, and external groups, and in any combination therein’. There is no fatality threshold for an incident to be included. Sub-events associated with ‘battles’ are designated according to the events outcome and consist of ‘armed clash’, ‘government regains territory’, and ‘non-state actor overtakes territory’.⁶
- **Violence against civilians:** ‘violent events where an organized armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants’ and includes attempts at inflicting harm (e.g. beating, shooting, torture, rape, mutilation) or forcibly disappearing civilian actors. Sub-events associated with ‘violence against civilians’ are: ‘sexual

³ ACLED, The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project - Bringing clarity to crisis, n.d., [url](#)

⁴ ACLED, About ACLED, n.d., [url](#)

⁵ ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, 3 October 2024, [url](#),

⁶ ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, 3 October 2024, [url](#)





violence', 'attack', and 'abduction/forced disappearance'. It should be noted that all violence against civilians do not fall under this category, as civilians can also be harmed as 'collateral damage' in 'explosions' and 'battles' – in such cases a separate civilian-specific event is not recorded, although the number of fatalities is aggravated.⁷

- **Explosions/remote violence:** 'incidents in which one side uses weapon types that, by their nature, are at range and widely destructive'. The sub-event types associated with 'explosions/remote violence' are 'chemical weapon', 'air/drone strike', 'suicide bomb', 'shelling/artillery/missile attack', 'remote explosive/landmine/IED', and 'grenade'.⁸

Structure and use of the report

The report's first chapter provides an overview of the country, covering aspects such as geography, religious groups, and the state structure. The second chapter focuses on political and economic developments, while the third chapter details the legal system and the judiciary. Chapters four and five provide information on different actors, on state security institutions, including the Lebanese armed forces, and on non-state armed groups, respectively. The sixth chapter covers the general security situation. The seventh and final chapter provides information on the treatment of seven selected profiles and groups of the population.

⁷ ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, 3 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸ ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, 3 October 2024, [url](#)



Map



Map 1: Lebanon © UN OCHA, 2025⁹

⁹ UN OCHA, Lebanon: Location map (2025), 9 July 2025, [url](#)

1. Country overview

Lebanon is a Middle Eastern country located along the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea¹⁰ bordering Syria to the north and east and Israel to the south.¹¹ Lebanon however does not recognise Israel as a legitimate state,¹² and indicates that Palestine is located at its south in public maps on the Lebanon Central Administrative Statistics' website.¹³ It has a population of 5.2 million people¹⁴ and covers an area of 10 452 square kilometres,¹⁵ which makes it one of the smaller and most densely populated countries around the Mediterranean.¹⁶ According to the Constitution of Lebanon, 'Arabic is the official national language. A law shall determine the cases in which the French language can be used.'¹⁷ Although French ceased to be an official language after Lebanon's independence, it remains a recognised and commonly used language, with many signs still in French, and both French and English widely spoken, though English has been gaining ground among younger generations.¹⁸

There are several¹⁹ religious groups living in Lebanon.²⁰ The last official census in Lebanon was conducted in 1932, when Christians accounted for 53 % of the population.²¹ More recent estimates suggest that the Muslim share has increased to 68 %, while the Christian share has decreased to approximately 28 %. This demographic change has been influenced by factors such as migration, including the arrival of Syrian refugees, and differing population growth rates among communities.²² No new census has been carried out due to political sensitivities of the power-balance between the different religious groups.²³ According to available estimates, around 95 % of the total population identify as Arab, 4 % as Armenians and 1 % as belonging to other ethnicities.²⁴ Based on available, the Muslim population is estimated to range between 60 % and 68 %, with Shia and Sunni communities each comprising

¹⁰ UNICEF, Lebanon country brief, 12 December 2024, [url](#); BBC, Israel-Hezbollah conflict in maps: Ceasefire in effect in Lebanon, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

¹¹ BBC, Israel-Hezbollah conflict in maps: Ceasefire in effect in Lebanon, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

¹² New Arab (The), Saudi normalisation of Israel could lead to deal with Lebanon, believes Katz, 11 March 2025;

¹³ Lebanon, CAS, About Lebanon, n.d., [url](#)

¹⁴ UNFPA, Lebanon – overview, 2024, data observed on 25 February 2025, [url](#)

¹⁵ BBC, Israel-Hezbollah conflict in maps: Ceasefire in effect in Lebanon, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

¹⁶ Britannica, Lebanon, 25 September 2025, [url](#)

¹⁷ Lebanon, the Lebanese Constitution, promulgated on 23 May 1926, [url](#), p. 5

¹⁸ RFI, From protector to onlooker: how France lost its influence in Lebanon, 4 October 2024, [url](#); L'Orient Today, Lebanon's tri-lingual evolution in Arabic, French, English, 21 May 2024, [url](#);

¹⁹ Britannica, Lebanon, People, 25 September 2025, [url](#)

²⁰ Independent (The), Christian nun in Lebanon prays for the Shiite Muslim fighters of Hezbollah. A furor ensues., 29 March 2024, [url](#); BBC, Lebanon country profile, 10 January 2025, [url](#)

²¹ L'Histoire, Liban, le pays déchiré, June 2025, serial number 530, magazine, p. 40

²² Pew Research Center, Religion in the Middle East and North Africa, 9 June 2025, [url](#); L'Histoire, Liban, le pays déchiré, June 2025, serial number 530, magazine, p. 40

²³ World Population Review, Population of Lebanon, 2025, [url](#); Nation (The), The World's Most Dangerous Census, 17 October 2019, [url](#)

²⁴ Moyen Orient, Bilan Géostratégique 2024, Guerre !, magazine, trimestriel, numéro 63, 1 July 2024, p. 44



approximately 30 %.²⁵ Christians are estimated approximately at 32.4 %, Druze at 5 % (a distinct religious group that originated from Ismaili Shia Islam but no longer identifies as Muslims and follows a separate faith²⁶), Alawites at less than 1 % (a Muslim sect rooted in Twelver Shia Islam, with distinct beliefs²⁷), and other faiths at 0.1 %.²⁸ .

Lebanon officially recognises 18 religious sects, within the Muslim, Christian, Druze,²⁹ and Jewish communities.³⁰ The Muslim sects include Sunni, Shia, Ismaili, and Alawite while the Christian sects include Maronite Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Melkite Greek Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, Armenian Catholic, Syriac Catholic, Syriac Orthodox, Chaldean Catholic, Assyrian Church of the East, Coptic Orthodox, Evangelical Protestant, and Latin Catholic. In addition, the Druze are recognised as a distinct community, and the Jewish Community also holds official recognition.³¹ Each of these groups participates in Lebanon's confessional political system, which allocates power based on religious affiliation.³²

Lebanon's administrative division functions on three levels, comprising nine Governorates (*mouhafazat*) divided into 26 districts (*caza*), alongside a decentralised local structure made up of over 1 100 municipalities (*baladiyah*), reflecting a dual system of governance with both central and local authorities.³³ The nine Governorates are Akkar, Baalbek-Hermel, Beirut, Bekaa, Keserwan-Jbeil, Mount Lebanon, Al Nabatieh, North, and South.³⁴ Their main characteristics are as follows:

- **Akkar Governorate** is located in the north of Lebanon, bordering Syria and has an estimated population of 450 000 inhabitants.³⁵ Akkar is mainly inhabited by Sunni Muslims and Christians (Maronites and Orthodox), with smaller communities of Alawites and Shia Muslims.³⁶
- **North Lebanon Governorate**, established in 2003 through an administrative division from the Akkar governorate, is home to an estimated 700 000 population (including refugees),³⁷ and its capital Tripoli is the second biggest city in the country.³⁸ The North Lebanon Governorate, like Akkar, is home to various religious sects, including Sunni,

²⁵ Moyen Orient, Bilan Géostratégique 2024, Guerre !, magazine, trimestriel, numéro 63, 1 July 2024, p. 44 ; Pew Research Center, Religion in the Middle East and North Africa, 9 June 2025, [url](#); L'Histoire, Liban, le pays déchiré, June 2025, serial number 530, magazine, p. 40 ; LIBNANEWS, Comprendre les diverses sectes de l'Islam au Liban, 23 August 2024, [url](#)

²⁶ Al Jazeera, Who are the Druze? A look at the community following a deadly attack, 1 August 2024, [url](#); LIBNANEWS, Comprendre les diverses sectes de l'Islam au Liban, 23 August 2024, [url](#)

²⁷ LIBNANEWS, Comprendre les diverses sectes de l'Islam au Liban, 23 August 2024, [url](#)

²⁸ Moyen Orient, Bilan Géostratégique 2024, Guerre !, magazine, trimestriel, numéro 63, 1 July 2024, p. 44

²⁹ JLIFLC, The rights of religious minorities in Lebanon, 5 February 2025, [url](#), p. 5

³⁰ JLIFLC, The rights of religious minorities in Lebanon, 5 February 2025, [url](#), p. 5

³¹ JLIFLC, The rights of religious minorities in Lebanon, 5 February 2025, [url](#), p. 5; Anera, What are the religions of Lebanon?, 5 July 2025, [url](#)

³² Lebanon News, La Complexité Religieuse du Liban : Une Mosaïque de Confessions [The Religious Complexity of Lebanon: A Mosaic of Confessions], 15 May 2024, [url](#)

³³ World Bank, Lebanon, systematic country diagnostic, August 2024, 15 August 2024, [url](#), p. 141 [footnote 242]

³⁴ World Bank, Lebanon Rapid Damage and Needs Assessments (RDNA), March 2025, 7 March 2025, [url](#), p. 9

³⁵ Anera, Anera in Akkar, Lebanon, 9 January 2025, [url](#)

³⁶ UN OCHA, Lebanon: North & Akkar Governorates Profile (October 2018), 31 October 2018, [url](#)

³⁷ Anera, Anera in the North Governorate of Lebanon, 9 January 2025, [url](#)

³⁸ Anera, Anera in the South Governorate of Lebanon, 9 January 2025, [url](#)





Alawite, Christian, and Shia communities.³⁹ Tripoli, with an estimated population of 200 000, is predominantly Sunni Muslim (about 80 %), with Alawites making up 6–7 %, and the remaining residents being Christians.⁴⁰

- **Baalbek-Hermel Governorate** is located in the northeast of Lebanon, bordering Syria, and has an estimated population of 400 000 inhabitants.⁴¹ The Baalbek-Hermel Governorate mainly consists of Shia Muslims, with smaller Christian and Sunni communities.⁴²
- **Keserwan-Jbeil Governorate** (also known as Byblos in English) was created in 2017 after being separated from the Mount Lebanon Governorate⁴³ and comprises its two northernmost districts, Keserwan and Jbeil.⁴⁴ Keserwan has an estimated population of 260 500,⁴⁵ while Jbeil has about 129 500,⁴⁶ majority of the population being Maronite Christians,⁴⁷ alongside a smaller Shia Muslim community.⁴⁸
- **Mount Lebanon Governorate** borders the Beirut Governorate, extending along the Mediterranean coast, and has an estimated population of 1.2 million inhabitants (including residents and refugees).⁴⁹ According to the 2014 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) report, Mount Lebanon is predominantly Christian, but with large pockets of Druze and other religious groups living in the southern and eastern parts of the Governorate.⁵⁰ No more recent information on the religious composition of Mount Lebanon could be found within the time constraints of this report.
- **Beirut Governorate** is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea to the west and surrounded by Mount Lebanon to the north, east, and south.⁵¹ Beirut city is also the capital of Lebanon.⁵² As of March 2025, Beirut has an estimated population of 2 379 000 inhabitants,⁵³ roughly split between Muslims and Christians.⁵⁴
- **Bekaa Governorate** (also spelled as Beqaa) is located between the mountain ranges spanning Syria and Lebanon.⁵⁵ Bekaa has an estimated population of 565 877

³⁹ UN OCHA, Lebanon: North and Akkar Governorates Profile (August 2016), 4 August 2016, [url](#)

⁴⁰ The National, MENA News, Lebanon fears sectarian violence as 10,000 Syrian Alawites flee across border, 10 March 2025, [url](#)

⁴¹ Anera, Anera in Baalbek-Hermel, Lebanon, 9 January 2025, [url](#)

⁴² UN OCHA, Lebanon: Bekaa & Baalbek - El-Hermel Governorates Profile (October 2018), 31 October 2018, [url](#);

Anera, Anera in Baalbek-Hermel, Lebanon, 9 January 2025, [url](#)

⁴³ Anera, Anera in the Kesrwan-Jbeil Governorate of Lebanon, 9 January 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁴ LAI, Administrative Division of Lebanon, information observed on 4 August 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵ Lebanon, CAS, Labour force and household living conditions survey 2018-2019 in Keserwan, Lebanon, n.d., [url](#), p. 4

⁴⁶ Lebanon, CAS, Labour force and household living conditions survey 2018-2019, Lebanon, n.d., [url](#), p. 18

⁴⁷ Anera, Anera in the Kesrwan-Jbeil Governorate of Lebanon, 9 January 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁸ The New Arab, Is Israel stoking sectarian tensions in attacks on Lebanon's Christian villages?, 26 September 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁹ Anera, Anera in Mount Lebanon governorate of Lebanon, 9 January 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁰ UN OCHA, Lebanon: Beirut and Mount Lebanon Governorate Profile (as of 11 August 2014), August 2014, [url](#)

⁵¹ UN HABITAT, Beirut city profile, 19 July 2021, [url](#)

⁵² BBC, Israel-Hezbollah conflict in maps: Ceasefire in effect in Lebanon, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵³ World Population Review, Beirut, information observed on 11 March 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁴ Britannica, Beirut, 5 March 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁵ Anera, Anera in the Bekaa governorate of Lebanon, 9 January 2025, [url](#)





inhabitants.⁵⁶ It is home to Christians, Sunni and Shia Muslims, and Druze communities.⁵⁷

- **Al Nabatieh Governorate** is located in the south of Lebanon, bordering Syria and Israel, and has mainly Shia Muslims, with a significant Christian community.⁵⁸ Al Nabatieh has an estimated population of 276 285 inhabitants.⁵⁹
- **South Governorate** borders Israel, and is home to various religious groups,⁶⁰ including predominantly Shia Muslims,⁶¹ as well as some Sunni Muslims, Druze, Eastern Orthodox, Maronite, Protestant, and Greek Catholic Christians.⁶²

During the Ottoman period, Mount Lebanon functioned with semi-autonomous status, later formalised in 1861 with the creation of the *Mutasarrifiyya*, a special district under Ottoman sovereignty but administered by a non-Lebanese Christian governor and a confessional council.⁶³ The modern Lebanese state was created in 1920 under a French mandate that lasted over twenty years.⁶⁴ Following its independence in 1943,⁶⁵ Lebanon adopted the unwritten 1943 National Pact between Christians and Muslims,⁶⁶ which established a confessional power-sharing system⁶⁷ that distributes political authority among religious communities⁶⁸ granting the most influential positions to those with the largest demographic weight.⁶⁹ According to this system, the president's position has been granted to a Maronite Christian, the prime minister to a Sunni Muslim, the speaker of Parliament to a Shia Muslim,⁷⁰ and the deputy speaker of Parliament to a Greek Orthodox.⁷¹ For more information, see section [2.1 Recent political developments](#).

Lebanon's confessional system has maintained a degree of pluralism within its government,⁷² where religion shapes politics and influences party affiliations.⁷³ Dr. Aurélie Daher, associate professor in political science at Université Paris-Dauphine PSL, and expert on Lebanese politics, institutions, and armed groups, who was interviewed by the EUAA for this report, stated that under Lebanon's confessional power sharing system, 'key ministries, and leadership roles are distributed among recognised religious communities'. Each community

⁵⁶ UNHCR, Inter Agency Coordination, Lebanon, Bekaa Governorate profile (June 2015), n.d., [url](#)

⁵⁷ COAR, Lebanon conflict analysis- central Bekaa, 17 February 2022, [url](#)

⁵⁸ Anera, Anera in Nabatiyeh, Lebanon, 9 January 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁹ Lebanon, IDAL, Nabatiyeh governorate, n.d., [url](#)

⁶⁰ Anera, Anera in the South governorate of Lebanon, 9 January 2025, [url](#)

⁶¹ BBC, Hezbollah at crossroads after blows from war weaken group, 4 April 2025, [url](#)

⁶² Anera, Anera in the South governorate of Lebanon, 9 January 2025, [url](#)

⁶³ Les Clés du Moyen Orient, La question libanaise (2/5) : le Mont-Liban pendant la période ottomane, 15 August 2025, [url](#); Britannica, Ottoman period, Lebanon, 11 September 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁴ L'Histoire, Liban, le pays déchiré, June 2025, serial number 530, magazine, p. 31 ; Britannica, Lebanon in the Middle Ages, n.d., [url](#)

⁶⁵ Lebanon, CAS, About Lebanon, n.d., [url](#)

⁶⁶ Britannica, Lebanon after independence, 11 August 2025, [url](#); Anera, What are the religions of Lebanon?, 5 July 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁷ CFR, Lebanon: How Israel, Hezbollah, and Regional Powers Are Shaping Its Future, 27 January 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁸ ACW DC, Legacies of Lebanon's 1975-1990 Civil War, 25 April 2025, [url](#); AA, Lebanon's prime minister-designate vows to form non-partisan government, 30 January 2025, [url](#); Geopolitical Monitor, The post-Nasrullah era: A seismic shift in Lebanon's politics, 5 November 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁹ Anera, What are the religions of Lebanon?, 5 July 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁰ CFR, Lebanon: How Israel, Hezbollah, and Regional Powers Are Shaping Its Future, 27 January 2025, [url](#)

⁷¹ L'Histoire, Liban, le pays déchiré, June 2025, serial number 530, magazine, p. 40

⁷² CFR, Lebanon: How Israel, Hezbollah, and Regional Powers Are Shaping Its Future, 27 January 2025, [url](#)

⁷³ Khatib, L. and Wallace, J., Lebanon's politics and politicians, Chatham House, 19 December 2022, [url](#)





maintains its own leadership hierarchy and parallel institutions, which handle local politics, social, and judicial matters for their members'.⁷⁴ According to Freedom House, in practice, most of Lebanon's political parties are built around long-standing community leaders, who maintain their influence through patronage, control of resources, and the benefits of holding office.⁷⁵

Although the 1943 Pact between Christians and Muslims allowed peace in the country that lasted until the 1970s, the balance among the country's 18 religious sects remained fragile. The Palestinian cause, Israeli invasions, and Syrian interference fuelled a devastating civil war from 1975 to 1990, during which Hezbollah, backed by Iran, emerged as 'a state within the state'.⁷⁶ For more information on the civil war see section [6.1 Conflict background](#). The Taif Agreement, signed on 5 November 1989,⁷⁷ under Saudi mediation with the involvement of Syria, the United States, and Lebanese factions, ended the civil war by revising the 1943 National Pact, shifting more power to the Council of Ministers and the Sunni Prime Minister, reducing the authority of the Maronite President, and recognising Lebanon's ties with Syria while calling the latter to withdraw its troops.⁷⁸

The post-war political landscape remained highly fragmented⁷⁹ with deepening sectarian divisions and obstructing policy consensus, allowing Hezbollah,⁸⁰ a Shia political and militia group,⁸¹ to rise as a dominant socio-political and militant force since 1982.⁸² More recently, Hezbollah reshaped government decisions through alliances with Sunni, Christian, and Druze factions.⁸³

Over the past two decades, Lebanese politics have been structured around two main blocs: the March 8 coalition, which includes some Christian and Shia parties such as Hezbollah and favours alignment with Syria and Iran, and the March 14 Coalition, which brings together Sunnis and other Christian parties and advocates closer ties with the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia.⁸⁴

According to the Constitution, 'the legislative power shall be vested in a single body, the Chamber of Deputies'.⁸⁵ The Lebanese parliament is referred to as the *majlis al-nuwwab* in

⁷⁴ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

⁷⁵ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025, Lebanon, 29 January 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁶ L'Histoire, Liban, le pays déchiré, June 2025, serial number 530, magazine, p. 31

⁷⁷ UN, The Taif agreement, n.d., [url](#), p. 1

⁷⁸ Arab News, 50 moments that changed the Middle East, 19 April 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁹ IRIS, Presidential Election in Lebanon: Dynamics and Internal and External Challenges, 10 January 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁰ Geopolitical Monitor, The Post-Nasrallah Era: A Seismic Shift in Lebanon's Politics, Geopolitical Monitor, 5 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸¹ Al Jazeera, Is Hezbollah weakened as Lebanon shifts towards new governance?, 21 January 2025, [url](#)

⁸² Geopolitical Monitor, The Post-Nasrallah Era: A Seismic Shift in Lebanon's Politics, Geopolitical Monitor, 5 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸³ Geopolitical Monitor, The Post-Nasrallah Era: A Seismic Shift in Lebanon's Politics, Geopolitical Monitor, 5 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁴ CFR, Lebanon: How Israel, Hezbollah, and Regional Powers Are Shaping Its Future, 27 January 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁵ Lebanon, the Lebanese Constitution, promulgated on 23 May 1926, [url](#), p. 6





Arabic⁸⁶ and consists of 128 deputies⁸⁷ elected directly by the people for a four-year term,⁸⁸ and largely dominated by traditional, sectarian-based parties.⁸⁹

Lebanon is a parliamentary republic, in which the President is elected by a two-thirds majority of the Parliament for a six-year term.⁹⁰ According to the Constitution, the President is the head of state and appoints the Prime Minister after consultations with members of Parliament.⁹¹ ‘The Executive authority shall be vested in the Council of Ministers’,⁹² which is chosen by the President and the Prime Minister.⁹³ As Daher noted in an interview with the EUAA, ‘community leaders, such as Dar al-Fatwa for Sunnis or their equivalents among Shias and other sects, frequently intervene, and their authority can override that of state institutions’.⁹⁴

2. Political and economic developments

2.1. Recent political developments

On 9 January 2025, Joseph Aoun, a Maronite Christian⁹⁵ and former army chief, was elected President of Lebanon through secret indirect suffrage by the parliament.⁹⁶ He secured 99 out of 128 votes in a second round,⁹⁷ ending a 26-month presidential vacuum.⁹⁸ During this period Lebanon was governed by a caretaker administration, struggling with political deadlock and a deep economic crisis.⁹⁹

Shortly after his election, Aoun announced the formation of a new government¹⁰⁰ with Nawaf Salam, a Sunni Muslim¹⁰¹ and President of the International Court of Justice, designated as

⁸⁶ Lebanon, UIP, Liban, n.d., [url](#)

⁸⁷ Beirut Today, Can Salam’s Government Revamp Lebanon’s Public Administration System?, 3 March 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁸ Lebanon, Overview of the Lebanese system, n.d., [url](#)

⁸⁹ Le Monde, Lebanon’s PM announces new government, 8 February 2025, [url](#)

⁹⁰ Lebanon, the Lebanese Constitution, promulgated on 23 May 1926, [url](#), pp. 3, 12

⁹¹ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025, Lebanon, 29 January 2025, [url](#); Freedom House, Lebanon, 23 February 2024, [url](#)

⁹² Lebanon, the Lebanese Constitution, promulgated on 23 May 1926, [url](#), art. 65

⁹³ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025, Lebanon, 29 January 2025, [url](#); Freedom House, Lebanon, 23 February 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁴ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

⁹⁵ Le Monde, Who is Joseph Aoun, Lebanon’s new president?, 11 January 2025, [url](#)

⁹⁶ IRIS, Presidential Election in Lebanon: Dynamics and Internal and External Challenges, 10 January 2025, [url](#); BBC, Lebanon country profile, 10 January 2025, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Who is Joseph Aoun, the new president of Lebanon, 9 January 2025, [url](#)

⁹⁷ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, report of the Secretary-General, 12 March 2025, [url](#), para. 52

⁹⁸ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, report of the Secretary-General, S/2025/153, 12 March 2025, [url](#), para. 52

⁹⁹ Al Jazeera, Lebanon names new government after two-year caretaker cabinet, 8 February 2025, [url](#)

¹⁰⁰ Al Jazeera, Lebanon names new government after two-year caretaker cabinet, 8 February 2025, [url](#)

¹⁰¹ Atlantic Council, Lebanon’s prime minister-designate is unlikely to confront Hezbollah, 29 January 2025, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Who is Nawaf Salam, Lebanon’s PM-designate amid political shift?, 14 January 2025, [url](#) BBC, ICJ president Nawaf Salam named Lebanon’s new prime minister, 13 January 2025, [url](#)





Prime Minister on 13 January 2025. Salam secured the support of 84 out of 128 parliamentarians' votes.¹⁰² On 8 February 2025, the President signed a decree appointing the Prime Minister's new government composed of 24 ministers, including five women.¹⁰³ The new cabinet also includes several independent persons, such as former UN envoy Ghassan Salame, reflecting a shift in Lebanon's political landscape after Hezbollah's weakened influence and the end of a prolonged political deadlock.¹⁰⁴

According to the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), one of the key achievements of the new executive lies in eliminating the 'blocking third' clause, which was established by the 2008 Doha Agreement. This clause granted any political party holding one-third of the ministers plus one, the power to veto and overturn the government. This mechanism had been repeatedly exploited by the Shia tandem of Amal Movement and Hezbollah, along with their allies.¹⁰⁵ Despite this, the new president has received broad support, including from the political wing of Hezbollah and Amal Movement in the parliament.¹⁰⁶

To maintain confessional balance and secure political support, Lebanon's new government assigned the Finance Ministry to Yassine Jaber, an Amal-backed figure close to Speaker Nabih Berri. This ensured that the Shia tandem of Hezbollah and Amal retains significant influence despite lacking formal veto power.¹⁰⁷ In addition, several other ministers, including women like Tamara Elzein (former Secretary-General of Lebanon's National Council for Scientific Research, and former Vice President of the Lebanese National Commission for UNESCO) and Haneen Sayed (World Bank economist), come from academic and professional backgrounds, reflecting a mix of technocratic expertise alongside political appointments.¹⁰⁸

Although Hezbollah and Amal continue to hold all 27 Shia seats in the 128-member parliament,¹⁰⁹ the Shia community has suffered major setbacks after the war with Israel and the fall of the Assad regime, with many areas in ruins and weakened leadership.¹¹⁰ According to the United Nations Secretary-General's July 2025 report, the formation of a government and

¹⁰² UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, report of the Secretary-General, 12 March 2025, [url](#), para. 54

¹⁰³ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, report of the Secretary-General, 12 March 2025, [url](#), para. 54

¹⁰⁴ Le Monde, Lebanon's PM announces new government, 8 February 2025, [url](#)

¹⁰⁵ IRIS, New Faces, Same Challenges? An Analysis of the Appointment of the Lebanese Government., 14 February 2025, [url](#)

¹⁰⁶ DW, Lebanon: New president sparks hope for Mideast stability, 10 January 2025, [url](#); RFE/RL, Election Of New Lebanese President Signals Iran's Waning Influence, 10 January 2025, [url](#); Reuters, Lebanon's army chief elected president, showing weakened Hezbollah, 9 January 2025, [url](#)

¹⁰⁷ IRIS, New Faces, Same Challenges? An Analysis of the Appointment of the Lebanese Government., 14 February 2025, [url](#)

¹⁰⁸ The New Arab, Who are some of New Lebanon's new ministers?, 8 April 2025, [url](#)

¹⁰⁹ Arab News, Why the future of Lebanon's fragile state rests on Hezbollah's next move, 21 July 2025, [url](#)

¹¹⁰ L'Orient Today, 35 years after the Christians, the Shiites face the twilight of their domination, 12 August 2025, [url](#)





the holding of municipal elections were significant steps toward extending the authority of the Lebanese state at the local level.¹¹¹

While the formation of the new government has reshaped Lebanon's political and economic landscape,¹¹² President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam remain under intense domestic and international pressure to implement structural reforms while maintaining state control and pursuing Hezbollah's disarmament.¹¹³ On 5 September 2025, the Cabinet led by President Joseph Aoun approved the Lebanese Army's plan to hold the sole authority over weapons, prompting all five Shia ministers to walk out in protest —Hezbollah and Amal ministers leaving first, followed by independent minister Fadi Makki, reflecting their opposition to Hezbollah's disarmament.¹¹⁴ On 24 September 2025, during a parliamentary session on a new election law, Hezbollah and Amal MPs suggested linking Hezbollah's disarmament to full implementation of the Taif Accord, while Christian leaders called for decentralisation or federalism, highlighting a chance to combine disarmament with broader political reform.¹¹⁵ For more information on the process of disarmament, see section [6.2 Overview of security dynamics related to recent developments with Israel](#).

2.2. International context

Lebanon's modern history, shaped by over a century of foreign intervention, including 20 years under the French Mandate, 30 years of Syrian influence, and repeated Israeli invasions, has seen various communities, including Christians, Sunnis, and Shias, alternately seeking foreign protection or support from the state when it aligned with their political and demographic interests.¹¹⁶ This historical pattern continues to shape Lebanon's present-day political landscape.¹¹⁷ France's role remains symbolic,¹¹⁸ while the United States supports mainly the Lebanese Armed Forces.¹¹⁹ The Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, have shifted from direct political patronage to economic leverage,¹²⁰ while Iran has entrenched its power by backing Hezbollah¹²¹ for decades and reinforcing its political and military role.¹²² Meanwhile,

¹¹¹ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025, report of the Secretary-General, S/2025/460, 11 July 2025, [url](#), para. 77

¹¹² IRIS, New Faces, Same Challenges? An Analysis of the Appointment of the Lebanese Government., 14 February 2025, [url](#)

¹¹³ Reuters, US envoy to warn Lebanon over Hezbollah's influence in government, 6 February 2025, [url](#); Financial Times, Lebanon's PM calls for global funding as it pushes to disarm Hizbollah, 29 August 2025, [url](#); BTI, Lebanon at a Turning Point? New Signals and Old Power Structures, 7 May 2025, [url](#)

¹¹⁴ This is Beirut, Cabinet Backs Army's Disarmament Plan Despite Shia Ministers' Walkout, 5 September 2025, [url](#); Naharnet, Govt. 'welcomes' army's weapons monopoly plan, asks for monthly reports, 5 September 2025, [url](#)

¹¹⁵ The National, How to disarm Hezbollah using a handy political lever, 24 September 2025, [url](#)

¹¹⁶ This is Beirut, The Guardianship Syndrome, 5 September 2025, [url](#)

¹¹⁷ CFR, Lebanon: How Israel, Hezbollah, and Regional Powers Are Shaping Its Future, 27 January 2025, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Analysis: How is Lebanon's Hezbollah regrouping after war with Israel?, 28 September 2025, [url](#);

¹¹⁸ PISM, France Seeks Greater Role in Political Transitions in the Middle East, 9 June 2025, [url](#)

¹¹⁹ Reuters, US sends \$230 million to Lebanon as it moves to disarm Hezbollah, sources say, 3 October 2025, [url](#)

¹²⁰ Reuters, Saudi Arabia is optimistic about Lebanon under reforms, Saudi FM says in Beirut, 23 January 2025, [url](#)

¹²¹ Al Jazeera, Analysis: How is Lebanon's Hezbollah regrouping after war with Israel?, 28 September 2025, [url](#);

¹²² ECFR, Beyond proxies: Iran's deeper strategy in Syria and Lebanon, 5 June 2024, [url](#)





Lebanon's relationship with Syria has been tense and often hostile, marked by wars, assassinations, occupation, and conflicts.¹²³

The country's political system has long been shaped by the influence of international actors pursuing their own agendas within the country's domestic affairs.¹²⁴ Following independence from France in 1943, the founders viewed non-recognition of Israel as essential for maintaining strong relations with Arab states,¹²⁵ a decision that laid the foundation for Lebanon's complex and often tense relationship with Israel over the past seventy-five years.¹²⁶

2.2.1. Relations with Iran

Relations between Iran and Lebanon have become more significant following the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 and the creation of Hezbollah by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in 1982.¹²⁷ Iran has supported Hezbollah politically, socially¹²⁸ and financially.¹²⁹ Meanwhile, the Iranian authorities claim having good relations with the new government of Lebanon while stating that 'the Hezbollah resistance movement [is] an inseparable part of the Lebanese government'.¹³⁰

At the time of writing, Iran continued supporting Hezbollah,¹³¹ which led to diplomatic tensions with the Lebanese government.¹³² The new Lebanese government forms closer ties with the new government in Syria, as well as with Saudi Arabia, while it takes distance from the Iranian axes.¹³³ The new Lebanese President stated that 'Lebanon is exhausted by others' wars on its soil,' and called on Iran to support Lebanon's unity, integrity, and sovereignty.¹³⁴ Iran continued projecting its influence in Lebanon mainly through longstanding support for Hezbollah, which, according to the International Crisis Group, constitutes a multilayered security concern from Israel's perspective due to the party's military, financial, and ideological ties to Tehran and its role in the regional 'axis of resistance'.¹³⁵

¹²³ The New Arab, A new chapter in Lebanon-Syria relations takes shape, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

¹²⁴ IRIS, Presidential Election in Lebanon: Dynamics and Internal and External Challenges, 10 January 2025, [url](#)

¹²⁵ Al Jazeera, Beyond Hezbollah: The history of tensions between Lebanon and Israel, 17 October 2023, [url](#)

¹²⁶ The Cairn Review of Global Affairs, Another Step Toward Peace: The Lebanon-Israel Maritime Agreement, 22 February 2023, [url](#)

¹²⁷ Bakawan A, Hezbollah: The Rise and Influence of a Militant Model in Lebanon, EISMENA, 11 September 2024, [url](#)

¹²⁸ ISPI, The Growth of Hezbollah: The Nexus of Iran's Influence, 22 March 2023, [url](#);

¹²⁹ Reuters, Hezbollah to pay total of \$77 million and rent to families affected by war, 5 December 2024, [url](#); ISPI, The Growth of Hezbollah: The Nexus of Iran's Influence, 22 March 2023, [url](#); CFR, What is Hezbollah, 29 October 2024, [url](#)

¹³⁰ Iran, Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Foreign Affairs, 4 March 2025, [url](#)

¹³¹ L'Orient Today, Khamenei: 'The wealth created by Hassan Nasrallah endures and continues', 24 September 2024, [url](#)

¹³² LIBNANEWS, Tensions diplomatiques : l'Iran rappelé à l'ordre par le Liban sur fond de débat sur le désarmement, 24 April 2025, [url](#)

¹³³ Abi-Akl, P., Juin échéance pour l'Iran et le Hezbollah, Ici Beyrouth, 8 April 2025, [url](#)

¹³⁴ L'Orient-Le Jour, « Le Liban est épuisé par les guerres des autres sur son territoire », lance Aoun aux Iraniens, 23 February 2025, [url](#)

¹³⁵ International Crisis Group, Lebanon, Why it matters, 21 September 2025, [url](#)





2.2.2. Impact of political transition in Syria on power dynamics in Lebanon

The fall of Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 has been widely celebrated in Lebanon, particularly by members of the far-right Lebanese Forces (LF) party who were critical of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon¹³⁶ that began in 1976 and ended in 2005 following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, for which Syria was widely accused.¹³⁷

However, the fall of the Assad regime was a significant loss for Hezbollah¹³⁸ as it cut off its 'land corridor' with Iran from which it was receiving arms, logistical supplies¹³⁹ and military advisors.¹⁴⁰ For decades, Hezbollah has been a major force in Lebanese politics, spearheading the pro-Syria March 8 Coalition against the anti-Syria March 14 Coalition.¹⁴¹ However, Hezbollah has recently weakened due to the loss of its key leaders,¹⁴² including Hassan Nasrallah, in its war with Israel¹⁴³ and the collapse of its ally, Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria.¹⁴⁴ For more information on Hezbollah, see section [5.1 Hezbollah](#).

Cited by The New Arab news, Ali Rizk, a Beirut-based political and security analyst stated that the fall of Assad 'clearly undermined Hezbollah politically in Lebanon.'¹⁴⁵ The source further noted that the new Syrian government holds an anti-Hezbollah stance, and certain actors within the emerging political landscape of 'New Syria' are deeply hostile toward both the Lebanese Shia group and Tehran.¹⁴⁶ In addition, the collapse of the Syrian regime has created an unstable security environment along the Lebanese-Syrian border, as Israeli airstrikes have weakened Hezbollah, and new militia groups hostile to Hezbollah have taken control of key border crossings, replacing both Syrian forces and Hezbollah militants and further undermining Lebanon's already fragile authority in these areas.¹⁴⁷ On 27 March 2025, Lebanese and Syrian defence ministers signed a Saudi-brokered agreement in Jeddah to enhance border security coordination and address military threats alongside their shared border.¹⁴⁸

¹³⁶ The New Arab, How the fall of Assad regime marks a new chapter for Lebanon, 9 December 2024, [url](#)

¹³⁷ France24, Lebanon marks 20th anniversary of Rafik Hariri's assassination, 14 February 2025, [url](#)

¹³⁸ International Crisis Group, Regional perspectives on the house of Assad's fall, 17 December 2024, [url](#)

¹³⁹ SWP, The fall of the Assad regime: regional and international power shifts, 25 February 2025, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Syria war to have 'massive' effect on Lebanon: US envoy Hochstein, 7 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴⁰ BBC, End of Assad rule will reshape region's balance of power, 8 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴¹ Geopolitical Monitor, The Post-Nasrallah Era: A Seismic Shift in Lebanon's Politics, Geopolitical Monitor, 5 November 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴² Al Jazeera, Is Hezbollah weakened as Lebanon shifts towards new governance?, 21 January 2025, [url](#)

¹⁴³ AP, Israel strikes Hezbollah in a huge blast targeting the militant group's leader, 28 September 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴⁴ IRIS, The Fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria: What Are the Consequences for Iran?, 11 December 2024, [url](#); Maddox B, The fall of President Bashar al-Assad is a blow to Iran and Russia – and a boost for Turkey, Chatham House, 8 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴⁵ The New Arab, Could Lebanese-Syrian relations move past Assad, Hezbollah era grievances?, 28 February 2025, [url](#)

¹⁴⁶ The New Arab, Could Lebanese-Syrian relations move past Assad, Hezbollah era grievances?, 28 February 2025, [url](#)

¹⁴⁷ Diwan, Pushing back against Hezbollah, 21 February 2025, [url](#)

¹⁴⁸ L'Orient Today, Lebanon and Syria reach key agreement on border security, 28 March 2025, [url](#)



2.3. Socio-economic situation

2.3.1. Overview of the economic crisis since October 2019

Lebanon's economic and financial crisis, which had been developing before October 2019, coincided with the protests that began in that month,¹⁴⁹ and has since been compounded by political divisions and the depreciation of the national currency.¹⁵⁰ The country's financial system has faced significant upheaval, marked by debt defaults, inflation, and a collapsing exchange-rate framework that continue to fuel unstable macroeconomic dynamics.¹⁵¹ In addition, due to years of financial mismanagement and corruption, the economy was further exacerbated by the 2020 Beirut port explosion, the Covid-19 pandemic, and regional instability following the war in Gaza.¹⁵²

2.3.2. Current state of the economy

Lebanon's economy, already strained by years of crisis, was further destabilised¹⁵³ by the war between Israel and Hezbollah, which began in October 2023¹⁵⁴ and ended in November 2024¹⁵⁵ following a ceasefire.¹⁵⁶ The conflict caused an estimated economic loss of USD 7.2 billion, primarily impacting commerce, industry, tourism, agriculture, food security, housing, healthcare, energy, and education.¹⁵⁷ This added to Lebanon's triple crisis in its banking sector, economy, and currency, further deepening destruction and uncertainty.¹⁵⁸ Israeli airstrikes across Lebanon further intensified the country's economic crisis.¹⁵⁹

The transitional government faced significant challenges¹⁶⁰ in managing reconstruction, which was estimated to require USD 11 billion.¹⁶¹ Prime Minister Salam pledged to revive the economy

¹⁴⁹ CFR, Conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon, 30 January 2025, [url](#); Al Jazeera, What's happening with Lebanon's economy and will it recover?, 10 March 2025, [url](#)

¹⁵⁰ CIDOB, Lebanon: Financial crisis or national collapse?, June 2022, [url](#)

¹⁵¹ Cherqaoui, S.,, Navigating Lebanon's Financial Collapse, Dollarization, Banking Dysfunction, and the Road to Recovery, ACRPS, 4 November 2024, [url](#), p. 1

¹⁵² Financial Times, Lebanon's economy had been in crisis. Then Israel invaded, 26 November 2024, [url](#); Cherqaoui, S.,, Navigating Lebanon's Financial Collapse, Dollarization, Banking Dysfunction, and the Road to Recovery, ACRPS, 4 November 2024, [url](#), p. 1

¹⁵³ Le Figaro, L'économie libanaise s'enfonce un peu plus dans le chaos, 28 September 2024, [url](#); TIMEP, Priced Out of Recovery: Lebanon Between War and Reconstruction, 24 April 2025, [url](#)

¹⁵⁴ BBC, What is Hezbollah and why has it been fighting Israel in Lebanon?, 14 February 2025, [url](#)

¹⁵⁵ Ya Lebanon, Lebanon needs \$11 bn for reconstruction and recovery from Israel war: World Bank estimates, 8 March 2025, [url](#)

¹⁵⁶ World Bank, January 2025, Global Economic Prospects, 5 January 2025, [url](#), p. 77

¹⁵⁷ World Bank, Lebanon Rapid Damage and Needs Assessments (RDNA), March 2025, 7 March 2025, [url](#), p. 20

¹⁵⁸ Al Jazeera, What's happening with Lebanon's economy and will it recover?, 10 March 2025, [url](#)

¹⁵⁹ HRW, Lebanon, events of 2024, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

¹⁶⁰ The Washington Institute, Lebanon's New Government May Walk a Thin Line Between Promises and Compromises, 12 February 2025, [url](#); World Bank, Lebanon Rapid Damage and Needs Assessments (RDNA), March 2025, 7 March 2025, [url](#)

¹⁶¹ World Bank, Lebanon Rapid Damage and Needs Assessments (RDNA), March 2025, 7 March 2025, [url](#), p. 9



and implemented reforms,¹⁶² however, the socio-economic situation continued to worsen due to political stalemate and ongoing economic deterioration.¹⁶³

As of 23 October 2024, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) reported severe economic contraction, rising poverty, and worsening public services amidst escalating hostilities.¹⁶⁴ In 2024, Lebanon's real GDP had declined by an estimated 7.1 %, marking a cumulative contraction of nearly 40 % since 2019.¹⁶⁵

The September 2024 escalation of conflict in Lebanon displaced thousands and further deepened the country's prolonged socio-economic crisis.¹⁶⁶

By May 2025, public services in Southern Lebanon, Baalbek-EI Hermel, and Bekaa were under severe strain. Widespread damage to healthcare, water, sanitation, electricity, and education systems created major service gaps affecting hundreds of thousands of people, particularly returnees and displaced households, and the situation was worsened by funding shortages and the limited capacity of local authorities and humanitarian organisations.¹⁶⁷

(a) Poverty, basic substance and employment

Lebanon faced severe economic challenges even before the recent escalation of hostilities, with widespread poverty and food insecurity already entrenched.¹⁶⁸ The 2024 war further worsened Lebanon's labour market, which was constrained by limited economic transformation, weak job creation, widespread informality, and poor-quality employment, with 29.6 % unemployment, 50.1 % labour underutilisation, 47.8 % youth unemployment, and 62.4 % of the workforce in informal, low-wage jobs without protection.¹⁶⁹

Access to basic services was severely limited for people who faced poverty and food insecurity, while ongoing Israeli attacks have significantly worsened these vulnerabilities.¹⁷⁰ The sharp depreciation of the Lebanese pound combined with high inflation has further eroded purchasing power and driven many Lebanese into poverty.¹⁷¹

The conflict deepened these vulnerabilities by devastating agriculture, infrastructure, and businesses, destroying farmland and irrigation systems in the south, and pushing unemployment higher, leaving an estimated 689 000 workers across the hardest-hit sectors of agriculture, construction, manufacturing, transport and storage, arts and entertainment,

¹⁶² AP, War-torn Lebanon forms its first government in over 2 years to end deadlock, 8 February 2025, [url](#)

¹⁶³ WFP, Lebanon, Annual country report 2025, 27 March 2025, [url](#), p. 9

¹⁶⁴ UNDP, UN Development Programme warns of socio-economic crisis in Lebanon amidst escalation of hostilities, 23 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁶⁵ World Bank, Lebanon, 10 April 2025, [url](#)

¹⁶⁶ WFP, Lebanon, information observed on 20 May 2025, [url](#)

¹⁶⁷ IPC, Lebanon, IPC acute food insecurity analysis, April 2025 – October 2025, 21 May 2025, [url](#), p. 9

¹⁶⁸ World Bank, Lebanon Rapid Damage and Needs Assessments (RDNA), March 2025, 7 March 2025, [url](#), p. 24

¹⁶⁹ UNDP, The socioeconomic impacts of the 2024 war on Lebanon, 23 July 2025, [url](#), p. 42

¹⁷⁰ EC, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, Lebanon, 22 May 2025, [url](#)

¹⁷¹ EC, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, Lebanon, 22 May 2025, [url](#)





accommodation and food services, and wholesale and retail trade facing job and income losses, with men disproportionately affected at 584 000 compared to 104 000 women.¹⁷²

Prior to the conflict, tourism accounted for 8.6 % of GDP and around 4.4 % of total employment, but the sector has since suffered major economic losses due to reduced revenues, rising operational costs, and job cuts. The municipal and public services sector also recorded an estimated USD 192 million in losses, including USD 1.8 million linked to expected job losses among contractors and daily workers, as many facilities stopped operating.¹⁷³

(b) Food security

Ongoing political stalemate and a deteriorating economy have further increased food insecurity in the country.¹⁷⁴ The September 2024 escalation of the conflict in Lebanon further deepened poverty, which has more than tripled over the past decade, reaching 44 % of the population.¹⁷⁵ As of May 2025, agricultural degradation in Lebanon's southern Governorates has been severe, as conflict has heavily disrupted production activities, particularly in rural areas reliant on agriculture; damage to essential infrastructure, restricted access to inputs, and interruptions to farming cycles have led to sharply reduced crop yields, undermining local food availability, market supply, and household income.¹⁷⁶ Food security has deteriorated further due to reduced agricultural output, price inflation, and disrupted supply chains, with damage to farmland and assets reported in 130 municipalities, cereal production falling 40 % below average, nearly one-quarter of the Lebanese population showing poor food consumption.¹⁷⁷ As of 21 July 2025, 2.7 million people in Lebanon were in need of food assistance,¹⁷⁸ with 1.2 million people facing high level of acute food insecurity despite the ceasefire.¹⁷⁹

(c) Housing

Following Israeli military operations, around 40 % of buildings in southern Lebanon's border region have been destroyed by Israeli bomb attacks,¹⁸⁰ representing an estimated 100 000 housing units that were partially or fully destroyed,¹⁸¹ with towns such as Kfar Kila and Aita al-Shaab experiencing approximately 66 % destruction, while Dhaira, Odaisseh, Ramieh, Teir Harfa, and Yarine have around 40 % of their buildings damaged or destroyed, leaving many areas uninhabitable, displacing hundreds of thousands of residents, and preventing thousands

¹⁷² UNDP, The socioeconomic impacts of the 2024 war on Lebanon, 23 July 2025, [url](#), p. 42

¹⁷³ World Bank, Lebanon Rapid Damage and Needs Assessments (RDNA), March 2025, 7 March 2025, [url](#), pp. 29, 44

¹⁷⁴ WFP, Lebanon, Annual country report 2025, 27 March 2025, [url](#), p. 9

¹⁷⁵ WFP, Lebanon, information observed on 20 May 2025, [url](#)

¹⁷⁶ IPC, Lebanon, IPC acute food insecurity analysis, April 2025 – October 2025, 21 May 2025, [url](#), p. 2

¹⁷⁷ UN OCHA, Flash Appeal, Lebanon, covering period January-March 2025, January 2025, [url](#), p. 6

¹⁷⁸ WFP, Lebanon, information observed on 21 July 2025, [url](#)

¹⁷⁹ IPC, Lebanon, IPC acute food insecurity analysis, April 2025 – October 2025, 21 May 2025, [url](#), p. 1

¹⁸⁰ Le Monde, In Maps: Satellite imagery reveals massive destruction in southern Lebanon, 29 November 2024, [url](#)

¹⁸¹ World Bank, New World Bank Report Assesses Impact of Conflict on Lebanon's Economy and Key Sectors, 14 November 2024, [url](#)





of Lebanese from returning to their homes.¹⁸² Citing local media in Lebanon, Anadolu Ajansı, the Turkish state-run news agency, reported in November 2024 that ‘The Israeli army has erased 37 towns and destroyed more than 40,000 housing units since the start of its deadly offensive on Lebanon last year’.¹⁸³ By September 2024, at the early stage of the war, Israeli attacks had damaged or destroyed over 23 000 homes, carried out over 5 600 strikes that devastated 1 200 hectares of farmland.¹⁸⁴ According to Amnesty International, between 1 October 2024 and 26 January 2025, Israeli strikes destroyed or severely damaged thousands of civilian structures across areas from the southern border to the Bekaa Valley and Beirut, affecting at least 26 municipalities in southern Lebanon, with much of the damage occurring after the 27 November 2024 ceasefire.¹⁸⁵ For more information, see section [6.4 Impact on civilian population and infrastructure](#).

(d) Healthcare

Prior to the recent conflict, Lebanon’s healthcare system was hospital-centric, largely privatised, and fragmented. According to World Bank data, only 32 out of 160 hospitals were public, and 311 primary healthcare centres were primarily private. Households experienced high health expenditures, dominated by out-of-pocket and private insurance spending, inequitable access to care due to governance fragmentation, and a decreasing medical workforce as well as deteriorating service delivery. Data from 2021 indicated that the situation had left 33 % of households deprived of essential healthcare.¹⁸⁶

Amid the recent conflict between Lebanon and Israel, reports have emerged of the destruction of healthcare facilities.¹⁸⁷ According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), between 7 October 2023 and 21 November 2024, there were 137 documented attacks on healthcare facilities in Lebanon, resulting in 65 incidents (47 %) with at least one fatality,¹⁸⁸ while a UN Security Council report of 12 March 2025 indicated that between 8 October 2023 and 20 February 2025, at least 160 healthcare facilities in the country were impacted by air strikes, resulting in 241 health workers killed and 295 injured while on duty, with three hospitals and 26 primary healthcare centres remaining affected.¹⁸⁹ In southern Lebanon, 17 air strikes were recorded in 2024, resulting in 20 aid worker deaths, according to the Aid Worker Security Database.¹⁹⁰

The conflict has caused an estimated USD 208 million in damage to Lebanon’s health sector with 885 assets having been destroyed or partially damaged, including the complete

¹⁸² UNDP, From Crisis to Recovery: Local Authorities Confronting Post-War Realities in Lebanon, Rapid Impact Assessment, UNDP Lebanon, January 2025, 21 January 2025, [url](#)

¹⁸³ AA, Israel destroys 37 towns, over 40,000 houses in deadly onslaught on Lebanon, 5 November 2024, [url](#)

¹⁸⁴ ESCWA, The multidimensional impact of Israeli attacks on Lebanon, 30 September 2024, [url](#)

¹⁸⁵ AI, Israel’s extensive destruction of Southern Lebanon, 26 August 2025, [url](#)

¹⁸⁶ World Bank, Lebanon Rapid Damage and Needs Assessments (RDNA), March 2025, 7 March 2025, [url](#), p. 39

¹⁸⁷ WHO, Lebanon: A conflict particularly destructive to health care, 22 November 2024, [url](#)

¹⁸⁸ WHO, Lebanon: A conflict particularly destructive to health care, 22 November 2024, [url](#); UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, report of the Secretary-General, 12 March 2025, [url](#), para. 61; World Bank, Lebanon Rapid Damage and Needs Assessments (RDNA), March 2025, 7 March 2025, [url](#), p. 39

¹⁸⁹ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, report of the Secretary-General, 12 March 2025, [url](#), para. 61

¹⁹⁰ AWSO, Major attacks in 2024, information observed on 7 October 2025, [url](#)



destruction of 121 dental clinics, 60 pharmacies, 34 social development centres, and one hospital. Moreover, 39 hospitals were partially damaged, impacting 33 % of the baseline. Al Nabatieh Governorate was the most affected with damages estimated to USD 85 million, followed by South (USD 39 million) and Baalbek-Hermel (USD 34 million). The districts with the highest facility damage included Marjaayoun (USD 37 million), Baabda (USD 32 million), and Tyre (USD 27 million).¹⁹¹

As of 23 September 2025, according to Doctors Without Borders (MSF), many damaged hospitals and primary healthcare facilities in southern Lebanon remain closed, and many still need rehabilitation.¹⁹²

3. Legal system and the judiciary

3.1. Judicial system

Lebanon's legal system is based on civil law rooted in the Roman legal tradition, with the judiciary operating under codified civil and criminal procedural laws and legal processes conducted mainly through written submissions,¹⁹³ in a centralised judicial system composed primarily of ordinary courts organised in three levels, which handle both civil and criminal matters, alongside separate administrative and specialised courts.¹⁹⁴

Lebanon's judiciary includes the Court of Cassation (*Mahkamat al-Tamyiz*), Courts of Appeal (*Mahakim al-Istinaf*), Civil Courts (*Al-Mahakim al-Madaniyya*), Criminal Courts (*Al-Mahakim al-Jazaiyya*), Religious Courts (*Al-Mahakim al-Shariyya*), the State Council (*Majlis Shura al-Dawla*), the Military Court (*Al-Mahkama al-Askariyya*), and the Labor Arbitration Council (*Majlis al-Amal al-Tahkim*).¹⁹⁵

Although Lebanon lacks court-administered alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, arbitration remains the sole officially recognised method, governed by the Civil Procedure Law, which empowers courts to appoint arbitrators when parties fail to agree and grants them exclusive authority to enforce or annul arbitral awards.¹⁹⁶ Mediation in Lebanon is governed by two laws: Judicial Mediation under Law 82 of 2018 allows courts to refer civil and commercial disputes to mediation with the parties' consent but excludes cases related to personal status, criminal matters, bankruptcy, and inheritance; Conventional Mediation under Law 286 of 2022 enables parties to voluntarily choose mediators outside of court, with both frameworks

¹⁹¹ World Bank, Lebanon Rapid Damage and Needs Assessments (RDNA), March 2025, 7 March 2025, [url](#), p. 39

¹⁹² MSF, Lebanon one year on: Uncertainty and growing needs, 23 September 2025, [url](#)

¹⁹³ Obeid & Partners, Litigation 2025, Lebanon, 3 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁹⁴ Obeid & Partners, Litigation 2025, Lebanon, 3 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁹⁵ Gherbal Initiative, دليل المواطن للقضاء اللبناني [Citizen's Guide to the Lebanese Judiciary], information observed on 8 October 2025, [url](#); Lebanon, Ministry of Justice, Lebanon courts, information observed on 8 October 2025, [url](#)

¹⁹⁶ Feghali, G, Lebanon, Weinstein International Foundation, 2 April 2024, [url](#)



requiring neutrality and confidentiality.¹⁹⁷ No other source could be found to corroborate this information within the time constraints of this report.

The Court of Cassation serves as the highest judicial authority,¹⁹⁸ where decisions from the Courts of Appeal may be contested. Below it are the Courts of Appeal, which function as second-level appellate courts, and beneath them are the first-instance Civil Courts, which have jurisdiction over civil matters.¹⁹⁹ There are also Administrative Courts, where the State Council (known as the *Majlis al Shura* in Arabic and *Conseil d'Etat* in French²⁰⁰) is Lebanon's highest administrative court.²⁰¹

In addition, there are various specialised courts, including religious courts, which deal with matters within their specific areas such as personal status, and military courts.²⁰² Freedom House observed that military courts in Lebanon have assumed jurisdiction not only in cases concerning alleged espionage and militancy but also in proceedings involving human rights activists and protesters.²⁰³

Criminal Courts act as both trial and appellate courts for felonies and misdemeanours.²⁰⁴ For more information on Criminal Courts, see section [3.1.2 Criminal law and courts](#).

In addition, the Constitutional Council examines matters related to elections and the constitutionality of laws, and the Commercial Courts are responsible for commercial disputes.²⁰⁵

The Supreme Judicial Council,²⁰⁶ also known as the High Judicial Council (HJC),²⁰⁷ is presided by the First President of the Court of Cassation or Chief Justice,²⁰⁸ and is mandated to appoint and train all judges in Lebanon.²⁰⁹

The HJC is an independent and self-governing judicial body and is responsible for overseeing the selection, appointment, transfer, promotion, and disciplinary proceedings of judges and prosecutors.²¹⁰ In recent years, Lebanon's judiciary has faced challenges to its independence due to political influence, official complaints from senior officials, and criticism of judges through social and mainstream media.²¹¹ In July 2025, Lebanon's parliament adopted a new law on judicial independence, which Human Rights Watch considers a positive step for

¹⁹⁷ LG, Alternative dispute resolution law at Lebanon, 13 May 2025, [url](#)

¹⁹⁸ Eid Jreissati, L., Introducing the Lebanese legal system and research, Globalex, NYU, Law, March/April 2025, [url](#); SALAH Mattar Law Firm, Lebanon Legal System, n.d., [url](#)

¹⁹⁹ Eid Jreissati, L., Introducing the Lebanese legal system and research, Globalex, NYU, Law, March/April 2025, [url](#)

²⁰⁰ Eid Jreissati, L., Introducing the Lebanese legal system and research, Globalex, NYU, Law, March/April 2025, [url](#); TIMEP, Towards an independent judicial branch in Lebanon? Part 2: The Administrative Judiciary, 26 October 2021, [url](#)

²⁰¹ AI, Lebanon: Landmark Shura Council decision must mark a turning point in ending impunity for torture, 12 March 2025, [url](#)

²⁰² Obeid & Partners, Litigation 2025, Lebanon, 3 December 2024, [url](#)

²⁰³ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section F2

²⁰⁴ Eid Jreissati, L., Introducing the Lebanese legal system and research, Globalex, NYU, Law, March/April 2025, [url](#)

²⁰⁵ Eid Jreissati, L., Introducing the Lebanese legal system and research, Globalex, NYU, Law, March/April 2025, [url](#)

²⁰⁶ NNA, Three new members of Supreme Judicial Council take oath before president Aoun at Baabda Palace, 30 May 2025, [url](#); The Legal Agenda, The government's first bill on the path to judicial reform: positive, negatives, and recommendations for improvement, 25 May 2025, [url](#)

²⁰⁷ RRRF, Functional review of the justice system in Lebanon, December 2023, [url](#), p. 5

²⁰⁸ SALAH Mattar Law Firm, Lebanon Legal System, n.d., [url](#)

²⁰⁹ Eid Jreissati, L., Introducing the Lebanese legal system and research, Globalex, NYU, Law, March/April 2025, [url](#)

²¹⁰ RRRF, Functional review of the justice system in Lebanon, December 2023, [url](#), p. 5

²¹¹ BTI, BTI 2024 Country Report, Lebanon, 19 March 2024, [url](#), pp. 12-14



enhancing judicial self-governance, but notes that it still falls short of fully safeguarding the HJC's autonomy and limiting executive influence.²¹² The HJC welcomed the law, noting that some provisions strengthen judicial independence, while others continue to fall short of fully safeguarding the judiciary.²¹³

3.1.1. Personal Status Law and courts

In Lebanon, the applicable Personal Status Law is determined by religious affiliation rather than a unified civil code, with 15 separate legal frameworks applied across the 18 officially recognised sects,²¹⁴ administered by religious courts representing 12 Christian, 4 Muslim, 1 Druze, and 1 Jewish community.²¹⁵ The absence of a unified civil code and the reliance on several separate religious personal status laws created a fragmented legal system that limits rights, fosters inequality, and forced some Lebanese, particularly minorities and unrecognised groups, to seek legal solutions abroad, especially for marriage and related personal matters.²¹⁶

Personal status courts handle matters such as marriage, divorce, and child custody for members of their own religious communities.²¹⁷ However, criminal matters arising in this context, including serious offences such as murder, terrorism, rape, drug trafficking, corruption, and organised crime, as well as other offences such as theft, assault and public disorder, are handled under secular criminal law, regardless of the individual's religious affiliation.²¹⁸

The Islamic personal status law is primarily applied²¹⁹ through Sharia Courts, which operate under distinct Sunni and Shia jurisdictions, while Christian and Jewish personal status matters are handled by Ecclesiastical Courts, divided into various denominational branches.²²⁰

Judges are appointed and supervised by the respective religious institutions, enjoying wide discretion within their specialised mandates. This fragmented court system entrenches disparities, leaving citizens subject to different rules and protections depending on their sectarian affiliation.²²¹ Consequently, differences in treatment can arise due to the overlap of religion and gender, particularly in areas such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody.²²²

Members of non-recognised religious groups often face legal obstacles, as they cannot access courts aligned with their beliefs and must navigate systems not designed for them.²²³

²¹² HRW, Lebanon: Judicial Reforms Positive, But Fall Short, 15 August 2025, [url](#)

²¹³ This is Beirut, HJC Backs Judicial Law but Warns of Gaps, 12 August 2025, [url](#)

²¹⁴ EUROMED Rights, Recognition of a civil marriage contracted remotely, a Lebanese court ruling sets a new legal precedent, 17 June 2025, [url](#);

²¹⁵ WLP, Family laws of Lebanon (documents, Arabic), 15 July 2019, [url](#)

²¹⁶ JLIFLC, The rights of religious minorities in Lebanon, 5 February 2025, [url](#), p. 34

²¹⁷ Eid Jreissati, L., Introducing the Lebanese legal system and research, Globalex, NYU, Law, March/April 2025, [url](#)

²¹⁸ LG, Criminal law Lebanon, 5 March 2025, [url](#)

²¹⁹ Obeid & Partners, Litigation 2025, Lebanon, , 3 December 2024, [url](#); SALAH Mattar Law Firm, Lebanon Legal System, n.d., [url](#)

²²⁰ Eid Jreissati, L., Introducing the Lebanese legal system and research, Globalex, NYU, Law, March/April 2025, [url](#); SALAH Mattar Law Firm, Lebanon Legal System, n.d., [url](#)

²²¹ JLIFLC, The rights of religious minorities in Lebanon, 5 February 2025, [url](#), p. 34

²²² BTI, BTI 2024 Country Report, Lebanon, 19 March 2024, [url](#), p. 8

²²³ JLIFLC, The rights of religious minorities in Lebanon, 5 February 2025, [url](#), p. 34



Although the Lebanese Constitution calls for replacing sectarian representation in public service and the judiciary with a merit-based system, appointments in the Lebanese judiciary continue to be shaped by religious power-sharing arrangements.²²⁴ Daher stated, in an interview with the EUAA, that ‘loyalty to one’s religious community often takes precedence over loyalty to the state’.²²⁵

3.1.2. Criminal law and courts

Criminal law in Lebanon is based on a civil law framework, influenced by French legal traditions and elements of Islamic jurisprudence in certain areas. The legal system is founded on the Lebanese Penal Code, originally enacted in 1943 and subsequently amended on multiple occasions.²²⁶

According to the Gherbal Initiative, a Lebanese nonprofit organisation, in Lebanon, each Governorate headquarters hosts one or more criminal courts, composed of a president and two consultants. Sessions are held in the presence of the Public Prosecutor (or Attorney General) and a court clerk.²²⁷ Lebanon’s judicial system includes ordinary criminal courts from the Penal Single Judge to the Court of Cassation, as well as special courts such as the Judicial Council and the Juvenile Court, each with defined jurisdictions under specific legal frameworks.²²⁸

In Lebanon, criminal cases are filed in courts based on the location of the crime, the defendant’s residence, or the location of the defendant’s arrest.²²⁹ Offences are classified as felonies and misdemeanours under the Penal Code, and penalties range from fines and short-term imprisonment for minor crimes such as theft (*sariqa*) and assault (*zar‘ al-‘udwān*) to long-term imprisonment or, rarely, the death penalty for serious crimes such as murder (*qatl*), rape (*iznā*), terrorism, drug trafficking, corruption, or organised crime.²³⁰

3.1.3. Access to justice

The Lebanese legal system recognises equal access to justice and courts, including legal aid for those lacking financial means.²³¹ In civil cases, applicants must demonstrate poverty through a statement from the local authorities and a tax notice, while in criminal cases it can be granted by a judge, and managed by the Beirut and Tripoli Bar Associations, who handle funds for legal aid and assign lawyers to represent applicants, since the state does not contribute to legal aid.²³²

During detention or arrest, the accused person is granted the right to contact a family member, an employer, a lawyer of their choice, or an acquaintance; to hire a sworn translator if

²²⁴ RRRF, Functional review of the justice system in Lebanon, December 2023, [url](#), p. 5

²²⁵ Daher A., online interview 13 August 2025, and email communication 22 August 2025

²²⁶ LG, Criminal law Lebanon, 5 March 2025, [url](#)

²²⁷ Gherbal Initiative, Criminal Courts, definition, information observed on 4 September 2025, [url](#)

²²⁸ Lebanon, Republic of Lebanon, Ministry of Justice, information observed on 22 July 2025, [url](#)

²²⁹ Obeid & Partners, Litigation 2025, Lebanon, , 3 December 2024, [url](#)

²³⁰ LG, Criminal law in Lebanon, 5 May 2025, [url](#)

²³¹ Razai, S,, Legal aid and access to justice in Lebanon, IEDJA, May 2018, [url](#)

²³² RRRF, Functional review of the justice system in Lebanon, December 2023, [url](#), p. 16





they do not understand Arabic; and the right to request, directly or through a representative or family member that the Public Prosecutor refer them for a medical examination.²³³

Individuals in Lebanon can report a crime to a local police station²³⁴ or go directly to the public prosecutor's office, the body responsible for receiving complaints and initiating investigations.²³⁵

In an interview with the EUAA, Daher stated that 'the deeply embedded system of sectarian loyalty [in Lebanon] undermines the authority of central state institutions, including the judiciary, whose powers are regularly overshadowed by the influence of sectarian leaders',²³⁶ which Freedom House similarly described as lacking independence, with political leaders exerting significant influence over judicial appointments, decisions, and processes.²³⁷ Access to justice for the poorest and most marginalised populations in Lebanon has been severely undermined by several factors, including political and economic crisis, widespread corruption, and an inadequate legal framework.²³⁸

According to the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, corruption within Lebanon's courts, such as bribery and outside interference, has become part of the daily routine, a problem that has worsened since the economic collapse, and further eroded public trust in the judiciary.²³⁹

Lebanon's legal system remains in deep crisis, with poorly paid judges, frequent court closures due to power outages, lack of basic resources, delayed trials, and blocked politically sensitive investigations, all of which undermine access to justice and public confidence.²⁴⁰ In addition, prison conditions in Lebanon remain dire, with severe overcrowding, inadequate food, and limited access to healthcare, particularly affecting pretrial detainees.²⁴¹

²³³ Gherbal Initiative, Administrative Judiciary Guide, Criminal Judiciary, rights of the accused, information observed on 4 September 2025, [url](#); NHRC-CPT, Monitoring human rights violations in places of detention in Lebanon: deprivation of everything, 16 August 2024, [url](#)

²³⁴ Lebanon, Lebanon Police, How do I report a crime or suspicious activity, information observed on 8 October 2025, [url](#)

²³⁵ Akoum J, Loutfi J, Abou Samra R, The role of public prosecutor in the Lebanese legal system, DPCE Online, 12 April 2024, [url](#)

²³⁶ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

²³⁷ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025, Lebanon, 2025, [url](#),

²³⁸ LAW, Lebanon, history and overview, the context in the country, information observed on 21 July 2025, [url](#); RRRF, Functional review of the justice system in Lebanon, December 2023, [url](#), p. 5

²³⁹ TIMEP, The Cost of Collapse: Lebanon's judiciary under economic strain, 28 July 2025, [url](#)

²⁴⁰ LIBNANEWS, La crise des ressources de la justice libanaise : un système à bout de souffle, 16 December 2024, [url](#)

²⁴¹ HRW, Lebanon : Harrowing Prison conditions, 23 August 2023, [url](#); AI, Lebanon: Sharp increase of deaths in custody must be a wake-up call for authorities, 7 June 2023, [url](#)





4. Security institutions

4.1. Lebanese Armed Forces

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), is an all-volunteer conventional military²⁴² with conscription abolished in 2007.²⁴³ It consists of the Army Command, Navy, Air Force, Special Units, and Ground Forces.²⁴⁴ Personnel is recruited from across Lebanon's various confessional communities.²⁴⁵ The LAF is estimated to number approximately 80 000 personnel,²⁴⁶ of these, around 5 000 troops have been deployed to southern Lebanon,²⁴⁷ with further redeployment to the south of the Litani River as of 27 November 2024.²⁴⁸ On 13 March 2025, Lebanon's Cabinet approved the enlistment of 4 500 additional soldiers in three phases to strengthen the LAF in the south; by 20 June 2025, 1 341 of the first 1 500 had been deployed south of the Litani River, bringing the total LAF personnel there to 7 522 across 116 geographical positions.²⁴⁹

While the LAF is formally responsible for maintaining security across the country, it continues to face major challenges due to chronic underfunding and limited manpower.²⁵⁰

While Lebanon's military spending increased by 58 % in 2024, to USD 635 million,²⁵¹ the LAF remained poorly equipped and heavily reliant on outdated weapons and ammunition provided by the United States and other Western countries.²⁵² The LAF has limited operational capabilities, with roughly 200 tanks, over 600 armoured vehicles, 32 additional armoured vehicles delivered between 2018 and 2021, and a modest air force with around 5 fixed-wing aircraft, 30 helicopters, and a few reconnaissance drones, a navy of nearly 70 vessels focused on coastal and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) security, and specialised units such as marine commandos.²⁵³ It also lacks aircraft defence and fighter jets and does not have a proper 'mandate from the government to take over the defence of the country' according to a Sergeant of the LAF, as cited by EL PAÍS, a Spanish newspaper.²⁵⁴

Daher stated, in an interview with the EUAA, that 'the deeply embedded system of sectarian loyalty undermines the authority of the army and the police, whose powers are regularly

²⁴² CFR, What is Hezbollah?, 29 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁴³ L'Orient Today, Parliamentary committee gives green light to draft military conscription bill, 8 July 2025, [url](#)

²⁴⁴ Lebanon, The official website of the Lebanese army, structure, information observed on 11 July 2025, [url](#);

²⁴⁵ CFR, What is Hezbollah?, 29 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁴⁶ Financial Times, Lebanon's army stays on sidelines as Israel and Hezbollah clash, 13 October 2024, [url](#); This is Beirut, Disarming Hezbollah: The Lebanese army challenge, 5 September 2025, [url](#)

²⁴⁷ Arab News, As Hezbollah and Israel battle on the border, Lebanon's army watches from the sidelines, 13 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁴⁸ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, report of the Secretary-General, 12 March 2025, [url](#), para. 18

²⁴⁹ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025, report of the Secretary-General, S/2025/460, 11 July 2025, [url](#), para. 18

²⁵⁰ LIBANEWS, Sécurité au Liban : vers un chaos généralisé?, 31 January 2025, [url](#)

²⁵¹ SIPRI, Fact sheet, April 2025, Trends in world military expenditure, 2024, 28 April 2025, [url](#), p. 11

²⁵² BBC, Quel est le rôle du Hezbollah au Liban ?, 30 September 2024, [url](#)

²⁵³ This is Beirut, Disarming Hezbollah: The Lebanese army challenge, 5 September 2025, [url](#)

²⁵⁴ EL PAÍS, Lebanese army seeks to vindicate itself between Israel's sword and Hezbollah's wall, 12 November 2024, [url](#)



overshadowed by the influence of sectarian leaders'.²⁵⁵ Similarly, Lebanese Journalist, Hala Nasreddine, reported that the Lebanese Army's absence from clashes between Hezbollah and Israeli forces reflects structural weaknesses rooted in sectarian power-sharing, with army's leadership divided along confessional lines.²⁵⁶

The LAF also faces deteriorating infrastructure and logistical and communication gaps.²⁵⁷ According to Daher, 'the LAF has never been capable of fully defending Lebanon's territory. She attributed this to the confessional system, in which power is divided along sectarian lines, limiting the army's mandate and cohesion.'²⁵⁸ Daher further described that 'the LAF is composed of officers and soldiers from different sectarian and ideological backgrounds; some within the army support Hezbollah, while others oppose it, yet this does not prevent coexistence in the field'.²⁵⁹

In contrast, Rym Momtaz, editor in chief of Strategic Europe, noted that despite these structural and funding challenges, the LAF has 'managed to preserve its cohesiveness,' remains 'operationally capable,' and has actively defended southern Lebanon even under fire from Israel, while improving border monitoring and counter-smuggling efforts.²⁶⁰ As Israel's ground invasion intensified, the LAF began 'repositioning' its forces in the south—not as a retreat, but as a strategic move reflecting an army that, though constrained, 'has a chance to find purpose in the aftermath' of the conflict.²⁶¹ According to the President of Lebanon, the LAF 'missions are not limited to maintaining internal security, but also include combating terrorism and drug smuggling, protecting and monitoring the borders, alongside other security missions.'²⁶²

As of 1 April 2025, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the LAF restarted patrolling along the Blue Line²⁶³— the demarcation line established by the United Nations in June 2000 to confirm Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, which runs roughly 120 kilometres along the Lebanese-Israeli border.²⁶⁴ Moreover, as of 3 June 2025, the LAF has taken control of several strategically important border highlands in southern Lebanon previously occupied by non-state armed groups.²⁶⁵ Daher described that 'the central issue is not replacing Hezbollah's territorial presence, but ensuring the defence of Lebanese territory against Israel is carried out under state authority. The government's stated aim is for the LAF, not Hezbollah, to take primary responsibility for this role, since Hezbollah conducts such defence without

²⁵⁵ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

²⁵⁶ Hasreddine H, Lebanese army caught between U.S., Iranian, and Sectarian ties, will it break free?, 21 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁵⁷ LIBNEWS, Précarité et violence : la montée de la criminalité au Liban face à une sécurité en déclin, 24 February 2025, [url](#)

²⁵⁸ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

²⁵⁹ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

²⁶⁰ Momtaz R, Game changing support for Lebanon's army is Europe's best bet, 29 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁶¹ Helou, A, Lebanon's military 'repositioning' itself as Israel invades – but for what? Breaking Defense, 1 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁶² NNA, President Aoun to Senator LaHood: Lebanon awaits Israel's final response to Barak's paper, 23 August 2025, [url](#)

²⁶³ UNIFIL, UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces resume patrolling together along Blue Line, 17 April 2025, [url](#)

²⁶⁴ UNIFIL, UNIFIL background, n.d., [url](#)

²⁶⁵ Libnews, Souveraineté retrouvé : l'armée libanaise s'impose sur les hauteurs du Sud, 3 June 2025, [url](#)



coordinating with the state and acts on its own initiative.²⁶⁶ Accordingly, the LAF has taken steps to assert state control in the south, repositioning its forces to manage defensive responsibilities independently of non-state actors.²⁶⁷

However, on 27 August 2025, the UNIFIL spokesperson stated that the Lebanese Armed Forces did not have the capacity and resources to fully assume responsibility in the south due to the country's financial crisis and the continued presence of Israeli forces inside Lebanon.²⁶⁸ While the country is recovering from the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, the Lebanese Army faces the challenge of extending state authority nationwide, including disarming the Iran-backed militia, that could alter the army's role and Lebanon's balance of power.²⁶⁹ For detailed information on the disarmament process, see section [6.2 Overview of security dynamics related to recent developments with Israel](#).

On 11 September 2025, in correspondence with the EUAA, Lebanon expert Dr. May Maalouf Monneau, who is a political scientist specialised on the Middle East, with a focus on Lebanon, and associate researcher at Mediterranean and Middle East Research and Study Institute (IREMMO), Paris, stated that 'while the LAF is very active in some regions, it struggles to maintain order and faces particular challenges in areas such as the south, where it had been absent for several years.'²⁷⁰ On 16 September 2025, UNIFIL handed over 101 vehicles including SUVs, cargo trucks, water tankers, ambulances and baggage dollies to the Lebanese Armed Forces aiming to enhance LAF mobility, security and operational response capabilities in southern Lebanon.²⁷¹

4.2. Internal Security Forces (ISF)

The Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF), Lebanon's primary national police agency,²⁷² are composed namely of the Beirut police, judicial police, mobile gendarmerie and territorial gendarmerie.²⁷³

As of 2024, the Lebanese police number about 24 500 officials, down from 30 000 before the 2019 crisis, with 500 expected to retire each year.²⁷⁴

During the period between October 2019 to May 2024, over 1 000 ISF members reportedly

²⁶⁶ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

²⁶⁷ Helou, A, Lebanon's military 'repositioning' itself as Israel invades – but for what? Breaking Defense, 1 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁶⁸ UN News, UN peacekeeping mandate in Lebanon faces scrutiny ahead of Security Council vote, 27 August 2025, [url](#)

²⁶⁹ This is Beirut, Disarming Hezbollah: The Lebanese army challenge, 5 September 2025, [url](#)

²⁷⁰ Dr. Maalouf Monneau, M.,, , email communication, 11 September 2025

²⁷¹ UNIFIL, Donation to LAF to reinforce state authority in south Lebanon, 16 September 2025, [url](#)

²⁷² International Crisis Group, Supporting Effective Policing by Lebanon's Embattled Security Agencies, 27 August 2025, [url](#)

²⁷³ Lebanon, Lebanese Internal Security Forces, information observed on 14 July 2025, [url](#)

²⁷⁴ L'Orient Today, ISF's recent recruitment campaign, 13 March 2024, [url](#)



left the service amid declining wages and ‘forcibly renewed contracts’.²⁷⁵

According to the International Crisis Group reporting on August 2025, the ISF face significant challenges in carrying out law enforcement and maintaining public security due to chronic resource shortages, limited budgets, inadequate equipment, frequent political interference undermining impartiality, and the ongoing economic crisis, which impacts its operational capacity.²⁷⁶ Within the ISF, widespread clientelism has further weakened institutional integrity, with recruitment and promotion often tied to political loyalty rather than merit, undermining professionalism and eroding public trust in law enforcement.²⁷⁷

4.3. Intelligence Agencies

Lebanon’s intelligence apparatus is composed of four agencies: the Intelligence Section of the Internal Security Forces (IS-ISF), the General Directorate of General Security (GDGS), the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID), and the State Security Directorate (SSD).²⁷⁸ The functions of the GDSC, among other activities, include collecting and analysing data on political, economic, and social issues in support of government operations, participating in judicial investigations related to internal and external threats to state security, overseeing the development and enforcement of security measures, and combating threats to national security by investigating sabotage, pursuing anarchist militants, and countering the spread of destabilising rumours.²⁷⁹

According to International Crisis Group, Lebanon’s intelligence agencies, including the GDGS and the MID, face significant resource constraints, reduced funding due to the economic crisis, and low public confidence in the security forces, which collectively limit their operational effectiveness.²⁸⁰ No other source could be found to corroborate this information within the time constraints of this report.

²⁷⁵ L’Orient Today, ‘If I come back I’ll be sent to jail’: Why solving ISF desertion problem is complicated, 27 May 2025, [url](#)

²⁷⁶ International Crisis Group, Supporting Effective Policing by Lebanon’s Embattled Security Agencies, 27 August 2025, [url](#)

²⁷⁷ Stedem, K. (2025). Policing for patrons: Clientelism & Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 3 June 2025, [url](#)

²⁷⁸ BOU NADER Ph, Lebanon: One intelligence agency to rule them all, *Centre Thucydide*, November 2017, [url](#), p. 2;

²⁷⁹ Lebanon, General Director of General Security, functions of the general security, information observed on 15 July 2025, [url](#)

²⁸⁰ International Crisis Group, Supporting Effective Policing by Lebanon’s Embattled Security Agencies, 27 August 2025, [url](#)



5. Non-state armed actors and militias

According to Daher, who was interviewed by the EUAA for this report, ‘there are both formal and informal armed groups in Lebanon including political, communal, clan-based, or linked to specific communities, which maintain their own armed capacities’.²⁸¹

Shia armed groups in Lebanon include Hezbollah,²⁸² the Amal movement (which officially announced in early 2024 that it is joining Hezbollah in the fight against Israel), and the Imam Hussein Division.²⁸³ In addition, there are Shia clan militias in Lebanon including the Zaiter, Jaafar, Noun, Jamal, and Rachini clans, who are historically rooted in southern Lebanon bordering Syria.²⁸⁴

According to BBC monitoring report of March 2024, ‘in addition to the two largest Iran-backed Palestinian factions, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which have a presence in southern Lebanon, a number of other lesser known groups have also been involved in attacks against targets in northern Israel and in disputed territory along the frontier’.²⁸⁵ By September 2024, other Palestinian factions, including Al-Fajr forces (the military wing of Jamaa al-Islamiya) and Hamas’s Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, were also operating in Lebanon.²⁸⁶

Daher noted that ‘some Sunni Islamist armed groups operate mainly in Tripoli and along the northern coast, and include former fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL)’.²⁸⁷ The Lebanese army reportedly arrested a commander of ISIL in the country²⁸⁸ and security forces allegedly arrested a group of individuals suspected of links to the group in the southern suburbs of Beirut.²⁸⁹

Adding to these groups, both ISIL and the al-Nusra Front, which is affiliated with Al-Qaeda, have attempted to infiltrate Lebanon, reflecting the enduring ideological and historical link between Al-Qaeda and ISIL despite their current operational separation.²⁹⁰

Furthermore, the LAF reports that the rise of Salafi-Jihadism in Lebanon, intensified by the Syrian conflict and the influx of refugees, has contributed to growing security threats as extremist groups exploit border regions to conduct attacks.²⁹¹

²⁸¹ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

²⁸² BBC, What is Hezbollah and why has it been fighting Israel in Lebanon?, 14 February 2025, [url](#); L’Orient Today, Why Sunni militias are reawakening in southern Lebanon, 13 September 2024, [url](#)

²⁸³ BBC monitoring, Explainer: Who are the armed groups operating in southern Lebanon?, 10 March 2024, [url](#)

²⁸⁴ L’Orient Today, Third day of fighting between Lebanese clans and Syrian forces along the border, 8 February 2025, [url](#)

²⁸⁵ BBC monitoring, Explainer: Who are the armed groups operating in southern Lebanon?, 10 March 2024, [url](#)

²⁸⁶ L’Orient Today, Why Sunni militias are reawakening in southern Lebanon, 13 September 2024, [url](#)

²⁸⁷ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

²⁸⁸ RUDAW, Lebanese army nabs ISIS top commander in the country, 25 June 2025, [url](#)

²⁸⁹ L’Orient Today, Group suspected of links to Islamic State arrested in Beirut’s southern suburbs, 30 June 2025, [url](#)

²⁹⁰ BMZ, The role played by the war in Syria and the influence of Hezbollah, 18 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁹¹ Lebanon, The official website of the Lebanese Army, The Crossroads of Crisis: Terrorism, Refugees, and Public Policy in Lebanon, 10 July 2024, [url](#)





Daher described that ‘major armed groups potentially remain active although most were officially disarmed after the civil war’. (1957-1990)²⁹² According to the United Nations Security Council report of November 2024, no progress was made on the disarmament of armed groups in Lebanon, as Hezbollah and other non-state actors continued to display their military capabilities, including strikes into Israel, with their retention of weapons outside state control in violation of Resolution 1701 (2006) undermining Lebanon’s full sovereignty and authority over its territory.²⁹³ On 11 September 2025, in correspondence with the EUAA for this report, Maalouf Moneau stated that ‘several groups remained armed’ in Lebanon.²⁹⁴ For further information on disarmament of the armed groups in Lebanon, see section [6.2 Overview of security dynamics related to recent developments with Israel](#).

5.1. Hezbollah

Hezbollah (party of God in Arabic) is a political and military group in Lebanon,²⁹⁵ led by Naim Qassem,²⁹⁶ who was appointed on 29 October 2024 as the group’s new secretary-general.²⁹⁷ The group, mainly composed of Shia Muslims, emerged following the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 that shaped the Shia community dynamics in the Middle-East,²⁹⁸ and later after Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982.²⁹⁹ In 1982, Hezbollah was founded by members of the Amal movement with the supervision and training of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).³⁰⁰ Hezbollah officially announced its existence in 1985 for the purpose of ending Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.³⁰¹ Daher stated, in an interview with the EUAA, that ‘Hezbollah also established the Lebanese Brigades to Resist the Israeli Occupation (LBRIO), which includes Sunnis, Christians, and Druze as reservists who assist during confrontations with Israel whenever needed’.³⁰² Founded in November 1997, the LBRIO is also known as the Lebanese Resistance Brigades or *Saraya al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya*.³⁰³ As of 20 October 2024, Hezbollah reportedly claimed having 100 000 fighters³⁰⁴ including its Radwan Force commando, which is operating in southern Lebanon.³⁰⁵ Daher further indicated that ‘women are active in organisational and administrative functions of Hezbollah, notably

²⁹² Daher A., Online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

²⁹³ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2024, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2024/817, 13 November 2024, [url](#), para. 36

²⁹⁴ Dr. Maalouf Monneau, M., email communication, 11 September 2025

²⁹⁵ BBC, What is Hezbollah and why has it been fighting Israel in Lebanon?, 14 February 2025, [url](#); L’Orient Today, Why Sunni militias are reawakening in southern Lebanon, 13 September 2024, [url](#)

²⁹⁶ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, report of the Secretary-General, 12 March 2025, [url](#), paras. 33, 34

²⁹⁷ New York Times, (The), Hezbollah names Naime Qassem as its new leader, 29 October 2024, [url](#); Reuters, Who is Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hezbollah’s new leader?, 30 October 2024, [url](#); Le Monde, Hezbollah’s new leader: Naim Kasseem, the longtime deputy of Hassan Nassrullah, 31 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁹⁸ L’Histoire, Liban, le pays déchiré, June 2025, serial number 530, magazine, p. 40

²⁹⁹ Khatib, L, and Wallace, J., Lebanon’s politics and politicians, Chatham House, 19 December 2022, [url](#)

³⁰⁰ L’Histoire, Liban, le pays déchiré, June 2025, serial number 530, magazine, p. 40

³⁰¹ BBC, Qui dirige le Liban et quel est le pouvoir du Hezbollah?, 20 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁰² Daher A., online interview 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

³⁰³ CTC, Hizb Allah’s Lebanese Resistance Brigades, December 2014, [url](#)

³⁰⁴ BBC, Qui dirige le Liban et quel est le pouvoir du Hezbollah?, 20 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁰⁵ LWJ, Israeli operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah: July 14–20, 2025, 23 July 2025, [url](#)





through the Women's Committee of the party, but they are not deployed in fighting roles and largely remain as backups'.³⁰⁶ Daher stated that 'Hezbollah has a strong presence in certain areas including southern Lebanon, parts of the north-east, and Beirut's southern suburbs'.³⁰⁷ For more information on Hezbollah's territorial control, see section [6.3 Areas controlled by different actors](#).

Lebanon's civil war, which lasted between 1975 and 1990,³⁰⁸ ended with the Taif Agreement, negotiated in Taif, Saudi Arabia.³⁰⁹ Since then, Hezbollah has become a major political and military force, justifying its arms by citing the right to resist Israel.³¹⁰ Daher stated that 'since 2006, Hezbollah has significantly expanded its military capabilities to counter Israel,'³¹¹ and as of 2012, it had been involved over prolonged years in the Syrian civil war, backing the Assad regime and gaining further battlefield experience.³¹² However, regional shifts, the Assad regime's declining capacity, and Iran's economic distress have eroded its ability to sustain its arsenal and overall military readiness.³¹³

While Israel's Prime Minister claimed to have weakened Hezbollah by killing its secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah and several senior commanders³¹⁴ including Ali Karaki, head of the group's southern front, in a 27 September 2024 strike on Hezbollah's central headquarters,³¹⁵ and by 'breaking the Axis of Resistance,'³¹⁶ Hezbollah quickly restructured its command and continued operations near the Lebanon-Israel border, using fortified tunnel networks as part of its military strategy.³¹⁷

On 29 October 2024, the group appointed longtime deputy leader Naim Qassem as its new secretary-general,³¹⁸ who asserted that Hezbollah retains 'thousands of trained fighters capable of holding their ground, with the resources to sustain a prolonged confrontation'³¹⁹ underscoring the group's resilience despite the losses.³²⁰

³⁰⁶ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

³⁰⁷ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

³⁰⁸ LIBNANEWS, Tensions diplomatiques : l'Iran rappelé à l'ordre par le Liban sur fond de débat sur le désarmement, 24 April 2025, [url](#)

³⁰⁹ UN, The Taif agreement, n.d., [url](#), p. 1

³¹⁰ LIBNANEWS, Tensions diplomatiques : l'Iran rappelé à l'ordre par le Liban sur fond de débat sur le désarmement, 24 April 2025, [url](#)

³¹¹ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

³¹² Hage Ali, M, Power Points Defining the Syria-Hezbollah Relationship, Carnegie Middle East Center, 29 March 2019, [url](#); Al Jazeera, The history of conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, 18 September 2024, [url](#)

³¹³ Atlantic Council, What to know about the history (and future) of the Hezbollah disarmament question, 13 August 2025, [url](#)

³¹⁴ L'Orient Today, Eliminating Nasrallah 'broke the Axis of Resistance,' says Benjamin Netanyahu, 28 April 2025, [url](#)

³¹⁵ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2024, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2024/817, 13 November 2024, [url](#), para. 13

³¹⁶ L'Orient Today, Eliminating Nasrallah 'broke the Axis of Resistance,' says Benjamin Netanyahu, 28 April 2025, [url](#)

³¹⁷ Reuters, Hezbollah forges new command for crucial ground war after heavy Israeli blows, 11 October 2024, [url](#)

³¹⁸ New York Times, (The), Hezbollah names Naim Qassem as its new leader, 29 October 2024, [url](#); Reuters, Who is Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hezbollah's new leader?, 30 October 2024, [url](#); Le Monde, Hezbollah's new leader: Naim Kasseem, the longtime deputy of Hassan Nassrullah, 31 October 2024, [url](#)

³¹⁹ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, report of the Secretary-General, 12 March 2025, [url](#), paras. 33, 34

³²⁰ Courier International, Une du jour. Un an après l'attaque aux bipeurs, le Hezbollah met en scène sa résilience, 17 September 2025, [url](#)



Many Lebanese, particularly those who experienced humiliation or personal loss during Israeli occupation (between 1982 and 2000), chose to join the resistance, with some aligning with Hezbollah or affiliated groups like the Lebanese Resistance Brigades, taking on roles in combat, logistics, and intelligence.³²¹ Hezbollah has been recruiting members from within its stronghold in the Shia dominated areas, including in the southern Lebanon region.³²² As of December 2024, Hezbollah has started recruiting ‘new fighters and was trying to find ways to rearm through domestic production and by smuggling materials through Syria’.³²³ However, Daher stated that ‘Hezbollah does not actively recruit members; instead, individuals seek to join, and there are usually more volunteers than available positions. Joining the group and leaving is done on volunteer basis.’³²⁴

Daher further noted that ‘the group’s legitimacy, particularly for its fight against Israel’s occupation and annexation of the south of the country (1978-2000) and continued bombings, alongside the rise of Hassan Nasrallah as a leader (1992-2024), has strengthened recruitment dynamics’.³²⁵ According to an October 2024 study by UMAM Documentation and Research, Hezbollah recruited and indoctrinated children through its 18 Al Mahdi Schools, mosques, *hussainiyas* (Shia religious centres) and *hawzat* (seminaries) in areas under its control.³²⁶ However, Daher stated that ‘Hezbollah does not recruit children, and that Hezbollah leadership has issued fatwas explicitly prohibiting the recruitment of child soldiers’.³²⁷ The source further noted that ‘recruitment is carried out through personal networks and word of mouth, and that there have been isolated cases of Druze and Christians converting in order to join Hezbollah’.³²⁸

Between 15 August and 21 September 2025, Israel reportedly killed at least five Hezbollah members in southern and eastern Lebanon, with the IDF reporting the killing of one Hezbollah member on 22 August 2025, two on 19 September, one on 20 September, and one on 21 September 2025.³²⁹ As of 27 September 2025, Hezbollah is seen as significantly weakened with major losses in leadership, command and control, and external support, yet it continues to resist calls for disarmament while recalibrating its strategy toward smaller tactical operations, political signalling, and efforts to recover influence inside Lebanon, even as pressure grows for its full disarmament.³³⁰ For more information on Hezbollah’s disarmament, see section [6.2 Overview of security dynamics related to recent developments with Israel](#).

³²¹ HEIDI.News, Comment devient-on combattant du Hezbollah?, 3 May 2024, [url](#)

³²² AshSouthern Lebanon: recruitment ground for Hezbollah fighters, 22 May 2024, [url](#)

³²³ Reuters, Exclusive: Lebanon’s Hezbollah aims to rebuild longer term despite Israeli blows, US intel says, 4 December 2024, [url](#)

³²⁴ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

³²⁵ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

³²⁶ UMAM D&R, Hezbollah's Children, Crafting Supporters from the Cradle to the Grave, 20 October 2024, [url](#)

³²⁷ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

³²⁸ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

³²⁹ International Crisis Group, Lebanon, recent developments, information observed on 24 September 2025, [url](#)

³³⁰ Al Jazeera, Analysis: How is Lebanon’s Hezbollah regrouping after war with Israel?, 27 September 2025, [url](#)



5.2. Palestinian factions

According to Daher, ‘Palestinian factions maintain armed groups within Lebanon’s 12 official refugee camps, located across Beirut, north Lebanon, Saida, Tyre, and the Bekaa Valley. These include not only Fatah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but also other smaller factions. Camps have also hosted groups linked to international jihadism, such as Fatah al-Islam, notably involved in the 2007 Nahr al-Bared conflict’.³³¹ These factions maintain an active presence across refugee camps in Lebanon.³³² According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), over many years Palestinian armed factions have engaged in fighting within the camps, sometimes breaching the inviolability of UNRWA premises, as in Ein El Hilweh where schools remained closed for much of 2025.³³³ UNRWA has also highlighted the absence of effective governance, judiciary, and law enforcement structures in these camps.³³⁴ For more information on the camps, see section [6.3 Areas controlled by different actors](#) and for information on the situation of Palestinian refugees in these camps, see section [7.7 Palestinians in Lebanon](#).

As of May 2025, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas agreed to prevent attacks on Israel from Lebanon and remove unauthorised weapons.³³⁵ In correspondence with the EUAA for this report, Maalouf Moneau stated that ‘Palestinian groups remain armed, but the government has begun disarming them through an agreement with the Palestinian Authority’³³⁶ while UNRWA reported that Lebanon, with Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) support, is working to demilitarise the camps under a ceasefire agreement with Israel.³³⁷ For more information, see sections [7.7.3 Security situation in the camps](#) and [7.7.3\(b\) Balance of power and role of militias in specific camps](#) and [6.3 Areas controlled by different actors](#).

On 21 August 2025, as part of the first phase of the broader disarmament effort, Fatah-affiliated groups in Burj al-Barajneh and several other camps handed over part of their weapons.³³⁸ ACLED recorded nine weapon seizures from groups linked to Fatah, while Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad refused to participate, highlighting the limited scope of the initiative.³³⁹ As of 13 September 2025, Palestinian factions in Ein al-Hilweh and Beddawi

³³¹ Daher A, online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

³³² Al Jazeera, Lebanon begins disarming Palestinian groups in refugee camps, 21 August 2025, [url](#); AA, Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon start handing over weapons, 21 August 2025, [url](#)

³³³ UNRWA, UNRWA Strategic Assessment - UN80 Initiative, Report to the Secretary-General, 20 June 2025, [url](#), para. 39

³³⁴ UNRWA, Where we work, Lebanon, updated in February 2025, information observed on 17 September 2025, [url](#)

³³⁵ AP, Lebanese and Palestinian leaders agree that Lebanon won’t be used as a launchpad to strike Israel, 21 May 2025, [url](#); Asharq Al-Awsat, Hamas Seeks Faction Talks Before Palestinian Disarmament in Lebanon, 22 May 2025, [url](#); L’Orient Today, Lebanon’s arms monopoly: Abbas signs, but what about Hamas?, 21 May 2025, [url](#)

³³⁶ Dr. Maalouf Monneau, M.,, , email communication, 11 September 2025

³³⁷ UNRWA, UNRWA Strategic Assessment - UN80 Initiative, Report to the Secretary-General, 20 June 2025, [url](#), para. 39

³³⁸ Al Jazeera, Lebanon begins disarming Palestinian groups in refugee camps, 21 August 2025, [url](#); ACLED, Middle East Overview: September 2025, 5 September 2025, [url](#);

³³⁹ ACLED, Middle East Overview: September 2025, 5 September 2025, [url](#)



refugee camps in Lebanon handed over truckloads of weapons to Lebanese authorities.³⁴⁰

5.3. Other groups

In Lebanon, several other armed groups have been active in recent years including Al-Fajr Forces,³⁴¹ the military wing of the Lebanese Sunni group Jamaa al-Islamiya.³⁴² Al-Fajr Forces were created in 1982 and reemerged during the early months of 2024 joining the fight against Israel,³⁴³ in coordination with Hezbollah.³⁴⁴ Jamaa al-Islamiya, which after the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) and during the years of Syrian tutelage (1990–2005) positioned itself as a political and social movement, later reasserted a military role through its armed wing, the Al-Fajr Forces. The group fought alongside Hezbollah against Israel in the 2006 war, and since then has been linked to Hamas in Lebanon, marking its transformation from a primarily political actor focused on education, welfare, and Islamist advocacy into an armed faction integrated into the broader Iranian-backed ‘axis of resistance.’³⁴⁵ On 22 April 2025, an Israeli drone strike south of Beirut killed the commander of al-Fajr Forces.³⁴⁶

Daher stated that ‘some other Sunni Islamist armed groups operate mainly in Tripoli and along the northern coast and include former fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’.³⁴⁷ ISIL, which entered Lebanon as a consequence of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, exploited the country’s 375 kilometre porous border with Syria to move fighters, recruit, and launch attacks, without being able to maintain a significant territory.³⁴⁸ Some armed groups linked to ISIL have a covert presence in Lebanon, particularly in Beirut’s southern suburbs, where security forces have recently arrested suspects connected to such networks.³⁴⁹

No information could be found on the direct impact of non-state armed groups on the Lebanese civilian population within the time constraints of this report; however, for detailed information on the impact of the conflict on civilians and infrastructure, see section [6.4 Impact on civilian population and infrastructure](#).

³⁴⁰ AP, Palestinian factions hand over truckloads of weapons in Lebanon’s largest refugee camp, 13 September 2025, [url](#); MEE, Palestinian factions hand over weapons from largest Lebanon refugee camp, 13 September 2025, [url](#); Alarabia English, Palestinian factions hand over truckloads of weapons in Lebanon’s largest refugee camp, 13 September 2025, [url](#)

³⁴¹ The New Arab, Who are Lebanon’s Al-Fajr Forces and why have they joined Hezbollah’s fight against Israel?, 16 May 2024, [url](#)

³⁴² EL Helwe D, Shifting Ideological Commitments and Political Practices in Al-Jama’a, Al-Islamiyya: From Radicalism to Moderation and Back, August 2024, [url](#); The New Arab, Who are Lebanon’s Al-Fajr Forces and why have they joined Hezbollah’s fight against Israel?, 16 May 2024, [url](#)

³⁴³ The New Arab, Who are Lebanon’s Al-Fajr Forces and why have they joined Hezbollah’s fight against Israel?, 16 May 2024, [url](#)

³⁴⁴ Al Jazeera, Israeli attack kills al-Jamaa al-Islamiya leader in Lebanon, 22 April 2025, [url](#)

³⁴⁵ EL Helwe D, Shifting Ideological Commitments and Political Practices in Al-Jama’a, Al-Islamiyya: From Radicalism to Moderation and Back, August 2024, [url](#)

³⁴⁶ Al Jazeera, Israeli attack kills al-Jamaa al-Islamiya leader in Lebanon, 22 April 2025, [url](#)

³⁴⁷ Daher A, online interview 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

³⁴⁸ RUDAW, Lebanese army nabs ISIS top commander in the country, 25 June 2025, [url](#)

³⁴⁹ L’Orient Today, Group suspected of links to Islamic State arrested in Beirut’s southern suburbs, 30 June 2025, [url](#)



6. Security situation

6.1. Conflict background

Lebanon remains divided along clan, family, confessional, social and regional lines, still marked by the legacy of its prolonged civil war (1975-1990)³⁵⁰ and recurring Israeli attacks.³⁵¹ Following the creation of Israel in May 1948,³⁵² more than 100 000 Palestinians, mostly from the northern areas of historic Palestine, fled to Lebanon during the mass displacement of Palestinians during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.³⁵³ Lebanon together with Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq declared war against the new state, which ended in early 1949 with an armistice³⁵⁴ that brought several years of relative calm along the border between Israel and Lebanon.³⁵⁵

Tensions escalated when Israeli commandos targeted planes at Beirut airport in 1968 following a Palestinian attack on an Israeli airliner.³⁵⁶ In 1970, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) relocated to Lebanon after being expelled from Jordan,³⁵⁷ which triggered border conflicts with Israel,³⁵⁸ after which Lebanon became a target of Israeli military action.³⁵⁹

On 13 April 1975, the Lebanese civil war broke out³⁶⁰ after Palestinian gunmen attacked Maronite Christians in Ain El-Remmaneh, prompting a Phalangist (Maronite Christian militia group³⁶¹) ambush of a bus carrying Palestinians,³⁶² escalating into fighting between Palestinian factions³⁶³ and Phalangist militia led by Bachir Gemayel.³⁶⁴ During the civil war, militias largely followed communal lines, including the Lebanese Front (LF) led by Maronite Christian Phalangists, the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a coalition of secular leftists and Sunni

³⁵⁰ International Crisis Group, Lebanon, Background, 25 August 2025, [url](#)

³⁵¹ EL PAIS, How did the confrontation between Israel and Lebanon begin? Keys to the historic conflict, 24 September 2024, [url](#)

³⁵² DW, Israel vs. Hezbollah in Lebanon: a timeline, 25 August 2024, [url](#); Reuters, Israel's long history of incursions and invasions in Lebanon, 1 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁵³ Al Jazeera, Sabra and Shatila massacre: What happened in Lebanon in 1982?, 16 September 2022, [url](#)

³⁵⁴ DW, Israel vs. Hezbollah in Lebanon: a timeline, 25 August 2024, [url](#); Reuters, Israel's long history of incursions and invasions in Lebanon, 1 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁵⁵ DW, Israel vs. Hezbollah in Lebanon: a timeline, 25 August 2024, [url](#); Reuters, Israel's long history of incursions and invasions in Lebanon, 1 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁵⁶ Reuters, Israel's long history of incursions and invasions in Lebanon, 1 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁵⁷ Reuters, Israel's long history of incursions and invasions in Lebanon, 1 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁵⁸ DW, Israel vs. Hezbollah in Lebanon: a timeline, 25 August 2024, [url](#); Reuters, Israel's long history of incursions and invasions in Lebanon, 1 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁵⁹ EL PAIS, How did the confrontation between Israel and Lebanon begin? Keys to the historic conflict, 24 September 2024, [url](#)

³⁶⁰ Moubayed S, This day in history: Syria ends its 29-year military occupation of Lebanon, Al Majalla, 26 April 2025, [url](#); This is Beirut, Rafic Hariri and Bachir Gemayel: Two Visions for Lebanon, One National Struggle, 17 July 2025, [url](#)

³⁶¹ Britannica, Lebanese Civil War, last updated on 19 July 2025, [url](#)

³⁶² Arab News, Echoes of a civil war, 28 March 2025, [url](#)

³⁶³ Moubayed, S., This day in history: Syria ends its 29-year military occupation of Lebanon, Al Majalla, 26 April 2025, [url](#)

³⁶⁴ Moubayed S., This day in history: Syria ends its 29-year military occupation of Lebanon, Al Majalla, 26 April 2025, [url](#); This is Beirut, Rafic Hariri and Bachir Gemayel: Two Visions for Lebanon, One National Struggle, 17 July 2025, [url](#)



Muslims supportive of Arab nationalism, the Amal movement composed of Shia factions,³⁶⁵ and the PLO representing Palestinian refugees, while other actors involved included Syria, Israel, and fragmented Lebanese Army factions.³⁶⁶ The conflict went through several phases³⁶⁷ and officially ended in October 1990 with the Taif Agreement.³⁶⁸

On the night of 14/15 March 1978, Israel carried out an incursion into southern Lebanon following a militant attack near Tel Aviv, establishing an occupation zone and supporting the South Lebanon Army (SLA), the local Christian militia opposing the PLO.³⁶⁹ On 15 March 1978, the Lebanese government submitted a claim to the UN Security Council over Israel's military operation, leading the Council on 19 March 1978 to call for Israel's withdrawal and approve the creation of UNIFIL, which was deployed on 23 March 1978.³⁷⁰

In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon again³⁷¹ advancing to and encircling Beirut³⁷² in response to PLO attacks from the south.³⁷³ President-elect Bachir Pierre Gemayel, a Maronite Christian backed by Israel³⁷⁴ was assassinated, and in the aftermath,³⁷⁵ the Phalange militia, allied with Israel, killed up to 3 500 Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Shatila camps.³⁷⁶

During the same period, Iran's IRGC created Hezbollah in Lebanon to counter Israel's incursion.³⁷⁷ PLO forces left Beirut and relocated to neighbouring countries, after a ceasefire was reached.³⁷⁸ In 1985, after three years, Israel withdrew from Beirut to an 850-square-kilometer zone between the Litani River and the Israeli border, maintaining its presence with the support of SLA.³⁷⁹ In its first political manifesto, Hezbollah declares Israel as its primary enemy.³⁸⁰ Israel continued occupying southern Lebanon until 2000.³⁸¹ In 2000, as Israel prepared to withdraw from southern Lebanon, the UN verified its pullout along the Blue Line, but the Shebaa Farms, claimed by Lebanon yet considered part of Syria by Israel and the UN, remained under Israeli control.³⁸² According to the United Nations, no progress has been made in delineating the border between Lebanon and Syria. Although the then caretaker

³⁶⁵ Britannica, Lebanese Civil War, last updated on 19 July 2025, [url](#)

³⁶⁶ Britannica, Lebanese Civil War, last updated on 19 July 2025, [url](#)

³⁶⁷ Wenger, M, Primer: Lebanon's 15-Year War, 1975-1990, Middle East Report 162, MRP, January/February 1990), [url](#)

³⁶⁸ Britannica, The Civil War in Lebanon, updated on 16 August 2025, [url](#)

³⁶⁹ Reuters, Israel's long history of incursions and invasions in Lebanon, 1 October 2024, [url](#); UNIFIL, UNIFIL background, n.d., [url](#)

³⁷⁰ UNIFIL, UNIFIL background, n.d., [url](#)

³⁷¹ UN, Question of Palestine, 23 January 2025, [url](#)

³⁷² UNIFIL, UNIFIL background, n.d., [url](#)

³⁷³ Al Jazeera, The history of conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, 18 September 2024, [url](#)

³⁷⁴ Moubayed, S., This day in history: Syria ends its 29-year military occupation of Lebanon, Al Majalla, 26 April 2025, [url](#); This is Beirut, Rafic Hariri and Bachir Gemayel: Two Visions for Lebanon, One National Struggle, 17 July 2025, [url](#)

³⁷⁵ EL Pais, The Lebanese Christian village on the border with Israel that escapes the shelling: 'This is safer than Beirut', 17 June 2024, [url](#)

³⁷⁶ IMEU, Explainer: The Sabra & Shatila Massacre, 10 September 2024, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Sabra and Shatila massacre: What happened in Lebanon in 1982?, 16 September 2022, [url](#)

³⁷⁷ Reuters, Israel's long history of incursions and invasions in Lebanon, 1 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁷⁸ UN, Question of Palestine, 23 January 2025, [url](#)

³⁷⁹ DW, Israel vs. Hezbollah in Lebanon: a timeline, 25 August 2024, [url](#)

³⁸⁰ Geopolitical Monitor, Timeline: Lebanon civil war, 19 November 2024, [url](#)

³⁸¹ Al Jazeera, The history of conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, 18 September 2024, [url](#)

³⁸² Britannica, Shebaa Farms, n.d., [url](#)



Prime Minister Najib Mikati announced the creation of a joint Lebanese-Syrian committee to begin the demarcation process in January 2025, both Syria and Israel have yet to respond to the UN's provisional definition of the Shebaa Farms area proposed in 2007.³⁸³

In addition, tensions along the border persisted with occasional incidents until 2006, when Hezbollah launched a major attack on Israel, triggering Israeli airstrikes and ground operations in Lebanon and marking a major escalation.³⁸⁴ On 7 September 2006, Israeli forces withdrew from more areas in southern Lebanon as United Nations troops took over their positions ahead of handing them over to Lebanese army units.³⁸⁵ Israel has reportedly applied the so called 'Dahiya Doctrine' in Lebanon, targeting areas associated with Hezbollah, resulting in extensive damage to civilian infrastructure, neighbourhoods, and civilian casualties.³⁸⁶

6.2. Overview of security dynamics related to recent developments with Israel

Hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel intensified between October 2023 and September 2024,³⁸⁷ with over 10 000 cross-border attacks recorded during that period,³⁸⁸ including strikes reaching Beirut by late September 2024, while Israeli airstrikes³⁸⁹ killed several of Hezbollah's senior leaders.³⁹⁰ Meanwhile, clashes between Israel and Hezbollah in the second half of 2024, including near Palestine refugee camps, further affected the broader security situation in southern Lebanon.³⁹¹ On 17 and 18 September 2024, coordinated blasts of thousands of pagers and handheld radios resulted in the fatalities of at least forty people, among them two children, and left over 3 400 injured.³⁹² This attack reportedly targeted around 4 000 Hezbollah members, including fighters and commanders, and was blamed by the group on Israel.³⁹³

On 16 October 2024, an Israeli airstrike struck the municipal headquarters in Al Nabatieh, during a council meeting, killing at least sixteen people including the mayor, Ahmad Kahil, and

³⁸³ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, report of the Secretary-General, 12 March 2025, [url](#), para. 48

³⁸⁴ UNIFIL, UNIFIL background, n.d., [url](#)

³⁸⁵ UN News, Israel withdraws from more areas in south Lebanon – UN, 7 September 2006, [url](#)

³⁸⁶ IMEU, explainer: The Dahiya Doctrine & Israel's Use of Disproportionate Force, 31 July 2024, [url](#)

³⁸⁷ Reuters, What is Hezbollah and what is its role in Lebanon, 24 September 2024, [url](#)

³⁸⁸ Al Jazeera, Mapping 10,000 cross-border attacks between Israel and Lebanon, 25 September 2024, [url](#)

³⁸⁹ AP, Netanyahu vows to use 'full force' against Hezbollah and dims hopes for a cease-fire, 27 September 2024, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Israel attacks Lebanon updates: 'We are not stopping, we'll keep attacking', 25 September 2024, [url](#)

³⁹⁰ Al Jazeera, The history of conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, 18 September 2024, [url](#)

³⁹¹ UNRWA, UNRWA Strategic Assessment - UN80 Initiative, Report to the Secretary-General, 20 June 2025, [url](#), para. 39

³⁹² UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2024, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2024/817, 13 November 2024, [url](#), para. 9; HRW, Lebanon: Exploding Pagers Harmed Hezbollah, Civilians, 18 September 2024, [url](#); BBC, What we know about the Hezbollah device explosions, 20 September 2024, [url](#)

³⁹³ This is Beirut, Netanyahu Says Nasrallah's Death Brought Down the Pro-Iranian Axis, 16 September 2025, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Exploding pagers, psychological warfare: Israel's attack on Hezbollah, 18 September 2024, [url](#)



injuring more than fifty others.³⁹⁴ A ceasefire agreement was reached on 27 November 2024³⁹⁵ and violence declined following the ceasefire as disarmament talks with Hezbollah and Palestinian armed groups progressed.³⁹⁶

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) report of March 2025 ‘The situation in Lebanon remains tenuous as continued military operations threaten the safety and protection of civilians’.³⁹⁷ Conflict-related violence has killed at least 98 civilians, including more than a dozen children, since the cessation of hostilities, and recent air strikes, demolitions, and artillery shelling have contributed to a significant increase in military activity in southern Lebanon.³⁹⁸ While the November 2024 ceasefire allowed border residents to return to their homes,³⁹⁹ and markets and services in southern Lebanon gradually resumed,⁴⁰⁰ Lebanon has continued to face repeated shelling and clashes along its southern border with Israel.⁴⁰¹ The Israel army carried out several attacks on Lebanon between December 2024 and September 2025.⁴⁰²

On 8 September 2025, Israeli warplanes conducted a series of airstrikes over northeastern Lebanon, targeting alleged training and weapons-storage sites of Hezbollah’s elite al-Radwan unit across the Anti-Lebanon heights, specifically near Hermel and several areas within northern Bekaa, causing five deaths and injuries.⁴⁰³ This incident reflects a notable expansion in Israel’s operational zones, which typically focus on southern Lebanon, now extending into the Bekaa amid tensions.⁴⁰⁴

³⁹⁴ Reuters, Mayor among 16 killed in Israeli strike on south Lebanon municipality building, 17 October 2024, [url](#); BBC, Mayor and 15 others killed in Israeli strike on Lebanon council meeting, 16 October 2024, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Israeli attack on town in Lebanon’s far north kills 14 people: Mayor, 10 November 2024, [url](#)

³⁹⁵ World Bank, Lebanon, 10 April 2025, [url](#); Reuters, Israel-Hezbollah truce holds, displaced Lebanese begin to journey home, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

³⁹⁶ ACLED, Middle East Overview: September 2025, 5 September 2025, [url](#)

³⁹⁷ UN OCHA, Lebanon: Flash Update #63 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 13 March 2025, 13 March 2025, [url](#), p. 1

³⁹⁸ UN OCHA, Today’s top news: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Lebanon, Syria, 23 September 2025, [url](#)

³⁹⁹ Reuters, Israel-Hezbollah truce holds, displaced Lebanese begin to journey home, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁰⁰ IPC, Lebanon, IPC acute food insecurity analysis, April 2025 – October 2025, 21 May 2025, [url](#), p. 7

⁴⁰¹ UN News, Israeli strikes in Lebanon continue to kill civilians, UN rights office warns, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁰² Al Jazeera, Updates: Israel bombs Lebanon, killing 9 in biggest attack since truce deal, 2 December 2024, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Israel kills at least 22 in south Lebanon on day army was due to withdraw, 26 January 2025, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Israeli air strike kills six in eastern Lebanon amid fragile ceasefire, 8 February 2025, [url](#); UN OCHA, Lebanon: Flash Update #63 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 13 March 2025, 13 March 2025, [url](#); BBC, Four killed in Israeli strike on Beirut, Lebanon says, despite ceasefire, 1 April 2025, [url](#); Al Jazeera, One killed, eight wounded as Israel hits Lebanon in major post-truce attack, 8 May 2025, [url](#); LWJ, Israeli operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah: May 19–May 25, 2025, 27 May 2025, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon kill three people, 28 June 2025, [url](#); New York Times (The), Israel launches new ground incursion in Lebanon, rising fears for truce, 9 July 2025, [url](#); LWJ, Israeli operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah: August 4–17, 2025, 21 August 2025, [url](#); LWJ, Israeli operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah: September 8–14, 2025, 17 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁰³ L’Orient Today, Five killed in Israeli airstrikes targeting Anti-Lebanon mountain range, 8 September 2025, [url](#); This is Beirut, Five killed in Israeli raids on East Lebanon, 8 September 2025, [url](#); LBC, Israeli army strikes Hezbollah targets in Lebanon’s Bekaa region, claims Avichay Adraee, 8 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁰⁴ AP, Israel airstrikes kill 5 in northeastern Lebanon, including 4 Hezbollah members, 8 September 2025, [url](#)



Meanwhile, UNIFIL's mandate, initially set to expire in August 2025,⁴⁰⁵ was unanimously extended, reaffirming its tasks of monitoring the cessation of hostilities, supporting LAF, and facilitating humanitarian access.⁴⁰⁶ The UNIFIL noted that the LAF currently lacks full capacity in the south due to Lebanon's financial crisis and the ongoing presence of Israeli forces, emphasising that the mission's role is to support state authority rather than disarm Hezbollah.⁴⁰⁷ With UNIFIL's withdrawal set for the end of 2026, concerns remain over a potential security vacuum and the need to reduce Hezbollah's influence to rebuild state credibility.⁴⁰⁸

The ongoing economic crisis has weakened Lebanon's defence and security forces.⁴⁰⁹ Meanwhile, Hezbollah, backed by Iran,⁴¹⁰ continues to exert influence in the Bekaa Governorate and other Shia border areas. Although the government has proposed bringing weapons under state control⁴¹¹ and integrating Hezbollah into the army,⁴¹² the group's ideology and the army's limited capacity make full integration unlikely.⁴¹³

Hezbollah's new leader, Sheikh Naim Qassem, stated that disarmament would only be considered as part of a nationally determined defence strategy and after a full Israeli withdrawal,⁴¹⁴ warning of possible violence if forced to disarm.⁴¹⁵ While Hezbollah and Amal split over protests against the government's weapons monopoly,⁴¹⁶ Israel indicated that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) could withdraw if the LAF takes steps to disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025 under a US-led security mechanism.⁴¹⁷ Meanwhile, Samy Gemayel, leader of the Kataeb (Phalange) Party, has called for all weapons to be brought under state authority.⁴¹⁸

According to the Associated Press article of 8 September 2025, Hezbollah has not fired at Israel since November 2024 ceasefire and claims it no longer maintains an armed presence south of the Litani River, while continuing to reject disarmament talks until Israel withdraws

⁴⁰⁵ UN News, UN peacekeeping mandate in Lebanon faces scrutiny ahead of Security Council vote, 27 August 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁰⁶ UNIFIL, Security Council extends UNIFIL's mandate: Resolution 2790 (2025), 28 August 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁰⁷ UN News, UN peacekeeping mandate in Lebanon faces scrutiny ahead of Security Council vote, 27 August 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁰⁸ AP, UN votes to end its peacekeeping force in Lebanon next year after nearly 5 decades, 28 August 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁰⁹ International Crisis Group, Supporting Effective Policing by Lebanon's Embattled Security Agencies, 27 August 2025, [url](#); France 24, Nasrallah's death was necessary to achieve Israel's war aims, says Netanyahu, 28 September 2024, [url](#)

⁴¹⁰ France 24, Nasrallah's death was necessary to achieve Israel's war aims, says Netanyahu, 28 September 2024, [url](#)

⁴¹¹ International Crisis Group, Supporting Effective Policing by Lebanon's Embattled Security Agencies, 27 August 2025, [url](#); Diwan, Pushing back against Hezbollah, 21 February 2025, [url](#); The New Arab, Exclusive: Lebanon's President Aoun says dialogue with Hezbollah is only way to secure state monopoly on weapons, 16 April 2025, [url](#)

⁴¹² Asharq Al-Awsat, Proposal of Merging Hezbollah Fighters with Lebanese Army Collides with Reality, 21 April 2025, [url](#)

⁴¹³ Asharq Al-Awsat, Proposal of Merging Hezbollah Fighters with Lebanese Army Collides with Reality, 21 April 2025, [url](#); International Crisis Group, Supporting Effective Policing by Lebanon's Embattled Security Agencies, 27 August 2025, [url](#); Diwan, Pushing back against Hezbollah, 21 February 2025, [url](#)

⁴¹⁴ Arab News, Why the future of Lebanon's fragile state rests on Hezbollah's next move, 21 July 2025, [url](#); Naharnet, Qassem says Hezbollah won't hand over arms 'while aggression continues', 18 August 2025, [url](#)

⁴¹⁵ ISW, Iran update, 26 August 2025, [url](#)

⁴¹⁶ Asharq Al-Awsat, 'Shiite Duo' in Lebanon Retracts Call for Protests against Govt Decisions, 26 August 2025, [url](#)

⁴¹⁷ International Crisis Group, Lebanon, recent developments, 25 August 2025, [url](#)

⁴¹⁸ The New Arab, Head of Phalange party says Hezbollah must apologise for Lebanon war, 1 November 2024, [url](#);



from five hilltop positions captured during the war.⁴¹⁹ Maalouf Monneau noted that security remains particularly precarious in southern Lebanon, western Bekaa, and southern Beirut.⁴²⁰

On 28 August 2025, the UN Security Council welcomed the Lebanese government's efforts to assert sovereignty across the country through the LAF, called on Israel to withdraw north of the Blue Line, and urged deployment of Lebanese forces, with UNIFIL support, to ensure that only the state maintains authority and weapons in line with relevant UN resolutions and the Taif Agreement.⁴²¹ Between 8 and 14 September 2025, the Israel Defense Forces conducted multiple operations across 17 locations in Lebanon, mainly south of the Litani River but also reaching as far as Hermel, including airstrikes, targeted assassinations, ground activities, detonations, and leaflet drops against Hezbollah personnel and assets, while overall activity remained relatively low compared with previous weeks.⁴²²

On 18 September 2025, the Israeli army carried out multiple airstrikes in the southern and northern areas of the Litani River,⁴²³ claiming to target Hezbollah positions to prevent them from rebuilding their strongholds.⁴²⁴ The IDF reportedly issued evacuation notices in southern Lebanon, asking residents to leave six specific buildings, which it described as Hezbollah military sites.⁴²⁵

Meanwhile, Israel, through the United States, asked the Lebanese Army to start its disarmament plan in the Baalbek and Hermel Governorates, described as hubs for advanced missiles and drones, and after Lebanese officers expressed reservations, Israeli warplanes struck the outskirts of Hermel, claiming to have hit Hezbollah training camps and weapons depots.⁴²⁶ By 18 September 2025, the Lebanese army recorded over 2 500 Israeli land, air and sea attacks on Lebanon since the November 2024 ceasefire.⁴²⁷

On 19 September 2025, the UNIFIL considered the Israeli attacks violations of Security Council resolution 1701, emphasising that they endanger civilians, put UN peacekeepers and Lebanese soldiers at risk, and threaten the fragile stability achieved in southern Lebanon.⁴²⁸ As of 23 September 2025, in a meeting with UN Secretary-General António Guterres, President Aoun stated that Lebanon's disarmament plan is ready but obstructed by Israeli

⁴¹⁹ AP, Israel airstrikes kill 5 in northeastern Lebanon, including 4 Hezbollah members, 8 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴²⁰ Dr. Maalouf Monneau M, email communication, 11 September 2025

⁴²¹ UNSG, Resolution 2790 (2025), Adopted by the Security Council at its 9989th meeting, on 28 August 2025, 28 August 2025, [url](#), p. 1

⁴²² LWJ, Israeli operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah: September 8–14, 2025, 17 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴²³ Arab News, Israel resumes attacks on Hezbollah's strongholds south, north of Litani River, 18 September 2025, [url](#); BBC, Israeli air strikes hit southern Lebanon, 18 September 2025, [url](#); Reuters, Israel attacks Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon, 18 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴²⁴ Reuters, Israel attacks Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon, 18 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴²⁵ ISW, IDF-Issued Evacuation Warnings for Southern Lebanon, 18 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴²⁶ Naharnet, Report: Israel asks that Lebanon begin disarmament plan from Baalbek-Hermel, 8 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴²⁷ Arab News, Israel resumes attacks on Hezbollah's strongholds south, north of Litani River, 18 September 2025, [url](#); L'Orient Today, Series of Israeli strikes on south Lebanon, Aoun, Salam and Berri urge action, 18 September 2025, [url](#);

⁴²⁸ UNIFIL, UNIFIL statement, 19 September 2025, [url](#)



strikes.⁴²⁹ As of 27 September 2025, Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem rejected disarmament, urged the government to ‘correct its mistake,’ highlighted the group’s ‘victories’ and resilience during the 66-day war, and reaffirmed Hezbollah’s readiness for any confrontation with Israel. He also called for parliamentary elections under the current law and the creation of a Senate as outlined in the Taif Agreement.⁴³⁰

6.3. Areas controlled by different actors

As of July 2025, the LAF had deployed over 5 000 of their planned 10 000 troops south of the Litani River, trying to take control of areas previously dominated by Hezbollah.⁴³¹ Despite this, Hezbollah continued to maintain presence in the south of Lebanon.⁴³² In August 2025, Daher stated that ‘in practice, Hezbollah retains influence in southern Lebanon, parts of the north-east, and Beirut’s southern suburbs, while the army is already deployed alongside Hezbollah in these areas, and the organisation maintains a presence beyond the south’.⁴³³ Daher further noted that the ‘LAF and Hezbollah sometimes both operate on the ground in the same areas’.⁴³⁴ However, ‘the groups co-exist rather than compete for control and are not hostile to each other’, according to Daher.⁴³⁵ For more information on disarming Hezbollah and deployment of LAF to the south, see section [6.2 Overview of security dynamics related to recent developments with Israel](#).

As of September 2025, UNIFIL continued its mandate in southern Lebanon.⁴³⁶ According to its August 2025 report, the mission operated from 50 positions along the Blue Line, supported by a Maritime Task Force of five patrolling ships, and was staffed by over 10 000 troops from around 50 countries, along with 800 civilian personnel.⁴³⁷

As of September 2025, Israel continued to maintain military positions at five locations in southern Lebanon⁴³⁸ including Hamames hill (Marjayoun district), Labouneh/Alma al-Shaab (Sour), Jabal Blat near Ramaya (Bint Jbeil), Jal al-Deir south of Aitaroun (Bint Jbeil), and a newly established position along the Markaba-Houla road (Marjayoun).⁴³⁹ These locations were chosen by the Israeli army for their elevation and proximity to the border, providing surveillance over areas linked to Hezbollah activity.⁴⁴⁰ In addition, Israel has continued

⁴²⁹ This is Beirut, Aoun to Guterres: Disarmament Plan Ready, 23 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴³⁰ This is Beirut, Naim Qassem Stands Firm: Weapons or Karbala, 27 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴³¹ The Economist, A bloody week in Syria may have ripple effects in Lebanon, 24 July 2025, [url](#)

⁴³² This is Beirut, Disarming Hezbollah: The Lebanese army challenge, 5 September 2025, [url](#); LWJ, Israeli operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah: July 14–20, 2025, 23 July 2025, [url](#); ACLED, A year of multi-front conflict: Israeli military operations in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon, 12 December 2024, [url](#)

⁴³³ Daher A., Online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

⁴³⁴ Daher A., Online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

⁴³⁵ Daher A., Online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

⁴³⁶ UNIFIL, UNIFIL Mandate, 2 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴³⁷ UNIFIL, FAQs, information observed on 12 August 2025, [url](#)

⁴³⁸ Jazeera, Lebanon’s terrible year: From exploding pagers to Israeli occupation, 17 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴³⁹ L’Orient Today, Israel to keep troops at five ‘strategic points’ in Lebanon beyond Tuesday, 17 February 2025, [url](#);

RFI, L’armée israélienne va se maintenir dans cinq «points stratégiques» au Liban, 17 February 2025, [url](#); Al

⁴⁴⁰ L’Orient Today, Israel to keep troops at five ‘strategic points’ in Lebanon beyond Tuesday, 17 February 2025, [url](#);

RFI, L’armée israélienne va se maintenir dans cinq «points stratégiques» au Liban, 17 February 2025, [url](#)



occupying the Shebaa Farms since 1967.⁴⁴¹ UNIFIL reported that the Israel Defense Forces remained in five positions and two buffer zones north of the Blue Line, while also observing their presence on at least 98 occasions outside these posts in areas such as Arab al-Luwayzah, Ghajar, Markaba, Ayta al-Sha'b, Labouneh, Marwahin, Rumaysh and Ramiyah, often engaged in earthworks or installing concertina wire.⁴⁴²

On 21 December 2024, the LAF took control of three military bases in Bekaa that had for decades been held by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) and Fatah al-Intifada (Palestinian factions), including positions in Sultan Yaaqoub and Hechmech, as part of efforts to confiscate weapons, dismantle non-state armed infrastructure, and extend state authority.⁴⁴³ According to Arab News, these factions were historically aligned with the Syrian regime and later with Hezbollah, and the army seized weapons and equipment during the takeover.⁴⁴⁴

As of June 2025, a PLO delegation has been working with Lebanese officials in Beirut on a plan to disarm armed groups in all 12 Palestinian refugee camps in the country, aiming to strengthen state control, though the effort faced delays and resistance from factions not aligned with the Palestinian Authority.⁴⁴⁵ The 12 official Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon are located across several cities and areas:⁴⁴⁶ (1) Burj al-Barajneh in the southern suburbs of Beirut;⁴⁴⁷ (2) Shatila in Beirut⁴⁴⁸ (near Sabra, a neighbourhood that became an extension of the camp due to population displacement and informal settlement after 1948⁴⁴⁹); (3) Mar Elias in southern Beirut;⁴⁵⁰ (4) Dbayeh 12 kilometers north of Beirut;⁴⁵¹ (5) Nahr el-Bared near Tripoli;⁴⁵² (6) Beddawi northeast of Tripoli;⁴⁵³ (7) Ain el-Helweh south of Saida;⁴⁵⁴ (8) Mieh Mieh south of Saida;⁴⁵⁵ (9) Rashidieh south of Tyre;⁴⁵⁶ (10) El Buss south of Tyre;⁴⁵⁷ (11) Burj Shemali near

⁴⁴¹ Britannica, Shebaa Farms, n.d., [url](#)

⁴⁴² UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025, report of the Secretary-General, S/2025/460, 11 July 2025, [url](#), para. 13

⁴⁴³ The New Arab, Lebanese army takes over three bases previously held by armed Palestinian factions, 21 December 2024, [url](#); L'Orient Today, Lebanese Army takes over former Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine positions in Bekaa, 21 December 2025, [url](#); Arab News, Lebanese army reclaims Palestinian sites in Bekaa that served Syrian regime and Hezbollah, 21 December 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁴ Arab News, Lebanese army reclaims Palestinian sites in Bekaa that served Syrian regime and Hezbollah, 21 December 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁵ Al-Monitori, PLO officials in Lebanon as push to disarm Palestinian camps steam, 2 June 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁶ This is Beirut, EXPLAINER: What Are the 12 Palestinian Camps in Lebanon?, 23 May 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁷ UNRWA, Burj Barajneh Camp, last updated December 2023, information observed on 9 October 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁸ UNRWA, Shatila Camp, last updated December 2023, information observed on 9 October 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁹ UN Habitat, Sabra Neighbourhood profile, information observed on 10 October 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁰ UNRWA, Mar Elias Camp, last updated December 2023, information observed on 9 October 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵¹ UNRWA, Dbayeh Camp, last updated December 2023, information observed on 9 October 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵² UNRWA, Nahr El-Bared Camp, last updated December 2023, information observed on 9 October 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵³ UNRWA, Beddawi Camp, last updated December 2023, information observed on 9 October 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁴ UNRWA, Ein El Hilweh Camp, last updated December 2023, information observed on 9 October 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁵ UNRWA, Mieh Mieh Camp, last updated December 2023, information observed on 9 October 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁶ UNRWA, Rashidieh Camp, last updated December 2023, information observed on 9 October 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁷ UNRWA, EL Buss Camp, last updated December 2023, information observed on 9 October 2025, [url](#)



Tyre;⁴⁵⁸ and (12) Al-Jalil⁴⁵⁹, which is referred to as Wavel camp by UNRWA, located near Baalbeck in the Bekaa Valley.⁴⁶⁰

As of July 2025, Lebanon has dismantled over 500 arms sites in the south since the 2024 Israel-Hezbollah war⁴⁶¹ though the state has continued to struggle with controlling and securing its territory.⁴⁶²

On 27 August 2025, the International Crisis Group reported that Lebanon has relied increasingly on hybrid security arrangements, with formal agencies delegating tasks to informal actors: in Tripoli through local notables including crime figures; in Beirut's southern suburbs through cooperation with Hezbollah, Amal, and local clans; in refugee inhabitant areas through camp committees; in other communities through self-organised patrols.⁴⁶³

6.4. Impact on civilian population and infrastructure

As of September 2024, Israeli attacks on Lebanon resulted in fatalities, displacement, and damage to infrastructure,⁴⁶⁴ while also eroding rule of law, weakening government institutions, including municipalities, and deepening political divisions.⁴⁶⁵ This has constrained the state's ability to manage overlapping crises.⁴⁶⁶

According to the UN Security Council report of October 2024 and March 2025, since the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon on 8 October 2023 and 13 February 2025, 4 244 people have been killed, including 341 children⁴⁶⁷ (with an average of over three children per day killed between October and November 2024⁴⁶⁸) and 962 women, and 17 506 injured.⁴⁶⁹

By September 2024, Israeli attacks had raised multidimensional poverty rates to 94 % in the Governorate of Al Nabatieh and 87 % in the Governorate of South Lebanon, damaged or demolished 50 210 residential units, destroyed around 121 hectares of farmland and 47 000 trees, much of them olive groves, and severely disrupted local livelihoods and services, deepening food insecurity and economic collapse across southern Lebanon, according to the

⁴⁵⁸ UNRWA, Burj Shemali Camp, last updated December 2023, information observed on 9 October 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁹ This is Beirut, EXPLAINER: What Are the 12 Palestinian Camps in Lebanon?, 23 May 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁰ UNRWA, Wavel Camp, last updated December 2023, information observed on 9 October 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁶¹ Al-Monitori, With UNIFIL under attack, Lebanon says 500 arms depots dismantled, 10 June 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁶² The Economist, A bloody week in Syria may have ripple effects in Lebanon, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, 24 July 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁶³ International Crisis Group, Supporting Effective Policing by Lebanon's Embattled Security Agencies, 27 August 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁴ UN ESCWA, The multidimensional impact of Israeli attacks on Lebanon, 30 September 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁵ International Alert, Practical approaches to localisation in peacebuilding, Lebanon, 11 March 2025, [url](#); UN

ESCWA, The multidimensional impact of Israeli attacks on Lebanon, 30 September 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁶ UN ESCWA, The multidimensional impact of Israeli attacks on Lebanon, 30 September 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁷ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, report of the Secretary-General, S/2025/153, 12 March 2025, [url](#), paras. 59-60

⁴⁶⁸ NRC, Ceasefire in name only: Ongoing attacks, occupation and displacement in Lebanon, 23 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁹ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, report of the Secretary-General, 12 March 2025, [url](#), paras. 59-60



United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA).⁴⁷⁰ For more information, see section [2.3 Socio-economic situation](#). On 24 September 2024, at least 558 people, including 50 children and 94 women, were killed and 1 835 wounded in Israel's air raids that devastated swathes of southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and the southern suburbs of Beirut.⁴⁷¹ Hospitals, medical centres, and ambulances were also damaged.⁴⁷² On 29 September 2024, UN human rights experts warned that Israel's escalating bombardment of densely populated areas, without adequate evacuation measures, could amount to 'domicide' – i.e. mass destruction of homes.⁴⁷³ By 24 October 2024, Israeli airstrikes across Lebanon damaged or destroyed over 3 600 buildings in just two weeks, which is more than in a year of prior conflict, killing at least 2 350 people, injuring over 10 000, and displacing up to 1.3 million with attacks expanding beyond the southern border to the Bekaa Valley and Beirut.⁴⁷⁴ Between 1 October 2024 and 26 January 2025, more than 10 000 civilian structures were deliberately destroyed or severely damaged in at least 24 municipalities of southern Lebanon, much of it after the 27 November 2024 ceasefire.⁴⁷⁵

Following the ceasefire, Israeli attacks destroyed over 90 000 housing units, caused extensive infrastructure damage, and left large areas contaminated with explosive ordnances, preventing returns and leaving nearly 99 000 people displaced as of 19 February 2025.⁴⁷⁶ By February 2025, Israeli attacks had also devastated water, electricity, telecommunications, and health services in southern Lebanon, effectively preventing tens of thousands of displaced residents from returning home, even where houses remain standing.⁴⁷⁷ As of 15 April 2025, at least 71 civilians, including 14 women and 9 children, had been killed since the ceasefire, while more than 92 000 people remained displaced.⁴⁷⁸ By 9 September 2025, at least 150 000 people in southern Lebanon still lacked access to running water after Israeli attacks destroyed key water, sanitation, and hygiene infrastructure, leaving more than 30 villages cut off, causing an estimated USD 171 million in losses, with 82 % of farmers unable to irrigate and 90 % of services disrupted within five kilometres of the border.⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁷⁰ ESCWA, The multidimensional impact of Israeli attacks on Lebanon, 30 September 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁷¹ Al Jazeera, 'Unimaginable consequences': World reacts to Israel's strikes on Lebanon, 24 September 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁷² HRW, Lebanon: Israeli Strikes Kill Hundreds as Hostilities Escalate, 23 September 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁷³ UN OHCHR, UN experts alarmed by Israel-Lebanon conflict, strongly condemn escalation and urge immediate protection for civilians, 30 September 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁷⁴ BBC, Lebanon: Satellite imagery reveals intensity of Israeli bombing, 24 October 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁷⁵ Al, Israel's extensive destruction of Southern Lebanon, 26 August 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁷⁶ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, report of the Secretary-General, 12 March 2025, [url](#), paras. 59-60

⁴⁷⁷ HRW, Lebanon: Destruction of Infrastructure Preventing Returns, 17 February 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁷⁸ UN OHCHR, Israeli operations in Lebanon continue to kill civilians, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁷⁹ Action Contre La Faim, Six Months After Ceasefire, Hundreds of Thousands in Lebanon Still Deprived of Running Water, 9 September 2025, [url](#)



6.4.1. Security incidents

During the period between 1 May 2024 and 26 September 2025, there were 11 776 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Lebanon, of which 264 were coded as battles, 11 388 explosions/remote violence and 124 incidents of violence against civilians.⁴⁸⁰




Figure 1. Evolution of ACLED security events coded ‘battles’, ‘explosions/remote violence’ and ‘violence against civilians’ between 1 May 2024 and 26 September 2025.⁴⁸¹

Security incidents were recorded in all Governorates with South and Al Nabatieh Governorates registering the highest numbers during the reference period (6 534 and 3 632 security events respectively). The South Governorate accounted for 33 % (1 354) of the overall fatalities, followed by Al Nabatieh (27 %, 1 102) and Baalbek-Hermel Governorates (21 %, 874).⁴⁸²

⁴⁸⁰ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 26 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁸¹ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 11 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁸² EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 26 September 2025, [url](#)



Security events, breakdown by region: 1 May 2024 - 26 September 2025




Figure 2. ACLED security events coded ‘battles’, ‘explosions/remote violence’ and ‘violence against civilians’ between 1 May 2024 and 26 September 2025. Breakdown by Governorate based on ACLED data.⁴⁸³

Number of security events and fatalities




Figure 3. Number of security events and fatalities in Lebanon between 1 May 2024 and 26 September 2025.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸³ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 26 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁸⁴ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 26 September 2025, [url](#)



6.5. Drug trafficking and organised crime

Since 2019, Lebanon has been grappling with a deepening economic and humanitarian crisis that has severely affected security and safety across the country.⁴⁸⁵ By 31 January 2025, the security situation had rapidly deteriorated with rising crime, escalating clashes between political and sectarian groups, and weakened security institutions, particularly the underfunded and understaffed army and police, which struggled to maintain stability amid increasing unrest and internal disorganisation.⁴⁸⁶ Meanwhile, Lebanon has been experiencing a significant surge in violent incidents, including attempted murders, killings over trivial disputes, and a wave of robberies, creating an atmosphere of fear and tension across the country.⁴⁸⁷

In both Beirut and Tripoli, the inability of the state to maintain order has enabled organised crime to expand, with crimes such as burglaries, carjackings, thefts, kidnappings and homicides on the rise.⁴⁸⁸ As of March 2025, Lebanon's drug trafficking networks have reportedly evolved beyond traditional clan-based traffickers into a system deeply embedded in local politics and security forces, with operations in Captagon (amphetamine-based drug) production and smuggling increasingly intertwined with regional militant financing and sustained by institutional weaknesses.⁴⁸⁹ According to the UNODC World Drug Report (June 2025), Lebanon is identified as one of the countries of origin of Captagon, though to a lesser extent than Syria, with the Near and Middle East as a whole remaining the region most affected by the trafficking and use of this substance.⁴⁹⁰

Since the early years following its independence in 1943, Lebanon's drug production has centred on hashish (cannabis) and opium, mainly in the northern Bekaa Valley along the eastern border with Syria,⁴⁹¹ where the LAF has reportedly faced persistent difficulties in controlling cross-border activities.⁴⁹² According to Daher, who was interviewed by the EUAA for this report, 'in north-eastern Lebanon, a region marked by strong clan structures and extensive cannabis cultivation, clans and large families maintain heavily armed groups made up of men aged roughly 18 to 50. Some of these groups, while mostly apolitical, may be engaged in drug trafficking, while drug networks or cannabis producers also employ private armed companies'.⁴⁹³ According to International Crisis Group, Hezbollah and Amal reportedly coordinate with state security forces in areas they dominate, helping to handle violent crime and patrol the streets, though both generally defer to powerful local clans.⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁸⁵ IMPACT Initiatives, Qualitative Perspectives on Safety and Security in Lebanese Urban Spaces, REACH, June 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁴⁸⁶ LIBNANEWS, Sécurité au Liban : vers un chaos généralisé?, 31 January 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁸⁷ This is Beirut, Mawlawi Reveals 1,920 Arrested Amid Surge in Criminality, 3 February 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁸⁸ This is Beirut, Security in Lebanon: When the Streets Call for Order, 12 April 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁸⁹ Hage Ali, M, Double Dealers: Lebanon and the Risks of Captagon Trafficking, Carnegie Middle East Center, 19 March 2025, [url](#), p. 3

⁴⁹⁰ UNODC, World drug report 2025, 13 June 2025, [url](#), p. 26

⁴⁹¹ Hage Ali, M, Double Dealers: Lebanon and the Risks of Captagon Trafficking, Carnegie Middle East Center, 19 March 2025, [url](#), p. 3

⁴⁹² This is Beirut, Mawlawi Reveals 1,920 Arrested Amid Surge in Criminality, 3 February 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁹³ Daher A., online interview, 13 August 2025, and email communication, 22 August 2025

⁴⁹⁴ International Crisis Group, Supporting Effective Policing by Lebanon's Embattled Security Agencies, 27 August 2025, [url](#)



7. Treatment of specific groups

7.1. Women and girls

7.1.1. Violence against women and girls

Lebanon's existing legislation includes the 2014 Law No. 293 on protection from domestic violence, as amended by Law No. 204 of 2020,⁴⁹⁵ and the 2020 Law No. 205 criminalising sexual harassment.⁴⁹⁶ The law on domestic violence,⁴⁹⁷ was described as falling short of covering the full spectrum of gender-based violence (GBV), including marital rape, and to be hindered by poor application, limited enforcement⁴⁹⁸ and the primacy of religious laws over civil law.⁴⁹⁹ In 2017, Article 522 of the Penal Code was repealed. This article allowed perpetrators of rape to avoid prosecution by marrying their victims.⁵⁰⁰ According to international human rights organisation Equality Now, despite the repeal of Article 522, impunity for rape persists in practice. Families or clans of victims, including minor girls, have at times compelled marriage between the perpetrator and the survivor to avoid public scandal, particularly in rural areas. Civil society sources reported that some judicial officials had occasionally suggested such marriages, notwithstanding their legal duty to uphold the law.⁵⁰¹ Furthermore, other articles concerning the possibility of perpetrators to avoid prosecution or imprisonment when marrying a minor with whom they had sexual intercourse, remained in force.⁵⁰²

Equality Now noted that rape survivors in Lebanon face multiple barriers to justice, including limited awareness of legal procedures, intimidation by perpetrators, and financial constraints in accessing qualified legal representation. Structural deficiencies within the criminal justice system, such as inadequate training, prolonged case resolution, and lenient sentencing, contributed to low conviction rates and mistrust, while gender-biased attitudes among judges further hindered fair outcomes.⁵⁰³

⁴⁹⁵ El-Husseini, R., Violence Against Women in Lebanon: The Challenge of Legislative Action, ACW, 6 June 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁹⁶ ILO, Law No. 205 to criminalize sexual harassment and for the rehabilitation of its victims, 2021, [url](#)

⁴⁹⁷ Lebanon, Law 293 of 7 May 2014, [الأسرة من العنف الأسري](#) [Protecting women and other family members from domestic violence], 15 May 2014, [url](#), Article 2

⁴⁹⁸ El-Husseini, R., Violence Against Women in Lebanon: The Challenge of Legislative Action, ACW, 6 June 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁹⁹ Ici Beyrouth, L'égalité des genres au Liban: des progrès malgré les obstacles, 8 March 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁰⁰ ICJ, Gender-based Violence in Lebanon: Inadequate Framework, Ineffective Remedies, July 2019, [url](#), pp. 17–18

⁵⁰¹ Equality Now, In Search of Justice: Rape laws in the Arab States, September 2025, [url](#), p.44

⁵⁰² ICJ, Gender-based Violence in Lebanon: Inadequate Framework, Ineffective Remedies, July 2019, [url](#), pp. 17–18; LCPS, Strengthening Protections: An Analysis of Violence Against Women Legislation in Lebanon, 18 March 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁰³ Equality Now, In Search of Justice: Rape laws in the Arab States, September 2025, [url](#), p.45



The judicial processing of domestic violence cases was also described as slow⁵⁰⁴ and ineffective by LIBNANEWS.⁵⁰⁵

Incidents of GBV against women and girls in Lebanon were reported to have increased in recent years,⁵⁰⁶ despite a decline of reporting of such incidents as a result of the ongoing security challenges.⁵⁰⁷ Assessments carried out in 2024—including a GBV safety audit,⁵⁰⁸ GBVIMS (Gender-based Violence Information Management System) data analysis,⁵⁰⁹ and a multi-sectoral study⁵¹⁰—consistently indicated that domestic and sexual violence were widespread.⁵¹¹ Intimate partner violence and family violence remained a prevalent form of GBV, with survivors describing frequent psychological, physical, and economic abuse within the household.⁵¹² Marital rape was further identified as a pervasive⁵¹³ but legally unrecognised form of violence.⁵¹⁴

Sexual violence - including rape, assault, and harassment - was reported across both private and public settings, including workplaces, transport hubs, displacement shelters, and urban neighbourhoods, with refugees and displaced women being particularly at risk.⁵¹⁵ According to LIBNANEWS, street harassment was a daily reality for many Lebanese women,⁵¹⁶ with Diab elaborating that its manifestations differed depending on a person's gender expression, nationality, and socio-economic background. Syrian refugee women reported that perpetrators frequently targeted them due to stereotypes of them being 'sexually available or "exchangeable" for material favors'.⁵¹⁷ Furthermore, migrant domestic workers under the *kafala* (sponsorship) system faced workplace violence and exploitation, including sexual harassment⁵¹⁸ and lacked access to justice.⁵¹⁹ Patterns of violence varied between urban and

⁵⁰⁴ LIBNANEWS, Violences domestiques en hausse : la protection des femmes en crise, 7 August 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁰⁵ LIBNANEWS, Les femmes libanaises face aux discriminations : une égalité encore inaccessible?, 6 March 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁰⁶ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section G3

⁵⁰⁷ UNFPA, Lebanon: Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Information Management System (IMS) – Annual Report 2024, 1 April 2025, [url](#), p. 2

⁵⁰⁸ GBV Working Group – Lebanon, Gender Based Violence Safety Audit for Lebanon, November 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁰⁹ UNFPA, Lebanon: Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Information Management System (IMS) - Annual Report 2024, 1 April 2025, [url](#)

⁵¹⁰ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#)

⁵¹¹ GBV Working Group – Lebanon, Gender Based Violence Safety Audit for Lebanon, November 2024, [url](#), p. 5; UNFPA, Lebanon: Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Information Management System (IMS) - Annual Report 2024, 1 April 2025, [url](#), p. 2; Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 96

⁵¹² GBV Working Group – Lebanon, Gender Based Violence Safety Audit for Lebanon, November 2024, [url](#), p. 5

⁵¹³ GBV Working Group – Lebanon, Gender Based Violence Safety Audit for Lebanon, November 2024, [url](#), p. 5; UNFPA, Lebanon: Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Information Management System (IMS) - Annual Report 2024, 1 April 2025, [url](#), p. 4

⁵¹⁴ Equality Now, In Search of Justice: Rape laws in the Arab States, September 2025, [url](#), p.44

⁵¹⁵ GBV Working Group – Lebanon, Gender Based Violence Safety Audit for Lebanon, November 2024, [url](#), p. 5

⁵¹⁶ LIBNANEWS, Les femmes libanaises face aux discriminations : une égalité encore inaccessible?, 6 March 2025, [url](#)

⁵¹⁷ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 9

⁵¹⁸ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), pp. 10, 13; GBV Working Group – Lebanon, Gender Based Violence Safety Audit for Lebanon, November 2024, [url](#), p. 5

⁵¹⁹ Equality Now, In Search of Justice: Rape laws in the Arab States, September 2025, [url](#), p.46



rural settings.⁵²⁰ Informal urban settlements,⁵²¹ (where housing lacks legal land rights or regulatory compliance) —especially in Tripoli and disadvantaged districts of Beirut— emerged as hotspots for harassment, intimate partner violence, and assaults in public spaces.⁵²² According to Equality Now, survivors of sexual violence often refrained from undergoing medical examinations that could provide evidence of rape needed for trial, due to taboos surrounding sexuality and fears of family or community rejection as ‘impure’, leading to isolation and possible economic marginalisation.⁵²³

Forced marriage⁵²⁴ as well as child marriage remained widespread, with the latter particularly prevalent among Syrian refugee girls aged 11 to 17⁵²⁵ as well as Lebanese communities in difficult financial situations, such as those displaced by conflict.⁵²⁶ Furthermore, rural areas - including the Bekaa Valley, Akkar, and South Lebanon - continued to show elevated rates of child marriage.⁵²⁷ GBV experts as well as community members further regularly observed online harassment, digital blackmail and stalking, with teenage girls, migrant workers, and women in roles with high public exposure being disproportionately targeted.⁵²⁸

The Internal Security Forces’ hotline recorded 615 domestic violence complaints between January and October 2024, excluding March 2024.⁵²⁹ In May 2025, the hotline received 74 complaints of physical violence, 69 in June 2025,⁵³⁰ and 59 in July 2025.⁵³¹ In August 2025 the number of recorded complaints rose to 90 cases of physical violence, 10 cases of psychological abuse, 2 cases of sexual violence, and no cases classified as economic or other forms of abuse.⁵³² In comparison, the NGO KAFA recorded 862 reports of domestic violence between January and July 2025, described an 18 % increase compared to the same period in 2024.⁵³³ According to the founder and director of the Lebanese NGO ABAAD, reliable data on

⁵²⁰ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 13

⁵²¹ UNFPA, Lebanon: Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Information Management System (IMS) - Annual Report 2024, 1 April 2025, [url](#), p. 2; Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 13

⁵²² Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 13

⁵²³ Equality Now, In Search of Justice: Rape laws in the Arab States, September 2025, [url](#), p.44

⁵²⁴ UNFPA, Lebanon: Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Information Management System (IMS) - Annual Report 2024, 1 April 2025, [url](#), p. 3

⁵²⁵ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 11

⁵²⁶ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 10

⁵²⁷ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 13

⁵²⁸ GBV Working Group – Lebanon, Gender Based Violence Safety Audit for Lebanon, November 2024, [url](#), p. 5

⁵²⁹ Khairallah, V., A Cry for Justice: Lebanon's Battle Against Femicide, Wilson Center, 9 December 2024, [url](#)

⁵³⁰ Al-Hurra, [لبنان، ما قصة اختفاء الفتيات في لبنان](#)[What is the story of the disappearance of girls in Lebanon?], 26 August 2025, [url](#)

⁵³¹ Al-Hurra, [لبنان، ما قصة اختفاء الفتيات في لبنان](#)[What is the story of the disappearance of girls in Lebanon?], 26 August 2025, [url](#); Anbaa Online, [أرقام مقلقة وتقارير صادمة: "كفى" تطالب بتحريك عاجل لمواجهة العنف الأسري](#)[Alarming figures and shocking reports: KAFA calls for urgent action to combat domestic violence.], 15 August 2025, [url](#)

⁵³² CLDH, Human Rights Developments in a Week, September 8 – September 14 2025, 14 September 2025, [url](#), p. 3

⁵³³ LIBANEWS, Violences domestiques en hausse : la protection des femmes en crise, August 7, 2025, [url](#)



femicide remained unavailable due to insufficient documentation, with only cases logged by the Internal Security Forces, reported by the media, or court-pursued recorded.⁵³⁴ A survey from 2021 by local NGO ABAAD found that 96 % of violence against women went unreported by survivors.⁵³⁵ According to the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) violence often went unreported due to cultural norms that instil fear of retaliation and stigma.⁵³⁶

Access to protection and response services, including shelters, remained limited, with survivors facing multiple barriers to support.⁵³⁷ Awareness of available services was low.⁵³⁸ Safe shelters were scarce – with six shelters throughout the country, including three in Beirut⁵³⁹ – and often inaccessible due to documentation requirements, restrictive admission criteria, and discriminatory practices—particularly for refugees, undocumented migrants, single women, and LGBTIQ persons.⁵⁴⁰ Women and girls with disabilities highlighted the virtual nonexistence of adapted GBV services and elevated risks of neglect, while older women faced additional obstacles as many shelters refused to admit those over 60.⁵⁴¹ When shelter access was granted, survivors described overcrowded facilities with little privacy and only temporary stays.⁵⁴² Sexual and reproductive health services⁵⁴³ were defined as disjointed, expensive, and insufficiently accessible for unmarried women, LGBTIQ persons, and individuals with disabilities. In addition, care approaches that were trauma-sensitive and survivor-focused,⁵⁴³ as well as cooperation across health, legal, and shelter sectors, were characterised as largely lacking.⁵⁴⁴ Interruptions in services in remote and insecure conflict-affected areas, including South Lebanon and the Bekaa, further restricted access to GBV assistance.⁵⁴⁵

7.1.2. Honour crimes

Article 562 of the Penal Code, which had explicitly granted reduced sentences for killings committed in the name of family honour, was repealed in 2011.⁵⁴⁶ Despite this reform, perpetrators continue to benefit from general mitigating provisions, such as claims of having

⁵³⁴ Khairallah, V., A Cry for Justice: Lebanon's Battle Against Femicide, Wilson Center, 9 December 2024, [url](#)

⁵³⁵ Beirut, Recent Study Reveals 96% Of Cases Of Violence Against Women Go Unreported In Lebanon, 25 November 2021, [url](#)

⁵³⁶ LCPS, Strengthening Protections: An Analysis of Violence Against Women Legislation in Lebanon, 18 March 2025, [url](#)

⁵³⁷ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 30; UNFPA, Lebanon: Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Information Management System (IMS) – Annual Report 2024, 1 April 2025, [url](#), p. 6

⁵³⁸ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 3

⁵³⁹ LIBNANEWS, Violences domestiques en hausse : la protection des femmes en crise, August 7, 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁴⁰ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 30

⁵⁴¹ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 11

⁵⁴² Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), pp. 31–32

⁵⁴³ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 3

⁵⁴⁴ LIBNANEWS, Violences domestiques en hausse : la protection des femmes en crise, August 7, 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁴⁵ GBV Working Group – Lebanon, Gender Based Violence Safety Audit for Lebanon, November 2024, [url](#), p. 5

⁵⁴⁶ HRW, Lebanon: Law Reform Targets 'Honor' Crimes, 11 August 2011, [url](#)



acted in a ‘fit of rage’, which are frequently invoked to reduce sentences in cases involving the killing of women.⁵⁴⁷

In December 2024, the former Minister of State for Economic Empowerment of Women and Youth described the persistence of honour killings as a particularly disturbing aspect of femicide in Lebanon.⁵⁴⁸

A 2023 article published by the American University of Beirut (AUB) described honour killings as a widespread phenomenon, noting that many women had lost their lives for perceived violations of social or community norms, such as immodest dress, relationships outside marriage, or premarital sex. State action to address the issue was said to have been limited, leaving many women fearful of being killed by their own families. The lack of effective legal protection and a judicial system often viewed as biased against women were identified as factors enabling impunity, as perpetrators frequently claimed they acted to preserve family honour. Although honour killings are criminalised, they were still reported to occur, particularly in rural regions.⁵⁴⁹ Director of the Institute for Migration Studies at the Lebanese American University, Jasmin Lilian Diab reported in 2025 that rural areas such as the Bekaa Valley, Akkar, and South Lebanon saw higher incidences of honour-based violence.⁵⁵⁰ According to Equality Now, civil society actors observed that the persistent association of women’s chastity with so-called family honour had frequently resulted in acts of ‘honour’-related violence against survivors of sexual assault, including instances where the perpetrator was a relative. Female survivors of rape had reportedly been killed by their own families to ‘restore’ family reputation or, if spared, subjected to severe abuse by fathers, brothers, or husbands. In certain cases, they had been coerced into marriage with the rapist. Women who had lost their virginity through rape had otherwise been regarded as unsuitable for marriage.⁵⁵¹

In August 2025, local media reported two cases described as honour crimes: one in Damour (a town in North Lebanon), where a man killed another man accused of drugging and raping the offender’s sister,⁵⁵² and another in North Lebanon, where a man admitted to killing his sister with the knowledge of their father.⁵⁵³

7.1.3. Discrimination in personal status matters

The Lebanese Constitution guarantees equality; however, Article 9 authorises each religious community to apply its own personal status laws in matters such as marriage, divorce, and

⁵⁴⁷ Daraj Media, ربيحة ضحية جديدة لقتل النساء في لبنان [He acted... then strangled her: Rabia, the latest victim of femicide in Lebanon], 9 May 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁴⁸ Khairallah, V., A Cry for Justice: Lebanon’s Battle Against Femicide, Wilson Center, 9 December 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁴⁹ AUB, Honor Killing: An Excused Femicide, 14 August 2023, [url](#)

⁵⁵⁰ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 13

⁵⁵¹ Equality Now, In Search of Justice: Rape laws in the Arab States, September 2025, [url](#), p.45

⁵⁵² Grand LB, جريمة الدامور – القصة الكاملة [“He drugged and raped her while she was conscious”... Murder and honor killing in Damour – the full story], 29 August 2025, [url](#); Al-Araby, جريمة الدامور [The Damour crime in Lebanon was recorded by its cameras. This is what Bassem, the perpetrator’s father, said.], 29 August 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁵³ L’Orient Today, North Lebanon: Police arrest victim’s father and brother, 22 August 2025, [url](#)



custody.⁵⁵⁴ As a result, 15 separate religion-based personal status codes are in force as of March 2025, producing substantial inconsistencies in the rights of women depending on religious affiliation.⁵⁵⁵ In the absence of a unified civil code, jurisdiction lies exclusively with religious courts.⁵⁵⁶ For more information on personal status law, see section [3.1.1 Personal Status Law](#).

Discriminatory provisions are embedded across confessional codes.⁵⁵⁷ While men are generally required to be 18 years old to marry, all sects permit the marriage of girls under 18.⁵⁵⁸ Women are deprived of equality in marriage and divorce⁵⁵⁹ and are typically excluded from guardianship of children following divorce, with the Armenian Orthodox community constituting the only exception. Custody rights for mothers are narrowly circumscribed,⁵⁶⁰ including various age requirements of the children.⁵⁶¹ The nationality law further institutionalises discrimination by granting Lebanese men, but not women, the ability to confer nationality to their children and foreign spouses.⁵⁶² Women's rights organisations continued to advocate for a unified personal status law and for reforms guaranteeing equal rights in custody, marriage, divorce, and nationality.⁵⁶³

7.2. Political opposition members

As noted by Freedom House, Lebanon's sectarian power-sharing framework ensures that no political party functions consistently as an opposition group, while intra-party competition was also constrained due to power consolidation among political elites. Political parties that had dominated the political landscape before the 2017 electoral reform continued to benefit from legal provisions they had shaped, and often relied on coercion, disinformation campaigns, and communal pressure to sideline new political actors. Nonetheless, in the 2022 parliamentary elections, independent representatives linked to the 2019 protest movement succeeded in obtaining 13 seats.⁵⁶⁴

Debates over electoral reform continued into 2025. According to reporting from that year, Hezbollah, the Amal Movement, and the Free Patriotic Movement opposed proposals to amend the expatriate voting law, seeking to preserve Article 122, which reserves six parliamentary seats for the diaspora. Their opposition was linked to concerns about losing

⁵⁵⁴ Lebanon, Constitution, 23 May 1926, Lebanese Parliament, [url](#), Articles 7, 9

⁵⁵⁵ This is Beirut, Spotlight Gender Equality in Lebanon: Progress amidst obstacles, 8 March 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁵⁶ El-Husseini, R., The Harrowing State of Women's Rights in Lebanon, ACW, 1 May 2023, [url](#)

⁵⁵⁷ HRW, World Report 2025 – Lebanon, 16 January 2025, [url](#), p. 283

⁵⁵⁸ APS, Persecution of Women in the Arab World – a Spotlight on Lebanon, 18 March 2024, [url](#); Adyan Foundation, Women's Rights in Religious Personal Status Laws in Lebanon, 2023, [url](#), pp. 100, 106–107

⁵⁵⁹ Adyan Foundation, Women's Rights in Religious Personal Status Laws in Lebanon, 2023, [url](#), pp. 110–114, 133–134; Hachem, T. and Karam, B., Personal Status in Lebanon Versus Optional Civil Marriage, 23 April 2024, [url](#), pp. 26–27

⁵⁶⁰ APS, Persecution of Women in the Arab World – a Spotlight on Lebanon, 18 March 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁶¹ Adyan Foundation, Women's Rights in Religious Personal Status Laws in Lebanon, 2023, [url](#), pp. 136, 144

⁵⁶² HRW, World Report 2025 – Lebanon, 16 January 2025, [url](#), p. 283; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section G3

⁵⁶³ Al, The State of the World's Human Rights – Lebanon 2024, 29 April 2025, [url](#), p. 238

⁵⁶⁴ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section B2



parliamentary representation, since expatriate ballots—comprising nearly one-third of the electorate—had predominantly supported opposition candidates during the 2022 elections.⁵⁶⁵

Beyond electoral matters, political elites were described as employing broader strategies to contain dissent. A 2025 report by the Dutch think tank Clingendael Institute highlighted the use of co-optation and fragmentation to contain and neutralise popular dissent, referencing demonstrations in the 1970s, 2015, and 2019 as examples. The report further noted that elite-driven rivalries sometimes resulted in shifts in the balance of power.⁵⁶⁶ For more information, see section [2.1 Recent political developments](#).

According to Freedom House, Lebanese authorities conducted surveillance of social media platforms and electronic communications, targeting *inter alia* political figures and dissidents. Security bodies were further alleged to have penetrated online networks employed by activists.⁵⁶⁷ In parallel, criminal defamation and insult laws were frequently employed to silence critics,⁵⁶⁸ particularly for exposing corruption or highlighting misconduct.⁵⁶⁹ For more information on the use of defamation laws, see section [7.4.1 Threats and harassment against journalists and media workers](#). Human Rights Watch documented that the advocacy group Kulluna Irada, which identifies itself as committed to promoting socio-economic and political reform in Lebanon,⁵⁷⁰ faced a legal complaint filed by a group of lawyers in March 2025 accusing it amongst others of disseminating false or exaggerated information that undermined public confidence in the state's financial stability.⁵⁷¹

Concurrently, the government pursued direct measures targeting Hezbollah's military capacity.⁵⁷² In July 2025, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam ordered the arrest of armed men, reportedly Hezbollah supporters, who carried weapons during a religious gathering in Beirut, stating that armed demonstrations were unacceptable.⁵⁷³ The following month, the government instructed the army to enforce the state's monopoly on arms by year's end, tasking it with disarming Hezbollah and restricting weapons to state-sanctioned forces.⁵⁷⁴ Lebanon's Agriculture Minister Nizar Hani confirmed that the army had already seized hundreds of Hezbollah sites and arms depots.⁵⁷⁵ For more information on Hezbollah's

⁵⁶⁵ Asharq Al-Awsat, Fear of Losing Seats Drives Resistance to Reforming Expat Voting Law in Lebanon, 3 July 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁶⁶ Clingendael, From dissent to action: Understanding Lebanon's political mobilization in a sectarian context, 30 January 2025, [url](#), pp. 14–15

⁵⁶⁷ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section D4

⁵⁶⁸ AI, The State of the World's Human Rights – Lebanon 2024, 29 April 2025, [url](#), p. 237; HRW, Human Rights Watch Letter to Lebanese Prime Minister-Designate Nawaf Salam, 30 January 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁶⁹ HRW, Human Rights Watch Letter to Lebanese Prime Minister-Designate Nawaf Salam, 30 January 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁷⁰ Kulluna Irada, Mission and Blueprint, n.d., [url](#)

⁵⁷¹ HRW, Lebanon: Journalists, Activist Summoned for Investigations, 14 April 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁷² All Arab News, In historic step, Lebanon's gov't tasks army with disarming Hezbollah by end of the year, 6 August 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁷³ National (The), Lebanese PM orders arrests of armed men who took part in Ashura commemoration, 5 July 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁷⁴ All Arab News, In historic step, Lebanon's gov't tasks army with disarming Hezbollah by end of the year, 6 August 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁷⁵ Al Jazeera, Hezbollah chief Qassem says resistance to Israel key amid disarmament talks, 5 August 2025, [url](#)



disarmament process, see section [6.2 Overview of security dynamics related to recent developments with Israel](#).

7.2.1. Anti-government demonstrators

According to Freedom House, the constitutional guarantee of the right to peaceful assembly was largely upheld in 2024, permitting demonstrations addressing government mismanagement and the financial crisis to proceed.⁵⁷⁶ At the same time, it was reported that security forces, as well as supporters of political parties, perpetrated assaults against journalists covering such gatherings⁵⁷⁷ and, in certain instances, on protesters themselves. Reference was made to a 2023 protest on human rights where such incidents occurred.⁵⁷⁸ In addition, security personnel were reported to have infiltrated online platforms used by demonstrators.⁵⁷⁹ A report published by the civil society organisation HuMENA in August 2024 documented occasions when anti-government protests were met with violence and arrests, citing examples from 2015, 2019, 2020 and 2023.⁵⁸⁰ According to HuMENA, repression against peaceful assemblies had intensified.⁵⁸¹ Security and military forces had increasingly employed measures contravening Article 37 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with violence and impunity escalating since 2015.⁵⁸² The use of disproportionate force, including rubber bullets, birdshot, and tear gas in confined areas, as well as arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, lengthy judicial proceedings, and torture in detention, had been reported.⁵⁸³

In February 2025, Hezbollah supporters staged protests in the vicinity of Beirut International Airport following the government's decision to ban an Iranian flight.⁵⁸⁴ Security forces reportedly deployed tear gas⁵⁸⁵ and fired shots into the air in order to disperse demonstrators, some of whom attempted to advance towards the airport.⁵⁸⁶ During the unrest, a UNIFIL convoy was attacked, resulting in injuries to two UN peacekeepers. Subsequently, more than 25 individuals were arrested, who – according to Interior Minister Ahmad al-Hajjar, were not necessarily responsible for the attack.⁵⁸⁷ Lebanon's military court later charged 20 men in

⁵⁷⁶ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section E1

⁵⁷⁷ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section D1

⁵⁷⁸ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section E1

⁵⁷⁹ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section D4

⁵⁸⁰ HuMENA, Peaceful Assembly Under Fire: Authorities' Violations of the Right to Protest in Lebanon, 26 August 2024, [url](#), p. 6

⁵⁸¹ HuMENA, Peaceful Assembly Under Fire: Authorities' Violations of the Right to Protest in Lebanon, 26 August 2024, [url](#), p. 17ff

⁵⁸² HuMENA, Peaceful Assembly Under Fire: Authorities' Violations of the Right to Protest in Lebanon, 26 August 2024, [url](#), p. 39

⁵⁸³ HuMENA, Peaceful Assembly Under Fire: Authorities' Violations of the Right to Protest in Lebanon, 26 August 2024, [url](#), p. 40

⁵⁸⁴ MEE, Lebanese authorities arrest 25 after attack on UN peacekeepers, 15 February 2025, [url](#); Reuters, Tear gas fired at Hezbollah supporters protesting Lebanon blocking Iranian flight, 15 February 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁸⁵ MEE, Lebanese authorities arrest 25 after attack on UN peacekeepers, 15 February 2025, [url](#); Reuters, Tear gas fired at Hezbollah supporters protesting Lebanon blocking Iranian flight, 15 February 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁸⁶ EFE, Lebanese army fires tear gas to disperse Hezbollah protesters in Beirut, 15 February 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁸⁷ MEE, Lebanese authorities arrest 25 after attack on UN peacekeepers, 15 February 2025, [url](#); Al Jazeera, More than 25 arrested after UN convoy attack in Lebanon, 15 February 2025, [url](#)



relation to the incident.⁵⁸⁸

Further demonstrations by supporters of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement took place in Beirut, as well as in southern and eastern regions of the country in August 2025, in response to a Cabinet decision mandating the disarmament of Hezbollah.⁵⁸⁹ No reports of violence in response to these protests could be found.

7.2.2. Whistleblowers

Lebanon introduced a legal framework aimed at protecting and providing incentives to individuals who disclose corruption⁵⁹⁰ through the Whistleblower Protection Law (Law No. 83/2018),⁵⁹¹ later amended in 2020,⁵⁹² and the creation of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) under Law No. 175/2020.⁵⁹³

However, according to the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS), several limitations hindered effective implementation of the legal framework, such as the absence of sanctions for non-compliance with NACC decisions, an inactive whistleblowers reception office, insufficient coordination between oversight bodies, and weak deterrents against retaliation. Additional challenges included vague security provisions, the obligation for whistleblowers to fully disclose their identity, and the exclusion of NGOs or media as legitimate disclosure channels.⁵⁹⁴ Furthermore, the law guarantees confidentiality and protection for whistleblowers and their close associates against retaliation, but such safeguards apply only if disclosures are made exclusively to the NACC.⁵⁹⁵

No information could be found regarding cases of whistleblowers in Lebanon or their treatment during the reference period.

7.3. Human rights defenders and activists

Freedom House reported in 2025 that Lebanese authorities regularly monitored social media and electronic communications, including those of activists, with security personnel infiltrating

⁵⁸⁸ New Arab (The), Lebanon court charges 20 over attack on UNIFIL vehicle which injured deputy commander, 28 February 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁸⁹ Cradle (The), Israel escalates in Lebanon as tensions surge over Hezbollah arms, 8 August 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁹⁰ LCPS, Strengthening Whistleblower Protection: A Key to Accountability in Lebanon, 29 May 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁹¹ Lebanon, Law 83 of 10 October 2018, حماية كاشفي الفساد [Protection of Whistleblowers], Official Gazette Nr. 45, 18 October 2018, [url](#)

⁵⁹² Lebanon, Law 182 of 12 June 2020, إضافة فقرة الى المادة التاسعة من قانون حماية كاشفي الفساد (10/10/2018 رقم 83) [Adding a paragraph to Article 9 of the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers (No. 83 dated 10/10/2018)], Official Gazette Nr. 25, 12 June 2020, [url](#)

⁵⁹³ Lebanon, Law 175 of 8 May 2020, مكافحة الفساد في القطاع العام وانشاء الهيئة الوطنية لمكافحة الفساد [Combating corruption in the public sector and establishing the National Anti-Corruption Authority], Lebanese University, 15 May 2020, [url](#)

⁵⁹⁴ LCPS, Strengthening Whistleblower Protection: A Key to Accountability in Lebanon, 29 May 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁹⁵ Lebanon, Law 83 of 10 October 2018, حماية كاشفي الفساد [Protection of Whistleblowers], Official Gazette Nr. 45, 18 October 2018, [url](#) أولاً [The basic principles on which this law is based, First]; GII, Bribery & Corruption Laws and Regulations 2025 – Lebanon, 5 December 2024, [url](#)



online groups used by campaigners and protesters.⁵⁹⁶ According to Human Rights Watch and NHRC-CPT (National Human Rights Commission – Committee for the Prevention of Torture), Lebanese authorities and various political factions continued to impose growing limitations on activists and journalists in the country, particularly by using defamation charges against critics.⁵⁹⁷ The authorities summoned activists, teachers, lawyers or artists for publicly speaking out against their interests. Some were targeted for criticising public officials, others for alleging corruption in the banking sector or for comments considered offensive to state institutions, including the army.⁵⁹⁸ In 2024, at least three people were summoned by the Internal Security Forces (ISF) without being told of the accusations against them before appearing in court.⁵⁹⁹ Freedom House further noticed that the state did not safeguard individuals from non-state actors, including political parties, armed groups and their affiliates, who monitored and retaliated against those voicing dissenting views.⁶⁰⁰ For further information of actions by state and non-state actors against public expressions of opinions and identities, see [7.4.1 Threats and harassment against journalists and media workers](#) and [7.5.1 Institutional discrimination based on sexual orientation/gender identity](#).

An incident in December 2024 illustrated these dynamics. Three activists —Sahar Ghaddar, Ghina Ghandour, and Evelina Mahous— were interrogated by the Cybercrimes Bureau following a complaint filed by the MTV television station. The complaint alleged defamation, incitement to murder, and stirring sectarian strife after the activists criticised the channel’s coverage of the Israeli war on Lebanon. The three women spent around twelve hours in the bureau. They were asked to sign undertakings not to target MTV and to delete the disputed posts. When they refused, the prosecutor ordered their detention. After protests and political mediation, they were released under investigation. Civil society actors described the procedures as exceeding the prosecutor’s legal powers and criticised the detention as a violation of freedom of expression.⁶⁰¹

According to Freedom House, the right to peaceful assembly was largely upheld in 2024, and gatherings commonly took place without official authorisation. While demonstrations focusing on state mismanagement and the economic crisis usually were allowed to proceed without interference, foreign nationals, LGBTIQ persons, and other marginalised groups encountered heightened obstacles when attempting to exercise their right to protest. The same source stated that protesters at times faced assaults from political factions, armed groups, or private individuals, while judicial police occasionally issued summons to those involved. No specific examples of such incidents during the reference period were given.⁶⁰² In 2023, a protest in Beirut against curbs on fundamental rights was violently disrupted by groups of men reportedly associated with religious extremists and security forces allegedly did not provide

⁵⁹⁶ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section D4

⁵⁹⁷ HRW, World Report 2025 – Lebanon, 16 January 2025, [url](#), p. 283; NHRC-CPT, Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Prevention of Torture An absolute and non-restrictive obligation, Annual Report 2023, 22 May 2024, [url](#), p.17

⁵⁹⁸ HRW, Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Lebanon 51st Session, 16 July 2025, [url](#), p. 7

⁵⁹⁹ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section F2

⁶⁰⁰ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section D4

⁶⁰¹ Legal Agenda, احتجاز ثلاث ناشطات لرفضهن حذف منشورات حول تغطية إم تي في خلال الحرب [Three activists detained for refusing to delete posts about MTV’s coverage during the war.], 17 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁰² Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section E1



effective protection, with some engaging in harassment or physical attacks against protesters and media representatives.⁶⁰³

Freedom House further reported that civil society organisations continued to operate but remained subject to the 1909 Law on Associations and to other legislation governing labour, finance, and immigration. Registration with the Ministry of Interior was required, and the ministry could investigate the organisation's founders and staff. Some NGOs experienced bureaucratic obstacles or interference by security agencies depending on their field of work. Groups led by Syrian refugees were particularly vulnerable to scrutiny, and organisations associated with LGBTIQ rights encountered restrictions, as authorities took steps to curb related initiatives.⁶⁰⁴ According to a 2024 Mid-Term report for the Universal Periodic Review in Geneva prepared by over 30 civil society organisations, civic space for civil society steadily narrowed as authorities intensified their crackdown on civil society organisations, especially those offering assistance to Syrian refugees. The government obliged organisations to obtain authorisation from governors and the Ministry of Social Affairs before entering refugee camps. Authorities further issued ad-hoc directives commanding NGOs share internal records and data on their beneficiaries.⁶⁰⁵ In addition, in late 2024, Israeli airstrikes and incursions in southern Lebanon and near the Syrian border severely disrupted the work of humanitarian groups, limiting their capacity to provide relief.⁶⁰⁶

The Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR) noted in a report about media workers from December 2024 that the war context placed persons who exercised free speech at heightened risk, with reports of killings, physical violence, pressure to suppress their work, and intimidation in digital spaces.⁶⁰⁷ In a subsequent submission from July 2025, GCHR emphasised that women human rights defenders faced particular risks. While the evidence cited predated the current reporting period, it described continuing patterns of harassment, social stigmatisation, online abuse, and surveillance targeting women advocating for gender equality, reform of personal status laws, and LGBTQ+ rights.⁶⁰⁸

7.3.1. Treatment of human rights lawyers and legal defenders

The Lebanese judiciary was reported to lack independence, with political leaders exerting significant influence over appointments, jurisdiction, and decision-making. Judicial processes were further affected by corruption and the undue influence of prominent individuals.⁶⁰⁹ Human rights lawyers stated that vague legislation regulating social media created uncertainty, as there were no clear standards defining what was permissible. Lawyers

⁶⁰³ NHRC-CPT, Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and Prevention of Torture An absolute and non-restrictive obligation, Annual Report 2023, 22 May 2024, [url](#), pp.18-19; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section E1

⁶⁰⁴ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section E2

⁶⁰⁵ ANND, Midterm Report 2024, 2024, [url](#), p.23

⁶⁰⁶ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section E2

⁶⁰⁷ GCHR et al., Attacked from all directions: Media workers under fire in Lebanon's war, December 2024, [url](#), p. 5

⁶⁰⁸ GCHR et al., Lebanon Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review, 51st Session, 24 July 2025, [url](#), pp. 8–9

⁶⁰⁹ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section F1



specialising in immigration matters reported being subjected to public hostility, with accusations of prioritising foreigners over Lebanese nationals. Judges were also reported to be targeted online, with details of their personal lives and families published on social media platforms as a means of intimidation.⁶¹⁰

Due process guarantees were described as particularly insufficient in Lebanon's exceptional courts, most notably the military courts. Judges in these courts were not required to have a legal background, yet were authorised to hear cases involving civilians and minors in matters deemed related to security. In practice, military courts exercised jurisdiction over cases involving human rights activists and demonstrators, in addition to cases involving alleged spies or militants.⁶¹¹ Human Rights Watch also reported the continued use of military courts to try civilians and intimidation of judicial actors.⁶¹²

During the reference period human rights lawyers faced direct targeting as a consequence of their work. Khaled W. Al Sabbagh, head of the advocacy and rights executive unit at the Tripoli Coalition of Advocates and of the strategic advocacy and communication unit at AnaHon – an independent media platform from Tripoli⁶¹³ –, had faced repeated harassment, threats, and intimidation since 2017 as a result of his work. He primarily operated in conflict-affected areas and represented human rights defenders accused under anti-terrorism legislation. On 9 October 2024, he was arrested by members of the 12th Brigade of the Lebanese Armed Forces and detained at the Military Police Detention Centre, where he was interrogated. During questioning, he was repeatedly asked whether he intended to continue criticising the Military Tribunal and security agencies. Authorities specifically referred to a podcast he had hosted on AnaHon, in which he and lawyer and defender Mohamad Sablough discussed human rights violations attributed to Lebanese security services, including allegations of torture during interrogation, unlawful detention, and procedural delays. He was released without charge the same day. Following his release, colleagues and community members reported that security agencies had been making enquiries about him in relation to the accusations.⁶¹⁴

Similar pressures were reported in the case of Mohammad Sablough, head of the legal support programme at the Cedar Centre for Legal Studies. He represented victims of torture and arbitrary detention and documented violations affecting Syrian refugees. Since 2021, he had reported repeated harassment. In August 2024, while attending a hearing for a client in the Military Court in Beirut, Sablough published a social media post criticising the sentencing decision by the court and calling for the abolition of the military judiciary. He was consequentially banned from entering the Military Court for three months due to the post. Following an appeal, the decision was lifted and he was able to resume appearing before the court.⁶¹⁵

⁶¹⁰ GCHR et al., Attacked from all directions: Media workers under fire in Lebanon's war, December 2024, [url](#), p. 19

⁶¹¹ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section F2

⁶¹² HRW, Lebanon: Judicial Reforms Positive, But Fall Short, 15 August 2025, [url](#)

⁶¹³ Anahon, Who We Are, n.d., [url](#)

⁶¹⁴ FLD, Human rights defender and lawyer Khaled W. Al Sabbagh subject to ongoing defamation campaign led by Lebanese security agencies, 7 November 2024, [url](#)

⁶¹⁵ CCLS, Harassment against Attorney Mohammad Sablough, 21 August 2024, [url](#)



Further restrictions on lawyers were introduced in 2025. On 6 May 2025, the Tripoli Bar Association issued a circular to all lawyers under its jurisdiction. The circular reminded lawyers of the obligation to obtain prior approval from the President of the Bar before making media appearances or public statements, in accordance with Article 39 of the Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct. It further prohibited public criticism of the judiciary or security agencies, warning of disciplinary measures for non-compliance.⁶¹⁶ For more information on the justice system in Lebanon, see section [3 Legal system and the judiciary](#).

7.4. Journalists and media workers

7.4.1. Threats and harassment against journalists and media workers

Journalists and media workers in Lebanon continued to operate in a restrictive environment marked by surveillance,⁶¹⁷ harassment,⁶¹⁸ intimidation,⁶¹⁹ and legal prosecution.⁶²⁰ The ongoing political and economic crisis further exacerbated risks to the media. Journalists described arbitrary restrictions and digital harassment as obstacles to reporting, alongside direct intimidation and threats to their physical safety, including arbitrary arrests.⁶²¹ Authorities monitored social media and electronic communications of journalists and security forces were reported to have infiltrated online groups used by activists.⁶²²

The persistent use of criminal defamation provisions remained one of the central mechanisms of pressure on the media.⁶²³ Defamation and insult laws were repeatedly applied against journalists and critics, particularly those investigating allegations of corruption or mismanagement.⁶²⁴ Amnesty International documented more than 15 cases of individuals summoned for interrogation between 2023 and mid-2025, noting that security and military agencies frequently deviated from standard procedures.⁶²⁵ In several cases, those summoned were not informed of the accusations beforehand, raising concerns regarding due process.⁶²⁶

⁶¹⁶ CCLS, Restricting Legal Speech - The Implications of the Tripoli Bar Association's Circular on Freedom of Expression and the Independence of the Legal Profession, 9 May 2025, [url](#)

⁶¹⁷ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section D4

⁶¹⁸ RSF, Lebanon, 2025, [url](#)

⁶¹⁹ AI, Lebanon: Authorities must immediately dismiss complaint against independent media outlets, 14 April 2025, [url](#)

⁶²⁰ AI, The State of the World's Human Rights – Lebanon 2024, 29 April 2025, [url](#), p. 237; Amnesty International, Lebanon: Crises Erode Human Rights: Submission to the 51st session of the UPR Working Group, 19-30 January 2026, July 2025, [url](#), p. 3

⁶²¹ LCPS, Voices Under Siege: Monitoring Freedom of Speech in Lebanon, 20 August 2025, [url](#)

⁶²² Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section D4

⁶²³ IFJ, Lebanon: Stop weaponising defamation laws to intimidate journalists, 14 July 2025, [url](#); HRW, Human Rights Watch Letter to Lebanese Prime Minister-Designate Nawaf Salam, 30 January 2025, [url](#); AI, The State of the World's Human Rights – Lebanon 2024, 29 April 2025, [url](#), p. 237

⁶²⁴ HRW, Lebanon: Journalists, Activist Summoned for Investigations, 14 April 2025, [url](#); AI, Lebanon: Authorities must immediately dismiss complaint against independent media outlets, 14 April 2025, [url](#); Article 19, MENA: Media freedom still under attack across the region, 4 May 2025, [url](#)

⁶²⁵ AI, Lebanon: Crises Erode Human Rights: Submission to the 51st session of the UPR Working Group, 19-30 January 2026, July 2025, [url](#), p. 3

⁶²⁶ AI, The State of the World's Human Rights – Lebanon 2024, 29 April 2025, [url](#), p. 237



Interrogated individuals were often pressured to delete content and sign pledges of silence.⁶²⁷ Following interrogation, individuals were generally not informed whether the charges against them would be dismissed. Even when cases did not advance to court, the summonses and interrogations functioned as a deterrent to free expression, according to Amnesty International.⁶²⁸

Several high-profile cases in 2024 and 2025 illustrated this trend. In June 2024, journalist Azza al-Hajj Hassan was sued by a parliamentarian and former judge on charges of libel and defamation after publishing an article examining links between politicians and bankers. In October 2024, Lebanese Syrian journalist Alia Mansour, deputy editor of NOW Lebanon, was detained for several hours after a fake social media account impersonating her allegedly interacted with Israeli social media users.⁶²⁹

Investigative journalists reporting on financial misconduct were subjected to continuous pressure. In July 2025, the chairman of Société Générale de Banque au Liban (SGBL), Antoun Sehnaoui, filed a defamation complaint against two journalists from Naqd media,⁶³⁰ an independent Lebanese media platform.⁶³¹ In spring of the same year, Daraj Media and Megaphone News were summoned for interrogation by the Cassation Public Prosecution Office after they were accused of undermining the state's financial standing, destabilising the currency, inciting deposit withdrawals, and conspiring against state security.⁶³² The complaint followed critical reporting on certain candidates for the Central Bank governorship and on Lebanon's financial crisis.⁶³³ Rights groups warned that these lawsuits amounted to an attempt by financial and political elites to instrumentalise the judicial system to intimidate independent media and restrict scrutiny.⁶³⁴

The harassment extended beyond legal measures. Journalists reported physical threats, violent attacks and online harassment, often linked to supporters of political factions.⁶³⁵ Social media platforms were used to target reporters with smear campaigns, death threats,⁶³⁶ and accusations of treason.⁶³⁷ In some cases, physical intimidation was reported.⁶³⁸ In 2024, journalist and television presenter Eman Shweikh announced her resignation from MTV after receiving death threats and repeated harassment that were attributed to supporters of

⁶²⁷ Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024, Lebanon, 31 May 2024, [url](#), section B2

⁶²⁸ AI, Lebanon: Crises Erode Human Rights: Submission to the 51st session of the UPR Working Group, 19-30 January 2026, July 2025, [url](#), p. 3

⁶²⁹ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section D1

⁶³⁰ IFJ, Lebanon: Stop weaponising defamation laws to intimidate journalists, 14 July 2025, [url](#)

⁶³¹ Naqd Media, About Naqd, not dated, [url](#)

⁶³² HRW, Lebanon: Journalists, Activist Summoned for Investigations, 14 April 2025, [url](#); AI, Lebanon: Authorities must immediately dismiss complaint against independent media outlets, 14 April 2025, [url](#); Article 19, MENA: Media freedom still under attack across the region, 4 May 2025, [url](#)

⁶³³ AI, Lebanon: Authorities must immediately dismiss complaint against independent media outlets, 14 April 2025, [url](#)

⁶³⁴ AI, Lebanon: Authorities must immediately dismiss complaint against independent media outlets, 14 April 2025, [url](#); Article 19, MENA: Media freedom still under attack across the region, 4 May 2025, [url](#)

⁶³⁵ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section D1

⁶³⁶ Arab News, Renowned Lebanese journalist quits MTV over death threats by alleged Hezbollah supporters, 5 December 2024, [url](#); RSF, Lebanon, 2025, [url](#)

⁶³⁷ Arab News, Renowned Lebanese journalist quits MTV over death threats by alleged Hezbollah supporters, 5 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶³⁸ HRW, World Report 2025 – Lebanon, 16 January 2025, [url](#), p. 283; RSF, Lebanon, 2025, [url](#)





Hezbollah. She described being followed home, pursued in public, and her family being harassed, which led her to leave her position out of concern for her and her family's safety.⁶³⁹ Public opinion in Lebanon also contributed to an increasingly hostile environment. Journalists covering sensitive issues such as refugees, gender, and minority rights were accused of promoting Western agendas, leading to additional threats. Political activists, particularly Hezbollah loyalists, were reported to have engaged in intimidation campaigns, including threats directed at reporters.⁶⁴⁰ Lebanese authorities repeatedly failed to safeguard journalists from threats and acts of violence perpetrated by political, religious, and other influential groups.⁶⁴¹

From October 2023 until the end of 2024, a minimum of nine journalists were reported killed in Israeli airstrikes in southern Lebanon, with several casualties involving individuals visibly identified as press and located away from active conflict areas.⁶⁴² On 25 October 2024, an Israeli strike hit a residence in Hasbaya housing 18 journalists, killing three,⁶⁴³ with the attacks being condemned as deliberate targeting of the press.⁶⁴⁴ According to Reporters Without Borders (RSF), killings of journalists in Lebanon remained unpunished.⁶⁴⁵

7.4.2. Censorship

According to Freedom House, the media landscape in Lebanon was among the most diverse in the region, yet outlets were largely dependent on political, financial, or foreign sponsors, which fostered a certain level of self-censorship. Criticism of the President or security services was criminalised, and such provisions were used to harass or detain journalists, who were at times required to sign pledges restricting future expression.⁶⁴⁶ Self-censorship was also prevalent in online spaces, where users feared retaliation, such as defamation lawsuits.⁶⁴⁷

For further information on defamation lawsuits and the harassment of journalists, see section [7.4.1 Threats and harassment against journalists and media workers.](#)

⁶³⁹ Arab News, Renowned Lebanese journalist quits MTV over death threats by alleged Hezbollah supporters, 5 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁰ RSF, Lebanon, 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁴¹ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section D1

⁶⁴² LCPS, Voices Under Siege: Monitoring Freedom of Speech in Lebanon, 20 August 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁴³ APC, Statement on the targeting and killing of journalists in Palestine and Lebanon, 12 November 2024, [url](#); Al Jazeera, How impunity fuels Israel's attacks on journalists in Gaza and Lebanon, 25 October 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁴ APC, Statement on the targeting and killing of journalists in Palestine and Lebanon, 12 November 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁵ RSF, Lebanon, 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁶ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section D1

⁶⁴⁷ Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024, Lebanon, 31 May 2024, [url](#), section B4





7.5. LGBTIQ persons, including activists

7.5.1. Institutional discrimination based on sexual orientation/gender identity

In Lebanon, personal status matters are regulated exclusively through religious law, with 15 distinct family codes applied by confessional courts. Same-sex unions or other forms of legal recognition for same-sex couples are not acknowledged in any of those 15 codes. Provisions of the Penal Code continue to criminalise or constrain the expression of sexual orientation and gender identity. Article 521 prescribes imprisonment of six years for ‘men disguising themselves as women,’ thereby criminalising gender expression of transgender women and individuals who cross-dress.⁶⁴⁸ Article 534 penalises ‘sexual intercourse contrary to the order of nature’ with up to one year of imprisonment.⁶⁴⁹ Although several judicial decisions between 2007 and 2018 affirmed that consensual same-sex relations could not be considered illegal, the provision remains in force.⁶⁵⁰ For more information on personal status law, see section [3.1.1 Personal Status Law](#).

According to Amnesty International, public rhetoric targeting sexual and gender minorities has intensified markedly since 2022, when the Minister of Interior prohibited public gatherings during Pride month on the grounds that they promoted ‘sexual perversion’.⁶⁵¹ The climate further deteriorated in 2023, when opposition parliamentarians introduced a proposal to repeal Article 534. Political and religious leaders from across the spectrum mobilised against the initiative.⁶⁵² This discourse contributed to a broader campaign rejecting LGBTIQ rights.⁶⁵³

Restrictions extended beyond rhetoric. According to Freedom House, security agencies monitored online activities of activists and groups, including LGBTIQ persons, by infiltrating social media networks.⁶⁵⁴ In September 2024, the president of the Lebanese University suspended the defence of a psychology master’s thesis on strengthening resilience among homosexuals against homophobia despite the thesis having met academic requirements, citing conflict with ‘prevailing social values,’ a decision that provoked criticism from faculty and students.⁶⁵⁵

⁶⁴⁸ Equaldex, LGBT Rights in Lebanon, 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁹ Lebanon, National Legislative Bodies and UNODC, قانون العقوبات, 1, 340, مرسوم اشتراعي رقم 1340 [Penal Code, Legislative Decree 1340] March 1943, [url](#), Article 534

⁶⁵⁰ AI, Lebanon: Crises Erode Human Rights: Submission to the 51st session of the UPR Working Group, 19-30 January 2026, July 2025, [url](#), p. 2; HRW, World Report 2025 – Lebanon, 16 January 2025, [url](#), p. 284

⁶⁵¹ AI, Lebanon: Crises Erode Human Rights: Submission to the 51st session of the UPR Working Group, 19-30 January 2026, July 2025, [url](#), p. 4

⁶⁵² ARI, Heteronationalism, Religion, and Family Values: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Lebanese Politicians’ Statements Following Attempts to Abolish Article 534, 11 April 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁵³ ARI, Heteronationalism, Religion, and Family Values: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Lebanese Politicians’ Statements Following Attempts to Abolish Article 534, 11 April 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁵⁴ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section D4

⁶⁵⁵ Al Araby Al Jadeed, الجامعة اللبنانية توقف مناقشة رسالة ماجستير حول المثلية الجنسية [The Lebanese University suspends the discussion of a master’s thesis on homosexuality], 17 September 2024, [url](#) Al Araby Al Jadeed, الجامعة اللبنانية توقف مناقشة رسالة ماجستير حول المثلية الجنسية [The Lebanese University suspends the discussion of a master’s thesis on homosexuality], 17 September 2024, [url](#)





In parallel, access to shelters for LGBTIQ survivors of violence remained extremely limited. Government-operated shelters largely excluded queer and transgender individuals, who were either denied entry or compelled to conceal their identity.⁶⁵⁶ A 2024 survey conducted by Jasmin Lilian Diab, further found that transgender women experiencing violence were frequently refused protection by the police and were instead threatened with arrest under morality provisions such as Article 534.⁶⁵⁷

Despite these constraints, reporting by L'Orient-Le Jour in February 2025 noted signs of revival in LGBTIQ life in Beirut, with events, performances, and conferences being organised. However, organisers maintained strict discretion, and community members continued to regard open communication as too risky, underscoring the persistence of caution.⁶⁵⁸

7.5.2. Societal discrimination

Individuals identifying as LGBTIQ, and particularly transgender women, were reported to face entrenched marginalisation, hostility, and violence within Lebanese society. Accounts from within the community described that they were targeted by relatives, neighbours, and community members, with limited avenues for safety or support services.⁶⁵⁹ Jasmin Lilian Diab's 2024 survey indicated that visibly queer persons—such as gender-nonconforming lesbians, transmasculine people, and transfeminine individuals—were subjected to violence in both public and private settings. Transgender persons, regardless of age, experienced heightened exposure to physical assault, harassment, and sexual violence, often at the hands of family members or acquaintances. Advocates underlined that for many transgender individuals, the act of appearing in public constituted both a declaration of identity and a considerable risk.⁶⁶⁰

In September 2025, Lebanese dancer Alexandre Paulikevitch, known for performing in dresses and corsets to classical Arabic music in a style traditionally associated with women, held sold-out performances in Beirut despite threats from extremist groups, including the right-wing Christian 'Soldiers of God' and Sunni Islamist actors. Prior to the event, security forces contacted the venue to express concern; however, the management proceeded with the performance and arranged additional police presence. Armed officers were deployed outside the venue, and the events concluded without incident.⁶⁶¹

Violence against queer individuals was frequently regarded as socially acceptable, and in some cases even encouraged by families, religious communities, and wider society.

⁶⁵⁶ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 14

⁶⁵⁷ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 22

⁶⁵⁸ L'Orient-Le Jour, À Beyrouth, la vie LGBTQ+ reprend... avec vigilance [In Beirut, LGBTQ+ life resumes... with vigilance], 1 February 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁵⁹ GBV Working Group – Lebanon, Gender Based Violence Safety Audit for Lebanon, November 2024, [url](#), p. 5

⁶⁶⁰ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 11

⁶⁶¹ AP, A Lebanese dancer defies extremist threats and social norms with his sold-out performances, 13 September 2025, [url](#)





Transgender persons were identified as facing the gravest risks, including repeated attempts on their lives by relatives, blackmail, forced confinement, and systematic exclusion. One transgender woman from Beirut stated that her family had attempted to kill her several times and continued to pursue her. In many communities, such acts were framed not as violations but as measures to restore family honour, preserve morality, or protect society from perceived corruption.⁶⁶²

A survey conducted by Beirut-based civil society organisation Proud Lebanon with 93 members of the LGBTIQ community in Lebanon found that two-thirds (66.7 %) of respondents reported psychological or emotional abuse related to their sexual orientation or gender identity, 83.1 % felt unsafe when seeking help or reporting discrimination and violence, and 70.3 % concealed their identity in the workplace out of fear of discrimination or retaliation.⁶⁶³

Furthermore, sexual harassment in public spaces (such as threats, verbal abuse or groping)⁶⁶⁴ was experienced by the majority of LGBTIQ persons, according to Jasmin Lilian Diab.⁶⁶⁵ Alongside this, emotional abuse and online harassment grew in prominence. Survivors recounted experiences of blackmail via social media, threats of exposure or shaming, and campaigns of online harassment.⁶⁶⁶ Human Rights Watch in 2023 documented that digital targeting often had severe repercussions in the offline environment. Hostility intensified in 2022 following the Interior Ministry's ban on public LGBTQ+ gatherings, which was accompanied by a surge of online hate speech.⁶⁶⁷

Healthcare provision was likewise characterised as exclusionary. LGBTIQ persons reported experiences of ridicule, misgendering, and denial of services. Healthcare delivery was frequently accompanied by intrusive or moralising inquiries concerning sexual behaviour and gender identity. Transgender women in particular stated that they were perceived as suffering from mental illness rather than being recognised as patients requiring a doctor. The anticipation of humiliation or involuntary disclosure of identity deterred many from accessing sexual and reproductive health services, even when such care was essential.⁶⁶⁸

Despite widespread discrimination, certain spaces of acceptance and support for LGBTIQ persons continued to exist in Lebanon, particularly in Beirut, where some bars, clubs, and cultural events catered to the community. These venues nevertheless operated under

⁶⁶² Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 21

⁶⁶³ Proud Lebanon, Invisible Voices, A Comprehensive Research on SOGIESC Diversity in Lebanon, 2024, [url](#), pp. 50–51, 61

⁶⁶⁴ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 14

⁶⁶⁵ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 9

⁶⁶⁶ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 11

⁶⁶⁷ HRW, Lebanon: Attack on Freedoms Targets LGBTI People, 5 September 2023, [url](#)

⁶⁶⁸ Diab, J. L., GBV Safety Audit Report on GBV, SRH, and Shelter Accessibility in Lebanon, CARE International, 27 June 2025, [url](#), p. 27



constant risk of raids and closures, and their presence did not necessarily indicate wider societal tolerance.⁶⁶⁹

7.5.3. Treatment of LGBTIQ activists

Information on the treatment of LGBTIQ activists during the reporting period remained limited. The following section therefore draws on the most prominent available reporting from 2022 and 2023.

Freedom House reported in 2025 that the activities of organisations advocating for LGBTIQ rights continued to be constrained in Lebanon. Authorities maintained restrictions on public expression and association, which affected the capacity of NGOs and activist groups to function openly.⁶⁷⁰ According to Human Rights Watch, security agencies had repeatedly interfered with initiatives addressing gender and sexuality since 2017. In June 2022, the caretaker Minister of Interior issued a directive instructing security forces to prevent LGBTIQ-related events, describing them as promoting ‘sexual perversion.’ Although a court suspended this directive in November 2022, the ministry issued a subsequent order prohibiting any conferences, gatherings, or protests addressing homosexuality.⁶⁷¹

These restrictions coincided with intensifying rhetoric by political and religious leaders against sexual and gender minorities from 2022 onwards. On the day the ministry’s directive was issued, officers from General Security and Internal Security reportedly questioned both feminist and LGBTIQ activists at a cultural centre concerning a planned private workshop, urging them to cancel or obtain authorisation. Activists stated that they were later subjected to repeated calls from security branches, requesting informal meetings and indicating that their online activities were under surveillance. Authorities justified such interventions by invoking the 1911 Law on Public Meetings, despite its applicability only to public - not private - gatherings.⁶⁷²

Societal hostility was also directed against activists and allies. In October 2023, a civil society march in defence of freedoms, which was not explicitly focused on LGBTIQ issues, was attacked by a group of men who shouted homophobic comments and physically assaulted participants. Amnesty International criticised the security forces for failing to protect demonstrators during the incident.⁶⁷³

⁶⁶⁹ LCPS, Living with Inequality: An Overview of LGBTQIA+ Rights in Lebanon, 2 September 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁷⁰ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section E2

⁶⁷¹ HRW, Lebanon: Attack on Freedoms Targets LGBTI People, 5 September 2023, [url](#)

⁶⁷² HRW, Lebanon: Unlawful Crackdown on LGBTI Gatherings, 4 July 2022, [url](#)

⁶⁷³ France 24, LGBTQ Lebanese under attack as activists decry eroding freedoms, 5 October 2023, [url](#)



7.6. Syrians in Lebanon

7.6.1. Legal status and demographics

Lebanon has not ratified the 1951 UN Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol⁶⁷⁴ and lacks a comprehensive national legal framework and policy on refugees.⁶⁷⁵ As new registrations of refugees from Syria by UNHCR were suspended by the government in 2015⁶⁷⁶ and the possibility of alternative informal registration with UNHCR was not used by many newly arriving Syrians,⁶⁷⁷ the actual number of refugees is unknown.⁶⁷⁸ As of 30 June 2025, the Lebanese government estimated the number of displaced Syrians in the country at 1.4 million, of whom 716 312 were registered with UNHCR.⁶⁷⁹ Syrian refugees are not eligible for Lebanese citizenship and lack political rights.⁶⁸⁰

Legal residency in Lebanon can be obtained on various grounds, including possession of a UNHCR registration certificate⁶⁸¹ (only issued until 2015),⁶⁸² sponsorship, courtesy (spouses and children of Lebanese citizens), study purposes, property ownership, or possession of a work permit.⁶⁸³ However, the majority of Syrians lacked access to legal residency in the country⁶⁸⁴ due to high fees and administrative obstacles involved in obtaining it.⁶⁸⁵ While UNHCR, UNICEF and the World Food Programme (WFP) jointly noted that the rate of legal residency among Syrians had increased by 3.3 % between 2021 and 2023 (from 16.4 % to 19.7 %),⁶⁸⁶ that rate dropped back to 18 % in 2024. At Governorate level, legal residency rates in 2024 were highest in Nabatieh (30 %), Beirut (28 %) and South Lebanon (26 %) and lowest in Akkar and Bekaa (10 and 15 %, respectively).⁶⁸⁷ For holders of legal residency, the renewal of residence permits involved major challenges, with reports of delays in handling extension applications at the office of the General Directorate of the General Security, along with difficulties related to the payment of renewal fees.⁶⁸⁸

⁶⁷⁴ CCLS, Report on Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Between Discriminatory Policies, Hate Speech and the “Death Boats”, 18 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁷⁵ UNHCR, Annual Results Report – 2024 Lebanon, 29 May 2025, [url](#), p. 11

⁶⁷⁶ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, 12 March 2025, [url](#), para. 65; UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), 9 October 2024, [url](#), para. 31

⁶⁷⁷ Syria Direct, Lebanon’s latest Syrian refugees in limbo, 10 June 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁷⁸ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, 12 March 2025, [url](#), para. 65; UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), 9 October 2024, [url](#), para. 31

⁶⁷⁹ UNHCR, Operational Data Portal, last updated 30 June 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁸⁰ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section B4

⁶⁸¹ UNHCR Lebanon, Legal Residency, n.d., [url](#)

⁶⁸² UNHCR Lebanon, Registration, n.d., [url](#)

⁶⁸³ UNHCR Lebanon, Legal Residency, n.d., [url](#)

⁶⁸⁴ AI, Lebanon: Crises Erode Human Rights: Submission to the 51st session of the UPR Working Group, 19-30 January 2026, July 2025, [url](#), p. 4

⁶⁸⁵ Syria Direct, Lebanon’s latest Syrian refugees in limbo, 10 June 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁸⁶ UNHCR et al., VASyR 2023: Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, 10 June 2024, [url](#), p. 13

⁶⁸⁷ UNHCR et al., Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR) 2024, n.d., [url](#), p. 3

⁶⁸⁸ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 9



7.6.2. Treatment by state, society and other actors

Syrian nationals in Lebanon faced stigmatisation involving various stereotypes and frequent attribution of criminal behaviour.⁶⁸⁹ Human rights organisations noted that in recent years, Syrians were subjected to arbitrary arrests, torture, forced returns,⁶⁹⁰ discriminatory policies,⁶⁹¹ mob violence, and public calls for their expulsion.⁶⁹² UNHCR pointed out that the authorities had introduced over 567 administrative measures affecting Syrian refugees in 2024⁶⁹³ and at least 104 over the first quarter 2025.⁶⁹⁴ These measures included restrictions on movement, arrests at checkpoints, restrictions on rent and livelihoods, the imposition of taxes, fees⁶⁹⁵ and municipal IDs,⁶⁹⁶ as well as orders to demolish their tents.⁶⁹⁷

The overall number of raids targeting Syrian refugees peaked in the second and fourth quarters of 2024⁶⁹⁸ before dropping to significantly lower levels during the first quarter of 2025.⁶⁹⁹ Most raids occurred in the Bekaa Valley.⁷⁰⁰ UNHCR reported that thousands of Syrians were deported after raids on refugees' residences and arrests made at checkpoints and during intercepted onward journeys by sea.⁷⁰¹ Raids and checkpoints led to restrictions of freedom of movement and livelihoods and heightened fears of arbitrary arrest and deportation among Syrians,⁷⁰² with some refugees interviewed by Amnesty International saying that they were avoiding to go outside their homes, to their workplaces, or to send their children to

⁶⁸⁹ CCLS, Report on Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Between Discriminatory Policies, Hate Speech and the "Death Boats", 18 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁹⁰ AI, Lebanon: Crises Erode Human Rights: Submission to the 51st session of the UPR Working Group, 19-30 January 2026, July 2025, [url](#), p. 4; HRW, World Report 2025 – Lebanon, 16 January 2025, [url](#), p. 281

⁶⁹¹ AI, Lebanon: Crises Erode Human Rights: Submission to the 51st session of the UPR Working Group, 19-30 January 2026, July 2025, [url](#), p. 4

⁶⁹² TNH, Israel's Lebanon assault: A double suffering for Syrian refugees, 2 October 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁹³ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (4th Quarter 2024), 2 January 2025, [url](#), p. 11

⁶⁹⁴ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 10

⁶⁹⁵ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 10; UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (4th Quarter 2024), 2 January 2025, [url](#), p. 11

⁶⁹⁶ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (4th Quarter 2024), 2 January 2025, [url](#), p. 11

⁶⁹⁷ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 10

⁶⁹⁸ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (4th Quarter 2024), 2 January 2025, [url](#), p. 12

⁶⁹⁹ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 11

⁷⁰⁰ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (4th Quarter 2024), 2 January 2025, [url](#), p. 12

⁷⁰¹ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025, 29 July 2025, [url](#), para. 50; UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2024, 13 November 2024, [url](#), para. 70

⁷⁰² UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 3



school.⁷⁰³ Raids on residences were followed by eviction orders issued by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), some of which also targeted refugees with valid residency.⁷⁰⁴

In April and May 2024, after the LAF found that Syrian citizens were behind the killing of a local official of the Lebanese Forces (LF),⁷⁰⁵ a major Christian political party,⁷⁰⁶ several violent incidents were reported, including physical assaults, as well as threats and protests against Syrian refugees. Unidentified groups distributed leaflets calling for the departure of Syrians from certain areas.⁷⁰⁷ Simultaneously, the authorities intensified their rhetoric against Syrian refugees.⁷⁰⁸

In May 2024, the General Directorate of General Security announced a series of new measures and rules, including the demand that Syrians without legal residency make arrangements with the border authorities to 'leave Lebanese territory'.⁷⁰⁹ The authorities also restricted the categories under which Syrian refugees were entitled to apply for residency.⁷¹⁰

An intensification of Israeli bombardments from 23 September 2024 in Southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley and Beirut's southern outskirts resulted in mass displacement among both Lebanese and Syrians,⁷¹¹ affecting an estimated 1 million people. This was followed by a temporary ceasefire on 27 November that prompted large-scale IDP return movements. However, as of late March 2025, only 64 % of displaced Syrians had returned to their places of residence (in comparison to 82 % of displaced Lebanese). One of the obstacles to return for Syrians were restrictive measures introduced by municipalities and non-state actors in southern Lebanon that expressly banned Syrians from returning to their places of residence.⁷¹² In the Bekaa Valley, municipalities threatened Syrians residing in some camps with eviction if they hosted newly displaced family members or friends, while in other cases, Syrians were evicted to make space for Lebanese IDP families.⁷¹³

Moreover, the collapse of the Assad government in Syria led to changes in perceptions among both Lebanese and refugee communities. Syrian refugees in the south in particular have been facing growing verbal harassment by the local communities urging them to return

⁷⁰³ AI, World leaders must commit to protecting Syrian refugees as Lebanon steps up crackdown ahead of Brussels conference, 27 May 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁰⁴ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 11

⁷⁰⁵ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2024, 12 July 2024, [url](#), para. 64

⁷⁰⁶ AI-Monitor, After kidnapping, senior Lebanese Forces official found dead in Syria, 8 April 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁰⁷ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2024, 12 July 2024, [url](#), para. 64

⁷⁰⁸ AI, The State of the World's Human Rights – Lebanon 2024, 29 April 2025, [url](#), p. 238; Musarea, A., Protecting Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, TWI, 8 May 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁰⁹ AI et al., Lebanon: Hundreds of Thousands of Syrian Refugees at Imminent Risk of Deportation, 16 May 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁷¹⁰ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section G1

⁷¹¹ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (4th Quarter 2024), 2 January 2025, [url](#), p. 4

⁷¹² UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), pp. 4-5

⁷¹³ Haid, H., Caught Between Two Wars: The Risky Return of Syrian Refugees from Lebanon, TIMEP, 13 November 2024, [url](#)



to Syria, with some reports of physical violence. In addition, there were reported tensions between newly arrived Alawite and Shia Syrians on the one hand and Sunni communities (both Lebanese nationals and long-term Syrian refugees) on the other over perceived ties between the newly arrived Syrians and the former Assad government. In Beirut and Mount Lebanon, a number of violent incidents occurred between newly arrived Syrian refugees and Lebanese IDPs sharing the same collective shelters.⁷¹⁴

7.6.3. Socio-economic conditions

Around 90 % of Syrian refugees were reported to live in ‘extreme poverty’⁷¹⁵ or below the poverty line.⁷¹⁶ Many Syrian refugees were housed in informal and illegal camps⁷¹⁷ and small-scale settlements,⁷¹⁸ facing poor living conditions with insufficient health structures or safe drinking water⁷¹⁹ and being subject to curfews and other limitations to freedom of movement.⁷²⁰ Lack of legal residency permits, concerning 93 % of all Syrian refugee households, restricted freedom of movement and access to basic services, healthcare and work, as well as access to justice.⁷²¹ Some Syrian refugees secondarily displaced by the hostilities in autumn 2024 had lost legal documentation, making the renewal of their rental contracts difficult. Without legal residency, Syrians were vulnerable to exploitation on the housing market, with landlords charging inflated rents, subjecting them to arbitrarily evictions, and favouring Lebanese tenants over Syrians.⁷²²

While Syrians in Lebanon worked in a variety of domains, discrimination⁷²³ and strict requirements regarding the issuance of residency papers and work permits have made it difficult for Syrians to find formal employment.⁷²⁴ Moreover, Syrian refugees were vulnerable to exploitation at the workplace and child labour was frequent within the refugee community.⁷²⁵ In May 2024, the General Directorate of General Security announced a series of new measures and rules, including the prohibition for Lebanese nationals ‘to employ, shelter, or provide housing for Syrians residing illegally in Lebanon’. The Directorate also demanded the closure of ‘all illegal establishments and shops managed or invested by Syrians’, threatening ‘appropriate measures against anyone who employs foreign workers in violation

⁷¹⁴ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 10

⁷¹⁵ TNH, Israel’s Lebanon assault: A double suffering for Syrian refugees, 2 October 2024, [url](#)

⁷¹⁶ AI, World leaders must commit to protecting Syrian refugees as Lebanon steps up crackdown ahead of Brussels conference, 27 May 2024, [url](#)

⁷¹⁷ ACW, Lebanon Needs Help in Dealing with Its Syrian Refugees, 10 July 2024, [url](#)

⁷¹⁸ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section G1

⁷¹⁹ IPS, Lebanon’s Deep Healthcare Crisis Exposed through Communicable Diseases, 8 July 2024, [url](#)

⁷²⁰ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section G1

⁷²¹ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 9

⁷²² UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 11

⁷²³ New Humanitarian (The), Syrians in Lebanon stay indoors as fears of xenophobic violence grow, TNH, 22 April 2024, [url](#)

⁷²⁴ TNH, Israel’s Lebanon assault: A double suffering for Syrian refugees, 2 October 2024, [url](#)

⁷²⁵ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section G4



of the residency system and the labour law'.⁷²⁶ Moreover, it disallowed UNHCR-registered Syrians from practising any remunerated work outside the employment sectors specified for them.⁷²⁷ Syrian refugees also had few property rights.⁷²⁸

Syrian refugees continued to be affected by restricted healthcare access due to various factors such as limited availability, conflict-induced disruptions in the provision of services, cuts in humanitarian funding, and prioritisation of Lebanese nationals. Both the North and South Governorates were affected by insufficient availability and unaffordability of medical services. In areas of Baalbek/the Bekaa Valley, humanitarian aid was frequently distributed at collective shelters, resulting in limited access to support for Syrian refugees accommodated in privately rented housing.⁷²⁹ Severe shortfalls in humanitarian funding has led to a decrease in aid for Syrians in Lebanon.⁷³⁰ UNHCR announced that it would discontinue its support for hospitalisation costs for refugees in the country by the end of 2025.⁷³¹ Similarly, both UNHCR and the WFP have significantly reduced the number of Syrians eligible for cash assistance.⁷³²

A large proportion of Syrian children were reported to be lacking access to education.⁷³³ Following public calls in 2024 for restrictions on access to schools for Syrian refugee children,⁷³⁴ the authorities, ahead of the 2024–25 school year,⁷³⁵ introduced documentation requirements for children.⁷³⁶ As of the first quarter of 2025, UNHCR noted that public schools across the country excluded Syrian children who did not have legal documentation (either legal residency or a UNHCR registration certificate). However, even some children holding valid documentation faced difficulties accessing education,⁷³⁷ with multiple municipalities denying even UNHCR-registered refugees access to public schooling if they lacked legal residency.⁷³⁸ Moreover, numerous Syrian refugees were unable to afford the cost of schooling and transport fees for their children, while others could not register their children at schools due to limited capacity.⁷³⁹ Children prevented from attending school were vulnerable to risks such as child labour and work-related abuse.⁷⁴⁰

⁷²⁶ Al et al., Lebanon: Hundreds of Thousands of Syrian Refugees at Imminent Risk of Deportation, 16 May 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁷²⁷ Al et al., Lebanon: Hundreds of Thousands of Syrian Refugees at Imminent Risk of Deportation, 16 May 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁷²⁸ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section G2

⁷²⁹ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 12

⁷³⁰ TCF, Home to Syria: Lebanon's New Refugee Returns Plan, 11 August 2025, [url](#)

⁷³¹ New Arab (The), EXCLUSIVE: UNHCR confirms healthcare for Syrian refugees in Lebanon will end, 30 May 2025, [url](#); L'Orient Today, UNHCR announces end of healthcare support for Syrian refugees in Lebanon, 28 May 2025, [url](#)

⁷³² TCF, Home to Syria: Lebanon's New Refugee Returns Plan, 11 August 2025, [url](#)

⁷³³ CCLS, Report on Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Between Discriminatory Policies, Hate Speech and the "Death Boats", 18 December 2024, [url](#)

⁷³⁴ HRW, Stop Politicizing Education for Lebanon's Refugee Children, 28 August 2024, [url](#)

⁷³⁵ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section F4

⁷³⁶ UNHCR, Annual Results Report – 2024 Lebanon, 29 May 2025, [url](#), p. 22

⁷³⁷ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 12

⁷³⁸ Syria Direct, Lebanon's latest Syrian refugees in limbo, 10 June 2025, [url](#)

⁷³⁹ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 13

⁷⁴⁰ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 12





Mass displacement due to Israeli bombardment in autumn 2024 resulted in collective shelters becoming overwhelmed, leaving numerous people on the streets.⁷⁴¹ Many facilities effectively turned into ‘Lebanese-only’ spaces,⁷⁴² compounding refugees’ struggle to secure basic needs such as food, housing and medical care.⁷⁴³ Restrictions on returns to certain municipalities and inflated rents charged in urban zones limited Syrian refugees’ prospects of finding safe shelter, resulting in prolonged displacement.⁷⁴⁴ At the same time, it was noted that discrimination was not universal, with some Lebanese accepting Syrian refugees into their homes, while some NGOs kept their shelters accessible to everyone.⁷⁴⁵

7.6.4. Return procedures

UNHCR reported that at least 5 678 Syrians were deported between January and October 2024⁷⁴⁶ and another 7 047 between February and June 2025.⁷⁴⁷ Sources interviewed by the Syrian Investigative Journalism Unit (SIRAJ) and The New Humanitarian (TNH), including recent deportees, reported sudden and violent raids involving beatings, mass deportations by lorry and long marches across the Lebanese-Syrian border zone.⁷⁴⁸

Meanwhile, one of the new measures announced by the General Directorate of General Security in May 2024 was to resume ‘the organization of (voluntary and safe) returns of Syrian nationals wishing to return to their country under the auspices of the General Directorate’,⁷⁴⁹ a repatriation plan that had initially been introduced in 2022.⁷⁵⁰ In July 2025, the General Directorate of General Security waived exit fees, overstay fines, and bans on re-entry for all Syrian nationals returning to Syria⁷⁵¹ who had entered Lebanon illegally or overstayed their legal residency period. They were allowed to return to Syria via the official border crossings, with the waivers valid for three months until 30 September 2025.⁷⁵²

⁷⁴¹ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (4th Quarter 2024), 2 January 2025, [url](#), p. 4

⁷⁴² Haid, H., Caught Between Two Wars: The Risky Return of Syrian Refugees from Lebanon, TIMEP, 13 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁴³ SNHR, A Dreadful Homecoming: Widespread Human Rights Violations Against Syrian Refugees Returning from Lebanon, 29 October 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁷⁴⁴ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 5

⁷⁴⁵ TNH, Israel’s Lebanon assault: A double suffering for Syrian refugees, 2 October 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁴⁶ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2024, 13 November 2024, [url](#), para. 70

⁷⁴⁷ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025, 29 July 2025, [url](#), para. 50

⁷⁴⁸ SIRAJ et al., The risk of return: As Israel bombs Lebanon, Syrian deportees face detention, conscription, or worse, TNH, 16 October 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁴⁹ Al et al., Lebanon: Hundreds of Thousands of Syrian Refugees at Imminent Risk of Deportation, 16 May 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁷⁵⁰ ME Council, From Exile to Uncertainty: Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Consider Returning Home, 20 May 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁵¹ UNHCR, UNHCR-supported Voluntary Repatriation of Syrian refugees Lebanon 2025 – 31 July 2025, 5 August 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁵² TCF, Home to Syria: Lebanon’s New Refugee Returns Plan, 11 August 2025, [url](#)





Immediately following this announcement,⁷⁵³ UNHCR launched its Self-Organized Voluntary Repatriation Programme.⁷⁵⁴ This framework consists of three main operational schemes, including the provision of assistance with structured General Security-facilitated short-term ‘Go-and-See’ visits, assistance with General Security-facilitated voluntary return and support to self-organized voluntary return.⁷⁵⁵ It involves a voluntary repatriation assessment and payment of a cash grant of USD 100 per returning person⁷⁵⁶ (provided by UNHCR Lebanon).⁷⁵⁷ In addition, returnees may be eligible to receive USD 400 in reintegration grants per family upon return⁷⁵⁸ (provided by UNHCR Syria).⁷⁵⁹

Alternatively to these ‘self-organised’ returns (where returnees arrange for their own transportation), refugees can also opt for an ‘organised’ return⁷⁶⁰ as part of the Organized Voluntary Repatriation Programme jointly launched by UNHCR and IOM in August 2025, which included assisted transportation⁷⁶¹ on buses provided by IOM, from designated return centres to the border.⁷⁶² The vast majority (97 %) of the 281 120 Syrians known to UNHCR who were confirmed or presumed to have returned to Syria between January and early September 2025 had returned spontaneously,⁷⁶³ rather than opting for organised returns, mainly due to the faster timeframes and greater flexibility of spontaneous (self-organised) returns.⁷⁶⁴

7.6.5. Cross-border movement

During the reference period, Syrian nationals were entering Lebanon at the same time as Syrian refugees were returning to Syria from Lebanon.⁷⁶⁵ In November 2024, the General Directorate of General Security made amendments to the entry regulations for Syrian refugees, amongst others requiring clearance for short-term stays in Lebanon and shortening the permitted stay durations for certain groups such as Syrian parents of Lebanese citizens (from one month to 15 days) and spouses of Palestinian refugees (from six months to one week). Moreover, re-entry to Lebanon is only permitted to individuals who have not received a re-entry ban upon exit. Community sources consulted by UNHCR reported of Syrian refugees crossing into Syria who were issued re-entry bans despite having valid UNHCR

⁷⁵³ TCF, Home to Syria: Lebanon’s New Refugee Returns Plan, 11 August 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁵⁴ UNHCR, UNHCR-supported Voluntary Repatriation of Syrian refugees Lebanon 2025 – 31 July 2025, 5 August 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁵⁵ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 7

⁷⁵⁶ UNHCR, UNHCR-supported Voluntary Repatriation of Syrian refugees Lebanon 2025 – 31 August 2025, 4 September 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁵⁷ TCF, Home to Syria: Lebanon’s New Refugee Returns Plan, 11 August 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁵⁸ TCF, Home to Syria: Lebanon’s New Refugee Returns Plan, 11 August 2025, [url](#); Reuters, Syrian returns from Lebanon to start under UN-backed plan, marking major shift, 9 July 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁵⁹ TCF, Home to Syria: Lebanon’s New Refugee Returns Plan, 11 August 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁶⁰ TCF, Home to Syria: Lebanon’s New Refugee Returns Plan, 11 August 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁶¹ UNHCR, UNHCR-supported Voluntary Repatriation of Syrian refugees Lebanon 2025 – 31 July 2025, 5 August 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁶² TCF, Home to Syria: Lebanon’s New Refugee Returns Plan, 11 August 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁶³ UNHCR, UNHCR-supported Voluntary Repatriation of Syrian refugees Lebanon 2025 – 31 August 2025, 4 September 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁶⁴ UNHCR, UNHCR-supported Voluntary Repatriation of Syrian refugees Lebanon 2025 – 31 July 2025, 5 August 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁶⁵ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), pp. 6, 8; WHO, Lebanon: soaring needs for trauma treatment and rehabilitation, 20 December 2024, [url](#)



documentation. In December 2024, the General Directorate of the General Security established in an internal circular that Syrian citizens were only allowed to enter Lebanon if they held a transit visa with proof of onward travel or were in possession of a valid annual or permanent residency permit.⁷⁶⁶ Due to the restrictive entry regulation and non-re-entry policy for Syrian refugees who have left Lebanon, many resorted to irregular means of entering the country.⁷⁶⁷

No information could be found on the impact of the new government in Syria on Syrian refugees, notably their treatment while crossing the border.

7.6.6. Patterns of return

Due to the conflict in autumn 2024, at least 350 000 Syrians crossed from Lebanon into Syria between September and November 2024⁷⁶⁸ in successive waves.⁷⁶⁹ Many of those who returned to Syria were not previously known to UNHCR Lebanon. Airstrikes at the Masnaa crossing point in late October/early November 2024 and temporary closures of some official crossings temporarily reduced the flow of people at several border points, although irregular crossings continued. The cross-border flow then increased following an announcement by General Security to ease the exit of Syrians (and Palestinians) irrespective of their legal status or conditions at initial entry.⁷⁷⁰ Meanwhile, it was recorded that 44 % of all UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees who had left returned to Lebanon within three months of the November 2024 ceasefire, frequently citing insecurity and lack of housing and economic prospects in Syria.⁷⁷¹

Following the collapse of the Assad government, 238 120 individuals known to UNHCR were confirmed or presumed to have returned from Lebanon to Syria between January and early September 2025.⁷⁷² Many Syrians undertook short-term visits to Syria to evaluate conditions in their places of origin. These cross-border movements have been occurring both through official border crossings (mainly Al-Masnaa and Qaa) and unofficial ones, often utilising the services of smugglers.⁷⁷³ The large numbers of irregular movements across Lebanon's long, fairly porous border with Syria made it difficult to estimate the real number of returns to Syria since the collapse of the Assad government.⁷⁷⁴

⁷⁶⁶ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (4th Quarter 2024), 2 January 2025, [url](#), p. 11

⁷⁶⁷ UNHCR, Annual Results Report – 2024 Lebanon, 29 May 2025, [url](#), p. 11

⁷⁶⁸ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 6

⁷⁶⁹ SNHR, A Dreadful Homecoming: Widespread Human Rights Violations Against Syrian Refugees Returning from Lebanon, 29 October 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁷⁷⁰ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (4th Quarter 2024), 2 January 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁷¹ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 6

⁷⁷² UNHCR, UNHCR-supported Voluntary Repatriation of Syrian refugees Lebanon 2025 – 31 August 2025, 4 September 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁷³ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 6

⁷⁷⁴ TCF, Home to Syria: Lebanon's New Refugee Returns Plan, 11 August 2025, [url](#)



Meanwhile, Lebanon witnessed a significant number of new arrivals of Syrians⁷⁷⁵ (around 100 000 individuals),⁷⁷⁶ including from Syria's Alawite, Shiite and Christian minorities, arriving in two major waves in late 2024 and March 2025.⁷⁷⁷

7.7. Palestinians in Lebanon

7.7.1. Legal status, demographics and socio-economic situation

Palestinians have been residing in Lebanon for decades.⁷⁷⁸ Lebanon has not ratified the 1951 UN Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol⁷⁷⁹ and lacks a comprehensive national legal framework and policy on refugees.⁷⁸⁰ Palestinians who are registered as refugees with the UN Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) fall under the UNRWA mandate.⁷⁸¹ Apart from these refugees, there is a smaller group of Palestinians who fall outside UNRWA's mandate but who, like those registered with UNRWA, hold an ID card issued by the Lebanese Directorate of Political Affairs and Refugees (DPAR)⁷⁸² known as the Identification Card for Palestine Refugee, which officially confirms their legal residence in the country.⁷⁸³ A third group of Palestinians is known as non-ID Palestinian refugees as they are neither recognised by the authorities nor covered by UNRWA's mandate.⁷⁸⁴ Notably, Palestinian refugees from Syria have faced difficulties maintaining their legal residency and obtaining civil documentation⁷⁸⁵ and remained excluded from UNHCR's system of support for Syrian refugees.⁷⁸⁶

According to UNRWA, the overall number of UNRWA-registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was nearly 500 000 as of February 2025. However, registration was voluntary. At the same time, emigration and deaths often went unreported, while refugees were able to register newly born children online even after moving to other countries.⁷⁸⁷ Thus, a June 2025 assessment by UNRWA put the number of Palestinian refugees effectively living in Lebanon at around 248 000, as confirmed through a digital verification procedure conducted in 2023–2024. An estimated 23 000 of these individuals were Palestinian refugees from Syria.⁷⁸⁸

⁷⁷⁵ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 8

⁷⁷⁶ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 8; TCF, Home to Syria: Lebanon's New Refugee Returns Plan, 11 August 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁷⁷ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (1st Quarter 2025), 4 July 2025, [url](#), p. 8

⁷⁷⁸ TIMEP, Externalizing Migration Control to the MENA Region: Lebanon, 1 May 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁷⁹ CCLS, Report on Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Between Discriminatory Policies, Hate Speech and the "Death Boats", 18 December 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁸⁰ UNHCR, Annual Results Report – 2024 Lebanon, 29 May 2025, [url](#), p. 11

⁷⁸¹ UNRWA, What is the mandate of UNRWA?, n.d., [url](#)

⁷⁸² FMR, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, n.d., [url](#)

⁷⁸³ Asylos, Lebanon: Stateless Palestinians, last updated 2 April 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁸⁴ FMR, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, n.d., [url](#)

⁷⁸⁵ Asylos, Lebanon: Stateless Palestinians, last updated 2 April 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁸⁶ Al-Akhbar, Lebanon's Residency Rules Trap Palestinian Syrian Students, 1 July 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁸⁷ UNRWA, Where We Work, last updated February 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁸⁸ UNRWA, UNRWA Strategic Assessment - UN80 Initiative, Report to the Secretary-General, 20 June 2025, [url](#), para. 37-38



Palestinian refugees are not eligible for Lebanese citizenship, lack political rights⁷⁸⁹ and have no access to state-provided services⁷⁹⁰ in the domains of healthcare and education.⁷⁹¹

There are 12 official refugee camps for Palestinians across the country⁷⁹² where UNRWA acts as the sole provider of basic services, housing about half of the country's Palestinian refugee population.⁷⁹³ For information on the 12 Palestinian refugee camps, see section [6.3 Areas controlled by different actors](#). Many camp-based Palestinians, particularly those from Syria and unregistered individuals, lacked legal documentation.⁷⁹⁴ The camps have long been affected by funding shortages⁷⁹⁵ with reports of overcrowding,⁷⁹⁶ poor ventilation and constant power outages. In some camps such as Nahr al-Bared, drinking water had turned salty and unsuitable for domestic use. According to the Lebanon-based Palestinian Association for Human Rights (Witness) (PAHRW), infrastructure in most camps was 'near total collapse' as of mid-2025.⁷⁹⁷ In June 2025, the UN noted that UNRWA was to face projected cash-flow gaps starting from July 2025 that put the continuous provision of essential services at risk.⁷⁹⁸

Discrimination in access to employment and property ownership,⁷⁹⁹ along with the impact of the economic crisis striking Lebanon in recent years⁸⁰⁰ have resulted in high poverty rates among Palestinian refugees⁸⁰¹ (exceeding 85 % in most camps as of mid-2025),⁸⁰² as well as wide-spread unemployment and underemployment.⁸⁰³ As PAHRW observed, unemployment among camp residents, particularly among youth, was at 'unprecedented' levels, with a rising number of families dependent on remittances, irregular day labour and humanitarian

⁷⁸⁹ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section B4

⁷⁹⁰ Arab Weekly (The), Lebanon's push to disarm Palestinian camps faces major hurdles, doubts emerge, 11 June 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁹¹ UNRWA, UNRWA Strategic Assessment - UN80 Initiative, Report to the Secretary-General, 20 June 2025, [url](#), para. 38

⁷⁹² UNRWA, UNRWA Strategic Assessment - UN80 Initiative, Report to the Secretary-General, 20 June 2025, [url](#), para. 37; UNRWA, Where We Work, last updated February 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁹³ UNRWA, UNRWA Strategic Assessment - UN80 Initiative, Report to the Secretary-General, 20 June 2025, [url](#), para. 37

⁷⁹⁴ PAHRW, The Reality of Palestinian Camps in Lebanon: An Ongoing Nakba and a Multi-Dimensional Struggle Issued by the Palestinian Association for Human Rights (Witness), June 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁹⁵ MMC, Lebanon's escalating conflict: what are the displacement and migration consequences?, 10 October 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁹⁶ UNRWA, UNRWA Strategic Assessment - UN80 Initiative, Report to the Secretary-General, 20 June 2025, [url](#), para. 37; MMC, Lebanon's escalating conflict: what are the displacement and migration consequences?, 10 October 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁹⁷ PAHRW, The Reality of Palestinian Camps in Lebanon: An Ongoing Nakba and a Multi-Dimensional Struggle Issued by the Palestinian Association for Human Rights (Witness), June 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁹⁸ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025, 29 July 2025, [url](#), para. 49

⁷⁹⁹ UNRWA, Where We Work, last updated February 2025, [url](#); HRW, World Report 2025 – Lebanon, 16 January 2025, [url](#), p. 281

⁸⁰⁰ UNRWA, Where We Work, last updated February 2025, [url](#); NRC, Cross-border hostilities deepen suffering for refugees and local communities in crisis-hit Lebanon, 25 April 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁰¹ UNRWA, Where We Work, last updated February 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁰² PAHRW, The Reality of Palestinian Camps in Lebanon: An Ongoing Nakba and a Multi-Dimensional Struggle Issued by the Palestinian Association for Human Rights (Witness), June 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁰³ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section F4



assistance.⁸⁰⁴ Indeed, as of 2024, the UN estimated that 168 026 Palestinian refugees needed humanitarian aid.⁸⁰⁵ These socio-economic conditions had resulted in 'dangerous' levels of food insecurity in the camps as of mid-2025, according to PAHRW.⁸⁰⁶

As of mid-2025, UNRWA operated 61 schools educating around 38 000 children.⁸⁰⁷ The situation at educational facilities in camps was marked by overcrowding, shortages in equipment, and poor infrastructure, with some schools recording drop-out rates of 16 %.⁸⁰⁸ In Ein el-Hilweh Palestine refugee camp, located in Sidon,⁸⁰⁹ fighting between armed factions forced UNRWA schools to remain closed for much of the first half of 2025. By June 2025, some schools had reopened, while others continued to be occupied by armed groups.⁸¹⁰ While around undocumented 3 000 Palestinian Syrian students were unofficially studying at UNRWA schools, Palestinian Syrian children faced persistent barriers to education.⁸¹¹

UNRWA ran 28 health centres, providing more than 200 000 medical consultations on an annual basis, whilst the agency financially supported hospitalisations of over 30 000 individuals per year.⁸¹² However, funding cuts led to a significant reduction in UNRWA's health services, with serious shortages of medical personnel, equipment, and medicines for the treatment of chronic diseases.⁸¹³ UNRWA lacked the financial resources to fully cover the health-related needs of the Palestinian refugees.⁸¹⁴ As coverage of hospitalisation costs decreased to 60 % or less,⁸¹⁵ patients were no longer able to cover their share of hospitalisation expenses.⁸¹⁶ In 2024, in-patient care was denied to over 5 000 individuals.⁸¹⁷

⁸⁰⁴ PAHRW, The Reality of Palestinian Camps in Lebanon: An Ongoing Nakba and a Multi-Dimensional Struggle Issued by the Palestinian Association for Human Rights (Witness), June 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁰⁵ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2024, 12 July 2024, [url](#), para. 66

⁸⁰⁶ PAHRW, The Reality of Palestinian Camps in Lebanon: An Ongoing Nakba and a Multi-Dimensional Struggle Issued by the Palestinian Association for Human Rights (Witness), June 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁰⁷ UNRWA, UNRWA Strategic Assessment - UN80 Initiative, Report to the Secretary-General, 20 June 2025, [url](#), para. 38

⁸⁰⁸ PAHRW, The Reality of Palestinian Camps in Lebanon: An Ongoing Nakba and a Multi-Dimensional Struggle Issued by the Palestinian Association for Human Rights (Witness), June 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁰⁹ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2024, 12 July 2024, [url](#), para. 38

⁸¹⁰ UNRWA, UNRWA Strategic Assessment - UN80 Initiative, Report to the Secretary-General, 20 June 2025, [url](#), para. 39

⁸¹¹ Al-Akhbar, Lebanon's Residency Rules Trap Palestinian Syrian Students, 1 July 2025, [url](#)

⁸¹² UNRWA, UNRWA Strategic Assessment - UN80 Initiative, Report to the Secretary-General, 20 June 2025, [url](#), para. 38

⁸¹³ PAHRW, The Reality of Palestinian Camps in Lebanon: An Ongoing Nakba and a Multi-Dimensional Struggle Issued by the Palestinian Association for Human Rights (Witness), June 2025, [url](#)

⁸¹⁴ UNRWA, Where We Work, last updated February 2025, [url](#)

⁸¹⁵ PAHRW, The Reality of Palestinian Camps in Lebanon: An Ongoing Nakba and a Multi-Dimensional Struggle Issued by the Palestinian Association for Human Rights (Witness), June 2025, [url](#)

⁸¹⁶ UNRWA, Where We Work, last updated February 2025, [url](#)

⁸¹⁷ UNRWA, UNRWA Strategic Assessment - UN80 Initiative, Report to the Secretary-General, 20 June 2025, [url](#), para. 77



7.7.2. Treatment by state, society and other actors

Palestinian refugees, mostly of Sunni Muslim faith,⁸¹⁸ have long faced structural discrimination in Lebanon.⁸¹⁹ Unlike in Jordan and Syria,⁸²⁰ under Lebanese law⁸²¹ Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were barred from 39 types of jobs⁸²² involving higher wages,⁸²³ excluded from state-provided healthcare and education⁸²⁴ and banned from owning immovable property.⁸²⁵ Palestinians are subjected to significantly harsher movement restrictions than Lebanese citizens,⁸²⁶ as Lebanese security services monitored movements of people into and from refugee camps⁸²⁷ and often restricted access. Refugees were vulnerable to exploitation at work and sex trafficking.⁸²⁸

Refugees faced heightened risks to their well-being.⁸²⁹ Palestinian refugees, including children, were affected by significant exposure to various forms of violence, both inside and outside their own communities. In refugee camp settings marked by overcrowding, lack of privacy⁸³⁰ and an absence of governance, justice and law enforcement mechanisms,⁸³¹ high rates of gender-based violence (GBV) were reported, including physical assault and sexual and domestic violence. Children were vulnerable to physical and psychological violence such as aggressive enforcement of discipline by parents and instances of bullying.⁸³² Despite the reported prevalence of GBV and violence against children, victims were often reluctant to seek help due to stigma and concerns about lack of confidentiality and potential reprisals.⁸³³

When the escalation of Israeli aerial attacks in autumn 2024 triggered mass displacement, some IDP shelters refused to accept Palestinian or Syrian families, giving priority to Lebanese citizens, fearing tensions or overcrowding. Moreover, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) quoted a Palestinian woman newly displaced to Mount Lebanon as saying that aid

⁸¹⁸ Al Jazeera, Palestinians in Lebanon, refugees living in fear of Israeli air strikes, 6 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸¹⁹ UNRWA, Where We Work, last updated February 2025, [url](#)

⁸²⁰ Arab Weekly (The), Lebanon's push to disarm Palestinian camps faces major hurdles, doubts emerge, 11 June 2025, [url](#)

⁸²¹ Al-Akhbar, Lebanese law designates Palestinian refugees as foreigners and requires them to obtain work permits, 1 May 2025, [url](#)

⁸²² Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section F4

⁸²³ Al Jazeera, Palestinians in Lebanon, refugees living in fear of Israeli air strikes, 6 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸²⁴ UNRWA, UNRWA Strategic Assessment - UN80 Initiative, Report to the Secretary-General, 20 June 2025, [url](#), para. 38

⁸²⁵ UNRWA, Where We Work, last updated February 2025, [url](#)

⁸²⁶ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section G1

⁸²⁷ Khouri, R. G., Palestinian Disarmament in Lebanon: Small Steps with Regional Implications, ACW, 4 September 2025, [url](#); Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section G1

⁸²⁸ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Lebanon, 2025, [url](#), section G1, G4

⁸²⁹ IOM, Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2025, last updated 5 March 2025, [url](#)

⁸³⁰ UNICEF, Silent Struggles: Mental health realities in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, 11 December 2024, [url](#), pp. 8, 10

⁸³¹ UNRWA, Where We Work, last updated February 2025, [url](#)

⁸³² UNICEF, Silent Struggles: Mental health realities in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, 11 December 2024, [url](#), pp. 8, 10, 22

⁸³³ UNRWA, Where We Work, last updated February 2025, [url](#)



organisations at times distributed food, clothes and money in an unequal manner, often prioritising Lebanese families.⁸³⁴

7.7.3. Security situation in the camps

(a) General security situation

Palestine refugee camps have long witnessed violent clashes between Palestinian armed factions.⁸³⁵ The UN described the security situation in the camps as ‘largely calm but highly fragile’ between April and September 2024,⁸³⁶ while noting ‘heightened insecurity’ over the first half of 2025. Fighting erupted between residents of Beddawi camp (near Tripoli) and the neighbouring Wadi al-Nahlah area in March 2025, followed by clashes involving rival criminal groups in Shatila camp (southern Beirut) in May 2025.⁸³⁷ The second quarter of 2025 in particular experienced a surge in violence, with UNRWA recording 21 incidents leading to at least nine deaths among Palestinian refugees.⁸³⁸

In Ein el-Hilweh camp, known for its volatile security situation due to the presence of a multitude of armed groups,⁸³⁹ several UNRWA schools remained inaccessible as of June 2025 as armed actors continued to be present on their premises.⁸⁴⁰ The level of proliferation of weapons varied among the camps. While heavy weaponry was found in Ein el-Hilweh and Rashidieh (in the Tyre area), the Nahr al-Bared camp was reported to be devoid of weapons.⁸⁴¹

In autumn 2024, Palestine refugee camps were affected by Israeli airstrikes targeting Ein el-Hilweh⁸⁴² and Beddawi (early October 2024),⁸⁴³ El Buss (early October⁸⁴⁴ and late November 2024), and Rashidieh (late November 2024),⁸⁴⁵ with reports of several casualties resulting from these attacks.⁸⁴⁶ Intense airstrikes also struck the area of Burj al-Barajneh camp in early

⁸³⁴ NRC, Far from home: inside Lebanon’s displacement crisis, 21 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸³⁵ UNRWA, UNRWA Strategic Assessment - UN80 Initiative, Report to the Secretary-General, 20 June 2025, [url](#), para. 37, 39

⁸³⁶ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), 9 October 2024, [url](#), para. 49

⁸³⁷ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025, 29 July 2025, [url](#), para. 34

⁸³⁸ UNRWA, Lebanon Quarterly Protection Update 1 April – 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 1

⁸³⁹ Al Jazeera, Why did Israel attack Lebanon’s biggest Palestinian refugee camp?, 1 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁴⁰ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025, S/2025/460, [url](#), para. 34

⁸⁴¹ Arab News, Regional war puts Palestinian disarmament in Lebanese camps on hold, 17 June 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁴² Al Jazeera, Why did Israel attack Lebanon’s biggest Palestinian refugee camp?, 1 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁴³ UNRWA, UNRWA Situation Report #5 on the Lebanon Emergency Response, 8 October 2024, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Palestinians in Lebanon, refugees living in fear of Israeli air strikes, 6 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁴⁴ UNRWA, UNRWA Situation Report #5 on the Lebanon Emergency Response, 8 October 2024, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Why did Israel attack Lebanon’s biggest Palestinian refugee camp?, 1 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁴⁵ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, 12 March 2025, [url](#), para. 39

⁸⁴⁶ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025, 12 March 2025, [url](#), para. 39; UNRWA, UNRWA Situation Report #5 on the Lebanon Emergency Response, 8 October 2024, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Why did Israel attack Lebanon’s biggest Palestinian refugee camp?, 1 October 2024, [url](#)



October 2024, prompting large-scale displacement of residents from the camp.⁸⁴⁷ Israeli airstrikes on camps continued into 2025.⁸⁴⁸

(b) Balance of power and role of militias in specific camps

Palestinian factions have long operated with relative autonomy in a number of the country's 12 refugee camps, which exist largely outside state jurisdiction.⁸⁴⁹ The traditionally Fatah-dominated⁸⁵⁰ Popular Committees and the Palestinian factions were responsible for security and governance in camps.⁸⁵¹ Some of the factions involved in governance have not pledged loyalty to the Palestinian Authority.⁸⁵² Notably, Hamas has a strong presence in the camps alongside Fatah.⁸⁵³ Under a tacit agreement, both the Fatah movement and its rival Hamas maintain security in the camps.⁸⁵⁴ Ein el-Hilweh, the largest⁸⁵⁵ and most overcrowded of all Palestine camps and home to diverse political and military factions⁸⁵⁶ was run by Fatah but Hamas was gaining ground against the group.⁸⁵⁷

For more information on Palestinian factions, see sections [5.2 Palestinian factions](#) and [6.3 Areas controlled by different actors](#).

(c) Conflict resolution mechanisms

After Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas had reached an agreement in May 2025 on disarming the Palestinian groups in Lebanon, the Lebanese authorities launched disarmaments in refugee camps on 21 August 2025.⁸⁵⁸ The handovers of weapons were overseen by the Palestinian Authority in coordination with Lebanese authorities.⁸⁵⁹ In an initial phase of the plan's implementation,⁸⁶⁰ some weaponry in Burj al-Barajneh camp (Beirut) was transferred to the Lebanese Army.⁸⁶¹ This was followed by the collection of weapons in Rashidieh, Al-Bass, and Burj al-Shamali camps in the Tyre area (28 August 2025).⁸⁶² A third phase again involved Burj al-Barajneh, as well as Mar Elias and

⁸⁴⁷ UNRWA, UNRWA Situation Report #5 on the Lebanon Emergency Response, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁴⁸ UNRWA, Lebanon Quarterly Protection Update 1 April – 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 1

⁸⁴⁹ Reuters, Lebanon says it is beginning disarmament of Palestinian factions in refugee camps, 22 August 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁵⁰ NRC, No Place Like Home: an assessment of the Housing, Land and Property rights of Palestinian refugee Women in camps and gatherings in Lebanon, 15 Dec 2013, [url](#), p. 32

⁸⁵¹ UNRWA, El Buss camp, n.d., [url](#); UNRWA, Rashidieh camp, n.d., [url](#); UNRWA, Burj al-Shamali camp, n.d., [url](#); UNRWA, Ein El Hilweh camp, n.d., [url](#); UNRWA, Beddawi camp, n.d., [url](#); UNRWA, Shatila camp, n.d., [url](#)

⁸⁵² Al Jazeera English, Lebanon begins disarming Palestinian groups in refugee camps, 1 September 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁵³ DW, Will Lebanon succeed in asserting state control over Palestinian camps and disarming armed factions?, 21 May 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁵⁴ This is Beirut, Explainer: What Are the 12 Palestinian Camps in Lebanon?, 23 May 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁵⁵ UNRWA, Ein El Hilweh camp, last updated December 2023, [url](#)

⁸⁵⁶ Arab News, Regional war puts Palestinian disarmament in Lebanese camps on hold, 17 June 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁵⁷ PBS NewsHour, Inside a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon where Hamas is gaining popularity amid war, 6 August 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁵⁸ Al Jazeera, Lebanon begins disarming Palestinian groups in refugee camps, 21 August 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁵⁹ Beirut (The), Palestinian authority advances security restructuring in Lebanon, 1 October 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁶⁰ AP, Palestinian factions begin handing over weapons at Beirut refugee camp, 22 August 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁶¹ Al Jazeera, Lebanon begins disarming Palestinian groups in refugee camps, 21 August 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁶² AA, Lebanon begins 4th phase of Palestinian camp disarmament plan, 14 September 2025, [url](#); Cradle (The), Lebanon continues 'disarmament' in Palestinian camps, 28 August 2025, [url](#)



Shatila camps (29 August 2025).⁸⁶³ On 13 September 2025, the Lebanese Army began implementing the fourth phase of the disarmament plan, focusing on Beddawi camp in the north⁸⁶⁴ and Ein el-Hilweh camp in the south.⁸⁶⁵

Meanwhile, journalist Rami George Khouri noted that the May 2025 agreement was hampered by both Aoun's and Abbas's insufficient control over actors on the ground. Thus, for instance, the weapons handed over from the Burj al-Barajneh camp in August did not stem from Fatah's official forces but from a renegade member who had been dismissed from Fatah. The journalist noted that as of early September 2025, it remained uncertain whether Fatah would fully turn over its arsenal of weaponry in the camps.⁸⁶⁶ Islamist groups like Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and other non-PLO groups rejected outright to surrender weapons,⁸⁶⁷ including militant groups operating in Ein el-Hilweh.⁸⁶⁸ As of mid-September, Hamas did not cooperate in the disarmament process, although talks with the group regarding arms handovers were reportedly ongoing.⁸⁶⁹

(d) Security forces in the camps

Security forces generally refrained from entering Palestine refugee camps⁸⁷⁰ (an exception being Nahr al-Bared camp in the country's north, which has been under Lebanese Army control since 2007),⁸⁷¹ but Lebanese security forces monitored all movement of persons and items into and out of the camps.⁸⁷² The Palestinian National Security Forces, restructured under a new command in 2025, were operating in the camps⁸⁷³ where they were tasked with enforcing order and discipline, including a ban on firing weapons.⁸⁷⁴

In July 2024, the Lebanese Army carried out raids inside the Nahr al-Bared camp in an attempt to arrest wanted 'gang' members. This operation reportedly led to exchanges of gunfire and heightened tensions, with instances of resistance to the raids prompting the deployment of further military reinforcements.⁸⁷⁵ In a more recent development, in 2025, it

⁸⁶³ AA, Lebanon begins 4th phase of Palestinian camp disarmament plan, 14 September 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁶⁴ Asharq Al-Awsat, Lebanese Army Launches 4th Phase of Palestinian Camps Disarmament, 13 September 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁶⁵ AP, Palestinian factions hand over truckloads of weapons in Lebanon's largest refugee camp, 13 September 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁶⁶ Khouri, R. G., Palestinian Disarmament in Lebanon: Small Steps with Regional Implications, ACW, 4 September 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁶⁷ Asharq Al-Awsat, Palestinian Concerns Arise in Lebanon Over Linking Camp Weapons to Hezbollah's Arsenal, 23 August 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁶⁸ AP, Palestinian factions hand over truckloads of weapons in Lebanon's largest refugee camp, 13 September 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁶⁹ Asharq Al-Awsat, Lebanese Army Launches 4th Phase of Palestinian Camps Disarmament, 13 September 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁷⁰ Israel, ITIC, Disarming the Palestinian Factions in Lebanon, 11 May 2025, [url](#), p. 2

⁸⁷¹ Arab News, Regional war puts Palestinian disarmament in Lebanese camps on hold, 17 June 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁷² Khouri, R. G., Palestinian Disarmament in Lebanon: Small Steps with Regional Implications, ACW, 4 September 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁷³ CLDH, Human Rights Developments in a Week September 1 - September 7 2025, 7 September 2025, [url](#), p. 2; Beirut (The), Palestinian authority advances security restructuring in Lebanon, 1 October 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁷⁴ Beirut (The), Palestinian authority advances security restructuring in Lebanon, 1 October 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁷⁵ L'Orient Today, Tensions in Nahr al-Bared camp as Lebanese Army conducts raids, 8 July 2024, [url](#)





was reported that the new Lebanese government was seeking to extend state authority into the Palestinian camps⁸⁷⁶ by implementing the above-mentioned plan to disarm the camps.⁸⁷⁷

7.7.4. Cross-border movements and returns

In May 2024, Lebanon's General Directorate of General Security announced a stop on the renewal⁸⁷⁸ or issuance of residency permits through housing lease contracts, sponsorship and financial guarantees,⁸⁷⁹ heightening vulnerabilities for this group of Palestinians.⁸⁸⁰

The major escalation of aerial attacks by Israeli forces in September 2024 prompted large waves of people to cross the border into Syria,⁸⁸¹ including thousands of Syrian Palestinians.⁸⁸² General Security later announced facilitating the departure of Palestinians (and Syrians) irrespective of their legal status or conditions at initial entry.⁸⁸³

Following the fall of Assad's rule in Syria,⁸⁸⁴ Lebanon's national plan on returns to Syria, presented by UNHCR in April 2025, anticipated the return of up to 400 000 people, including 5 000 Palestinians from Syria, by year's end.⁸⁸⁵ In July 2025, the General Security waived exit fees, overstay fines, and bans on re-entry for all Syrians and Syrian Palestinian refugees wishing to return to Syria.⁸⁸⁶ These waivers, valid for three months until 30 September 2025, allowed Syrians and Palestinian residents of Syria who entered Lebanon illegally or overstayed their legal stay to return to Syria via official border crossings without being subjected to fees, fines, or bans on future re-entry into Lebanon.⁸⁸⁷ Jaber Suleiman, a Palestinian independent researcher and consultant, reported in October 2025 in correspondence with the EUAA that Syrian Palestinians in Lebanon holding Syrian documents were able to return to Syria and that their return was moreover encouraged by the Lebanese authorities in order to diminish their numbers in the country.⁸⁸⁸ The same month, UNHCR launched its Self-Organized Voluntary Repatriation Programme, followed by the joint launch

⁸⁷⁶ This is Beirut, ExplainerWhat Are the 12 Palestinian Camps in Lebanon?, 23 May 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁷⁷ Asharq Al-Awsat, Lebanese Army Launches 4th Phase of Palestinian Camps Disarmament, 13 September 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁷⁸ UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2024, 12 July 2024, [url](#), para. 62

⁸⁷⁹ Al et al., Lebanon: Hundreds of Thousands of Syrian Refugees at Imminent Risk of Deportation, 16 May 2024, [url](#), p. 1; Al, World leaders must commit to protecting Syrian refugees as Lebanon steps up crackdown ahead of Brussels conference, 27 May 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁸⁰ UNRWA, UNRWA Strategic Assessment - UN80 Initiative, Report to the Secretary-General, 20 June 2025, [url](#), para. 38

⁸⁸¹ SNHR, A Dreadful Homecoming: Widespread Human Rights Violations Against Syrian Refugees Returning from Lebanon, 29 October 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁸⁸² Syria Direct, No return to Yarmouk for Syrian-Palestinians fleeing Lebanon, 25 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁸³ UNHCR, Protection Monitoring: Situation of Forcibly Displaced Syrians in Lebanon (4th Quarter 2024), 2 January 2025, [url](#), p. 6

⁸⁸⁴ AP, Syrian government falls in stunning end to 50-year rule of Assad family, 8 December 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁸⁵ Diab, J. L., Lebanon's 2025 Syrian Repatriation Agenda: Consent under Constraint?, LCPS, 19 June 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁸⁶ UNHCR, UNHCR-supported Voluntary Repatriation of Syrian refugees Lebanon 2025 – 31 July 2025, 5 August 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁸⁷ TCF, Home to Syria: Lebanon's New Refugee Returns Plan, 11 August 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁸⁸ Suleiman J, email communication, 13 October 2025





by UNHCR and IOM of an Organized Voluntary Repatriation Programme in August 2025.⁸⁸⁹ For more detailed information on these programmes, see section [7.6.4 Return procedures](#).

As for travel documentation, the General Directorate of General Security explains on its website that since 2016, Palestinian refugees have been issued biometric passports registered under their refugee status.⁸⁹⁰ These travel documents were issued to Palestinian refugees registered with both UNRWA and the DPAR⁸⁹¹ (an entity that is part of the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities and is directly linked to General Security and the Ministry of National Defense)⁸⁹² and to those without UNRWA registration if they were registered with the DPAR.⁸⁹³ The travel documents for registered Palestinians remained valid for one, three or five years.⁸⁹⁴ Regarding undocumented Palestinians, the Palestinian Embassy in Lebanon, in coordination with Lebanese authorities, has been providing Palestinian passports/travel documents since 2011 that allow these individuals to travel abroad.⁸⁹⁵ As for possibilities for Palestinians from Lebanon to return to Lebanon from abroad, Suleiman reported in October 2025, in correspondence with the EUAA, that in principle, holders of such travel documents are eligible to leave and come back to Lebanon without restrictions, because this is part of Lebanon's legal obligations under the Casablanca Protocol (1965) issued by the Arab League. However, this right of Palestinian refugees to freedom of movement has occasionally been subjected to violation.⁸⁹⁶ A report by Asylos quoted Jasmin Lilian Diab, Director of the Institute for Migration Studies at the Lebanese American University (Beirut), as saying in October 2022 that Palestinians who had left Lebanon were 'always at risk of not being permitted to re-enter'. According to her, such re-entry was 'less likely' if they were in possession of a Palestine refugee document issued by the Lebanese authorities. But those who had left Lebanon through irregular means, or those whose asylum application was rejected in a third country, were typically not allowed to re-entry into Lebanon.⁸⁹⁷ No information could be found specifically addressing the possibilities for Syrian Palestinians with Syrian documents to return to Syria.

⁸⁸⁹ UNHCR, UNHCR-supported Voluntary Repatriation of Syrian refugees Lebanon 2025 – 31 July 2025, 5 August 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁹⁰ Lebanon, General Directorate of General Security, The instructions related to biometric passports granted to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, n.d., [url](#)

⁸⁹¹ Lebanon, General Directorate of General Security, Essential requirements, n.d., [url](#)

⁸⁹² Tabet, N., La dialectique de l'exclusion(s)-inclusion(s) des camps de réfugiés palestiniens au Liban [The dialectic of exclusion(s)-inclusion(s) in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon], 24 February 2020, [url](#), p. 147

⁸⁹³ Lebanon, General Directorate of General Security, Essential requirements, n.d., [url](#)

⁸⁹⁴ Lebanon, General Directorate of General Security, A new travelling document, n.d., [url](#)

⁸⁹⁵ Asylos, Lebanon: Stateless Palestinians, last updated 2 April 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁹⁶ Suleiman J, email communication, 13 October 2025

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Dr. May Maalouf Monneau, email communication, 11 September 2025. Dr. Maalouf Monneau is a political scientist specialised on the Middle East, with a focus on Lebanon, and an associate researcher at Mediterranean and Middle East Research and Study Institute (IREMMO), Paris. Her research explores political systems, governance, and nation-building in Lebanon and the wider region. She is the author of *Le Liban: de l'État inachevé à l'invention d'une nation* (L'Harmattan, 2015), as well as other works on Middle Eastern politics and Jerusalem.

Jaber Suleiman, email communication, 13 October 2025. Jaber Suleiman is a Palestinian independent researcher and consultant specialised in refugee studies, with a focus on Palestinian refugees and the right of return. Since 2011, he has worked with the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Forum, the Common Space Initiative, and UNDP-supported projects on consensus building and civil peace in Lebanon. He previously served as a consultant for UNICEF's Palestinian programme in Lebanese refugee camps and has authored numerous research papers, studies, and book chapters on Palestinian refugee issues.

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Annex 2: Terms of Reference

The research focuses on the period between 1 May 2024 and 26 September 2025.

Country overview

- Basic information: geography, demographics, religious and ethnic landscape, and languages.
- Overview of state structure: executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

Political and economic developments.

- Recent political developments.
- International context:
 - Relations with Iran.
 - Impact of political transition in Syria on power dynamics in Lebanon.
- Socio-economic situation.
 - Overview of the economic crisis since 2019.
 - Recent economic crisis.

Legal system and the judiciary.

- Judicial system, including crime reporting, judicial structure, effectiveness, access to justice.

Lebanese security institutions.

- Overview of Lebanese armed forces, the police and intelligence.

Non-state actors and militias.

- Hezbollah, Palestinian factions, Sunni Islamist groups (ISIL and Al-Qaeda affiliates, Salafi groups).
 - Recruitment practices.
 - Impact on civilian population.

Security situation.

- Overview of security dynamics related to recent developments with Israel.
- Areas controlled by different actors.
- Impact on civilian populations and infrastructure.
- Drug trafficking and organized crime.

Treatment of specific groups.

- **Women and girls**



- Violence against women and girls including sexual, domestic violence, honour crimes, and discrimination in personal status matters (marriage, divorce, custody).
- **Political opposition members**
 - Supporters, dissidents, anti-government demonstrators, and whistleblowers.
- **Human rights defenders/activists**
 - Environment, legal defenders, and human rights lawyers.
- **Journalists and media workers**
 - Investigative journalists, threats, harassment, and censorship.
- **LGBTIQ+ persons, including activists**
 - Institutional and societal discrimination based on sexual orientation/gender identity.
- **Syrians in Lebanon**
 - Legal status, demographics, treatment by the state, society, and other actors (as relevant; socio-economic conditions, and return procedures)
 - Cross-border movements, patterns of return, and the impact on Syrian refugees.
- **Palestinians in Lebanon**
 - Legal status, demographics, socio-economic conditions of Palestinian refugees.
 - Human rights situation, including in the refugee camps
 - Security situation in the camps including the current balance of power in specific camps, conflict resolution mechanisms, the active security forces, the role of militias in specific camps, impact of Syrian transition.
 - Cross-border movements, patterns of return, and the impact on Palestinian refugees.





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