


2025 Country Talk: Syria

Country of Origin Information report and Country Guidance


25 July 2025



Structure




Country of Origin Information and Country Guidance



Country of Origin
Information

COI is the **factual basis** on which Country Guidance provides an assessment in the form of Common Analysis and Guidance.

In the examination of individual cases, the decision-maker always needs to refer to relevant and up-to-date COI.



Country Guidance



Interim Country Guidance: Syria (June 2025)

General guidance and
methodological remarks



Country Guidance: explained

Outlines the general guidance relied upon in this analysis, as well as the methodological framework, approach and indicators used in CG docs.

<https://euaa.europa.eu/publications/country-guidance-explained-0>

Country Guidance

Interim
Country Guidance:
Syria

Interim Country Guidance: Syria
Publication date: 20 June 2025

The 'Interim Country Guidance: Syria' represents Member States' joint assessment of the situation in the country of origin in relation to the applicable international and EU legislation on international protection. The guidance note, accompanied by the common analysis, was agreed by the Country Guidance Network of senior policy officials in May 2025 and was endorsed by the EUAA Management Board in June 2025. It is based on COI up to 11 March 2025.

In addition to this electronic publication, the 'Interim Country Guidance: Syria' (June 2025) is available in pdf format.

[Read more online](#)

[Download the PDF](#)

<https://euaa.europa.eu/interim-country-guidance-syria>

Accessibility: automatic translation in EU languages

The screenshot displays the EUAA website interface. At the top, a toolbar contains various icons, with the 'Accessibility' icon (a person with a speech bubble) highlighted by a yellow box. Below the toolbar, the EUAA logo is visible, followed by navigation links: 'Asylum Trends', 'Practical Tools', 'Careers', 'Grants & Tenders', and 'M'. A large yellow arrow points to the 'Accessibility' button, which is also highlighted with a yellow box. Below the navigation bar, a dark blue header contains links: 'About Us', 'Training', 'Asylum Knowledge', 'Operations', 'Partners', 'Publications / Public Registry', and 'News'. The main content area features a blue banner with the text 'Home' and 'Interim Country Guidance: Syria'. Below the banner, a table of contents is visible on the left, listing 'List of abbreviations and glossary', 'Introduction', 'Guidance note', and 'Common analysis'. On the right, there are buttons for 'Citation', 'Share', and 'Print'. The main content area also features a large image of the 'Interim Country Guidance: Syria' cover, which includes the EUAA logo and the text 'Interim Country Guidance: Syria' and 'Publication date: 20 June 2025'.

Hyperlinks between Country Guidance and Country Focus

Home / Interim Country Guidance: Syria / 4. Refugee status
/ Profiles at risk of persecution from other actors than the Assad regime (for which the Assad regime was not considered an actor of persecution)

Alawites

Citation  Share  Print 

COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: June 2025

The analysis below is primarily based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2025, 1.2, 1.2.2, 1.3.2; Targeting 2020 [🔗](#), 10.6; Security 2019 [🔗](#), 1.1. Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. The section below should be read in conjunction with the most recent COI available at the time of the examination.

The position of Alawites has changed radically with the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, which was dominated by the Alawite minority.

Alawites had been subjected to persecution (e.g. torture, killing) by different non-State actors including Islamist groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and anti-government armed groups.

The [Transitional Administration](#) emphasised its commitment to integrating Alawites into Syria's governance and engaged in discussions with local Alawite representatives. Despite these assurances, Alawites remain largely excluded from the new political and military structures, while public distrust toward former regime officers and officials further hinders their integration. Also, the

Home / COI Report - Syria: Country Focus

/ 1. Political and human rights developments
/ 1.2. Political developments

1.2.2. Governance under the Transitional Administration

Citation  Share  Print 

> (a) Political transition

> (b) Government formation

> (c) Military reforms

> (d) Public sector reforms

> (e) Economic reforms and sanctions

> (f) Political transition in accordance with UN Resolution 2254



Methodology

- Following the recent developments in Syria, namely the fall of the Assad regime and the establishment of a Transitional Administration, EU+ countries together with the EUAA identified **the need to update the ‘EUAA, Country Guidance: Syria, April 2024’**.
- Given the short reference period on which the present guidance is based on and the uncertainties deriving from the transitional situation in Syria, **the structure and content of some chapters may be different, compared to other country guidance documents.**
- This common analysis is based on country of origin information (COI) covering the **period from November 2024 to February 2025. Some limited additional information until 11 March has also been reflected.**



It should be noted that the information referred to in this document is generally limited to events having taken place until 28 February 2025, with some minor updates from the period until 11 March 2025. Within this timeframe, information on several topics remained limited and/or conflicting. However, a new EUAA COI Report was published earlier this month.



Actors of persecution or serious harm

- A main actor of persecution and serious harm, the Assad regime, has vanished.
- Since its takeover of power, **Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)** has been de facto ruling Syria in the framework of the **Transitional Administration**.
- A number of non-State actors continue to be active, including the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Asayish, the Syrian National Army, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), etc.



Refugee Status Profiles → Actor-based approach

- The risk posed by the Assad regime has essentially vanished, but other actors of persecution or serious harm are still present and operating in Syria.
- Guidance provided on three categories of profiles:
 1. Profiles for which the Assad regime was considered the *sole* actor of persecution;
 2. Profiles at risk of persecution from *multiple* actors;
 3. Profiles for which the Assad regime was *not* considered an actor of persecution.
- Guidance is also provided on Palestinians.

Interim Country Guidance: Syria (2025)

Refugee status profiles – Conclusions I

Among the most commonly encountered profiles of applicants, the following **would likely not qualify for refugee status**:

- Draft evaders
- Military deserters and defectors from the Syrian Armed Forces of the Assad regime
- (Former) members of anti-Assad armed groups, now integrated in the new Syrian military

Interim Country Guidance: Syria (2025)

Refugee status profiles – Conclusions II

The following would **highly likely qualify for refugee status**:

- Journalists, other media professionals and human rights activists targeted by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Syrian National Army (SNA), and the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL)
- Persons with perceived links to ISIL and their family members (NB: exclusion considerations)
- Kurds from areas under the control of the SNA
- Members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with the SDF/YPG in areas where the SNA operates
- Persons with diverse SOGIESC (also referred to as LGBTIQ persons)

Interim Country Guidance: Syria (2025)

Refugee status profiles – Conclusions III

Further guidance is provided on **the risk-impacting circumstances which may affect the probability of granting refugee status** to profiles such as:

- (Former) members of anti-Assad armed groups, now integrated in the new Syrian military
- Women and girls
- Children
- Former members of Assad's armed forces and pro-Assad armed groups
- Former Assad government officials, and civilians perceived to be supporting the Assad regime
- Alawites

Interim Country Guidance: Syria (2025)

Refugee status profiles – Conclusions IV

Short of clear conclusions at the time of writing, some considerations are provided for:

- Political activists, Assad-opposition party members, protesters, and civilians originating from areas associated with opposition by the Assad regime
- Military deserters and defectors from the new Syrian military in relation to the potential targeting by the Transitional Administration
- Doctors, other medical personnel and civil defence volunteers

➤ other profiles for which the information available is not yet sufficient will be addressed in the comprehensive update (Dec 2025)



Article 15(c) QD/QR - Conclusion

It is **not considered feasible** to assess the risk of serious harm in relation to the level of indiscriminate violence in Syria under the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR.

 Clear guidance will be provided at the governorate level in the comprehensive update (Dec 2025)

Internal Protection Alternative in Damascus city - Conclusion

Taking into account the three criteria under Article 8 QD/QR, internal protection alternative may be applicable in Damascus city **only in exceptional cases**.



Cessation?

It should also be noted that **UNHCR does not consider that the requirements for cessation of refugee status for beneficiaries of international protection originating from Syria have currently been met.**







**COUNTRY
FOCUS SYRIA
(JULY 2025)**



Country of Origin Information **online**



EUAA, [*COI Report – Syria: Country Focus*](#), March 2025.




EUAA, [*COI Report – Syria: Country Focus*](#), July 2025.

Political developments and governance

- **Constitutional Declaration** covering a five-year transitional period.
- Strong **presidential system** and **Islamic jurisprudence** as main source of legislation.
- Transitional government formed in March 2025, composed of ministers from **diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds**, though largely **dominated by figures with close ties to HTS**.
- **Judiciary** is largely **non-functional**. Significant gaps remain in addressing transitional justice process, HLP issues and due process.
- Initiatives to rebuild the **police** and **army**. **Limited integration** of armed groups into state institutions.
- Incidents of **retaliatory** and **sectarian violence** revealed gaps in command and control, civilian oversight, and institutional neutrality.









Security situation

- **Security landscape** remains **fragmented** with numerous armed groups continuing to operate with varying degrees of autonomy.
- Outside of main cities, **government control** remains **tenuous**.
- **Criminality, lawlessness** and **retaliatory/sectarian violence**.
- Activity by extremist actors incl. **ISIL**.
- Continued **Israeli military presence** and **activity**, including beyond the area of separation of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement.


Evolution of security incidents no.



Impact on civilians



No. of civilian fatalities recorded by SNHR (Dec 2024 – May 2025)



No. of civilian fatalities recorded by SNHR (Dec 2024 – May 2025). Breakdown by governorate.

High number of civilian fatalities occurred in the context of **violence in coastal areas** (Mar. '25), offensive against Assad regime (Dec. '24), **assassinations** and **retaliatory violence** by unidentified parties.


Contamination with **explosive remnants of war** led to over **1.000 civilian casualties** between Dec '24 – May '25.





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THANK YOU!



COUNTRY GUIDANCE COMPREHENSIVE UPDATE






- The comprehensive update of the ‘Country Guidance: Syria’ has been launched on 15 July with mid-December 2025 as an expected publication date.
- This update will be based on the most recent available COI, i.e. the EUAA Country Focus: Syria (July 2025) and a COI Query as an update of the Country Focus, to be published in October 2025.
- The aim being to assess international protection needs under Refugee Status and Article 15(c) QD/QR, and to determine the potential availability of internal protection alternative in Damascus city.



Please provide your feedback on the Interim CG Syria 2025!



- HTML version | [Link](#)
- PDF version | [Link](#)
- Automatic translations | Accessibility tool

Your feedback

8. Do you consider the content of this Country Guidance useful for your work?

6A. Suggestions on how to improve the content of the document:

7. Do you consider the format of this Country Guidance user-friendly?

7A. Suggestions on how to improve the format of the document:

8. In which language would you prefer to use this Country Guidance, if translations were made available?

- ☐ English
☐ National language
☐ Both would be useful for me

9. Overall, how would you rate the quality of this Country Guidance document on a scale from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high).

Interim Country Guidance: Syria (June 2025) ★★★★★

Other

10. Do you have any other comments on the quality, use and impact of country guidance documents?

Thank you for your feedback!

Submit

Feedback form [↗](#)

Syria: Country Focus



Process

ToRs jointly developed with CG Network and Syria CSN

Peer reviewed by 3 EU MS

Reference period: the period following Assad's ouster with a focus on **March – May 2025**

Topics covered

State structure and governance under the interim government



Treatment of certain profiles and groups of the population (Individuals perceived to have supported the former government, Individuals opposing or perceived to be opposing the interim government/non-state armed groups, Ethno-religious minorities, Women, Children, LGBTIQ)


Security situation at country and governorate level

Socio-economic situation with a focus on Damascus city

Return trends

To access EUAA COI products, visit: <https://euaa.europa.eu/country-origin-information>

The Syrian Mosaic Post-Assad



Areas of Control

- HTS
- Sunni tribal factions
- Druze militia
- Israeli expansion post-Assad
- Alawite stronghold
- Kurdish-led SDF
- SNA (Turkish proxies)

- Mixed factions in desert areas
- Islamic State presence

Military Bases

- United States
- Turkey
- Russia

- Principal road
- Secondary road
- Oil facility
- Population center
- Provincial capital

Alawites

Dismissal from public sector jobs

Eviction, land confiscation and property seizure by armed groups affiliated with the government

Extrajudicial killings by armed groups affiliated with the government in the context of pro-Assad insurgency

Assassinations and kidnappings by unidentified perpetrators

Kurds

Kurds living in SNA-controlled areas are still subjected to abuses such as extortion, property confiscation, arbitrary arrests

Negotiations with the government are ongoing

Druze

Clashes with tribal armed groups, government forces and groups affiliated with the government

Christians

Incidents of intimidation by Islamist actors incl. religious proselytization; sporadic attacks on alcohol shops

Attack of Christian church in Damascus by extremist group

Individuals perceived to have supported the former government

Arrests and detention of former soldiers and security personnel who haven't laid their weapons and are suspected of involvement in war crimes. No official charges, incommunicado detention, and sporadic reports of torture in detention. Some have been released after it was determined they were not involved in crimes.

Other categories: government employees, doctors affiliated with security services, media professionals.

Sporadic arrests of B'ath party members, politicians.

Targeting by unidentified perpetrators or newly emerged Salafi-jihadi factions (Saraya Ansar Al-Sunnah)

Individuals opposing or perceived to be opposing the interim government


Limited information available. No clear targeting pattern observed in relation to political opponents, journalists, activists.

Reports of arrests of individuals connected to criminal cases, and of suspects of attacks against security forces.

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Socio-economic conditions and return

- **EU and US lifted most economic sanctions.**
- **90% of population** lives in poverty and **16.5 million** require **humanitarian assistance**.
- **High unemployment (24% in 2024)** was further exacerbated by massive public sector layoffs.
- **Infrastructure damage impacts health care, education, access to water and electricity.**
- **1.3 million IDPs** returned since end of Nov '24. **7.4 million persons** remain in **displacement** (69% living in host communities).
- Almost **600.000 Syrians** returned (temporarily or permanently) from abroad between 8 Dec' 2024 – June 2025.
- Key challenges to **sustainable return** included **worsening economic conditions, unemployment, limited access to basic services, HLP rights** and **widespread infrastructure destruction**.





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