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2.14.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

At the start of June 2025, clashes erupted on the border with Libya, after troops from the Sabil Al-Salam battalion affiliated with Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) reportedly advanced into the El Uweinat border area.[1169](#) On 11 June 2025, the RSF reported having taken control of the El Uweinat area, the strategic border triangle between Sudan, Libya and Egypt, while the SAF announced they had evacuated the area and accused the RSF of receiving direct support from Khalifa Haftar's LNA.[1170](#) In July 2025, the Sudans Post noted that Northern and River Nile states, previously considered relatively stable, faced an increased risk of being drawn into the armed conflict as the northern region faced RSF drone strikes, threats and military advances.[1171](#) In 2025, the RSF reportedly increased their drone capabilities, employing long-range drones capable of reaching infrastructure in previously safe areas, for example repeatedly targeting Merowe dam.[1172](#) In April 2026, UNHCR described the situation in Northern state as remaining 'relatively stable', albeit with increased drone activity reported in Al Dabbah, Merowe and Dongola.[1173](#)

- [1169](#)

Al-Monitor, Sudan army loses border control to RSF after clashes with Libya's Haftar, 11 June 2025, [url](#)

- [1170](#)

Dabanga, SAF evacuates 'strategic' Sudan-Libya-Egypt border triangle following RSF takeover, 12 June 2025, [url](#)

- [1171](#)

Sudans Post, SAF reinforce North after RSF threats, 1 July 2025, [url](#)

- [1172](#)

ACAPS, Sudan: Risk Analysis [2026], 13 May 2026, [url](#), p. 11; Sudan Tribune, Drone attacks reshape Sudan war, targeting infrastructure and civilians, 17 April 2025, [url](#)

- [1173](#)

UNHCR, External Update #115 Sudan Situation - January 2026, 7 April 2026, [url](#), p. 3