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1.3.2. General situation

Since the outbreak of the conflict, several human rights bodies have documented 'atrocious crimes' and obstruction of humanitarian assistance by both the SAF and the RSF.^{[112](#)} UN OHCHR reported patterns of 'continued pervasiveness of sexual violence', 'retaliatory violence against civilians', mostly ethnic based, targeting of alleged collaborators with opposing parties^{[113](#)} as well as systematic 'threats and intimidation against civil society actors' in the first half of 2025.^{[114](#)}

The UN Human Rights Council's (UN HRC) Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) for Sudan reported in September 2025 that 'both parties to the conflict violated international human rights and humanitarian law, with most violations amounting to war crimes.'^{[115](#)} Dabanga reported findings by the Adala Centre for Studies and Research, a Sudanese research centre, indicating a marked escalation in violations in December 2025 including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, kidnappings for ransom, widespread looting and forced displacement.^{[116](#)} Findings from a report by the Sudan Human Rights Hub (SHRH), drawing on 35 000 pieces of open-source data, satellite imagery and witness accounts gathered between April 2023 and June 2025, showed 'systematic' patterns of abuse committed by both the SAF and the RSF, including extrajudicial killings, torture, indiscriminate violence, enforced disappearances, forced recruitment and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).^{[117](#)}

○ (a) Extrajudicial killings

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) reported a threefold rise in documented killings outside the immediate conduct of hostilities between February and April 2025, going from 97 in February 2025, to 150 in March 2025, and 334 in April 2025. UN OHCHR linked the rise to a wave of 'summary executions' in Khartoum following the SAF and allied forces' recapture of formerly RSF-held territory in late March 2025, during which reprisals were reportedly carried out against individuals accused of collaborating with the RSF. According to one reported witness, those subjected to reprisals included youth aged 14 or 15.^{[118](#)} Similarly, the ACHPR FFM observed that 'both the SAF and the RSF carried out extrajudicial killings'

against individuals perceived to support the opposing party to the conflict. The victims died from 'gunshots, beatings, torture, and summary executions'.¹¹⁹ In April 2025 reports of mass arrests by the SAF of people alleged to be supporters or members of the RSF circulated on social media. Ayin Network reported that at least 20 individuals had been executed, some publicly, while others had been taken to unknown locations.¹²⁰ 'Summary killings' by SAF-affiliated fighters were reported in Sennar and North Kordofan states.¹²¹ In January 2025 at least 210 deaths due to 'summary executions and attacks on villages perceived to be supportive of one of the fighting parties' occurred in Al Jazirah state 'in the context of hostilities between RSF and SAF' for control of the territory.¹²² For additional information see section [2.1. Perceived political opponents](#). The Nuba Mountains Observatory for Human Rights reported the execution of nine detainees in the period between January and April 2026.¹²³

In RSF-controlled areas, numerous incidents of summary executions were reported in North Darfur occurring during the fighting, including extrajudicial killings of humanitarian personnel and civilians found hiding in improvised bomb shelters' (known as *khanadiq*¹²⁴) or attempting to flee.¹²⁵ RSF commanders were directly implicated in atrocities and showed no intention to stop them, as illustrated by the case of an RSF field commander that appeared in several videos either personally executing or ordering the execution of detainees in October 2025.¹²⁶ Survivors who fled El Fasher after the fall of the city in October 2025, described witnessing the shooting of groups of men and 'seeing hundreds of dead bodies' left in the streets and along main roads out of the city.¹²⁷ A large number of videos posted by RSF fighters themselves showed the perpetration of mass killings.¹²⁸ The civilians who stayed in the city were labelled by the RSF as collaborators of its enemies and individuals found carrying supplies were immediately executed. Women and children trying to flee the city were deliberately run over by RSF drivers, according to The New Humanitarian.¹²⁹ In April 2025, a summary execution of at least 17 civilians accused of collaborating with the SAF, including two women, was carried out by RSF fighters in Al-Halba, a village in the White Nile state.¹³⁰ For additional information see section [2.5. Ethnic groups](#). A source interviewed by the Sudan Tribune in February 2026 noted that in Khartoum 'the RSF used land designated for a medical complex hospital near Obaid Khatim Street to bury the dead in both individual and mass graves.' The same source estimated that 'more than 1 000 bodies are buried at the site.'¹³¹

○ (b) Arbitrary arrests and detention

Both the SAF and the RSF were implicated in arbitrary detention of civilians and military personnel being held without legal process or formal charges, often indefinitely, as found by an investigation by the SHRH. The RSF reportedly used detention as a tool for ransom and ethnic targeting ‘particularly against non-Arab communities’, and the SAF using imprisonment to suppress those it perceived as RSF collaborators.¹³² The ACHPR FFM recorded violations by the SAF and the RSF including arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention across Al Jazirah, Gedaref, Blue Nile, Darfur, Kassala, Khartoum, Kordofan, Northern and Sennar states.¹³³ For additional information see section [2.1. on Perceived political opponents](#) and section [2.5 on Ethnic groups](#).

Multiple SAF-aligned forces organised into so-called security cells have been involved in unlawful detentions. The security cells included the General Intelligence Service (GIS), the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), and on occasion a military-affiliated militia, the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Battalion (BBMB).¹³⁴ Often arrests happened at checkpoints and Starlink satellite internet access points, usually following telephone searches that allegedly identified ‘“anti-war” content’ or other material interpreted as evidence of ‘collaboration’ with the opposing party to the conflict. ¹³⁵ UN OHCHR reported that the SAF held under arrest up to 4 000 individuals – ‘including civil society actors and perceived opponents’ – as they recaptured Al Jazirah state’s capital, Wad Madani, in January 2025.¹³⁶

In September 2025, Ayin network reported that the RSF have ‘tightened restrictions on civilian movement in areas under their control,’ particularly affecting young men attempting to travel to territories held by the SAF for work or study. In one reported incident in Umm Bader, North Kordofan, approximately 66 young men and students were allegedly arrested by the RSF and transferred to detention facilities in Darfur, while women were permitted to continue their journey. Families reported that some detainees were released only after payment of ransom.¹³⁷

In April 2025, the ACJPS reported an increase in unlawful detention and torture by SAF-aligned forces in Sinjah town, primarily attributed to the MIS, targeting women human rights defenders ‘working to support women’, aid workers providing food to the displaced, and displaced people from Darfur, following the army’s recapture of Sennar state in November 2024.¹³⁸ For additional information on arbitrary arrests and detention of women and girls, see section [2.6.2. Violence against women and girls](#).

○ **(c) Enforced disappearances**

Enforced disappearances, namely taking individuals into custody and then holding them incommunicado while their whereabouts remain unknown, have become a systematic pattern of the Sudan conflict. Investigations by local and international organisations indicated that both the SAF and the RSF, as well as affiliated militias and security bodies, were implicated in these practices.¹³⁹ These kidnappings and abductions occurred since the conflict broke out in 2023 and ‘intensified since the beginning of 2025’.¹⁴⁰

In May 2025, the Emergency Lawyers found that ‘the most alarming aspect’ of SAF’s arbitrary arrest campaigns was that ‘in many cases, there is no trial or even imprisonment. Instead punishment is carried out immediately.’ The group documented field executions and enforced disappearances, particularly in Khartoum state.¹⁴¹

The ACHPR FFM recorded violations by the SAF and the RSF including enforced disappearances across Al Jazirah, Gedaref, Blue Nile, Darfur, Kassala, Khartoum, Kordofan, Northern and Sennar states.¹⁴²

Multiple social media posts have reported instances of individuals disappearing under unknown circumstances, later being located in detention centres or remaining unaccounted for.¹⁴³ In April 2026, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Sudan reported that the number of missing persons cases recorded had reached over 11 000, with an increase of more than 40 % in the previous 15 months.¹⁴⁴ For additional information see section [2.1 on Perceived political opponents](#), section [2.3.2 on journalists and other media personnel](#) and section [2.4.2 on the situation of aid workers](#).

○ **(d) Treatment in detention and prison conditions**

Both parties designated former prisons, military compounds and civilian buildings as detention centres across multiple locations. In Greater Khartoum, through the conflict, the SAF controlled the Hatab detention centre and the Sirkab detention centre, while the RSF controlled multiple detention centres across the capital including the Al-Saliha 50 department detention centre, the Dar Al-Tawba detention centre (known as Soba prison), the former family and child protection department converted into a detention facility, the Al Nakeel police station, the Riyadh detention centre and an unofficial detention site in Omdurman.¹⁴⁵ In RSF-controlled areas, homes, schools, and abandoned government buildings were frequently used as makeshift detention sites.¹⁴⁶

UN OHCHR confirmed at least ten deaths in custody of individuals detained by both the RSF and the SAF between January and June 2025, ‘including a well-known Sudanese footballer, volunteer medics, and local humanitarian volunteers.’¹⁴⁷ Accounts from Soba prison indicated that between four and ten detainees died daily, ‘and on some days up to eighty, largely due to malnutrition and treatable illnesses.’ Bodies were reportedly removed daily by trucks and buried at undisclosed locations.¹⁴⁸ In Wad Madani prison, a cholera outbreak reportedly resulted in the deaths of up to 300 detainees.¹⁴⁹

Some former detainees reported having witnessed mass executions. It has been estimated that more than 500 people have died in custody since the start of the war.¹⁵⁰

Large-scale burial sites were reportedly uncovered in Khartoum North (Bahri) and Omdurman, including at a former RSF base in Garri and a school in Al-Salha, where hundreds of detainees allegedly died as a result of torture, starvation, or denial of medical care.¹⁵¹

Conditions in both formal and informal detention facilities remained harsh regardless of the detaining party, and were characterised by overcrowding, insufficient food and water, no access to medical care despite widespread disease and torture. SHRH indicated that the RSF were using detention as part of a broader strategy of ethnic cleansing, which was mostly directed against Darfur’s non-Arab communities.¹⁵²

Testimonies collected by HRW between June 2025 and February 2026 indicated ill-treatment against detainees, included women, by the SAF and its affiliated groups in areas retaken from the RSF, including Khartoum, Al Jazirah, Gedaref, Red Sea, and Northern states.¹⁵³

Both factions employed severe beatings to extract forced confessions and held individuals in prolonged detainment without trial.¹⁵⁴ Testimonies recounted the deliberate execution of detainees in front of others to instil fear. In one case, a nine-year-old boy was shot dead during an RSF interrogation session, while survivors were forced to watch and threatened with the same fate.¹⁵⁵

SAF-run facilities, including military camps in Rufaa and Wad Madani, were ‘used for coercive interrogations.’ Former detainees described severe conditions in RSF detention, including prolonged *incommunicado* detention, systematic beatings, electric shocks, deprivation of food and water, and the withholding of medical treatment.¹⁵⁶

For additional information on detention of women and girls, see Section [2.6.2. \(d\) on detention](#).

○ (e) Torture and ill-treatment

UN OHCHR received numerous accounts of ‘torture and other forms of ill-treatment’ in places of formal and informal detention, which included severe beatings, electric shocks, burning inflicted with heated metal rods, sexual violence, and torture involving prolonged suspension.[157](#) The ACHPR also documented the use of beatings against civilians by both the SAF and the RSF. These beatings often occurred during arrests, detention and random searches and seizures. [158](#) The beatings appeared to be an exertion of power to force civilians to comply with combatants’ demands and to punish non-compliance. They also served as an interrogation technique.[159](#) An investigation by the SHRH reported that both the SAF and the RSF were implicated in the torture of civilians. The RSF, in particular, was reportedly torturing civilians through ‘beatings, starvation, acts of humiliation and degradation and psychological abuse.’[160](#)

The ACHPR received reports about the use of electrocution by the RSF to torture civilians. On 25 January 2025, the SAF tortured a victim to death by electrocution and poured nitric acid on his wounds.[161](#) In August 2025, the Committee for Justice (CFJ), an independent human rights monitoring and advocacy group,[162](#) documented instances of victims ‘being tied to trees for days, shackled with heavy iron chains, and subjected to repeated beatings’ by the RSF.[163](#)

Numerous videos circulating on X, as reported by the SHRH, provided evidence of various torture methods used by the RSF against detainees, civilians, and opposition members. These recordings depict individual being ‘beaten with metal rods and lashes, buried alive, burned with heated objects or chemicals, starved, subjected to prolonged psychological torment under indefinite detention, and sexually assaulted’. Other reported methods included ‘forcing detainees into stress positions, administering electric shocks, and conducting mock executions’.[164](#) For additional information see section [2.1 on Perceived political opponents](#) and section [2.5 on Ethnic groups](#).

○ (f) Sexual violence and conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV)

Multiple sources indicated that comprehensive statistics on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in Sudan were lacking and all confirmed that GBV was widespread in active conflict areas.[165](#) While girls and women were primarily targeted, men and boys were also affected.[166](#) According to UNICEF’s data, approximately 66 % of child rape involved girls and 33 % involved boys.[167](#) Survivors frequently bear cultural blame

within Sudan's patriarchal society, exposing both male and female survivors and their families to severe stigma, shame, and social exclusion.¹⁶⁸ For more information on conflict related sexual violence against women and girls, see section [2.6.2. \(a\) Conflict Related Sexual Violence \(CRSV\)](#).

The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA) noted that there were documented SGBV cases affecting men and boys in Darfur, Al Jazirah and Khartoum, although no clear attribution to a specific actor was made. One reported case involved an assault perpetrated by a soldier affiliated with the SPLM-N-al-Hilu. Men attempting to protect women and girls from sexual violence, frequently faced violence themselves. According to the organisation, documented cases involving men and boys were limited as survivors often requested for their testimonies not to be recorded or shared. This has been particularly observed in Darfur and Al Jazirah, where survivors have explicitly requested that their cases remained undocumented.¹⁶⁹ Underreporting was reportedly due to shame, fear of prosecution through anti-sodomy laws, or rejection by families.
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○ **(g) Victims of trafficking in human beings**

Trafficking in human beings presents various forms, including sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, forced marriage, forced labour,¹⁷¹ recruitment of child soldiers or recruitment of children to commit crimes.¹⁷² A definition of 'trafficking in human beings' is provided in the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.
¹⁷³

In 2021, the transitional Sudanese authorities launched the 2021-2023 national action plan to combat trafficking in human beings.¹⁷⁴ The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ¹⁷⁵ however, reported that the military coup of October 2021 resulted in the postponement of the roll-out of the National Action Plan.¹⁷⁶

In August 2025, UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) provided assistance to victims of trafficking in Sudan, having identified 312 victims of trafficking in eastern Sudan. The UNHCR report provided information about security operations in Kassala state that resulted in the arrest of persons 'with alleged links to smuggling and human trafficking.'¹⁷⁷ Another operation of the Sudanese security forces resulted in the arrest of traffickers in human beings and the release of 65 victims in eastern Kassala in September 2025.¹⁷⁸ In November 2025, the UN reported on trafficking of women and girls for sexual exploitation and slavery and the recruitment and use of

children as fighters in RSF-controlled areas in and around El Fasher.¹⁷⁹ The report echoed the findings of a previous year report about the increase of trafficking in persons, particularly involving women and girls.¹⁸⁰

In a March 2026 Child Protection Brief, UNHCR provided information on young Sudanese refugee boys and girls taking irregular routes to Europe through traffickers and smugglers via South Sudan, noting that the risks are ‘particularly severe for unaccompanied and separated children who continue to be highly vulnerable to exploitation both within South Sudan and across border’.¹⁸¹ A 2024 report on Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking (MSHT) by Global Partners Governance (GPG),¹⁸² found that precarious living conditions affecting Sudanese refugees in the region – particularly in Egypt – together with a rise in the number of unaccompanied or separated Sudanese child refugees resulted in an increase in forced child labour.¹⁸³ As further noted by the GPG, since the onset of the conflict, the overall state capacity ‘to respond to victims of MSHT or to take action against perpetrators’ has been ‘significantly reduced.’ The report also noted that vulnerability to trafficking was more acute among IDPs, returnees and refugees.¹⁸⁴

Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) was committed by members of the RSF in areas under their control, as well as by aid workers in humanitarian settings such as IDP and refugee camps.¹⁸⁵ Individuals receiving aid in Sudan were reportedly at a higher risk of SEA by aid workers, with data placing Sudan within the top four riskiest humanitarian settings for SEA globally.¹⁸⁶

Children in Sudan are at specific risk of facing trafficking in the form of forced marriage, sexual exploitation, forced recruitment by armed groups and child labour.¹⁸⁷ For additional information on child marriage, see section [2.6.2. \(b\) Forced marriage](#); for additional information on sexual exploitation, see section [2.6.2. \(a\) Conflict Related Sexual Violence](#); for additional information on forced recruitment of children by armed groups, see [section 2.7.2. Child soldiers](#); for additional information on child labour, see section [2.7.3. Labour exploitation](#).

○ (h) Death penalty

According to Sudanese criminal law, death sentences may be implemented only after all remedies are exhausted, including a final appeal to the Constitutional Court. As of April 2026, based on the consulted sources, the Constitutional Court was yet to be re-established, precluding the implementation of death sentences.¹⁸⁸ Between January and June 2025, at least 108 death sentences were reportedly issued in Sudan, mainly by criminal and anti-terrorism courts, as well as more than 70 long-term and life

sentences, mostly for ‘alleged collaboration with the RSF’. Monthly totals averaged between 12 and 15 death sentences ‘issued in multiple states by courts in Al Jazirah (Wad Madani, Managil), Blue Nile (Damazine), Gedaref, Kassala, Khartoum (Omdurman, Karrari), North Kordofan (El Obeid), Northern (Dongola, Merowe and Karima), Red Sea (Port Sudan), River Nile (Atbara, Shendi, Damer), Sennar (Sennar, Sinjah), and White Nile (Kosti, Kenana) states.’¹⁸⁹ As of October 2025, the death row section of Singa Prison, Sennar state, was reportedly overcrowded.¹⁹⁰ Ayin network noted in March 2026 that ‘courts in Wad Medani had handed down hundreds of death and life sentences to individuals accused of collaborating with the RSF.’¹⁹¹

The legal accusations brought forward were mainly based on provisions contained in the Sudanese Criminal Code (Articles 26, 50, 51, and 186), including “‘conspiracy’, ‘waging war against the state’, and ‘crimes against humanity’”.¹⁹²

Some of the women imprisoned within SAF-controlled areas, at least 25 of whom were between 19 and 26 years old, had received death sentences on accusations of collaboration with the RSF as of April 2025.¹⁹³ For additional information on women and girls, see Section [2.6.2. Violence against women and girls](#).

For additional information see section [2.1 on Perceived political opponents](#) and section [2.5 on Ethnic groups](#).

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