



(b) Assessment of indiscriminate violence per province

COMMON ANALYSIS

Last update: October 2026

The map below summarises and illustrates the assessment of indiscriminate violence per province (reference period 1 November 2024 – 3 July 2026).

To visualise all the provinces and/or districts, please zoom in (Hold down CTRL + mouse scroll to zoom).

map visualization

Note that it is considered that there are **no areas in Pakistan** where the degree of **indiscriminate violence** reaches an **exceptionally high level** or a **high level**.

Indiscriminate violence not at a high level

No real risk

Indiscriminate violence not at a high level

Areas where indiscriminate violence is taking place, however **not at a high level**.

Accordingly, **a higher level of individual elements** is required in order to show substantial grounds for believing that a civilian, returned to the area, would face a real risk of serious harm in the meaning of Article 15(c) QR.

The areas assessed as belonging to this category as well as the main elements leading to this assessment are highlighted below.

□ **Balochistan**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [COI Update 2026](#), 1., 2., 6., 7.; [Country Focus 2026](#), [3.2.13.](#), [4.1.1.](#), [4.2.1.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

In Balochistan indiscriminate violence takes place, however not at a high level. Notably, confrontations between insurgent groups and state authorities have had a limited impact on civilians despite persistent high-intensity insecurity, marked by large-scale armed violence, and a strong militant presence across the province.

Baloch insurgent groups, particularly the BLA and its *Jeeyand* faction, expanded their methods and tactics and demonstrated greater capacity to conduct coordinated, high-profile operations, including attacks on security positions, infrastructure and government structures, suicide attacks in urban spaces, sieges, hijackings, targeted killings, roadblocks and temporary seizures of territory. At the same time, reports describe increased militarisation, and serious human rights violations by the authorities. Islamist militant expansion, and border clashes with Afghanistan further aggravated insecurity.

ACLED recorded 3 245 security incidents between 1 November 2024 and 3 July 2026, including 1 484 incidents of violence against civilians, 1 038 battles and 723 explosions/remote violence. 4 076 fatalities recorded by ACLED represented 27 per 100 000 inhabitants.

While the frequency and lethality of security incidents between insurgent groups and the authorities are significant, the impact on civilians is limited, therefore it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place, but not at a high level.

□ **South and West Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)**

For this guidance, South and West Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) comprises Bajaur, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Hangu, Karak, Khyber, Kohat, Kurram, Lakki Marwat, Mohmand, North Waziristan, Orakzai, South Waziristan, and Tank districts.

For guidance on **Peshawar** district, see No real risk.

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [COI Update 2026](#), 2., 7.; [Country Focus 2026](#), [3.2.1.](#), [3.2.9.](#), [3.3.](#), [4.2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

While the violence spread into populated areas and its intensity was significant, its impact on civilians was limited. Therefore, it can be concluded that, **in South and West Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (except Peshawar district), indiscriminate violence takes place, however not at a high level.**

The security situation was characterised by a high level of militant violence, largely driven by the resurgence of TTP since 2021, ongoing counter-militancy operations, and recurrent border clashes with Afghanistan. This violence was not confined to a single district; rather, it formed a broad arc of insecurity extending across those districts in which Islamist militant groups, particularly the TTP, maintained an operational presence, notably the former FATA and the southern districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).

The TTP and affiliated factions carried out attacks against security personnel, including suicide operations, abductions, targeted killings, drone strikes, and cross-border infiltrations, demonstrating sustained operational capability. The rivalry between the TTP, largely associated with the Mehsud tribe of South Waziristan, and HGB, rooted in the Wazir and Dawar tribes of North Waziristan, further intensified the competition over territory and influence. Reports also indicated that the TTP maintained recruitment hubs and elements of shadow governance, while militants exercised influence through roadblocks, checkpoints, and embedded presence among civilians. Schools were also affected, facing closures, threats, and attacks, including incidents in late 2025 involving hundreds of students and staff.

Out of the 2 283 security incidents recorded by ACLED in KP between 1 November 2024 and 3 July 2026, 2 025 of them (i.e. nearly 89 %) took place in South and West KP. They included 1 067 battles, 538 explosions/remote violence and 420 incidents of violence against civilians. Out of the 4 502 fatalities recorded by ACLED in KP between 1 November 2024 and 3 July 2026, 4 168 of them (i.e. around 92 %) occurred in South and West KP and represented 32 per 100 000 inhabitants.

The highest numbers of security incidents in South and West KP were recorded in Bannu (383 incidents; 17 % of the provincial total), Lakki Marwat (297; 13 %), South Waziristan (249; 11 %), and North Waziristan (208; 9 %). The highest numbers of fatalities were reported in North Waziristan (902 fatalities; 20 %), Bannu (567; 13 %), South Waziristan (450; 10 %), and Kurram (374; 8 %).

Against this backdrop, since most security incidents involved only TTP and Pakistani armed forces, and, taking into consideration that evacuations at times occurred in anticipation of government security operations, the impact on civilians is limited, therefore it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place, but not at a high

level.

No real risk

Areas where **there is no real risk** for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QR. This may be because the criteria for an armed conflict within the meaning of this provision are not met, or because no indiscriminate violence is taking place.

The areas assessed as belonging to this category as well as the main elements leading to this assessment are highlighted below.

☐ Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT)

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [COI Update 2026](#), 6.; [Country Focus 2026](#), 4.2.5.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

In Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), the security situation remained comparatively stable and low in intensity when measured against Pakistan's main conflict zones. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QR in the ICT.**

While the security incidents in ICT carried symbolic and psychological significance because they showed the reach of militant networks into the federal capital, they remained isolated and were made of attacks against security forces, minority groups and anti-government protesters. ICT Police and the Counter Terrorism Department carried out search and intelligence-based operations, arresting militants and demonstrating an active capacity to prevent attacks. The main high-impact incidents were the November 2025 suicide bombing outside a court and the February 2026 suicide attack inside a Shiite Mosque.

Considering the limited number and scale of security incidents, it can be concluded that there does not exist a situation of indiscriminate violence in the ICT.

□ **North and East Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) including Peshawar**

For this guidance, North and East Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) comprises Abbottabad, Battagram, Buner, Charsadda, Haripur, Kolai-Palas Kohistan, Lower Chitral, Lower Dir, Lower Kohistan, Malakand, Mansehra, Mardan, Nowshera, Peshawar, Shangla, Swat, Swabi, Torghar, Upper Chitral, Upper Dir, and Upper Kohistan districts.

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [COI Update 2026](#), 2., 6., 7.; [Country Focus 2026](#), 4.2.2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Considering that the recorded violence is very limited in scale and intensity, with security incidents being generally isolated and not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QR in North and East Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Peshawar**.

Islamist militant groups, particularly the TTP and allied factions, have expanded their operational presence to nearly all districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. However, both militant activity and counterterrorism operations remain heavily concentrated in the southern belt, especially in the former FATA, which continues to be the main theatre of violence.

While violence outside former FATA has traditionally been focused in the Peshawar and Malakand divisions, it shifted predominantly towards the south in 2024–2025. In 2025, attacks again spread beyond the southern districts to areas such as Peshawar, Swat, Lower Dir and Shangla, including high-profile suicide and targeted attacks.

Out of the 2 283 security incidents recorded by ACLED in KP between 1 November 2024 and 3 July 2026, 258 of them (i.e. around 11 %) took place in North and East KP. They included 126 battles, 54 explosions/remote violence and 78 incidents of violence against civilians. Out of the 4 502 fatalities recorded by ACLED in KP between 1 November 2024 and 3 July 2026, 334 of them (i.e. around 7 %) occurred in these districts and represented 1 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants.

The highest numbers of security incidents in North and East KP districts were recorded in Peshawar (97 incidents; 4 % of the provincial total), Lower Dir (33; 1 %), and Swabi (22; 1 %). The highest numbers of fatalities were reported in Peshawar (102 fatalities; 2 %), Lower Dir (51; 1 %), and Mardan (36; 1 %).

Despite this geographic expansion, northern and north-eastern districts remained

comparatively less affected and were not among the primary hotspots of violence with no noticeable impact on civilians.

□ **Pakistan Administered Kashmir**

For this guidance, Pakistan Administered Kashmir is used to refer to the areas named 'Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK)' and 'Gilgit-Baltistan (GB)' in EUAA, [COI Report – Pakistan: Country Focus](#), May 2026.

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [COI Update 2026](#), 6.; [Country Focus 2026](#), [4.2.6](#).; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Considering that violence linked to militant groups and counter-militancy operations remained sparse, with marginal impact on civilians, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QR in Pakistan Administered Kashmir**.

The main security dynamics were shaped less by militant activity than by violent demonstrations in late 2025 and by the short-lived India-Pakistan escalation in May 2025, causing civilians fatalities, infrastructure damage and internal displacement in districts such as Bagh, Muzaffarabad and Haveli. Other security challenges were also limited in scale, though three militant attacks occurred in 2025, including in Diamer and Gilgit, as well as some sectarian unrest and protest-related violence.

While homes, schools and hospitals were reportedly damaged in Pakistan Administered Kashmir, and isolated unrest episodes in GB occurred, these incidents remained limited in number and geographical scope with marginal impact on civilians.

□ **Punjab**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [COI Update 2026](#), 6.; [Country Focus 2026](#), [4.2.3](#).; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Considering that the recorded violence was very limited in scale and intensity, with security incidents being generally isolated and not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QR in Punjab.**

The security situation remained very limited in intensity compared to KP and Balochistan, although militant groups continued to seek a foothold, especially in South Punjab and districts bordering KP or Balochistan. Militant attacks diminished in 2025 and were limited to isolated incidents in places such as Rawalpindi, Attock, Taunsa and Mianwali. Counterterrorism operations appeared to have disrupted urban militant cells effectively, while the TTP remained the main perpetrator and had focused attacks on police stations and checkpoints.

While Punjab experienced militant violence, with isolated TTP attacks and effective counterterrorism limiting broader operational expansion, these incidents remained limited in number and geographical scope with no noticeable impact on civilians.

□ Sindh

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [COI Update 2026](#), 6.; [Country Focus 2026](#), 4.2.4.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Considering that the recorded violence is very limited in scale and intensity, with security incidents being generally isolated and not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QR in Sindh.**

Sindh experienced sporadic and low-level security incidents. The Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA), a Sindhi separatist group, had limited operational capabilities compared to other militant groups in Pakistan. Baloch separatist groups and Islamist militants were responsible for a small number of attacks in Sindh province, but their activities in Sindh appeared peripheral to the groups' priorities. Methods included attacks on security forces, police stations, railway tracks, oil pipelines, oil tankers, passenger trains, and incidents of sectarian violence. State actors further routinely arrested suspected members of insurgent groups, demonstrating the willingness and ability of provincial authorities to counter militant attacks.

While Sindh faced peripheral militant activity, the separatist capacity was limited and routine state action contained broader escalation risks, making these incidents limited in number and geographical scope with no noticeable impact on civilians.

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Please note that in areas where there would be 'no real risk' for a civilian to be affected by indiscriminate violence within the meaning of Article 15(c) QR, depending on personal circumstances, an applicant may still be exposed to a risk of persecution (see [4. Refugee status](#)) or a risk of serious harm under [Article 15\(a\) QR: death penalty or execution](#) or [Article 15\(b\) QR: torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment](#). Hence, this assessment of 'no real risk' should in no way be misconstrued as the designation of 'safe areas' for return or any other purposes.

