



4.1.1. Surge in militant violence since November 2024

As mentioned in section 4.1. General description of the security situation, during the reporting period, Pakistan experienced a notable rise in militant violence,[533](#) marking 2025 the fifth consecutive year of an increase in militant attacks.[534](#) According to PICCS, militant attacks expanded geographically and in frequency and lethality in 2025, with recorded incidents increasing from 908 in 2024 to 1 066 in 2025, reflecting a 17 % rise. Concurrently, security operations spiked by 63 % from 296 to 482.[535](#) PIPS noted 521 militant attacks in 2024 – up 70 % from 2023[536](#) – and 699 in 2025, marking a 34 % increase over 2024.[537](#) CRSS documented 444 militant attacks in 2024[538](#) and 880 in 2025.[539](#) PIPS, PICSS, and CRSS reported that in 2025, KP experienced the highest number of militant attacks.[540](#) The GTI highlighted that over 96 % of militant attacks and fatalities in Pakistan in 2024, including as a result of intensified attacks by militant groups operating from Afghanistan, occurred in the western border regions of KP and Balochistan,[541](#) compared to over 74 % of militant attacks and over 67 % of fatalities in 2025.[542](#)

Militant groups targeted security forces, civilian infrastructure, and government installations in 2025,[543](#) employing attack types such as suicide attacks, tactical assaults, grenade throwing, mortar or rocket fire, drones, improvised explosive device (IED), abductions and targeted killings.[544](#)

PICSS reported an increase in the usage of small drones and a higher deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) by security forces.[545](#) Drones were reportedly increasingly used by security forces for monitoring and striking militants, particularly in remote regions close to Afghanistan, resulting in civilian fatalities and injuries.[546](#)

ACLEED reported that in 2025, Baloch separatist groups adapted their tactics from traditional hit-and-run methods towards more complex operations, including the temporary occupation of public spaces. They also increasingly resorted to traditional methods such as direct assaults on security positions like police stations.[547](#) These groups engaged in sieges, hijackings, highway roadblocks, and hostage-taking.[548](#) The Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), part of China's Belt and Road Initiative,[549](#) has attracted violence from ethno-nationalist armed groups in Balochistan and Sindh, including the BLA, targeting Chinese nationals and investments, a shift from earlier attacks primarily by Islamist groups.[550](#)

In 2025, religiously motivated groups carried out 454 out of 699 militant attacks, an increase from 335 in 2024, as noted by PIPS, primarily driven by the TTP and its local allies, alongside the

Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB) group, Lashkar-e Islam (LeI) and Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP).[551](#)

Between January and November 2025, the TTP engaged in around 700 attacks or confrontations with security forces, as reported by ACLED,[552](#) while the Ittihadul Mujahideen alliance, comprising LeI, HGB, and Inqilab-e Islami, was also active.[553](#) PICSS documented 18 ISKP-linked attacks in 2025 in Pakistan (including ISPP), compared to 24 (or 23[554](#)) in 2024, generating higher casualties despite fewer attacks. The occurrence of two suicide bombings in 2025, compared to none in 2024, indicated a 'shift toward higher-impact tactics'. ISKP attacks in 2025 were carried out in KP, while attacks in Balochistan and Sindh were attributed to ISPP. Main targets included police forces, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) leaders and gatherings, political rallies, clerics, tribal elders, businessmen, and civilians accused of espionage.[555](#) PIPS reported seven ISKP attacks and four major suicide bombings in 2025 in Balochistan, as well as two suicide bombings in KP province.[556](#)

Baloch separatist groups, notably the BLA and the BLF, intensified their insurgency in Balochistan province in 2024.[557](#) This trend continued into 2025,[558](#) with 234 recorded ethnic or sub-nationalist, militant violence attacks, up from 175 in 2024.[559](#) Of these attacks, primarily targeting security forces, 225 occurred in Balochistan province, and four in Sindh and Karachi.[560](#) Five attacks were linked to Sindh insurgent groups.[561](#)

PICSS reported a 162 % rise in militant abductions in 2025, including of security forces, civilians, and government officials and pro-government figures, from 82 in 2024 to 215, particularly in KP (127)[562](#) and Balochistan provinces (82).[563](#) PIPS also recorded a rise in militant abduction incidents from 3 in 2024,[564](#) to 47 in 2025, primarily by the TTP and affiliated groups in KP province.[565](#)

For a detailed description of the main non-state armed groups, see section 3.2. Main non-state armed groups and for a description of the state actors, see section 3.1. State Actors .

From 1 November 2024 to 24 April 2026 ACLED reported 5 149 security incidents at national level: 2 023 (39 %) were coded as battles, 1 176 (23 %) as explosions/remote violence and 1 950 (38 %) as incidents of violence against civilians.[566](#)

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Figure 1: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Pakistan, 1 November 2024 - 24 April 2026, based on ACLED data[567](#)

ACLED recorded security incidents across all provinces during the reference period. The highest number were reported in Balochistan (2 755 events, 53 % of total) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces (2 003 events, 39 % of total).[568](#)

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Figure 2: Security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Pakistan, 1 November 2024 - 24 April 2026. Breakdown by provinces based on ACLED data[569](#)

Battles was the event type with the highest number of incidents by far with the majority of them recorded in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.[570](#)

Fatalities

From 1 November 2024 to 24 April 2026 ACLED reported 7 736 fatalities.[571](#)

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