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# **(b) Assessment of indiscriminate violence per province**

COMMON ANALYSIS | Last update: June 2026

## **Country Guidance: Afghanistan (June 2026)**

### **Assessment of the level of indiscriminate violence by province based on the reference period 1 October 2024 - 25 March 2026**

map visualization

For more information and analysis on the level of indiscriminate violence per province, see sections below.

Note that it is considered that there are **no areas in Afghanistan** where the degree of **indiscriminate violence** reaches an **exceptionally high level** or a **high level**.

## **Indiscriminate violence not at a high level**

### **No real risk**

## **Indiscriminate violence not at a high level**

Areas where indiscriminate violence is taking place, however **not at a high level**.

Accordingly, **a higher level of individual elements** (See [4.3.4. Serious and individual threat](#)) is required in order to show substantial grounds for believing that a civilian, returned to the area, would face a real risk of serious harm in the meaning of Article 15(c) QR.

The areas assessed as belonging to this category as well as the main elements leading to this assessment are highlighted below.

## ○ **Kabul**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: [COI Update 2026](#), 3., Annex 1., Annex 2.; [Country Focus 2026](#), 2.1.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

In Kabul province, **indiscriminate violence takes place, however not at a high level**. Notably, the situation is characterised by volatility in the context of the conflict with Pakistan, the absence of conflict-induced displacement, and a relatively moderate number of security incidents and civilian deaths.

In particular, Kabul City since August 2021 remains the most affected area by security incidents, largely due to its population size (over 6 million inhabitants in Kabul City and province) and concentration of high-profile de facto authorities. The security situation in Kabul has been characterised by incidents mainly involving the *de facto* security forces targeting civilians, and the NRF and AFF targeting the de facto security forces, as well as by the ongoing conflict with Pakistan.

During **01 October 2024 - 30 November 2025**, ACLED reported **155 security incidents** (44 battles, 32 remote violence/explosions, 79 instances of violence against civilians, representing 2.6 security incidents per week), mainly involving the de facto security forces targeting civilians, and the NRF and AFF targeting the de facto security forces. UCDP recorded **26 civilian deaths** in Kabul province, representing 0.4 civilian deaths per 100 000 inhabitants.

In the same period, perpetrating actors in security incidents included **armed resistance groups** in 'battles' and 'explosions/remote violence' in 61 events. Moreover, **ISKP** may have been responsible for two events. The **de facto GDI and security forces** conducted several operations killing alleged **ISKP** members in Kabul City.

During **1 December 2025 - 20 March 2026**, ACLED documented **36 security events** (2 battles, 25 remote violence/explosions, 9 instances of violence against civilians, amounting to 2.3 incidents per week). UCDP recorded **156 civilian deaths**, representing 3 civilian deaths per 100 000 inhabitants.

According to ACLED across both reference periods, Afghan *de facto* military or security forces and MPVPV were the main perpetrator of acts of 'violence against civilians' (88 events). These incidents were not necessarily linked to an armed conflict. A few incidents involved also unidentified armed groups.

No displacement from Kabul was observed.

Kabul was among the provinces impacted by airstrikes between **Pakistan** and the Afghan *de facto* authorities. Following the breach of a ceasefire, Pakistani airstrikes were reported in Kabul City since 27 February 2026, while the city was also hit by 'drone strikes, anti-aircraft gunfire and explosions' in March 2026. As of 20 March 2026, Pakistan had bombed Kabul city five times since October 2025, and hostilities appeared to have abated after the latest incident. However, UN OCHA reported that, as of 18 March 2026, there were no clear signs of de-escalation in the conflict.

### ○ **Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktika, Paktia**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: [COI Update 2026](#), 3., Annex 1., Annex 2.; [Country Focus 2026](#), [2.1.](#), [3.1.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

In the eastern and southeastern provinces bordering with Pakistan, namely **Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktika, Paktia**, **indiscriminate violence takes place, however not at a high level**. In particular, the situation is characterised by a relatively moderate number of security incidents and civilian deaths, mostly resulting from the volatile conflict between the *de facto* security forces and Pakistani forces, and reported low numbers of conflict-induced displacement.

In the provinces of **Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktika**, and **Paktia**, a large share of events during the period **1 October 2024 - 20 March 2026** involved *de facto* security forces targeting civilians but also, increasingly, fighting against the Pakistani security forces. These provinces, located along the border with Pakistan, were affected by airstrikes and cross-border violence, contributing to an increase in security incidents and civilian deaths throughout the reference period.

Between **01 October 2024 and 30 November 2025**, in **Kandahar** perpetrating actors in security incidents mostly involved Pakistani security forces targeting civilians and the *de facto* security forces. Also, several events involved the *de facto* security forces targeting civilians. In a few events ISKP attacked *de facto* security forces in **Nangarhar** and **Kunar**, while in the same provinces the *de facto* intelligence and security forces had carried out several operations killing alleged ISKP members. A large share of civilian deaths was caused by Pakistani airstrikes in **Kandahar** and **Khost**, as well as in **Paktika**, where Pakistani airstrikes also caused damage to several shops in a civilian market.

In early 2026, hostilities between Pakistan and the Afghan *de facto* authorities escalated. On 21 February 2026, the ceasefire broke down, and Pakistan conducted airstrikes in Afghanistan against alleged TTP positions. In the first 12 days of March 2026, there were close to daily reports of airstrikes and cross border clashes. For example, between 1–2 March 2026, cross-border fire was reported from 25 different locations in 24 hours, along the shared borders in the provinces of **Kunar, Nangarhar** and **Khost**, highlighting the continued impact of cross-border activity. Moreover, the Spin Boldak and Takta Pul areas in **Kandahar** were described as ‘high-risk areas’ for humanitarian staff. Airports have been also hit by the airstrikes, such as a civilian airport in **Kandahar**, and the Jalalabad airport in **Nangarhar**. The intensity of attacks was high in March 2026; **Kunar**, based on information by local *de facto* authorities, experienced an additional 124 rocket attacks in a timeframe of 24 hours.

Amid hostilities in the period 26 February - 3 March 2026, UN OCHA recorded the displacement of 16 370 families, including in Paktia (7 000), Kunar (3 000), Khost (2 500), Nangarhar (2 500), and Paktika (470).

### **Scale and trends of violence**

In **Kandahar**, during **1 October 2024 - 30 November 2025** ACLED recorded 31 security incidents (14 battles, 2 explosions/remote violence incidents and 15 incidents of violence against civilians, representing 0.5 security incidents per week). UCDP recorded 48 civilian deaths, representing 3.1 civilian casualties per 100 000 inhabitants. During **1 December 2025 - 20 March 2026**, ACLED registered 29 security incidents (12 battles, 12 explosions/remote violence, 5 instances of violence against civilians, representing 1.9 security incidents per week). UCDP recorded 10 civilian deaths, representing 1 civilian death per 100 000 inhabitants.

In **Khost**, during **1 October 2024 - 30 November 2025** ACLED recorded 37 security incidents (11 battles, 7 explosions/remote violence incidents, and 19 instances of violence against civilians, representing 0.6 security incidents per week). UCDP recorded 20 civilian deaths, representing 2.9 civilian deaths per 100 000 inhabitants. During **1 December 2025 - 20 March 2026**, ACLED documented 31 security incidents (18 battles, 12 explosions/remote violence, 1 instance of violence against civilians, representing 2 security incidents per week). UCDP recorded 33 civilian deaths, which amounted to 5 civilian deaths per 100 000 inhabitants.

In **Kunar**, during **1 October 2024 - 30 November 2025** ACLED recorded 37 security incidents (18 battles, 14 explosions/remote violence incidents and 5 incidents of violence against civilians, representing 0.6 security incidents per week). UCDP recorded 5 civilian deaths, representing 0.9 civilian casualties per 100 000 inhabitants. During **1 December 2025 - 20 March 2026**, ACLED documented 46 security incidents (7 battles, 34 explosions/remote violence, 5 instances of violence against civilians, representing 3 security incidents per week). UCDP recorded 26 civilian deaths,

amounting to 5 civilian deaths per 100 000 inhabitants.

In **Nangarhar**, during **1 October 2024 - 30 November 2025** ACLED recorded 63 security incidents (23 battles, 10 explosions/remote violence incidents and 30 incidents of violence against civilians, representing 1 security incident per week). UCDP recorded 20 civilian deaths, representing 1.1 civilian casualties per 100 000 inhabitants. During **1 December 2025 - 20 March 2026**, ACLED reported 49 security incidents (21 battles, 27 explosions/remote violence, 1 instance of violence against civilians, representing 3.1 security incidents per week). UCDP recorded 37 civilian deaths, corresponding to 2 civilian deaths per 100 000 inhabitants.

In **Paktia**, during **1 October 2024 - 30 November 2025** ACLED recorded 24 security incidents (8 battles, 3 explosions/remote violence incidents and 13 incidents of violence against civilians, representing 0.4 security incident per week). UCDP recorded 10 civilian deaths, representing 1.5 civilian casualties per 100 000 inhabitants. During **1 December 2025 - 20 March 2026**, ACLED reported 20 security incidents (11 battles, 7 explosions/remote violence, 2 instances of violence against civilians, representing 1.3 security incidents per week). UCDP recorded 8 civilian deaths, amounting to 1 civilian death per 100 000 inhabitants.

In **Paktika**, during **1 October 2024 - 30 November 2025** ACLED recorded 32 security incidents (8 battles, 9 remote violence/explosions, 15 instances of violence against civilians, representing 0.5 security incidents per week). UCDP recorded 67 civilian deaths, representing 7.9 civilian deaths per 100 000 inhabitants. During **1 December 2025 - 20 March 2026**, ACLED reported 27 security incidents (5 battles, 16 explosions/remote violence, 6 incidents of violence against civilians, representing 1.7 security incidents per week). UCPD recorded 23 civilian deaths, corresponding to 3 civilian deaths per 100 000 inhabitants.

## No real risk

Areas where, **there is no real risk** for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QR.

This may be because the criteria for an armed conflict within the meaning of this provision are not met, or because no indiscriminate violence is taking place.

The areas assessed as belonging to this category as well as the main elements leading to this assessment are highlighted below.

## ○ **Remaining provinces**

In the remaining provinces the reference period was marked by a general decrease in violence after a peak in 2022 (mostly linked to violence between the *de facto* authorities and resistance groups as well as the ISKP) and by a relative stability ever since.

Namely, most of the provinces have not been impacted by the conflict with the Pakistani military. The recorded violence mostly involved resistance groups, the ISKP and the *de facto* military and police forces and caused a very low number of incidents and of civilian deaths. Events recorded as ‘violence against civilians’ were mostly perpetrated by the *de facto* security forces; this included arrests based on various motives, and the use of excessive violence in various situations, including in combatting crime, implementing sharia as well as exploiting their position to exert violence. Finally, conflict-induced displacement was not recorded.

Considering all the elements not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QR in the following provinces:

**Badakhshan, Badghis, Baghlan, Balkh, Bamyan, Daikundi, Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Ghor, Helmand, Herat, Jowzjan, Kapisa, Kunduz, Laghman, Logar, Nimruz, Nuristan, Panjshir, Parwan, Samangan, Sar-e Pul, Takhar, Uruzgan, Wardak and Zabul.**

Please note that in areas where there would be ‘no real risk’ for a civilian to be affected by indiscriminate violence within the meaning of Article 15(c) QR, depending on personal circumstances, an applicant may still be exposed to a risk of persecution (see [3. Refugee status](#)) or a risk of serious harm under [4.1. Article 15\(a\) QR: death penalty or execution](#) or [4.2. Article 15\(b\) QR: torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment](#). Hence, this assessment of ‘no real risk’ should in no way be misconstrued as the designation of ‘safe areas’ for return or any other purposes.