3.1. Members of the security institutions of the former government

COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: June 2026

This profile refers to members of the former Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), including former Afghan Local Police (ALP) and pro-government militias. Situation of family members is also addressed. This profile should be read in conjunction with 3.3. Persons affiliated with foreign forces.

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: COI Update 2026, 5.; Country Focus 2026, 4.1.1., 4.1.2., 4.1.3., 4.1.4., 4.2.; Country Focus 2024, 4.1.1., 4.1.2., 4.1.3., 4.1.4., 4.1.5., 4.2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

During the conflict before the takeover, ANDSF personnel both on and off duty was a priority target of the Taliban. After August 2021, many left the country. A general amnesty for members of the former government's administration and security forces was issued by the Taliban, but the text has not been made publicly available, creating uncertainty regarding its scope and enforcement. Despite the amnesty and some security officials having retained their job, targeting has been documented. The *de facto* authorities have reportedly deterred reporting on killings, while ambiguity and limited control over officials have enabled arbitrary arrests and abuses without accountability.

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution?

Some acts to which members of the security institutions of the former government could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, torture (*inter alia* to extract contact details of former colleagues), abuse and other ill-treatment as well as extortion have been reported. Most recorded violations against former security personnel occurred in the months following the takeover, although retaliatory violence has continued ever since. In subsequent human rights reports by UNAMA covering 1 January - 31 December 2025, 41 killings of former ANDSF members were documented. In the period 1 October - 31 December 2025, former civilian government officials and ANDSF members returning from Iran and Pakistan have been subjected to arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings.

Most sources indicate that the killings that have occurred are not part of an orchestrated campaign, however, some reports suggest some level of systematicity. As Taliban *de facto*

officials have not been held accountable, a climate of impunity exists. Former security personnel are reported to live in hiding or to live with a constant fear of being arrested.

Cases were reported where **family members** of former security personnel have been targeted to put pressure on former security officials, including to force them to come out of hiding. Instances of arrests and detention have been registered. Cases in which family members had been detained and killed together with former military officials were also documented.

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that persons under this profile could be subjected to and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should also be considered. For example, it was noted that former security officials were prevented from leading a normal life and faced hurdles in simple tasks such as registering a vehicle.

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?

A well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated for members of the security institutions of the former government, given the severity and persistent nature of the targeting, as well as the unpredictability as to who may be targeted.


Family members may also have a well-founded fear of persecution, for example in the context of Taliban putting pressure on former security officials or conducting house raids and searching for the individual they are related to.

In the case of a female applicant under this profile, it is reminded that in light of the current situation, a well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated for Afghan women and girls.

For additional information, see 3.13. Women and girls

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?

Persecution of individuals under this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of **political opinion** as having fought for the former government is considered as collaborating with ‘the enemy’.



Exclusion considerations are relevant to this profile, as members of the security institutions of the former government may have been involved in excludable acts. See 7. Exclusion.

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