



## 3.3. Peace initiatives

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#### 3.3.1. 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement

In September 2025, the JEP issued its first ruling, sentencing seven former members of the FARC-EP and 12 former members of state security forces for their responsibility in the commission of war crimes during the conflict between the state and the FARC-EP.[389](#) The JEP continued working on the 11 overarching cases covering crimes committed during the conflict between the state and the FARC-EP.[390](#)

The 2016 Peace Accords ended a 50-year conflict between the government and the FARC-EP; however, violence by illegal armed groups has since continued and transformed into new dynamics.[391](#) New conflict dynamics post-2016 are described as fragmented and localised.[392](#) As of late 2024, the main armed groups in the country continued to operate and 'expand their presence' across the country.[393](#) The Petro government re-affirmed their commitment to the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Accords through 2024, while acknowledging their concerns regarding implementation, particularly rural land reform, as unequal land distribution is one of the main underlying causes of conflict.[394](#) Implementation of the 2016 Peace Accords has been described as 'slow and lackluster'.[395](#)

Land adjudication and formalisation advanced, with the latter reaching 50 % of the goal established in the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement.[396](#) Land delivery to peasants and ethnic populations also continued.[397](#) As of October 2025, around 9 % out of the three million-hectare of land set for adjudication in the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement has been completed; about 64 % of adjudicated land has benefited farmers.[398](#) Also, as of October 2025, about 3.5 million hectares of land have been formalised, about half of the seven million set in the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement; 75 % of formalised land has benefitted indigenous peoples.[399](#) In July 2025, the Ministry of Agriculture issued a decree establishing a program to grant land to victims of forced displacement.[400](#) Additional information could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

'Security guarantees' concerns, budgetary constraints, uneven regional investment, and insufficient coordination between state institutions are cited as the main challenges for the implementation of the agreement.[401](#)

Despite efforts by state entities to provide protection to former combatants, violence against them persisted.[402](#) The reintegration of former combatants has had some progress in terms of access to land, housing and the establishment of collective productive projects.[403](#) Security

risks and limited inter-institutional coordination remained.[404](#) Around 11 000 former combatants remained active in the reintegration process.[405](#) Since the signing of the 2016 FARC-EP Peace Agreement, over 17 000 hectares have been delivered to former FARC-EP combatants.[406](#)

- [389](#)

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