



## 2.10. Individuals targeted by Boko Haram

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For background information on Boko Haram and its splinter groups, including their capacity, *modus operandi*, areas of operation and violations perpetrated by them [see EUAA COI Report – Nigeria Security Situation November 2025](#).

Boko Haram mainly operates in North-East Nigeria.<sup>650</sup> The major point of contention between the two main Boko Haram factions - Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) - is rooted in a fundamental disagreement over how civilians should be treated. JAS views civilians as legitimate targets, operating through extreme violence and sectarianism, including suicide attacks, massacres, and the enslavement of those it labels 'infidels' or 'apostates'. ISWAP, on the other hand, distinguishes between Muslims and non-Muslims, seeking to build support among Muslim communities by imposing taxes and enforcing its own governance system, rather than relying on indiscriminate plunder. While ISWAP limits violence against Muslim civilians, non-Muslims remain unprotected under its rule.<sup>651</sup>

JAS considers unaffiliated Muslim civilians to be apostates and targets them accordingly. Lower-level fighters frequently conduct raids independently, risking punishment if apprehended. JAS raids go beyond merely looting goods or money; they also involve the abduction of girls and women. JAS commanders have reportedly rewarded loyal fighters by permitting forced marriages with these captives, a practice prohibited by ISWAP.<sup>652</sup>

ISWAP has carried out massacres of civilians accused of breaching its rules. Justifications include refusal to pay taxes, suspected cooperation with government forces, or defiance of its authority. In accordance with Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)<sup>653</sup> ideology, ISWAP considers the killing and enslavement of non-Muslims to be permissible.<sup>654</sup> Media sources noted that ISWAP have increasingly targeted farmers, fishermen, loggers, herders, and metal scrap collectors, accusing them of spying and relaying information to the military and local militias opposing them.<sup>655</sup> In September 2024, ISWAP militants attacked Mafa town in Yobe State, killing dozens and destroying the town. While authorities confirmed 34 deaths, locals report over 100 burials across multiple sites. The attack was reportedly carried out as retaliation for the community's refusal to pay extortion levies.<sup>656</sup> In a similar attack in January 2025, ISWAP militants killed some 40 farmers in Borno state, allegedly for trespassing on its territory without permission and failing to pay required levies.<sup>657</sup>

Schoolchildren have been significantly impacted by Boko Haram's campaign against secular education. Attacks on schools and widespread abductions by Boko Haram and other armed groups have led to the closure or destruction of thousands of educational institutions at all levels. Student kidnappings for ransom remain a major threat, particularly in northern Nigeria. [658](#) In February 2024, suspected Boko Haram fighters abducted over 200 IDPs, mostly children, in Ngala Local Government Area of Borno State. [659](#)

Boko Haram's attacks on women have been especially severe, with kidnapped victims frequently subjected to forced marriage, sexual violence, and other abuses. [660](#) (for more information see Conflict-related violence under [2.3.3. Violence against women and girls](#)). Members of civil society organisations have faced threats and physical violence for speaking out against Boko Haram. [661](#) Armed groups such as JAS, ISWAP and Bakura have continued to carry out attacks against civilians, including humanitarian workers. [662](#)

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In 2015, Boko Haram's leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to the ISIS, leading the movement to adopt the name Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). However, internal divisions soon emerged, and in 2016, dissenting members broke away. This splinter group retained the ISWAP name and gained formal recognition from ISIS. Meanwhile, Shekau and his loyalists formed a separate faction, returning to the original designation of Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS). See Crisis Group, JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters, 28 March 2024, [url](#)

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