



## 1.4.2 Baghdad

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Baghdad map

#### **Map 3. Baghdad governorate, © UNOCHA and MapAction.[197](#)**

For a general description of the governorate, please refer to section 2.3 of the [EUAA COI Report Iraq – Security Situation \(May 2024\)](#). Baghdad governorate’s population according to the latest available figures of 2022 was estimated to be 9 006 001.[198](#) As of 2025, the metropolitan area of Baghdad city was estimated to have about 8.06 million inhabitants.[199](#)


According to a June 2025 article published by Al-Hurra channel, all key pro-Iranian militias had a ‘significant presence’ in the country’s capital.[200](#) In April 2025, Iraqi outlet Shafaq News reported that 20 000 members of armed factions had been integrated into the PMF and other security institutions, then redeployed around the capital in the Baghdad belt.[201](#) Disagreements about the role of militias and the lack of state authority over them reportedly almost led to clashes between fighters from Muqtada Al-Sadr’s armed group Saraya Al-Salam and Iran-backed Kata’ib Hezbollah in the capital in July 2025.[202](#) Later that same month, fighters from PMF brigades linked to Kata’ib Hezbollah stormed the Ministry of Agriculture to thwart the appointment of a new director, leading to at least one police officer being killed in the ensuing gun battle.[203](#)

There were several instances of rocket or drone attacks on areas with US forces presence, such as Baghdad International airport,[204](#) as well as Taji military base, which formerly hosted US and international coalition forces.[205](#) In terms of ISIL-related activity, there was limited reporting on the group’s presence in Baghdad governorate, mostly in the form of arrests of ISIL suspects.[206](#) In January 2025, four Iraqi soldiers were reportedly killed in clashes with ISIL militants in Tarmiya district, north of Baghdad.[207](#) Additionally, the governorate experienced recurrent armed violence linked to tribal disputes.[208](#) According to the media organisation Daraj, at least four tribal clashes were recorded between mid-January and mid-April 2025 in and around the capital, specifically in the areas of Zafaraniya, Mada'in, Mahmoudiyya, and Al-Shu'la.[209](#) Some of the armed disputes affected uninvolved civilians, killing a 12-year-old boy in Al-Shu'la[210](#) and causing a fire to break out in several homes in Husseiniya.[211](#)

#### **Security incidents (number and type of security incidents)**

During the reference period (1 August 2024 - 1 August 2025), ACLED recorded 147 security incidents in Baghdad governorate, of which 47 were coded as battles, 26 as explosions/remote violence, and 74 as incidents of violence against civilians. Security incidents were recorded in about half of all 14 governorate districts, the districts with most recorded incidents being Kadhimiya (36), Thawra (26), Adhamiya (24) and Rusafa (18).[212](#)

Image



**Figure 8: Security events coded ‘battles’, ‘explosions/remote violence’ and ‘violence against civilians’ in Baghdad between August 2024 and 1 August 2025 on district level, based on ACLED data.**[213](#)

According to ACLED data, unidentified armed groups were involved as main actor (coded as either ‘Actor 1’ or ‘Actor 2’) in 93 incidents, followed by unidentified tribal militia with 26 incidents.[214](#) For the period between 1 August 2024 and 1 August 2025, UCDP recorded 3 security events in Baghdad governorate, leading to 4 casualties.[215](#)

### Civilian casualties

During the reference period, UNAMI recorded 2 civilian casualties in Baghdad governorate (1 civilian killed and 1 injured).[216](#) UCDP likewise reported one civilian fatality.[217](#)

### Conflict-related infrastructure damage and ERW

No information on new conflict-related infrastructure damage could be found in the reference period within the time constraints of this report. Occasionally, security forces reportedly seized war remnants such as mortar shells and other explosive devices in the vicinity of Baghdad city.[218](#)

### Conflict-induced displacement and return

IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)[219](#) unit stated in its Iraq Master List Report 134 (covering the period September – December 2024) that, as of 31 December 2024, Baghdad governorate was hosting 25 698 displaced people, 8 724 of them in Mahmoudiya district, followed by Abu Ghraib district with 4 998 and Karkh district with 4 350. About 38 % of these IDPs were displaced from Anbar governorate, while 35% were displaced from Babil governorate.[220](#) As of December 2024, the return rate[221](#) in Baghdad governorate was 70 %. Baghdad recorded 96 216 returnees, most of whom had been displaced within the governorate (90 %), with the principal districts of return being Mahmoudiya (51 714) and Abu Ghraib (24 390).[222](#)

- [197](#)

UNOCHA and iMMAP, Iraq: Baghdad Governorate Reference Map 2020, 5 May 2020, [url](#)

- [198](#)

Iraq, CSO, [البيانات للبابل 2022.2023](#) [Statistical Collection 2022-2023, Part Two], 21 August 2023, [url](#), p. 8

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Iraqi News, Baghdad ranks 43rd in world's largest cities by population, 23 May 2025, [url](#)

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Al-Hurra, Iraqi Militias Mobilize as Iran-Israel Tensions Reignite Talk of "Unified Front", 21 June 2025, [url](#)

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Shafaq News, SOURCE: Iraq absorbs 20,000 fighters into PMF, 28 April 2025, [url](#)

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Al-Kaabi, A., Game On: Sadr and the Iraqi "Resistance" Clash Over State Control of Arms, TWI, 17 July 2025, [url](#)

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Al Jazeera, Gunfight in Baghdad kills one as paramilitary group storms ministry, 27 July 2025, [url](#)

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ISW and CTP, Iran Update Special Report: Iraq after the Israel-Iran War, June 13 - July 3, 2025, 3 July 2025, [url](#); New Arab (The), Rockets strike US military base near Baghdad airport as Iraqi interior ministry launches probe on attacks, 1 October 2024, [url](#); Cradle (The), 'Suspicious' attack hits US outpost at Baghdad airport ahead of Iranian president's visit, 11 September 2024, [url](#)

- [205](#)



EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 1 August 2025, [url](#)

- [215](#)

EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 1 August 2024 to 1 August 2025 provided by courtesy of UCDP by email, 19 August 2025

- [216](#)

EUAA analysis based on UNAMI data. Email to EUAA, 4 August 2025

- [217](#)

EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering from 1 August 2024 to 1 August 2025

- [218](#)

Central, دادغب بونج ةيبرح تافلخم طبض [War remnants seized south of Baghdad], 1 June 2025, [url](#); Baghdad Today, ةيبرح تافلخم طبض "شعاد" تاباصعل ةيبرح تافلخم طبض [War remnants of ISIL gangs seized near Baghdad], 29 December 2024, [url](#)

- [219](#)

Please note that IOM differentiates between displacement induced by conflict/violence and displacement driven by natural disasters. The displacement due to natural disasters is not included in the DTM data, see IDMC, Country Profile Iraq, n.d., [url](#)

- [220](#)

IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq IDPs Master Lists 134, 12 February 2025, [url](#)

- [221](#)

The return rate is calculated by dividing the number of returnees per governorate by the total number of returnees and IDPs originating from that governorate. (IOM Iraq, Returns in Iraq: 2021 Overview, December 2020 (Round11) to December 2021 (Round 14), February 2022, [url](#), p. 2, footnote 5)

- [222](#)

IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 134 (September-December 2024), January 2025, [url](#), p. 10