

4.9.3. Druze

COMMON ANALYSIS | Last update: December 2025

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: [COI Update](#), 4., 5.; [Country Focus July 2025](#), [2.4.4.](#), [5.8.13.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

The Druze constituted approximately 3 % of Syria's pre-war population (more or less 700 000 individuals), primarily residing in Sweida governorate, with smaller communities near Damascus and in Idlib. Historically, the Druze maintained a degree of autonomy, including local militias with tens of thousands of fighters. The Men of Dignity, the largest Druze militia, was to be placed under the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in March 2025, but this had not been effectively implemented at the time of writing. As of October 2025, Druze militias still control much of Sweida governorate. In the framework of the violence that took place between February and July 2025 between [the Transitional Government](#), Druze, and Bedouins, more than one thousand casualties were reported among Transitional Government security forces, Druze fighters, and civilians. Anti-Druze sentiment surged online, with accusations of collaboration with Israel and the Assad regime and calls for violence.

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution?

Some acts to which Druze could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution such as extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, kidnappings, abductions, sexual violence, and enforced disappearances. Reports on events that took place from February to July 2025 describe killings of civilians in homes, a square, a school and a hospital. Druze civilians were arbitrarily arrested or forcibly disappeared by security forces of the Transitional Government, often without warrants or notification to families. Reports revealed deaths under torture. Also, retaliatory kidnappings between Druze and Bedouin groups occurred in Sweida in July 2025 and more than one hundred women and girls were abducted by armed groups linked to the Transitional Government. In at least three documented cases, Druze women were reportedly raped before being executed.

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that Druze could be subjected to and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should be considered. For example, Druze properties have been looted, and Druze have been extorted. Also, Druze, including students in Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, and Latakia, continued to face harassment. Druze civilians were subjected to sectarian slogans, and religious men were humiliated, including by the forcible shaving of their culturally significant moustache.

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for Druze to face persecution should take into account **risk-impacting circumstances**, including the facts and circumstances in the relevant area at the time of the decision, such as:

- **Regional specifics:** whether, in the applicant's area of origin at the time of the decision, the Druze community benefits from security guarantees or faces increased risks of targeted violence.
- **(Perceived) political background:** whether, at the time of the decision, the Druze community, including the applicant themselves, is generally perceived to be opposing the Transitional Government, to be associated with Israel, or to be affiliated to a militia.

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this is highly likely to be for reasons of **race/nationality** and/or **religion** as Druze are a distinct ethno-religious group. **(Imputed) political opinion** is also relevant in case of persecution due to perceived affiliation with the Assad regime and/or Israel.



Exclusion considerations could be particularly relevant to this profile, as members of Druze militias may have been involved in excludable acts. See [8. Exclusion](#).