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4.1.2. Former Assad government officials and other civilians who (are perceived to) have collaborated with the Assad regime

COMMON ANALYSIS | Last update: December 2025

This profile covers the situation of civilians who (are perceived to) have collaborated with the Assad regime, such as government employees, doctors affiliated with military hospitals, media professionals formerly employed by state-run outlets, former Ba'ath Party members, and informants.

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports and query: [COI Update](#), 5; [Country Focus July 2025](#), [2.1.1.](#), [2.3.](#); [Country Focus March 2025](#), [1.1.](#), [1.2.](#), [1.3.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution?

In itself, the prosecution of persons responsible for serious human rights violations and criminal acts committed under the rule of the former Assad government does not amount to persecution.

However, some acts to which persons falling under this profile could be exposed are of such a severe nature that they would amount to persecution, such as execution, extrajudicial killing, revenge killing, arbitrary arrest and detention, incommunicado detention, physical assault, enforced disappearance.

More precisely, the [Transitional Government](#) has carried out sporadic arrests of individuals suspected of involvement in violations under the Assad regime, such as government employees, doctors affiliated with military hospitals linked to security services, and media professionals formerly employed by state-run outlets. Former Ba'ath Party membership alone does not appear to result in targeting. However, the arrest of former civilian officials is reported to be arbitrary. Prominent individuals who were publicly visible or made statements during the previous regime may be singled out, likely to demonstrate the authorities' commitment to justice. In contrast, lesser-known individuals are generally not detained unless implicated in specific crimes or known to have ties to intelligence services.

Since April 2025, vigilante attacks against former regime collaborators have reportedly increased. Documented incidents include executions of Sunni collaborators and assaults on [Alawites](#) accused of supporting the former government or acting as informants. Between January and April 2025, at least 361 civilians were reportedly killed extrajudicially in Homs and Hama governorates, with most incidents occurring in Alawite-majority areas. In Homs, the targeting of Alawites appears to be sectarian in nature, driven by perceptions of collective complicity in regime crimes.

Additionally, the [Syrian Democratic Forces \(SDF\)](#) have reportedly carried out arbitrary detentions of civilians, including suspected Assad regime supporters. In response to escalating retaliatory violence, the Transitional Government issued a *fatwa* in June 2025 prohibiting revenge killings and extrajudicial retaliation, urging resolution through legal channels. The impact of this measure remains unverified.

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?

The mere fact of having been a civilian affiliated to the Assad regime, including having been a former member of the Ba'ath party, would not in itself lead to the level of risk to establish well-founded fear of persecution.

Therefore, the individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for former Assad government officials and other civilians who (are perceived to) have collaborated with the Assad regime to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as:

- **Whether the applicant is alleged to have committed crimes under the Assad regime:** individuals who have been alleged to have committed crimes while affiliated with the Assad regime, including former regime informants, face a higher risk.
- **Religious background:** although persons of Sunni and other religious backgrounds have been targeted as well, individuals belonging to the Alawite minority face a higher risk, particularly from non-state actors. See also [4.9.4. Alawites](#).
- **Home area:** the demographic composition of an area may also impact the risk. For example, individuals under this profile living in areas where Alawites make up a large part of the population may be at higher risk. Refer to [4.9.4. Alawites](#).

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this is highly likely to be for **reasons of (imputed) political opinion**, as being a former Assad government official or another civilian who (is perceived to have) has collaborated with the Assad regime is seen as a political opinion.



Exclusion considerations could be particularly relevant to this profile, as former Assad government officials and other civilians who (are perceived to) have collaborated with the Assad regime may have been involved in excludable acts. See [8. Exclusion](#).

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