



**Please cite as:** EUAA, '[6.2. Safety](#)' in *Country Guidance: Somalia*, October 2025.

## 6.2. Safety

COMMON ANALYSIS

Last update: October 2025

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report/s: [Country Focus 2025, 2.](#); [Security 2025, 2.3.](#), [2.6.1.](#), [2.8.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

### 6.2.1. Absence of persecution or serious harm

When examining the element 'absence of persecution or serious harm', the decision-maker should refer to chapters 2 to 5 of this document.

When assessing the requirement of safety with regard to the applicability of IPA in individual cases of applicants from Somalia, the following elements should be taken into account:

- **General security situation in relation to indiscriminate violence**

Based on the analysis under [4.3.3. Indiscriminate violence](#), the conclusions with regard to the three cities of Mogadishu, Garowe and Hargeisa are as follows:

In **Mogadishu** (Benadir/Mogadishu region): indiscriminate violence reaches a high level, and, accordingly, a lower level of individual elements is required to show substantial grounds for believing that a civilian, returned to the territory, would face a real risk of serious harm within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD.

In **Garowe** (Nugal region): there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR.

In **Hargeisa** (Wogoyi Galbeed region): there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD.

With regard to the **safety of IPA in Mogadishu**, a careful examination should be performed, given the complex security situation in the capital.

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### **Actor of persecution or serious harm and their reach**

In case where the applicant fears persecution or serious harm by **State actors** (e.g., [journalists](#), [individuals \(perceived as\) contravening Islamic and customary laws/tenets outside Al-Shabaab controlled areas](#), [persons with diverse SOGIESC](#)), there is a presumption that IPA would not be available.

In specific cases where **the reach of a certain State actor is clearly limited** to a particular geographical area (e.g. FMS authorities, Somaliland authorities), the safety criterion may be satisfied with regard to other parts of Somalia.

In cases where the applicant faces persecution or serious harm by **Al-Shabaab**, the safety requirement would, in general, not be satisfied in South-Central Somalia. With regard to Puntland and Somaliland, IPA may be considered safe depending on the applicant's individual circumstances. The group's capacity to track and attack individuals in areas outside its direct control, should be given due consideration.

In cases where the applicant faces persecution or serious harm by **ISS or clans**, the safety requirement may be satisfied depending on the applicant's individual circumstances.

For more information on the territorial control and influence of different actors, see [2. Actors of persecution or serious harm](#) and [4.3.3.b. Assessment of indiscriminate violence per region](#).

In cases where the applicant faces persecution or serious harm for reasons related to the prevalent social norms in Somalia and the actor of persecution or serious harm is the **Somali society at large** (e.g. [persons with diverse SOGIESC](#), [individuals contravening social or religious laws/ tenets](#)), the safety requirement would generally not be met.

For certain particularly vulnerable individuals, such as some women and children, if the actor of persecution or serious harm is the **(extended) family or the**

**community at large** (e.g. [FGM/C](#), [forced marriage](#)), considering the reach of these actors, the lack of State protection and their potential vulnerability to other forms of violence, the safety requirement would in general not be met.

For the territorial control and influence of actors, see also [2. Actors of persecution or serious harm](#).

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**Whether the profile of the applicant is considered a priority target and/or a threat by the actor of persecution or serious harm**

The applicant's profile could make him or her a priority target, increasing the likelihood that the actor of persecution or serious harm would attempt to trace them in the potential IPA location (e.g. high-level federal and state officials).

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**Behaviour of the applicant**

It is recalled that an applicant cannot be reasonably expected to abstain from practices fundamental to their identity, such as those related to religion or sexual orientation and gender identity, in order to avoid the risk of persecution or serious harm [12](#)

- **Other risk-enhancing circumstances**

The information under [3. Refugee status](#) should be used to assist in this assessment.

**6.2.2. Availability of protection against persecution or serious harm**

Alternatively, it may be determined that the requirement of safety is satisfied if the applicant would have access to protection against persecution or serious harm, as defined in Article 7 QD/QR, in the area where IPA is considered. In the case of persecution by the State, a presumption of non-availability of State protection applies. See also [5. Actors of protection](#).

In relation to **Mogadishu, the requirement of safety may be satisfied only in exceptional cases**. Individual circumstances are to be taken into consideration.

In relation to **Garowe and Hargeisa, the requirement of safety may be satisfied**, depending on the profile and the individual circumstances of the applicant.

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- [6.2. Safety](#)
- [6.3. Travel and admittance](#)
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CJEU, *Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v X and Y and Z v Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel*, joined cases C- 199/12 to C-201/12 judgment of 7 November 2013, *X and Y and Z*, paras. 70-76,

<https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=144215&pageIndex=0&doclan>

CJEU, *Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Y and Z*, joined cases C-71/11 and C-99/11, judgment of 5 September 2012, para. 80,

<https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=126364&doclang=en>