



**Please cite as:** EUAA, '[3.1.1. Federal and state officials](#)' in *Country Guidance: Somalia*, October 2025.

## 3.1.1. Federal and state officials

### COMMON ANALYSIS

Last update: October 2025

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: [Country Focus 2025, 1.6., 1.6.1.](#); [Targeting 2021, 6.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

This sub-profile refers to staff of the FGS and FMS and Somaliland administrations and focuses on their **risk of persecution by Al-Shabaab**.

#### Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution?

Acts to which federal and state officials could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, Al-Shabaab has been reported to conduct targeted IEDs and mortar attacks, killings by shooting or use of suicide bombers against them.

#### Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?

**In South-Central Somalia, a well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated for prominent and high-ranking federal and state officials**, as they were targeted during the reference period on several occasions.

The targeting of **lower-level officials** in **South-Central Somalia** appears to lack a consistent pattern, nevertheless the assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood to face persecution should take into account **risk-impacting circumstances**, such as:

- **Nature of duties and visibility:** Al-Shabaab has targeted different categories of federal and state officials, including government officials, district and deputy commissioners, tax collectors, employees of government institutions. Family members of these officials have also been targeted. Officials with visibility through the exercise of their duties, such as tax collectors, may have a higher risk.
- **Frequented locations and places:** Individuals frequenting places where attacks are mostly recorded (e.g., hotels, cafes and restaurants where other state officials are present) may have a higher risk. The same applies to officials frequently travelling in convoys.

- **Home area and Al-Shabaab operational capacity:** In areas bordering contested areas or in contested areas between Al-Shabaab and FGS and FMS, federal and state officials may have a higher risk.

In **Puntland**, Al-Shabaab has lower operational capacity, nevertheless in the case of federal and state officials the individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood to face persecution **should take into account risk-impacting circumstances**, such as:

- **Nature of duties and visibility:** Al-Shabaab's intelligence service has the ability to track and find individuals. Especially, individuals with visibility through the exercise of their duties may have a higher risk. For example, in 2020 Al-Shabaab carried out attacks killing the governor of Mudug region in Galkayo and the governor of Nugal in Garowe.
- **Home area and Al-Shabaab operational capacity:** Al-Shabaab has stronger presence in the northern parts of Puntland (see [map](#)).

In **Somaliland**, Al-Shabaab has very limited operational capacity and in the reference period no incidents against federal and state officials were reported. Therefore, **a well-founded fear of persecution** for state and federal state officials in Somaliland **would in general not be substantiated**.

### **Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?**

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this is highly likely to be for reasons of **religion** and/or **political opinion**, as Al-Shabaab considers people associated with the Somali government to be infidels and/or as their political enemies.