

Please cite as: EUAA, '[3.1.2. Members of the federal and state armed forces](#)'
in *Country Guidance: Somalia*, October 2025.

3.1.2. Members of the federal and state armed forces

COMMON ANALYSIS

Last update: October 2025

This sub-profile refers to members of the FGS and FMS armed forces, as well as to Somaliland armed forces and focuses on their risk of persecution by Al-Shabaab.

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: [Country Focus 2025](#), [1.6.3.](#); [Targeting 2021](#), 6.2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution?

While certain risks are inherent to armed forces' duties and activities, acts to which members of federal and state forces could be exposed, with regard to the risks outside the performance of their duties, are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, Al-Shabaab has carried out targeted assassinations and attacks, involving mostly shootings, IEDs and suicide bombings against them, including against officers of lower unspecified rank and regular soldiers.

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?

In South-Central Somalia, a well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated for members of the federal and state armed forces. As they were targeted during the reference period on several occasions. SNA members have been a primary target for Al-Shabaab. More specifically, in different incidents in 2023, 2024 and 2025, SNA members have been targeted with IEDs planted by Al-Shabaab.

In **Puntland**, Al-Shabaab has lower operational capacity, nevertheless in the case of members of the federal and state armed forces the individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood to face persecution **should take into account risk-impacting circumstances**, such as:

- **Nature of duties and visibility:** Individuals with visibility through the exercise of their duties may have a higher risk.
- **Home area and Al-Shabaab operational capacity:** Al-Shabaab has stronger presence in the northern parts of Puntland (see [map](#)). For example, in January 2024 an attack with an IED at a tea kiosk/khat chewing point in Bossaso was reported.

In **Somaliland**, Al-Shabaab has very limited operational capacity and in the reference period no incidents against members of the federal and state armed forces were reported. Therefore, **a well-founded fear of persecution** for members of the federal and state armed forces in Somaliland **would in general not be substantiated**.

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this is highly likely to be for reasons of **religion** and/or **political opinion**, as Al-Shabaab considers military personnel as part of the Somali government hence to be infidels and/or as their political enemies.



Exclusion considerations are relevant to this profile, as members of the FGS and FMS armed forces may have been involved in excludable acts. See [7. Exclusion](#).