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## 5.2.4. Russia

After assuming power, the interim government initially maintained relations with Russia and provided security guarantees for its military bases in Syria. However, since early 2025, it cancelled a contract granting Russia management of the Tartous port. Russia's past support for Assad during the war, combined with the recent lifting of Western sanctions on Syria while Russia remains under heavy international sanctions, has reportedly complicated bilateral cooperation.<sup>[790](#)</sup> According to ISW, as of late May, Russia was assessed to have a presence at the Hmeimim air base, the Tartous naval base and at the Qamishli base.<sup>[791](#)</sup> Other sources reported that Russia maintained a limited presence near the Hmeimim military base in Latakia governorate.<sup>[792](#)</sup>

- [790](#)

Smagin, N., *As the New Syrian Regime Gains Legitimacy, It Is Pushing Russia Out*, Carnegie Politika, 17 June 2025, [url](#)

- [791](#)

ISW, *Assessed Control of Terrain in Syria as of May 27, 2025*, 28 May 2025, [url](#)

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EUISS, *Geopolitical miscalculations: The case against Russia's presence in Syria*, 14 March 2025, [url](#); US CRS, *Syria: Transition and U.S. Policy*, 11 March 2025, [url](#), p. 23; New York Times (The), *Hundreds of Civilians Take Shelter at Russian Air Base in Syria*, 11 March 2025, [url](#)