


b) Assessment of indiscriminate violence per region

COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: June 2025

For the purposes of this document, the assessment of the level of indiscriminate violence in Sudan is made by (non-administrative) regions, denoted as follow:

- **Khartoum region** which comprises Khartoum state;
- **Darfur region** which comprises North Darfur, South Darfur, West Darfur, East Darfur and Central Darfur states;
- **Kordofan region** which comprises North Kordofan, South Kordofan and West Kordofan, including Abyei¹⁴;
- **Central region** which comprises Al Jazirah, Sennar, Blue Nile and White Nile states;
- **North region** which comprises Northern and River Nile states; and,
- **East region** which comprises Gedaref, Kassala and Red Sea states.

The map below summarises and illustrates the assessment of the level of indiscriminate violence per region.



Map 2. Level of indiscriminate violence in Sudan (based on information up to 21 March 2025).

- Mere presence** would be considered sufficient in order to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR.
- Indiscriminate violence reaches a **high level** and a lower level of individual elements is required to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR.
- Indiscriminate violence is taking place, however **not at a high level**, and a higher level of individual elements is required to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR.
- In general, there is **no real risk** for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR.

- [Mere presence](#)
- [High level of indiscriminate violence](#)
- [Indiscriminate violence not at a high level](#)
- [No real risk](#)

Mere presence

Areas where the degree of indiscriminate violence reaches such an exceptionally high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the relevant area, would, **solely on account of their presence there**, face a real risk of being subject to the serious threat referred to in Article 15(c) QD/QR. Accordingly, additional individual elements are not required in order to substantiate subsidiary protection needs under Article 15(c) QD/QR. The areas assessed as belonging to this category as well as the main elements leading to this assessment are highlighted below.

○ Khartoum state

- **Actors and territorial control:** in Khartoum, the most densely inhabited state in Sudan with a population of 9.4 million, the SAF and the RSF and their allies are the primary warring parties actively confronting to gain control of the areas. Also, international actors are active, notably the Egyptian air force supporting the SAF. Following the offensives, the SAF regained control over most of the three cities, while the RSF remained in control of western and southern parts of Omdurman. See [2. Actors of persecution or serious harm](#).
- **Methods and tactics:** explosive weapons and drone attacks have been used by both warring parties, but while the **SAF** is reported to conduct also air strikes and artillery shelling, the **RSF** uses asymmetric tactic relying on heavy artillery attacks, acting on the ground through its infantry. Reportedly, civilians continued to be injured and killed in heavy artillery crossfire and due to the use of drone-dropped munitions against persons wearing civilian clothes, airstrikes and shelling during the 2024 SAF's offensive. The RSF targeted civilian infrastructures (such as markets, medical facilities, and other services) killing and injuring dozens of people in Omdurman. Reportedly, in April 2023, the RSF used the presence of detained civilians in streets and open areas close to buildings as 'human shields' to deter SAF airstrikes in Khartoum and Bahri. Additionally, sexual violence is used as a weapon of war, particularly by the RSF and allied militias. See [3.9. Women and girls](#).
- **Incidents and fatalities:** in the reference period, 52.8 security incidents per week and 103 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants were reported in Khartoum state. In 1 075 instances civilians were the primary or only target.
- **Displacement:** with around 3 500 400 IDPs, Khartoum represents the second most common area of origin for IDPs in Sudan accounting for 31 % of all IDPs in the country. It is reported that despite the 'mass exodus' triggered by the conflict, there was still a large number of persons who either could not afford to flee or were unable to do so due to vulnerabilities or insecurity.
- **Further impact on civilians:** the use of explosive weapons by both the SAF and the RSF with wide area effects in densely populated Khartoum has resulted in large-scale destruction of homes, schools, hospitals, and other vital infrastructure. Reportedly, many indirect cases of deaths resulting from war-factors are not recorded. The healthcare system has been 'decimated' due to the conflict with Khartoum being reported as the most affected by attacks to healthcare facilities. Severe food insecurity due to the conflict resulted in deaths for starvation, including among children. See the use of food as a weapon of war in Presence, methods and tactics of actors under section [a\) Security situation in Sudan:](#)

[recent events](#). Finally, explosive remnants of war were reported in Omdurman and northern Bahri, in the latter the RSF was also accused of planting mines. See also [3.7. Humanitarian and healthcare workers](#) under RS and [4.2.1. Healthcare, humanitarian assistance and socio-economic conditions](#) under SP.

Khartoum state experiences exceptionally high level of indiscriminate violence, characterised by intense urban warfare, shifting territorial control, heavy aerial bombardments, and widespread civilian targeting. Both the SAF and the RSF engage in large-scale military operations, including airstrikes, artillery shelling, and drone attacks, leading to severe civilian casualties, mass displacement, destruction of infrastructure, and humanitarian collapse. Given the scale and intensity of the conflict, civilians in Khartoum face a real and immediate risk of serious harm solely due to their **mere presence** in the area. Accordingly, additional individual elements are not required in order to substantiate subsidiary protection needs under Article 15(c) QD/QR.

[COI reference: [Country Focus 2024](#), 1.2.2.; [Security 2025](#), [2.1.](#); [COI Update](#), 2.2., 3.1.1.]

○ Darfur region [North Darfur, South Darfur, West Darfur, East Darfur and Central Darfur states]

- **Actors and territorial control:** the Darfur region is mostly controlled by the RSF except for El Fasher state capital, some parts of North Darfur, and Jebel Marra. Nevertheless, territorial control in Darfur remains contested, with various armed actors exerting influence over different areas. The shifting alliances, defections and internal divisions among these actors contribute to the volatile security situation. The RSF, originating from Darfuri Arab groups, hold control over four of the five state capitals, with El Fasher in North Darfur remaining a key battleground where the SAF and allied factions retain a presence. The SLM maintains influence in different areas, with the SLM-AW controlling parts of Jebel Marra and claiming to protect civilians there, while the SLM-MM and the JEM have actively engaged in hostilities against the RSF in North Darfur where SLM-MM exert control over some areas. Some smaller groups composing the Joined Forces or JFASM, together with SLM-MM and JEM also abandoned their neutrality in April 2024.
- **Methods and tactics:** the ongoing conflict in Darfur is characterized by the use of protracted sieges, indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas and infrastructures (including healthcare facilities), the use of heavy artillery and airstrikes and targeted ethnic violence. Violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) have been documented, particularly concerning the protection of civilians and vulnerable populations. Despite an existing UN arms embargo prohibiting weapons supplies to Darfur, weaponry was transferred into the region and the active participation of other armed groups has heightened risks of serious harm for civilians caught in the crossfire. See [3.1.1. Non-Arabs/Africans from Darfur](#). Additionally, sexual violence is used as a weapon of war, particularly by the RSF and allied militias. See [3.9. Women and girls](#).

Reportedly, the **SAF** primarily relied on air superiority, employing indiscriminate airstrikes in urban and rural areas, resulting in civilian casualties, damage to infrastructures, and forced displacement. However, shelling against civilians and bombardments of civilian areas and infrastructures (including schools, healthcare facilities markets, IDPs camps) resulting in fatalities and casualties among the civilian population were also reported.

The **RSF** employed siege warfare, notably in El Fasher where it trapped over 900 000 civilians under dire conditions, subjecting them to daily artillery shelling targeting markets and other locations. Also, the RSF engaged in indiscriminate artillery shelling that targeted civilian infrastructures such as markets, hospitals and IDP camps, (notably Abou Shouk, Ardamata and Zamzam) causing the loss of civilian life and damage to infrastructures. The use of suicide drones has been reported as part of the RSF's military strategy. The above-mentioned tactics have contributed to widespread human rights violations and a deterioration of the security situation.

- **Incidents and fatalities:** in the reference period, 22.7 security incidents per week and 223 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants were reported in Darfur region. In 1 017 07 instances civilians were the primary or only target.
- **Displacement:** most of the 5 293 048 internally displaced persons originated from Darfur region moved within the respective state. In October 2024, it was reported that about 2.8 million people in and around El Fasher had no option to escape or to access humanitarian assistance.
- **Further impact on civilians:** attacks against civilian infrastructures caused significant damages, including on health facilities, schools, markets, hospitals, houses and routes. Widespread destruction was reported in the region, where many villages were targeted by fires. The general situation is exacerbated by both the RSF and the SAF limiting the access of humanitarian aid. Children malnutrition and people dying from starvation and diseases were also reported. For example, in Zamzam IDP camp the severely limited humanitarian access is reported to be one of the primary causes of famine. See the use of food as a weapon of war in Presence, methods and tactics of actors under section [a\) Security situation in Sudan: recent events](#).

The Darfur region experiences an exceptionally high level of indiscriminate violence characterised by ongoing fighting for territorial control with the use of indiscriminate attacks against civilian areas and infrastructures resulting in the highest number of fatalities and IDPs overall. Looking at the indicators, it can be concluded that in the **Darfur region**, indiscriminate violence reaches such a high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the region, would, solely on account of their **mere presence** on its territory, face a real risk of being subject to the serious threat referred to in Article 15(c) QD/QR. Accordingly, additional individual elements are not required in order to substantiate subsidiary protection needs under Article 15(c) QD/QR.

[COI reference: [Country Focus 2024](#), 1.2.1.; [Security 2025](#), 1.3., 2.2.; [COI Update](#), 2.2., 3.1.1.]

○ Kordofan region [North Kordofan, South Kordofan, West Kordofan states, including Abyei]

- **Actors and territorial control:** territorial control in the region is contested and subjected to rapid developments. As of October 2024, the RSF controlled most areas of the Kordofan region while the SAF remained in control of its military garrisons and strategic cities. Although besieged by the RSF, El Obeid and Kadugli, the capitals of North and South Kordofan states, remained under the control of the SAF during the reference period while heavy fighting took place in and around the cities. The SPLM-N-al-Hilu controlled some territories mainly in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan. The SPLM-N-al-Hilu remained officially neutral until February 2025 when, together with RSF and 22 other smaller rebel movements, and political and civil society groups, they signed an alliance aiming to establish a parallel government in RSF-controlled areas. Before the alliance the SPLM-N-al-Hilu had occasional fights with both sides of the conflict while seeking to gain control of territories.

Between July and October 2024, the RSF bolstered its hold in West Kordofan with the capture of the state's capital Al-Fula as well as the towns of Al-Meiram and Wad Banda whereas the disputed cities of Al Nuhud, Babanusa and Lagawa remained under SAF control. In South Kordofan, the SAF benefited from the support of the SPLM-N-al-Hilu to repel RSF attacks on the populous town of Dilling, amid inter-ethnic violence targeting Nuba.

In the Kordofans, the shifting alliances and internal divisions among the main actors contributed to the volatile security situation, including clashes erupting between the SAF or the RSF and their local allied forces.

- **Methods and tactics:** clashes and fighting were conducted by the three main actors in the state, each trying to expand their territorial control in the region. The **SAF** made large use of airstrikes, bombings and artilleries, including against civil areas and civilian infrastructures, such as a crowded markets and resulting in civilian casualties and fatalities. The **RSF** imposed sieges on entire cities, attacked villages, looting and burning down houses and entire villages, and reportedly perpetrated mass killings of civilians. Kidnapping, forced disappearance and sexual violence against civilians by RSF troops have also been reported, targeting especially Nuba localities and inhabitants in South Kordofan. Sexual violence is used as a weapon of war, particularly by the RSF and allied militias. See [3.1.2. Nuba from the Kordofans](#) and [3.4. Members of political parties, unions and civil society organisations](#) and [3.9. Women and girls](#).
- **Incidents and fatalities:** in the reference period, 9.8 security incidents per week and 67 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants were reported across all states of the Kordofan region. In 364 instances, civilians were the primary or only target.
- **Displacement:** 820 379 IDPs were displaced from the Kordofan region as of the March 2025, mainly inside the region itself.
- **Further impact on civilians:** SAF airstrikes and bombings have damaged or destroyed public infrastructures such as schools, markets, state legislature and civil registries. RSF attacks damaged or destroyed houses and villages. Deaths have been reported as a result of starvation and lack of access to health services, particularly in the Nuba Mountains. See the use of food as a weapon of war in Presence, methods and tactics of actors under section [a\) Security situation in Sudan: recent events](#).

In the disputed region of Abyei, the situation remained tense as intercommunal clashes continued and accounted for most of the security incidents reported in the region.

In addition, the local security situation continued to be affected by the conflict in Sudan with an ongoing flow of weapons into the region, the arrival of persons displaced by the fighting and clashes between the SAF and the RSF in border areas. There were also reports of RSF incursions into Abyei territory, mainly in connection with looting incidents.

With regard to the high intensity of the conflict in the three states composing the region, illustrated by the methods employed by the actors, the numbers of security incidents and casualties reported as well as the general impact on civilians, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence in the **Kordofan region** reaches such an exceptionally high level that **mere presence** on the territory would be considered sufficient in order to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR. Accordingly, additional individual elements are not required in order to substantiate subsidiary protection needs under Article 15(c) QD/QR.

○ Central region [Al Jazirah]

For the different conclusion on the assessment of the level of indiscriminate violence in the other states of the central region, namely Sennar, Blue Nile and White Nile, assessed under the ‘high level category’ see [below](#).

- **Actors and territorial control:** the conflict expanded to the Central region in July 2023 with a large-scale offensive by the RSF. Since March 2024, the SAF received the support of the SLM-MM, the JEM, the SPLM-N-Agar. They also relied increasingly on Islamist militia.

The recent SAF offensive to recapture **Al Jazirah** state where the RSF controlled 90 % of the state since December 2023 has notably increased the volatility of the security situation of the state. In retaliation to the defection of an RSF commander in October 2024, the RSF troops carried major attacks against more than 30 localities across Al Jazirah, committing mass killings, sexual violence, and looting of markets and homes.

The RSF seized parts of northern **White Nile** state while the SAF pulled back into defensive positions further south. Although the frontlines have remained static, the RSF raids on villages have been reported in the state, with the use of hit-and-run tactics, the looting of localities and killing of civilians. Beyond some clashes between the SAF and the SPLM-N in July 2023, **Blue Nile** benefited of relative calm until August 2024, when the RSF began expanding its military attacks. As of November 2024, the RSF reported to have made some advances again in Blue Nile state. In 2024, **Sennar** state was affected by the offensive of both the RSF that took control of the area in July 2024, and then by the SAF and its allies that between October and December 2024, managed to retake control of most cities in Sennar state, including Sinja.

- **Methods and tactics:** SAF airstrikes reportedly targeted crowded spaces such as markets in RSF-controlled areas with the aim of disrupting commercial activities and targeting RSF members, as stationary targets are easier to hit than moving forces in the field. However, these attacks led to civilian casualties. The **RSF** is reported to attack areas and use hit-and-run tactics to raid and loot towns and villages. In addition, sieges by the RSF are also reported. Violence against civilians, including (mass) killings, food supplies poisoning, shootings, tortures, sexual violence and lootings, and shelling of civilian facilities (e.g. markets) were reported during RSF's offensives and in areas under its control. Reportedly, a reason behind the attack might have been retaliation for some village members having taken up arms against the RSF. Sexual violence is used as a weapon of war, particularly by the RSF and allied militias. See [3.4. Members of political parties, unions and civil society organisations](#) and [3.9. Women and girls](#).
- **Incidents and fatalities:** in the reference period, 17.6 security incidents per week and 50 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants were reported in the Central region. In 1 070 instances civilians were the primary or only target.

- **Displacement:** furthermore, 1 570 760 of IDPs were displaced from the Central region, as of the start of March 2025, mainly outside the region.
- **Geographical Scope:** If security incidents and fatalities were recorded across all states composing the Central region, they have not been equally impacted. Al Jazirah was the most affected state in the region, with about 71 % recorded security incidents, while Sennar accounted for 14 %, White Nile for 11 % and Blue Nile for 3 %. Similarly, 77 % of the IDPs displaced from the region within the reference period originated from Al Jazirah state.
- **Further impact on civilians:** SAF airstrikes targeting crowded places, such as markets, destroyed public infrastructures. The RSF reportedly engaged in land grabbing and looted and/or damaged and/or attacked essential infrastructures, such as health, water and food facilities as well as irrigation and electrical systems. The damages caused to food production capacities in the region, including through attacks targeting farming infrastructures, is likely to exacerbate food insecurity in other parts of the country. Theft of humanitarian assets, including the looting of essential food supplies from the WFP warehouse were also reported. See the use of food as a weapon of war in Presence, methods and tactics of actors under section [a\) Security situation in Sudan: recent events.](#)

Al Jazirah state experiences an exceptionally high level of indiscriminate violence due to an ongoing offensive by the SAF. The volatile situation there resulted in the concentration of most of the security incidents, fatalities and IDPs overall recorded in the Central region. Looking at the indicators, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence in Al Jazirah state reaches such an exceptionally high level that the **mere presence** on the territory would be considered sufficient in order to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR. Accordingly, additional individual elements are not required in order to substantiate subsidiary protection needs under Article 15(c) QD/QR.

[COI reference: [Country Focus 2024](#), 1.2.4.; [Security 2025](#), 1.3.1., 2.3.; [COI Update](#), 2.2., 3.1.1.]

High level of indiscriminate violence

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Areas where 'mere presence' would not be sufficient to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR, but where, **indiscriminate violence reaches a high level**.

Accordingly, **a lower level of individual elements** is required to show substantial grounds for believing that a civilian, returned to the area, would face a real risk of serious harm in the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR.

The areas assessed as belonging to this category as well as the main elements leading to this assessment are highlighted below.

Central region [Sennar, Blue Nile and White Nile states except Al Jazirah]

For the assessment of the indicators related to the central region and the conclusion on Al Jazirah state see [above](#) under the ‘mere presence’ category.

The security situation in **Blue Nile, Sennar and White Nile** remains volatile and intrinsically linked to developments in neighbouring states, as the offensives of the warring parties have often spread from one to the other. Therefore, in light of the current security situation in Al Jazirah, assessed above in the ‘mere presence’ category, and based on the respective number of incidents in each state, the overall number of casualties in the Central region and the general impact on civilians, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence in Blue Nile, Sennar and White Nile states reaches a **high level**. Accordingly, [a lower level of individual elements](#) is required in order to show substantial grounds for believing that a civilian, returned to the area, would face a real risk of serious harm in the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR.

[COI reference: [Country Focus 2024](#), 1.2.3.; [Security 2025](#), [1.3.1.](#), [2.4.](#), [COI Update](#), 2.2., 3.1.1.]

Indiscriminate violence not at a high level

COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: June 2025

Areas where indiscriminate violence is taking place, however **not at a high level**. Accordingly, **a higher level of individual elements** is required in order to show substantial grounds for believing that a civilian, returned to the area, would face a real risk of serious harm in the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR. The areas assessed as belonging to this category as well as the main elements leading to this assessment are highlighted below.

North region [Northern and River Nile states]

- **Actors and territorial control:** the SAF maintains predominant control over the region, particularly in key cities like Dongola (Northern) and Atbara (River Nile). In April 2023, the Northern state was described as the ‘heartland of Sudan’s military’. Although the RSF has attempted incursions into the area, it has not established a lasting foothold. In 2024, the RSF presence was reported in the Hajar al-Asal areas of River Nile state, close to the border with Khartoum, and in all the checkpoints on the unpaved routes through the desert connecting Mellit district in North Darfur with Al Dabbah city in Northern State. Key confrontations have occurred around Merowe, Shendi and the bordering region between Khartoum and River Nile states where the RSF engaged SAF positions before being repelled.
- **Methods and tactics:** the violence in the North region is localised and strategic rather than widespread and indiscriminate. The SAF conducted aerial operations against RSF positions in the region, while the RSF used drone strikes and limited ground incursions, primarily in Merowe and Shendi. However, in 2024 an increased use of remote violence by both sides was observed, including the deployment of airstrikes, drones and artillery fire. Reportedly, while most drones attacking civilian areas were shot down, some have hit civilians, particularly in Atbara and Merowe regions. Civilian fatalities and injuries were also reported in the fighting around the Hajar al-Asal area of River Nile state close to the border with Khartoum state.

- **Incidents and fatalities:** in the reference period, 1 security incidents per week and 6 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants were reported in the North region, many of them were reported to be combatants. In 33 instances civilians were the primary or only target.
- **Geographical Scope:** the violence is concentrated around Merowe (Northern), Shendi, and Atbara (River Nile). Other areas remain relatively stable, with limited direct impact from active hostilities.
- **Displacement:** furthermore, 65 735 IDPs were displaced from the North region as of the start of March 2025, mainly inside the region itself. Furthermore, approximately 1.5 million displaced persons have sought refuge in the region rather than fleeing from it, notably persons from Khartoum.
- **Further impact on civilians:** landmine-related incidents occurred, such as the explosion on a bus in Shendi that killed 10 civilians in January 2024?. In October 2024, due to the RSF activities, telecommunication services were shut down, hindering access to essential services in River Nile state.? Finally, essential services were reported to be affected by the high number of IDPs hosted in the region, such as overcrowded hospitals, shortages of food and other essential supplies.

The security situation in **North region** is characterised by a general stable territorial control by the SAF, with exceptions in certain areas, including the bordering region with Khartoum state where sporadic incidents of remote violence by both sides were observed, including the deployment of airstrikes, drones and artillery fire. Therefore, in light of the current security situation in North region, where the conflict between the SAF and the RSF seems to be more targeted as also reflected in the relatively low number of civilian fatalities and incidents reported, it can be concluded that in Northern and River Niles states indiscriminate violence is taking place, however **not at a high level**. Accordingly, [a higher level of individual elements](#) (such as the area of origin) is required in order to show substantial grounds for believing that a civilian, returned to the area, would face a real risk of serious harm in the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR.

[COI reference: [Security 2025](#), 2.5. - 2.5.6.; [COI Update](#), 2.2., 3.2.1., 3.1.1.]

No real risk

COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: June 2025

Areas where, **in general, there is no real risk** for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR. This may be because the criteria for an armed conflict within the meaning of this provision are not met, because no indiscriminate violence is taking place., or because the level of indiscriminate violence is so low, that in general there would be no real risk for a civilian to be affected by it. The areas assessed as belonging to this category as well as the main elements leading to this assessment are highlighted below.

- **Actors and territorial control:** during the reference period, the SAF maintained control over the eastern states of Sudan, including the strategically significant Red Sea coast and Port Sudan, where the SAF ministries had relocated since 2023. While the RSF attempted to expand their presence there, they failed to establish significant control in Gedaref state. Fighting escalated in 2024, with RSF forces advancing near El Fau and along Gedaref's western border with Sennar state, and the disputed Fashaga region near Ethiopia prompting authorities to activate popular resistance. The SAF also held key supply routes, including the last remaining connection between Sennar city and Gedaref state. Additionally, various SAF-aligned armed groups, such as SLM-MM, SLM-Tambour, JEM, and the JFASM, were active in the region, with thousands of new recruits undergoing training in Gedaref and Kassala. Pro-SAF militias, including the Eritrea-backed National Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD) and the Eastern Corps, were also deployed in rural and some urban areas of Kassala state. Popular resistance forces, composed of civilians acting in self-defence, were present across SAF-controlled areas, while the SAF reportedly armed and paid the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) to counter the RSF. The region also saw tensions with an armed tribal group from the Beja community, which considers itself the rightful possessor of eastern Sudanese lands and was headquartered in Port Sudan where clash erupted between the SAF and Beja community in mid-September 2024.
- **Methods and tactics:** the SAF's tactics include airstrikes, clashes, declaring states of emergency, deploying joint security forces to enforce control. The expansion of the conflict into agricultural regions like Gedaref is also being used as a strategic pressure point, worsening food insecurity and exacerbating humanitarian conditions. The RSF, in turn, has increasingly relied on drone warfare, conducting strikes deep into SAF-controlled areas, including Gedaref and El Fau, and even attempting to assassinate SAF commander Al-Burhan. Additionally, the RSF engages in territorial incursions, particularly along the borders of Gedaref, Al Jazirah, and Sennar states, prompting local authorities to mobilise popular resistance forces. The group also employs sporadic drone-strikes and shelling to destabilise enemy-controlled regions.
- **Incidents and fatalities:** in the reference period, 0.7 security incidents per week and 1 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants were reported across all states of the East region. In 28 instances civilians were the primary or only target.
- **Displacement:** furthermore, 51 018 IDPs were displaced from the East region including within the region.
- **Further impact on civilians:** The conflict's expansion into eastern Sudan, particularly Gedaref state, threatens to worsen an already critical food security situation. The RSF's forced shutdown of Zain Sudan's telecommunications services in Port Sudan in February 2024 disrupted online payments, making it difficult for civilians to access essential goods. Additionally, RSF offensives in Sennar state in July 2024 further damaged food production, exacerbating food shortages across Sudan.

In light of the relative stability of the area, as well as the low number of security incidents, civilian fatalities and IDPs, it can be concluded that in the **East region**, there is, in general, **no real risk** for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR.

Additionally, due consideration should be given to the volatile situation in Port Sudan where multiple attacks at the beginning of May 2025 have been reported. In particular, drone attacks caused explosions and huge fires near the international airport, and fuel depots in the port area were targeted and a major power station was hit causing a complete blackout in the city¹⁵.

[COI reference: [Security 2025](#), 2.6.; [COI Update](#), 2.2., 3.1.1.]

¹⁴

Abyei: disputed territories

¹⁵

BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation), Drone attacks raise stakes in new phase of Sudan's civil war, 15 May 2025, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg4vz0qy77no>

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