

3.1.3. Arabs from Darfur and the Kordofans

COMMON ANALYSIS

Last update: June 2025

Sudanese Arabs comprise about 70 % of the total population but represent approximately only 1/4 to 1/3 of the population in Darfur. This sub-profile refers only to individuals belonging to Arab groups from Darfur and the Kordofans.

Historically, the central and northern Arabs, also referred to as Riverain Arabs, have dominated the political landscape of Sudan and therefore are still seen as supporters of the SAF and the old regime by the RSF and their allies. Central and northern Arabs may also be subjected to targeting but this falls outside the scope of this profile. For additional information please refer to [3.4. Members of political parties, unions and civil society organisations](#).

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: [Country Focus 2024](#), 1.1., 1.2., 2.4., 2.5.; [Country Focus 2025](#), 2.5., 3.2.; [Security 2025](#), 1.2.1. Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Arabs from the peripheries, especially Rizeigat and Misseriya from Darfur and Hawazma from South and West Kordofan, make up the majority of the RSF and allied militias. For additional information, please refer to [2. Actors of persecution or serious harm](#).

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution?

Acts to which persons falling under this profile could be exposed are of such a severe nature that they would amount to persecution. Reports indicate that the SAF, also through the military intelligence and the SAF-backed Zaghawa armed groups, targeted people based on their actual or presumed ethnicity or affiliation with Arab tribes from Darfur and the Kordofans which are suspected of supporting the RSF and its allies. Examples of acts included torture, illegal detention and harassment. Ethnically motivated sexual violence against Arab women by Masalit armed groups in Darfur has also been reported.

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for Arabs from Darfur and the Kordofans to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as:

- **Political profile/visibility:** Arabs with a political profile or a visible role in their community are more likely to be targeted. See [3.3. Members of the Resistance committees \(RCs\) and Emergency Response Rooms \(ERRs\)](#) and [3.5. Community leaders, human rights activists and lawyers](#).
- **Area of residence in relation with area of origin:** Arabs originating from Darfur and the Kordofans are more likely to be targeted in territories controlled by the SAF and its allies, including Port Sudan.
- **Gender:** considering the general situation of women and girls in Sudan, in particular in the areas most affected by the conflict where sexual violence is prevalent, Arab women and girls are at higher risk. For more details, please refer to [3.9.1. Violence against women and girls](#).
- **Ethnic background:** individuals belonging to Rizeigat and Misseriya ethnic groups from Darfur and Hawazma from South and West Kordofan are exposed to a higher risk as they make up the majority of the RSF and allied militias.

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for individuals under this sub-profile, this is highly likely to be for reasons of **race/nationality** and/or **(imputed) political opinion**, as Arabs from Darfur and Kordofans are seen as supporters of the RSF and its allies. In addition, conflict related sexual violence (CRSV), reported against women and girls, may also have a political motive as it is used as a weapon of war by the SAF and its allies. See also [3.9.1. Violence against women and girls](#).



Exclusion considerations are particularly relevant to this profile, as Arabs from Darfur and the Kordofans composed the majority of the RSF and allied militias and therefore may have been involved in excludable acts. See [7. Exclusion](#).