

## 3.8. Civilians from areas associated with the opposing warring party

### COMMON ANALYSIS

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This profile includes civilians who originate from or reside in areas associated with the opposing warring party, including those targeted, for example, in retaliation for some members of their village who are perceived as supporters of the opposing warring party. It also addresses the situation of civilians from areas under the influence of the opposing warring party and those from recaptured areas.

For more details about the presence and influence of the actors of persecution in Sudan please see [2.1. Map: areas of control and influence](#) under [2. Actors of persecution and serious harm](#), and Presence, methods and tactics under [a\) Security situation in Sudan](#).

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports and query: [Country Focus 2024](#), 2.4.2.; [Country Focus 2025](#), 1.4., 2.4. (b), 2.5. (b); [Security 2025](#), 1.1.2., 2.2., 2.3., 2.4.2., 2.4.4.; [COI Update 2025](#), 4.. Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

#### Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution?

**Acts to which persons falling under this profile could be exposed are of such a severe nature that they would amount to persecution.** Examples of reported incidents include mass and extrajudicial killings, executions, starvation, sexual violence, kidnappings, arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions, forced displacement, looting, poisoning of food supplies, restricted access to food, water and/or medical care.

Reports indicate that both warring parties have used the deprivation of humanitarian aid and food as a weapon of war, causing thousands of deaths due to starvation, lack of access to health services and humanitarian assistance. This includes blocking convoys and forbidding the purchase of goods in areas controlled by the opposing party. Examples included the SAF not allowing people to buy goods in SAF-controlled areas to bring into RSF-controlled areas, or the RSF preventing the transit of humanitarian aid through El Fasher alleging that it would benefit the SAF.

Reports indicate that in Al Jazirah and South Kordofan, the RSF in retaliation for the perceived support of the SAF, killed hundreds of people, kidnapped, perpetrated sexual violence against women, including medical personnel. Dozens of men and boys were missing, and over 40 000 people were displaced after one episode. The RSF has also been accused of looting markets, destroying and burning villages, as well as poisoning food supplies entering the besieged Hilaliya town, and blocking the arrival of food, water, and medical care due to the imposed siege, resulting in a high number of deaths. Reportedly, the RSF was involved in the extrajudicial killings of unarmed civilians in North Darfur and in RSF-controlled areas, while houses holding execution rooms were found in Khartoum. For additional information on extrajudicial killings, see also [3.9.1.](#)

[Violence against women and girls](#) and [3.1.2. Nuba from the Kordofans](#).

The SAF reinforced repression through the ‘Law on Unfamiliar Faces’, a harsh policy that arbitrarily targets individuals based on perceived social affiliations, labelling them as RSF sympathisers without evidence. Death sentences were issued by courts in SAF-controlled areas under article 50 and 51 of the Criminal Law (‘undermining the constitutional system’ and ‘waging war against the state’) against civilians accused of supporting the RSF (spying for the RSF or being ‘ sleeper cells’) or opposing the war.

See [Article 15\(a\) QD/QR: death penalty or execution](#).

### Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?

**The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for civilians from areas associated with the opposing warring party to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as:**

- **Area of origin, residence:** persons from conflict-affected areas, notably, Al Jazirah, South Kordofan, and North Darfur and retaken territories, are exposed to a higher risk.
- **Community ties or other connection to suspected members of the opposing warring party:** reportedly, entire villages have been associated with the defection of one of their residents exposing the whole community to persecution.
- **Visibility in relation to role in the community/profession:** individuals with a role within the community or exercising some professions may be more exposed to higher risk.
- **Displacement:** IDPs originating from areas associated with the opposing warring party are exposed to a higher risk. Reportedly, arbitrary arrests and detention by both parties frequently involved individuals on their way to the border.
- **Ethnic background:** individuals belonging to ethnic groups may be perceived as supporters of the opposing warring party and therefore exposed to a higher risk of persecution. See also [3.1. Ethnic groups](#).

### Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant falling under this profile, this is highly likely to be for reasons of **(imputed) political opinion**, as civilians may be seen as supporting the SAF or the RSF and allies, for example, because they originate, or reside in areas under the control of the opposing warring party.