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3.4. Members of political parties, unions and civil society organisations

COMMON ANALYSIS
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This profile covers the situation of political party members (including the National Congress Party (NCP), the National Umma Party (NUP), and the Sudanese Congress party (SCP)) as well as members of the two factions of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC-CC and FCC-DB) which are coalition of political parties, unions, and civil society organisations.

Please note that also other individuals falling under other profiles may be perceived as political opponents. See also 3.3. Members of the Resistance committees (RCs) and Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), 3.5. Community leaders, human rights activists, and lawyers, 3.6. Journalists and other media workers, 3.7. Humanitarian and healthcare workers.

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports and query: Country Focus 2024, 1.1.1., 2.3.; Country Focus 2025, 1.1., 1.2., 2.1.(c); COI Update 2025, 1.. Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Political parties in Sudan are described as largely ineffective, with a source reporting that they are unable to operate as they do not have the power to mediate between the two main warring forces. They have also lost the popular appeal they once had. The FFC was initially meant to guide the country toward democratic governance alongside the SAF and the RSF. However, the coalition split into two factions between 2021 and 2022:

- **The FFC – Central Command or Council (FFC-CC):** allegedly aligned with the RSF, this faction comprises over 40 parties, movements, and professional groups that signed the political framework agreement with the military junta in December 2022.

- **The FFC – Democratic Block (FFC-DB):** reportedly aligned with the SAF, this faction is described as a coalition of pro-*coup* armed groups and political party factions that reject the framework agreement.

The establishment of the *Taqaddum* coalition, which includes the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC-CC), has led to SAF and its supporters branding them as RSF allies, resulting in demonisation and repression. In February 2025, the announced amendments to the 2019 Constitutional document included the removal of references to the FFC. In March 2025, discussions about establishing a government in exile took place in Kampala, organised by the *Taqaddum* and led to its division into two distinct groups.

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution?

Some acts to which persons falling under this profile could be exposed are of such a severe nature that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, sources highlight the ongoing repression and targeting of political party members and perceived opponents in Sudan amid the ongoing conflict. The SAF, the RSF, and other intelligence, security and police forces, have engaged in campaigns to silence political opponents. This includes human rights violations such as extrajudicial killing, arbitrary arrest, detention, ill-treatment, torture, and the use of excessive, lethal force of political figures. While enforced disappearances have been a persistent issue in Sudan for decades, particularly as a means of silencing human rights defenders and opposition figures, the practice has escalated significantly since the outbreak of the ongoing conflict. The Military Intelligence arrested two leaders of the Unionist Alliance in Port Sudan, while other members have been arrested in various locations across the country. In West Darfur, prominent political figures, such as the Masalit Wali of West Darfur and leader of the SA, were impacted by the violence.

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts to which (perceived) political opponents could be subjected to and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should also be considered. For example, government authorities in Port Sudan have been confiscating identity cards from members of the Sudanese Congress Party, preventing them from renewing their passports.

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?

A well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated for prominent political party members in light of the severity of and the ongoing campaign to silence the political dissent in Sudan.
The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable likelihood for other political party members and (perceived) political opponents to face persecution should consider risk-impacting circumstances such as:

- **Place of residence or origin**: the level of risk also varies by location, as areas under the SAF or the RSF control pose different dangers depending on each faction's stance toward political opposition. For more details about the presence and influence of the actors of persecution in Sudan please see 2.1. Map: areas of control and influence under 2. Actors of persecution and serious harm, and Presence, methods and tactics of actors under a) Security situation in Sudan.
- **Profession**: the SAF and the RSF engaged in similar campaigns targeting non-combatants they perceive as their opposition – including doctors, journalists, and humanitarian workers. See also 3.6. Journalists and other media workers and 3.7. Humanitarian and

healthcare workers.

- **Ethnic background**: Individuals belonging to ethnic groups may be perceived as supporters of the opposing warring party and therefore exposed to a higher risk of persecution. See also 3.1. Ethnic groups.

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for individuals under this profile, persecution is highly likely to be for reasons of **(imputed) political opinion** as applicants falling under this profile are seen by SAF or RSF as opposing their political stance.

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