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3.3. Members of the Resistance committees (RCs) and Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs)

COMMON ANALYSIS

Last update: June 2025

This profile covers the situation of members of Sudan's Resistance Committees (RCs), which consist of a diverse range of pro-democracy groups, including political parties, university students and staff, professional associations and unions, and civil society organisations. It also addresses the situation of members of the Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), or simply 'emergency rooms' which include volunteer medical staff, engineers, and other emergency specialists across the country.

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports and query: [Country Focus 2024](#), 1.1.5., 2.2.1., 2.3.; [Country Focus 2025](#), 1.2., 2.1.(b); [COI Update 2025](#), 4.. Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

The 5 000 neighbourhood-organised resistance committees, which existed in Sudan before the outbreak of the ongoing conflict and played a major role in the removal of Al-Bashir in 2019, are reported to be one of the few forces trusted by the population. Targeted already in previous periods, the RCs and ERRs continued to be targeted by both warring parties. Official decrees banning grassroots committees further exposed RC members to state persecution.

Patterns of human rights violations against protesters and (perceived) political opponents, common during the Bashir regime, have persisted since the outbreak of the war. Both the SAF and the RSF suspected members of RCs and ERRs for having led the pro-democracy protests that toppled the al-Bashir regime in 2019.

See also [3.4. Members of political parties, unions and civil society organisations](#).

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution?

Acts to which persons falling under this profile could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, members of RCs and

ERRs have been repeatedly targeted by both the SAF and the RSF. Reports indicate cases of violence at the hands of both warring parties including killing, and execution, torture, physical and sexual violence, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and deliberate attacks, particularly in areas controlled by SAF's military intelligence and RSF-affiliated forces. SAF targeted RC members and sought to dismantle their structures to regain control over humanitarian aid. The RSF has similarly detained and abducted them, often using sexual and physical violence.

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?

A well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated for members of the RCs and ERRs given the severity and persistent nature of the targeting by both warring parties. The documented state complicity, particularly through military intelligence and official decrees banning grassroots organisations, further increases the risk level.

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?

Persecution of individuals under this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of **(imputed) political opinion**. Members of RCs and ERRs have been persistently targeted by both the SAF, also through the military intelligence, and the RSF due to their (perceived) political affiliations or collaboration with rival parties. They have been also targeted because of their monitoring work against violations that they (had) performed before and during the conflict as well as on other grounds. Additionally, the RSF and SAF-affiliated intelligence agencies interpreted protests against the war as expression of criticism directed towards themselves and rounded up peace demonstrators.