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Members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with the SDF/YPG

COMMON ANALYSIS

Last update: June 2025

This profile refers to members of the SDF/YPG, as well as to other individuals perceived to be collaborating with them.

The analysis below is primarily based on the following EUAA COI reports: [Country Focus 2025, 2.2, 2.5, 4.2](#); [Targeting 2022](#), 4. Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. The section below should be read in conjunction with most recent COI available at the time of the examination.

Members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with the SDF/YPG had been subjected to persecution (e.g. arbitrary arrest, abduction, killing) by the [Syrian National Army \(SNA\)](#) and the [Islamic State of Iraq and Levant \(ISIL\)](#). These groups are still present and operating and there is no information available indicating that their approach towards members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with the SDF/YPG has changed.

Recent information also indicates that security incidents of (heavy) fighting occurred between the SDF and the SNA, and ISIL attacks on SDF patrols and checkpoints were reported, as well as instances of targeting of civilians.


Therefore, the assessment of the international protection needs of [members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with the SDF and YPG](#) in '[EUAA, Country Guidance: Syria, April 2024](#)' would largely remain valid. More specifically:

'For members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with SDF/YPG in areas where the SNA operates, well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated.'

In Kurdish-controlled areas, ISIL is still capable of conducting attacks and views individuals under this profile as a priority target. **The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as:** regional specifics (areas where ISIL has operational capacity), visibility of the applicant (position within the community, nature of

activities undertaken by the individual, public expression of support for SDF/YPG or condemnation of ISIL's actions, etc). For further information on how these circumstances impact the risk, refer to the COI summary in 'EUAA, [4.4. Members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with the SDF and YPG](#)' in *Country Guidance: Syria*, April 2024'.

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this is highly likely to be for **reasons of (imputed) political opinion**. In the case of persecution by the SNA, **it may also be for reasons of race/nationality.**'



Exclusion considerations could be relevant to this profile, as members of the SDF and the YPG may have been involved in excludable acts.

See other topics concerning 'Profiles at risk of persecution from other actors than the Assad regime':

- [Profiles at risk of persecution from other actors than the Assad regime \(for which the Assad regime was not considered an actor of persecution\)](#)
 - [\(Former\) members of Assad's armed forces and pro-Assad armed groups](#)
 - [Former Assad government officials, and civilians perceived to be supporting the Assad regime](#)
 - [Alawites](#)
 - [Members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with the SDF/YPG](#)
 - [Persons perceived to be opposing the SDF/YPG](#)
 - [Persons fearing forced or child recruitment by Kurdish forces](#)
 - [Christians](#)
 - [Druze](#)
 - [Yazidis](#)