

# Alawites

## COMMON ANALYSIS

Last update: June 2025

The analysis below is primarily based on the following EUAA COI reports: [Country Focus 2025, 1.2, 1.2.2, 1.3.2](#); [Targeting 2020](#), 10.6; [Security 2019](#), 1.1. Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. The section below should be read in conjunction with most recent COI available at the time of the examination.

The position of Alawites has changed radically with the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, which was dominated by the Alawite minority.

Alawites had been subjected to persecution (e.g. torture, killing) by different non-State actors including Islamist groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and anti-government armed groups.

[The Transitional Administration](#) emphasised its commitment to integrating Alawites into Syria's governance and engaged in discussions with local Alawite representatives. Despite these assurances, Alawites remain largely excluded from the new political and military structures, while public distrust toward former regime officers and officials further hinders their integration. Also, the Transitional Administration dismissed hundreds of employees, with some of them accusing the government of dismissal on sectarian and political grounds. These mass public-sector layoffs particularly affecting Alawites led to the loss of state-provided housing. Besides security operations conducted by the Transitional Administration against hostile Alawites associated to the Assad regime who took up arms against the Transitional Administration, Alawites have also been victims of revenge killings, personal retributions, and sectarian violence (see also the situation of [civilians perceived to be supporting the Assad regime](#)).

For Alawites, **it can be concluded that:**

Acts reported to be committed against Alawites are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution (violence, abductions, detention and extrajudicial killings).

**The mere fact of being an Alawite in itself would normally not lead to the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances such as:**

- **Perceived opposition to the Transitional Administration:** Alawites with a strong oppositional stance towards the Transitional Administration would face a higher risk
- **Regional specifics:** Attacks on Alawites took place particularly in areas where the Transitional Administration control is contested or less effective, such as Latakia, Tartous, Homs and Hama. This does not mean that there is no risk for Alawites in other parts of the country.
- **Perceived links to the Assad government:** refer to [Former Assad government officials, and civilians perceived to be supporting the Assad regime.](#)

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this may be for **reasons of (imputed) political opinion, race/nationality** and/or **religion**.

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See other topics concerning 'Profiles at risk of persecution from other actors than the Assad regime':

- [Profiles at risk of persecution from other actors than the Assad regime \(for which the Assad regime was not considered an actor of persecution\)](#)
  - [\(Former\) members of Assad's armed forces and pro-Assad armed groups](#)
  - [Former Assad government officials, and civilians perceived to be supporting the Assad regime](#)
  - [Alawites](#)
  - [Members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with the SDF/YPG](#)
  - [Persons perceived to be opposing the SDF/YPG](#)
  - [Persons fearing forced or child recruitment by Kurdish forces](#)
  - [Christians](#)
  - [Druze](#)
  - [Yazidis](#)