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Former Assad government officials, and civilians perceived to be supporting the Assad regime

COMMON ANALYSIS

Last update: June 2025

This section covers the situation of civilians affiliated, or perceived to be affiliated, to the former Assad regime such as civil servants, and former Baath party members.

The analysis below is primarily based on the following EUAA COI reports: [Country Focus 2025, 1.2., 1.3.1, 4, 4.1.2](#). Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. The section below should be read in conjunction with most recent COI available at the time of the examination.

Former Assad government officials, and civilians perceived to be supporting the Assad regime had been subjected to persecution (e.g. assassination, arbitrary detention), by the [Syrian Democratic Forces \(SDF\)](#), the [Islamic State of Iraq and Levant \(ISIL\)](#) and [Other non-State actors](#), such as unspecified armed individuals. Those groups are still present and operating and there is no information available indicating that their approach towards former Assad government officials, and civilians perceived to be supporting the Assad regime has changed.

While HTS had subjected civilians perceived to be supporting the Assad regime to persecution (e.g. detention, killing, execution) in the past, [the Transitional Administration](#) has dismissed large numbers of public sector employees reportedly to downsize state institutions. Some former employees – particularly [Alawites](#) – claimed that the dismissals have been based on sectarian and political grounds.

The Transitional Administration announced the dissolution of the Baath party and all of its structures. Measures were taken to remove members of Syria's Central Bar association appointed by the Baath party and replace them with those affiliated with the HTS-led Idlib administration. The implications for former Baath party members and officials remain unclear, with no reporting available on their situation.

Additionally, while there is no information available about the treatment of high-ranking officials in civilian positions of the former Assad government, their situation might be influenced by their potential involvement in human rights abuses committed by the Assad regime.

For individuals under this sub-profile, **it can be concluded that:**

The mere fact of having been a civilian affiliated to the Assad regime, including having been a former member of the Baath party, would not in itself lead to the level of risk to establish well-founded fear of persecution.

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as:

- **Whether the applicant allegedly committed crimes on behalf of the Assad regime:** Hundreds of individuals who had allegedly committed crimes on behalf of the Assad regime, including former regime informants, were arrested and detained by the Transitional Administration.
- **Regional specifics:** The security situation in a specific area may impact the risk. More specifically, revenge killings and sectarian violence are more prominent in the areas where the Transitional Administration control is less effective. At the time of writing, such areas include the coastal areas (Latakia and Tartous), Homs, Hama and Rural Damascus, while no report indicates instances of revenge killings in Damascus.

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this is highly likely to be for **reasons of (imputed) political opinion.**



Exclusion considerations could be relevant to this profile, as former Assad government officials may have been involved in excludable acts.

For practical guidance on how to assess claims related to political opinion, including *sur place* claims and claims based on social media activities, please refer to 'EUAA jointly with Member States, [Practical Guide on Political Opinion](#), December 2022', and to 'EUAA, [Practical Guide on Evidence and Risk Assessment](#), January 2024,' Publications on social media, pp.118-120.

Also, the CJEU has ruled in 'CJEU, S and A v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, C-151/22, Third Chamber, judgment of 21 September 2023'([1](#))on the assessment of the well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinions developed in the host Member State.

See other topics concerning 'Profiles at risk of persecution from other actors than the Assad regime':

- [Profiles at risk of persecution from other actors than the Assad regime \(for which the Assad regime was not considered an actor of persecution\)](#)
 - [\(Former\) members of Assad's armed forces and pro-Assad armed groups](#)
 - [Former Assad government officials, and civilians perceived to be supporting the Assad regime](#)
 - [Alawites](#)
 - [Members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with the SDF/YPG](#)
 - [Persons perceived to be opposing the SDF/YPG](#)
 - [Persons fearing forced or child recruitment by Kurdish forces](#)
 - [Christians](#)
 - [Druze](#)
 - [Yazidis](#)

- [1](#)

CJEU, *S and A v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie*, C-151/22, Third Chamber, judgment of 21 September 2023,

<https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?jsessionid=78F1E42DD71AE262F3228D99B9>