

Kurds

COMMON ANALYSIS

Last update: June 2025

The analysis below is primarily based on the following EUAA COI reports: [Country Focus 2025, 1.3.3](#); [Country Focus 2024, 1.5](#); [Targeting 2022, 10](#). Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. The section below should be read in conjunction with most recent COI available at the time of the examination.

The Assad regime subjected Kurds to various forms of discrimination (refer to EUAA, '[4.10.2. Kurds](#)' in *Country Guidance: Syria*, April 2024). As mentioned above, the risk related to the Assad regime has vanished. Before the fall of the Assad regime, the [Syrian National Army \(SNA\)](#) subjected Kurds to persecution (e.g. militia violence, illegal detention, abduction, torture and ill treatment against civilians) and there is no information available indicating that their approach towards Kurds has changed.

In the framework of the agreement between the SDF and the Transitional Administration, the latter stated its intention to acknowledge the Kurdish minority as an integral part of Syria and to ensure their political representation and participation. However, at the time of writing, the practical implementation of the agreement could not be monitored (see [Syrian Democratic Forces \(SDF\)](#)).

Therefore, **it can be concluded that:**

Acts reported to be committed by the SNA against Kurds are of such severe nature that they amount to persecution (e.g. militia violence, arbitrary detention, kidnapping, killing, enforced disappearance).

For Kurds from areas under the control of the SNA, well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated.

In the case of other Kurds, the potential statelessness of the applicant should be considered. More specifically, stateless Kurds are treated differently depending on their home area. Before the fall of the Assad regime, the Kurdish-led DAANES reportedly did not differentiate between stateless Kurds and those holding citizenship, and stateless individuals had equal access to services, institutions, and education. In the areas under the control of the

Transitional Administration, at the time of writing, there is no information available suggesting that stateless Kurds have been naturalised which would give them access to equal rights attached to the Syrian citizenship.

See also [Members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with the SDF/YPG](#).

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this may be **for reasons of race, nationality** and/or **(imputed) political opinion**.

See other topics concerning 'Profiles at risk of persecution from multiple actors (including previously the Assad regime):

- [Profiles at risk of persecution from multiple actors \(including previously the Assad regime\)](#)
 - [Journalists, other media professionals and human rights activist](#)
 - [Doctors, other medical personnel and civil defence volunteers](#)
 - [Persons with perceived links to ISIL](#)
 - [Sunni Arabs](#)
 - [Kurds](#)
 - [Women and girls](#)
 - [Children](#)
 - [Persons with diverse SOGIESC \(also referred to as LGBTIQ persons\)](#)