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# Persons with perceived links to ISIL

## COMMON ANALYSIS

Last update: June 2025

This profile refers to persons with perceived links to ISIL and family members of such persons, as well as civilians who resided in territories previously controlled by ISIL.

It should be noted that a very careful examination of international protection needs and exclusion should be conducted in relation to those with actual affiliation to ISIL. For example, applications from individuals formerly detained in SDF-managed camps Al-Hol and Al-Roj, and other detention facilities in Northeast Syria should be examined carefully in relation to their potential actual affiliation to ISIL as well as their individual responsibility.

The analysis below is primarily based on the following EUAA COI reports: [Country Focus 2025, 1.1, 1.3.5, 2.5](#); [Targeting 2022, 3.1., 3.2](#); [Actors, 4.1.4](#). Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. The section below should be read in conjunction with most recent COI available at the time of the examination.

Persons with perceived links to ISIL had been subjected to persecution (e.g. enforced disappearance, death penalty, killing) by the Assad regime and the [Syrian Democratic Forces \(SDF\)](#). As mentioned above, the risk related to the Assad regime has vanished. The SDF are still present and operating against ISIL and there is no information available indicating that their approach towards persons with perceived links to ISIL has changed.

While HTS has conducted campaigns against ISIL in the past, there is, at the time of writing, no specific information as to the treatment of persons affiliated with ISIL by [the Transitional Administration](#). However, this should not be interpreted as an indication that there might not be further international protection needs.

Therefore, the conclusion on the international protection needs of [persons with perceived links to ISIL](#) in '[EUAA, Country Guidance: Syria, April 2024](#)' would still be valid. More specifically:

'The prosecution of the criminal acts of the insurgents and their targeting in accordance with the rules of international humanitarian law do not amount to persecution. However, acts reported to be committed against persons with perceived links to ISIL are of such severe nature that they

amount to persecution (e.g. enforced disappearance, killing).

**For persons with perceived links to ISIL and the family members of such persons, well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated.**

**In the case of civilians who resided in territories previously controlled by ISIL, the individual assessment** of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account **risk-impacting circumstances**, in particular the perceived level of support for ISIL.

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, this is highly likely to be for **reasons of (imputed) political opinion.**'



Exclusion considerations could be particularly relevant to this profile, as members of ISIL may have been involved in excludable acts.

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See other topics concerning 'Profiles at risk of persecution from multiple actors (including previously the Assad regime):

- [Profiles at risk of persecution from multiple actors \(including previously the Assad regime\)](#)
  - [Journalists, other media professionals and human rights activist](#)
  - [Doctors, other medical personnel and civil defence volunteers](#)
    - [Persons with perceived links to ISIL](#)
      - [Sunni Arabs](#)
      - [Kurds](#)
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  - [Persons with diverse SOGIESC \(also referred to as LGBTIQ persons\)](#)