

# Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

## COMMON ANALYSIS

Last update: June 2025

This analysis is based on the following EUAA COI report: [Country Focus 2025, 2.5](#). Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI. The section below should be read in conjunction with most recent COI available at the time of the examination.

For information on the human rights violations committed by ISIL before the fall of the Assad regime, see EUAA, '[3.5. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant \(ISIL\)](#)' in *Country Guidance: Syria*, April 2024.

For further information about the operational capacity of the ISIL, see [Country Focus 2025, 2.5, 4.1.3](#).

ISIL reportedly utilised the power vacuum left by the fall of the Assad regime to attack former government forces, expanding its presence in Homs and Hama governorates into areas of the Syrian desert vacated by Assad's forces. The UN Secretary-General reported that the Syrian desert region was still a 'centre for external operational planning' for ISIL and remained crucial for its operations. ISIL reportedly managed to seize large amounts of weapons left by former government troops. Meanwhile, the US expanded its airstrikes on ISIL camps and operatives, likely weakening the group.

The Syrian Observatory of Human Rights (SOHR) documented 17 ISIL operations in January 2025, mainly in SDF-held areas. The group's operations involved ISIL cells attacking SDF patrols (see [Members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with the SDF/YPG](#)) and checkpoints, with some of these attacks involving Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).

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See other topics concerning actors of persecution or serious harm:

- [Areas of control and influence](#)
- [The Transitional Administration](#)
- [Syrian National Army \(SNA\)](#)
- [Syrian Democratic Forces \(SDF\)](#)
- [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant \(ISIL\)](#)
- [Other non-State actors](#)