

# Guidance Note 2

## COMMON ANALYSIS

Last update: August 2023

Both Al-Shabaab and ISS have targeted federal and state officials, however, this sub-profile focuses on individuals targeted by Al-Shabaab.

This sub-profile should be read in conjunction with the [3.2.1. Overview](#).

## COI summary

Al-Shabaab has increased its operational tempo since August 2020, and the beginning of 2021 had seen a new peak in the number of attacks targeting government officials [[Targeting](#), 6.1., p. 88].

Al-Shabaab has targeted individuals such as high-ranking FGS and FMS government and administration officials, also in the context of the parliamentary and presidential elections [[Security 2023](#), 2.4.2., p. 131], police officers, government intelligence officials, tax collectors and any individual suspected to be a government or an administration employee. It has also targeted government officials with different or non-specified profiles, both in targeted assassinations and in attacks on venues frequented by government and security officials. Lawmakers have also faced attacks, assassinations and executions. [[Targeting](#), 6.1., pp. 88-91]

Attacks against such officials have taken place in Puntland, where Al-Shabaab has steadily become stronger, and in South-Central Somalia [[Targeting](#), 6.1., p. 88].

From July 2021 to November 2022, Al-Shabaab's attacks included: several IED attacks targeting officials of the South-West administration, a mortar attack against the Presidential Palace in Baidoa, the killing of the Minister of Justice and Judiciary Affairs of the South West State and his son [[Security 2023](#), 2.2.2., pp. 94, 96], the killing of Marka's District Commissioner in Lower Shabelle [[Security 2023](#), 2.2.3., p. 105], the attack and siege of a hotel frequented by members of parliament and senior government officials, injuring a minister, the attack in Benadir of a seaside restaurant frequented by government officials [[Security 2023](#), 2.3.3., p. 117], election-related killings and attacks on government officials in Hiraan [[Security 2023](#), 2.4.1., p. 122], the killing of two lawmakers in a twin attack in Hiraan [[Security 2023](#), 2.4.1., p. 126], the attack on a local restaurant in Hiraan 'packed with local officials and politicians' [[Security 2023](#), 2.4.1., p. 127], the killing of several members of Middle Shabelle regional parliament over the past years, and the attack on a restaurant in Middle Shabelle [[Security 2023](#), 2.4.2., p. 129, 133].

## Conclusions and guidance

**Do the acts qualify as persecution under Article 9 QD?**

Acts reported to be committed against individuals under this profile are of such severe nature that they amount to persecution (e.g. assassination).



### **What is the level of risk of persecution (well-founded fear)?**

In **South-Central Somalia** and **Puntland**, well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated in the case of **higher level federal and state officials**. With regard to **lower level officials**, the individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: nature of duties, visibility of profile, area of origin and operational capacity of Al-Shabaab, etc.

In **Somaliland**, where the group has limited operational capacity, the risk of persecution for state and federal state officials is generally low. However, risk-impacting circumstances (e.g. visibility of profile, nature of duties, area of origin and operational capacity of Al-Shabaab) should be given due consideration



### **Are the reasons for persecution falling within Article 10 QD (nexus)?**

Available information indicates that persecution of this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of religion and/or (imputed) political opinion.

---

See other topics concerning persons associated with the government of Somalia and/or international actors:

- [3.2.1. Overview](#)
- [3.2.2. Federal and state officials](#)
- [3.2.3. Members of the federal and state armed forces](#)
- [3.2.4. Electoral delegates](#)
- [3.2.5. Civilians perceived as ‘spies’ by Al-Shabaab](#)